Artificially Intelligent Copyright: Rethinking Copyright Boundaries by Gaon, Aviv Hertzel
 Artificially Intelligent Copyright: Rethinking Copyright Boundaries 
 
Aviv-Hertzel Gaon 
 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES 
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
Graduate Program in Law 
York University, Toronto, Ontario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 2019 
© Aviv-Hertzel Gaon, 2019 
ii 
 
Abstract 
My dissertation explores the legal boundaries of copyright law in the wake of artificial intelligence 
(AI) technology. In building the theoretical foundations for my dissertation, I go through several 
key phases. First, I highlight important historical events and milestones in AI. I further develop 
the philosophical debate on AI legal personhood and deliberate whether we are approaching a 
“singularity” – the next stage of AI evolution. I also explore the concept of AI as it matured through 
the years.  
In the second part, I theorize how AI can be regarded as an author under IP normative 
standards. Part of accepting the argument that AI deserve copyright is a willingness to change the 
perception that only human creations are worthy of copyright protection. I also seek an answer to 
two sub-questions – the “who” and the “what”. The “who” considers the normative standards of 
authorship in the ongoing struggle between an author’s right and the public domain. The “what” 
raise the originality debate and discusses the standard of creation.  
In the third part, I outline the many “candidates” for AI authorship – the programmer, the 
user, the AI and an alternative legal framework for AI’s ownership like the public domain or 
author-in-law. Finally, I discuss the outcomes of each model and provide my conclusions.  
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PART I: SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND: CONCEPTUALIZING AI 
“I never think about the future – it comes soon enough.” (Albert Einstein)  
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Technology and its interactions with humans have long captivated writers.1 An extensive and 
wide-ranging literature has covered artificial intelligence (AI) technology in the fields of computer 
science,2 philosophy,3 economy,4 religion,5 ethics6 and science-fiction.7 Indeed, the AI debate 
encompasses a variety of technical, scientific and legal issues.8  
                                                          
1 Nils J Nilsson, The Quest for Artificial Intelligence: A History of Ideas and Achievements (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) at 19, online (pdf): <ai.stanford.edu/~nilsson/QAI/qai.pdf>. 
2 Vincent C Müller, ed, Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing 
Switzerland, 2016) [Müller, “Fundamental Issues of AI”]; Vincent C Müller, ed, Philosophy and Theory of Artificial 
Intelligence (Springer-Velrag Berlin Heidelberg, 2013) [Müller, “Philosophy and Theory of AI”]. 
3 Aristotle wrote: “For suppose that every tool we had could perform its function, either at our bidding or itself 
perceiving the need ... of which the poet says that ‘self-moved they enter the assembly of gods’ – and suppose that 
shuttles in a loom could fly to and fro[m] and a plucker play a lyre all self-moved, then manufacturers would have no 
need of workers nor masters of slaves.” Aristotle, The Politics, translated by T A Sinclair (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1962) at 31. Thomas Hobbes referred in Leviathan to an artificial animal, stating: “NATURE … is by the Art of man, 
as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion 
of Limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principall part within; why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines 
that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the Heart but a Spring; 
and the Nerves but so many Strings; and the Joynts but so many Wheels, giving motion to the whole Body, such as 
was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that Rational and most excellent worke of Nature, Man.” 
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed by C B Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968) at 81. Nilsson stated that the 
science historian, George Dyson, has referred to Hobbes as the patriarch of AI. Nilsson, supra note 1 at 21; See also 
Pamela McCorduck, Machines Who Think: A Personal Inquiry into the History and Prospects of Artificial Intelligence 
(W H Freeman and Company, 1979) at 3-29. Pamela McCorduck is one of the leading AI historians. In her book she 
outlined the history of AI and machine intelligence. 
4 US, Executive Office of the President, Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy (2016), online (pdf): 
<obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Artificial-Intelligence-Automation-
Economy.PDF> [AI & the Economy White Paper]. 
5 Jewish folklore contains stories about an animated anthropomorphic being that was created from clay or mud, called 
Golem. The most famous Golem story is about the Golem of Prague. The Maharal (Judah Loew ben Bezalel) is said 
to have created the Golem in the late 16th century to defend the Jewish ghetto from anti-Semitism. See Nathan 
Ausubel, ed, A Treasury of Jewish Folklore (Crown Publishers Inc, 1948) at 605, online (pdf): 
<http://www.bibleandjewishstudies.net/stories/The_Golem_of_Prague.pdf>. See also McCorduck, supra note 3 at 12-
13. 
6 Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & Ryan Jenkins, eds, Robot Ethics 2.0: From Autonomous Cars to Artificial Intelligence 
(Oxford University Press, 2017); Nick Bostrom & Eliezer Yudkowsky, “The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence” in Keith 
Frankish & William M Ramsey, eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence (Cambridge University Press, 
2014) at 316-334; Burkhard Schafer et al, “A Fourth Law of Robotics?: Copyright and the Law and Ethics of Machine 
Co-Production” (2015) 23:3 AI & L 217 [A Fourth Law of Robotics]; See also Stuart Russell & Peter Norvig, eds, 
Artificial Intelligence A Modern Approach, 3rd ed (Prentice Hall, 2010) at 1034-1040. Recently, the EU Commission 
for the Efficiency of Justice has adopted ethical principles relating to the use of AI in judicial systems. These principles 
include ensuring compatibility of the design and implementation of AI systems with fundamental rights, preventing 
discrimination and bias, making data processing methods accessible and transparent, etc. See CEPEJ, European 
Ethical Charter on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Judicial Systems and their Environment, 3 December 2018 
[2018]. 
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In The Path of Law,9 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes proclaims that “the development of 
our law has gone on for nearly a thousand years, like the development of a plant, each generation 
taking the inevitable next step, mind, like matter, simply obeying a law of spontaneous growth.”10 
Holmes’ pragmatic approach accepts the general idea of the law as a mechanism for mediating 
social interactions. Hence, as Jack Balkin suggests, “When we consider how a new technology 
                                                          
7 Science fiction has contributed tremendously to human perceptions about AI. Star Trek: The Next Generation, for 
example, introduced the AI humanoid robot Data. Data is in a constant search for his humanity, and throughout the 
series (and movies) we realize how Data has evolved to become an equal member of the Enterprise (starship) crew. 
See the interesting discussion during Data’s “trial” – Star Trek: The Next Generation, “The Measure of a Man” (13 
February 1989), online (video): YouTube <www.youtube.com/watch?v=bJF-IRbTh0Q>. Another example is the 
phenomenal HBO series Westworld. Westworld is an amusement park populated by synthetic androids called “hosts”. 
During the first season we learn about the hosts’ thoughts and development. Several interesting discussions challenge 
human perception, see the dialog between Bernard and Dr. Robert Ford (portrayed by Anthony Hopkins) about 
consciousness, Westworld, “Trace Decay” (20 November 2016), online (video): YouTube 
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=S94ETUiMZwQ>. Science fiction has also been driven by the fear from potential AI 
catastrophes. In the film The Terminator (1984), an AI entity known as Skynet becomes self-aware, decides that 
humanity poses a threat to its existence, and seeks to exterminate the human race in order to fulfill its original purpose. 
See the recent Terminator opening scene, Terminator Genisys (22 June 2015), online (video): YouTube 
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=3iMvFMMrNkA>. I should also indicate two important movies in the field of AI as 
well: Ex Machina (2015) and Her (2013). Examples in the science fiction literature abound as well. Isaac Asimov is 
considered an AI visionary. His book I, Robot (Random House Publishing Group, 2004) consists of nine stories about 
robots that are very different from the common robot stories of the time. Asimov’s robots are not destructive by nature. 
He is also known for Asimov’s rules of robotics. First Law: A robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction, 
allow a human being to come to harm. Second Law: A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings except 
where such orders would conflict with the First Law. Third Law: A robot must protect its own existence as long as 
such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law. In later work, Robots and Empire (Doubleday Books, 
1985), Asimov added a Fourth Law (also known as the Zeroth Law): A robot may not injure humanity or, through 
inaction, allow humanity to come to harm. These examples reflect more than anything else the human fixation with 
AI.  
8 Yuval Noah Harari, 21 Lessons for the 21st Century (Penguin Random House Canada, 2018); See also Jean-Gabriel 
Castel & Matthew E Castel, “The Road to Artificial Intelligence: Has International Law a Role to Play?” (2016) 14 
CJLT 1 [J G Castel & M Castel] (on the existential threat that AI poses to humanity); Fundamental Issues of AI, supra 
note 2 (discusses fundamental issues regarding present and future AI from the perspectives of cognitive science, 
computer science, neuroscience, and philosophy); “Focus Feature: Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, and the Future of 
Law” (2016) 66 UTLJ 423 (the authors argue, in four different articles, that future machines will develop capabilities 
and perform many of the tasks currently performed by the legal community today); Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: 
Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) (the author explores what will happen to humanity 
when machines surpass human intelligence); Kevin Kelly, What Technology Wants (Viking, 2010) (Kelly offers 
insights for the behaviour of technology as a natural system); Philosophy and Theory of AI, supra note 2; Russell & 
Norvig, supra note 6; Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (Penguin, 2005) 
(leading the singularity debate); McCorduck, supra note 3. 
9 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, “The Path of Law” (1897) 10 Harv L Rev 457.  
10 Ibid at 468. 
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affects law, our focus should not be on what is essential about the technology but on what features 
of social life the technology makes newly salient.”11 
In the coming decades, humanity will be forced to address new social issues induced by 
scientific progress. It is reasonable to assume that these changes will affect social interactions and, 
subsequently, the development of our legal norms.12 As James Boyle articulates: “Both the 
definition of legal persons, and the rights accorded to those persons, have changed over time … 
Progress may have been gradual, intermittent or savagely resisted by force. There may have been 
back-sliding. But in the end the phrase ‘all men’ actually came to mean all men, and women too.”13 
Indeed, when “our world fills with robotic and AI technologies, our lives and relationships of 
social, political, and economic power will also change, posing new and unexpected challenges for 
law.”14 The phenomena of the Internet and smartphones have taught us that we cannot predict 
                                                          
11 Jack M Balkin, “The Path of Robotics Law” (2015) 6 CALRC 45 at 46. See also Ryan Calo, “Robotics and the 
Lessons of Cyberlaw” (2015) 103 Cal L Rev 513. Calo and Balkin contemplate on the benefits and challenges robots 
and AI technology will bring. 
12 In “The Path of Law: Towards Legal Singularity” (2016) 66 UTLJ 443, Benjamin Alarie coined the term “legal 
singularity.” Alarie offers, ibid at 445, that “we can be confident that technological development over the course of 
this century will lead to (a) a significantly greater quantification of observable phenomena in the world (‘more data’) 
and (b) more accurate pattern recognition using new technologies and methods (‘better inference’) … The culmination 
of these trends will be what I shall term the ‘legal singularity’.” According to Alarie, ibid at 446, “[t]he legal singularity 
contemplates the elimination of legal uncertainty and the emergence of a seamless legal order, which is universally 
accessible in real time. In the legal singularity, disputes over the legal significance of agreed facts will be rare. There 
may be disputes over facts, but, once found, the facts will map onto clear.” In the second paper, “Self Driving Laws” 
(2016) 66 UTLJ 429 at 430, Anthony J Casey & Anthony Niblett claim that “law will exist in a catalogue of precisely 
tailored directives, specifying exactly what is permissible in every unique situation.” See also Anthony Casey & 
Anthony Niblett, “The Death of Rules and Standards” (2017) 92:4 Ind L Rev 1401; Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, 
“Four Futures of Legal Automation” (2015) 63 UCLA L Rev 26; Jesse Beatson, “AI-Supported Adjudicators: Should 
Artificial Intelligence Have a Role in Tribunal Adjudication?” (2018) 31 CJALP 307. Brian Sheppard discusses how 
technology developments could change “essential features” of our legal system and norms. See Brian Sheppard, 
“Warming Up to Inscrutability: How Technology Could Challenge Our Concept of Law” (2018) 68:1 UTLJ 36. 
13 James Boyle, Endowed by Their Creator? The Future of Constitutional Personhood (Brookings, 2011) at 7, online 
(pdf): <www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0309_personhood_boyle.pdf>. See also Jeffrey Rosen & 
Benjamin Wittes, eds, Constitution 3.0: Freedom and Technological Change (Brookings, 2011). I should clarify that, 
even if the normative conclusion leads to recognising legal rights for AI, this does not necessarily mean that AI will 
earn the same rights as humans. For example, I do not believe that AI rights are to be bestowed “naturally” upon 
creation. 
14 Balkin, supra note 11 at 49. See also Andrew J Wu, “From Video Games to Artificial Intelligence: Assigning 
Copyright Ownership to Works Generated by Increasingly Sophisticated Computer Programs” (1997) 25 AIPLA QJ 
131. 
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technological effects on our laws and norms, while many expected changes turn out to be 
insignificant.15 Further, as Balkin opines, “The characteristics of a new technology, in short, are 
partly the product of current use and partly the work of human imagination about potential 
affordances and opportunities, dangers and threats.”16 Balkin claims that the law will resort to legal 
fictions in the face of difficulties and “substitute robot for human to allow the law to function 
effectively in the face of the legal enigmas posed by emergent behaviour. Or we might adopt legal 
fictions to keep existing legal doctrines working provisionally until we can produce more thorough 
and coherent reforms.”17 
                                                          
15 In 1991, for example, the World Wide Web’s “essential features were its abilities to cross jurisdictional lines at will, 
to send digital information quickly and cheaply, and to facilitate anonymous communication.” However, by 1999 “it 
was clearer that states could control features of the Internet traffic and that the degree of truly anonymous 
communication the Internet afforded was overstated.” Balkin, supra note 11 at 47. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid at 58. As Boyle, supra note 13 at 17, indicated, Legal fictitious are not absent from law – “corporations are 
artificial entities and yet we have chosen to classify them as legal persons to which many constitutional rights adhere.” 
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For many, the AI future is bright and promising. Predictions about future applications of 
AI-based technology fill our books, academic papers, and news. Think about the prospects of 
caregivers’ robots for the elderly, nanny-bots for infants or the promise of AI doctors,18 
psychologies,19 lawyers,20 drivers,21 etc. Indeed, AI technology is affecting transportation,22 home 
services,23 healthcare,24 education,25 public safety,26 employment and businesses,27 food 
production and productivity,28 investment and finance,29 entertainment,30 government services,31 
journalism,32 and may even provide an alternative to human interaction.33  
                                                          
18 See e.g. Parmy Olson, “This AI Just Beat Human Doctors On A Clinical Exam” (28 June 2018), online: Forbes 
<forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2018/06/28/ai-doctors-exam-babylon-health/#63b1b1e312c0>. 
19 Sam Shed, “Apple is hiring a counsellor to help Siri have ‘serious conversations’” (15 September 2017), online: 
Business Insider <uk.businessinsider.com/apple-is-hiring-a-psychologist-to-help-siri-have-serious-conversations-
2017-9>. 
20 The Legal-Tech industry provides a variety of research tools and services that could enhance lawyer’s work 
significantly. Codex classified legal technologies into nine groups: marketplace, document automation, practice 
management, legal research, legal education, online dispute resolution, e-discovery, analytics, and compliance. 
Recently, Ontario Superior Court capped the costs awarded in a liability case stating that “[i]f artificial intelligence 
sources were employed, no doubt counsel’s preparation time would have been significantly reduced.” Cass v 1410088 
Ontario In, 2018 ONSC 6959. The Superior Court decision is interesting giving the possible impact on practicing 
lawyers that would require to use AI legal search engines to save costs. See also Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett & 
Albert H Yoon, “Law in the Future” (2016) 66:4 UTLJ 423; Beverley McLachlin, “The Legal Profession in the 21st 
Century” (Remarks delivered at the 2015 Canadian Bar Association Plenary, Calgary, 14 August 2015); Chris 
Johnson, “Leveraging Technology to Deliver Legal Services” (2009) 23 Harv JL & Tech 259; Bernard Marr, “How 
AI And Machine Learning Are Transforming Law Firms And The Legal Sector” (23 May 2018), online: Forbes 
<forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/23/how-ai-and-machine-learning-are-transforming-law-firms-and-the-legal-
sector/#605ba3ab32c3>; Dan Mangan, “Lawyers could be the next profession to be replaced by computers” (17 
February 2017), online: CNBC News <cnbc.com/2017/02/17/lawyers-could-be-replaced-by-artificial-
intelligence.html>. 
21 There is an abundance of information concerning self-driving cars. See e.g. online: The Guardian recent reports 
from November and October 2018 <www.theguardian.com/technology/self-driving-cars>. See also Harari, supra note 
8, chapter 2 “work”. 
22 Nevada passed legislation to authorize the use of driver-assistive platooning technology and the use of a fully 
autonomous vehicle to provide transportation services. See US, AB 69, An Act Relating to Transportation, 2017, Sen 
Assem, Nev 2017. See also recent discussions regarding self-driving legislation at the US, HR, Self-Driving Vehicle 
Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Digital Commerce and Consumer Protection, 115 Cong (2017), 
online: <energycommerce.house.gov/hearings/self-driving-vehicle-legislation>. On the Federal level, see US, 
Department of Transportation, Automated Driving Systems 2.0 A Vision for Safety (2017), online (pdf): 
<nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/13069a-ads2.0_090617_v9a_tag.pdf>. According to the 100 Year 
Study “[t]ransportation is likely to be one of the first domains in which the general public will be asked to trust the 
reliability and safety of an AI system for a critical task”, Peter Stone et al, Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030 - 
One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence: Report of the 2015-2016 Study Panel (Stanford University Press, 
2016) at 18, online (pdf): <ai100.stanford.edu/2016-report> [The 100 Year Study]. The 100 Year Study is the first in 
a planned series of studies on AI. The purpose of the study is “to provide a collected and connected set of reflections 
about AI and its influences as the field advances.” Ibid at 1. In Australia, a recent policy paper by the National 
Transport Commission outline possible legislation changes concerning automated and self-driving cars, AUS, 
National Transport Commission, Changing Driving Laws to Support Automated Vehicles (2017), online (pdf): 
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<ntc.gov.au/Media/Reports/(E5695ACE-993C-618F-46E1-A876391B8CD9).pdf>. See also Noah Zon & Sara Ditta, 
Robot, Take the Wheel: Public Policy for Automated Vehicles (Mowat Research Publications, 2016) at 118; Janet 
Fleetwood, “Public Health, Ethics, and Autonomous Vehicles” (2017) 107 AJPH 532; Patrick Lin, “Why Ethics 
Matter for Autonomous Cars” in Markus Maurer, J, eds, Autonomous Driving: Technical, Legal and Social Aspects 
(Springer, 2016) at 69-85. MIT Moral Machine experiment can highlight, in a very vivid way, the dilemmas that 
engineers are facing in designing automated/self-driving cars, see <moralmachine.mit.edu>. 
23 In the next decade (or even before), caregiver’s robots and other automated systems/AIs would be able to take over 
a great load of our work at home and the office: “Special purpose robots will deliver packages, clean offices, and 
enhance security, but technical constraints and the high costs of reliable mechanical devices will continue to limit 
commercial opportunities to narrowly defined applications for the foreseeable future.” The 100 Year Study, ibid at 
24.  
24 I Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch & Effy Vayena, eds, Big Data, Health Law, and Bioethics (Cambridge 
University Press, 2018); Daniel Akst, “Computers Turn Medical Sleuths and Identify Skin Cancer” (10 February 
2017), online: The Wall Street Journal <wsj.com/articles/computers-turn-medical-sleuths-and-identify-skin-cancer-
1486740634>; See also the 100 Year Study, supra note 22 at 25. AI-based systems can provide a better and most 
accurate diagnostic while AI robots can change the clinical setting replacing humans as surgeons. In China, for 
example, a robot dentist performed the first successful autonomous implant surgery recently. See Alice Yan, “Dentists 
in China Successfully Used a Robot to Perform Implant Surgery Without Human Intervention” (1 September 2017), 
online: Business Insider <businessinsider.com/dentists-in-china-used-a-robot-to-perform-implant-surgery-2017-9>. 
For a futuristic example, see the short clip from Elysium (7 August 2013), online (video): YouTube 
<youtube.com/watch?v=RyMoJHf7rCQ>.  
25 AI promise to change our education system as well. Though, as the 100 Year Study have indicated, ibid at 31, 
“computer-based learning systems are not likely to fully replace human teaching in schools,” AI technologies will 
probably play an important role as an assistant tool for teachers and university professors. Even today, the use of 
Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS) applications in US high schools, universities and the military is growing. Students, 
teachers and professors are getting used to online and other technological services. Recently, Osgoode Hall Law 
School and the Faculty of Computer Science at the University of Waterloo, have offered an online course – Advanced 
Research Topics: Artificial Intelligence: Law, Ethics, and Policy – in which the lecturer used a video conference 
interface to broadcast the seminar from Waterloo to Toronto. I assume that in the future universities will offer more 
interactive courses, which in turn will allow more people access to high education. Furthermore, other advantages in 
technology will enhance the learning experience and effectively more students/users will prefer the online self-
learning opportunities over the orthodox teaching methods. One possibility is using virtual and augmented reality-
based technology. The future opportunities that AI presents in education probably will have a positive effect in third 
world countries as well.  
26 Deploying AI based technology to improve safety in cities has both positive and negative implications on our day 
to day life. Take surveillance cameras for example. Using AI and machine-learning capabilities can improve the 
chances of detecting crime and potential dangers (including terror activates) before posing any risk. AI systems would 
be able to identify if someone is expressing tension or odd behaviour and dispatch law enforcement agencies to prevent 
the crime. On the other hand, we might lose the minimal privacy we have left with making us all “naked” to the world. 
There are several successful examples of using AI to detect and prevent Cybercrime. See Shannon Bond, “Artificial 
Intelligence and Quantum Computing Aid Cyber Crime Fight” (24 May 2017), online: Financial Times 
<ft.com/content/1b9bdc4c-2422-11e7-a34a-538b4cb30025>. 
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27 As the 100 Year Study, supra note 22 at 39, states “[t]he economic effects of AI on cognitive human jobs will be 
analogous to the effects of automation and robotics on humans in manufacturing jobs. Many middle-aged workers 
have lost well-paying factory jobs and the socio-economic status in family and society that traditionally went with 
such jobs. However, at the end these changes might eventually create more work and raise the economic value of a 
certain field.” Spyros Makridakis shares these views arguing that “[t]he expected changes being brought by AI 
technologies will be just as, or even more significant as those of the Industrial revolution and much harder to predict.” 
See Spyros Makridakis, “The Forthcoming Artificial Intelligence (AI) Revolution: Its Impact on Society and Firms” 
(2017) 90 Futures 46 at 53. AI might also influence the location and size of the workforce making certain jobs in the 
organization done by AI and effectively hire few people. Managing the workforce can also be done by an AI and from 
a virtual office (saving the cost of maintaining offices). See also “Artificial intelligence will create new kinds of work” 
(26 August 2017), online: The Economist <economist.com/news/business/21727093-humans-will-supply-digital-
services-complement-ai-artificial-intelligence-will-create-
new?fsrc=scn/fb/te/bl/ed/artificialintelligencewillcreatenewkindsofwork>; Harari, supra note 8, chapter 2. Several 
people have expressed concern about high unemployment rates. See, e.g. Michael A Peters, “Technological 
Unemployment: Educating for the Fourth Industrial Revolution” (2017) 5:1 Journal of Self-Governance and 
Management Economics 25; John Barnett, “Will AI Revolution Lead to Mass Unemployment?” (24 April 2017), 
online: Business <business.com/articles/john-barnett-artificial-intelligence-job-market>. However, as Mark Lemley 
answers rhetorically: “What will people do when they no longer have to work to produce the goods and services they 
need and want? I don’t know. But I am doubtful the answer is ‘nothing’.” see Mark Lemley, “IP in a World Without 
Scarcity” (2015) 90 NYU L Rev 460 at 513 [Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity]. 
28 The World Economic Forum argues that new technology, AI included, “can create significant new value through 
innovations for food systems.” See World Economic Forum, Shaping the Future of Global Food Systems: A Scenarios 
Analysis (2017) at 22, online (pdf): 
<www3.weforum.org/docs/IP/2016/NVA/WEF_FSA_FutureofGlobalFoodSystems.pdf>; A T Kearney, Technology 
and Innovation for the Future of Production: Accelerating Value Creation (World Economic Forum, 2017), online 
(pdf): <www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_White_Paper_Technology_Innovation_Future_of_Production_2017.pdf>. 
Forbes offer several AI implications on improving agriculture (AgTech) such as automated harvesting and image 
recognition systems that can detect plant’s pests. See Rob Trice, “Can Artificial Intelligence Help Feed The World?” 
(5 September 2017), online: Forbes <forbes.com/sites/themixingbowl/2017/09/05/can-artificial-intelligence-help-
feed-the-world/#1d8854e446db>. See recently, The Institute for Competitiveness & Prosperity, “From Prediction to 
Reality: Ontario’s AI Opportunity” (2018), online (pdf): 
<competeprosper.ca/uploads/2018_From_prediction_to_reality_Ontarios__AI_opportunity.pdf> [Ontario’s AI 
Opportunity Report]. 
29 PWC has published a report assessing the impact of AI on the insurance industry. According to the report, AI is 
expected to improve efficiencies and automating existing underwriting and claims processes. See PWC, “Top Issues: 
AI in Insurance: Hype or Reality?” (2016), online (pdf): <pwc.com/us/en/insurance/publications/assets/pwc-top-
issues-artificial-intelligence.pdf>. Banks and stock markets are using AI algorithms with prediction analysis for 
investments. See Matt Turner, “Machine Learning Is Now Used in Wall Street Dealmaking, and Bankers Should 
Probably Be Worried” (4 April 2017), online: Business Insider <www.businessinsider.com/jpmorgan-using-machine-
learning-in-investment-banking-2017-4>. See also Martin Arnold & Laura Noonan, “Robots enter investment banks’ 
trading floors’” (6 July 2017), online: Financial Times <www.ft.com/content/da7e3ec2-6246-11e7-8814-
0ac7eb84e5f1>; Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, “Big Data and Social Netbanks: Are You Ready to 
Replace Your Bank?” (2016) 53 Hous L Rev 1211. 
30 Makridakis, supra note 27 at 53, states the transition of the newspaper industry as an example to the change 
technology might have on the markets. It is difficult to predict how AI technology will affect the entertainment 
business. We can, however, suggest that it will not necessarily harm the industry by examining the effects of the 
Internet on the same business. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, supra note 27 at 487, explains that the Internet 
Revolution did not harm the entertainment industry, on the contrary “the overall industry grew from $449 billion in 
1998 to $745 billion in 2010.” See also Peter Menell & Ben Depoorter, “Using Fee Shifting to Promote Fair Use and 
Fair Licensing” (2014) 102 Cal L Rev 53. Virtual and augmented reality have great potential for the entertainment 
industry. See Mark Lemley & Eugene Volokh, “Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality” (2018) 166:5 Penn St 
L Rev 1051. 
31 Aviv Gaon & Ian Stedman, “A Call to Action: Moving Forward with the Governance of Artificial Intelligence in 
Canada”, 56:4 Alta L Rev [forthcoming in 2019]. One example is using AI for decision making in processing 
immigration applications, see Teresa Wright, “Canada’s Use of Artificial Intelligence in Immigration Could Lead to 
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Even the orthodox and conservative field of legal services have not escaped AI technology 
influence, to some extent.34 In a recent book, Richard and Daniel Susskind argue for two possible 
scenarios for the future of professions in the age of AI: The first is a “more efficient version of 
what we already have today.” The working force will remain relatively the same but will “heavily 
standardize and systemize their routine activities.” The other scenario involves a “transformation 
in the way that expertise of professionals is made available in society.” The Susskinds argue that 
“capable systems will … displace much of the work of traditional professionals.”35 These scholarly 
discussions might seem fruitless, given the current stage of AI; however, there are significant 
advancements in the commercial application of AI technology and, as several reports have 
indicated, AI is expected to affect many creative industries.36 
Others view these expected developments as a real threat to humanity. The late theoretical 
physicist, Stephen Hawking, has stated that “success in creating AI would be the biggest event in 
human history. Unfortunately, it might also be the last.”37 Elon Musk shares Hawking’s 
                                                          
Break of Human Rights: Study” (26 September 2018), online: Global News <globalnews.ca/news/4487724/canada-
artificial-intelligence-human-rights>. 
32 Noam Lemelshtrich Latar observes that “within 5-10 years, the majority of all journalistic text stories will be written 
by robots.” Noam L Latar, Robot Journalism: Can Human Journalism Survive? (World Scientific Publishing Co Pte 
Ltd, 2018) at 29. 
33 Sex robots for example. Ian Yeoman and Michelle Mars discuss the benefits of sex robots (mainly in the sex 
industry) and provide several scenarios for that future. See Ian Yeoman & Michelle Mars, “Robots, men and sex 
tourism” (2012) 44 Future 365. Will human “fall in love” with robots? See Noel Sharkey et al, “Our Sexual Future 
with Robots” (2017), online (pdf): <responsible-robotics-myxf6pn3xr.netdna-ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/FRR-Consultation-Report-Our-Sexual-Future-with-robots-1-1.pdf>.  
34 See e.g. Beatson, supra note 12; Kevin D Ashley, Artificial Intelligence and Legal Analytics: New Tools for Law 
Practice in the Digital Age (Cambridge University Press, 2017); Lauren H Scholz, “Algorithmic Contracts” (2017) 
20 Stan Tech L Rev 128; David A Larson, “Artificial Intelligence: Robots, Avatars, and the Demise of the Human 
Mediator” (2010) 25:1 Ohio St J Disp Resol 105.  
35 Richard Susskind & Daniel Susskind, The Future of the Professions: How Technology Will Transform the Work of 
Human Experts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 9. 
36 See e.g. Hasan Bakhshi, Carl B Frey & Michael Osborne, Creativity Vs. Robots: The Creative Economy and the 
Future of Employment (NESTA, 2015), online (pdf): 
<robots.ox.ac.uk/~mosb/public/pdf/1866/creativity_vs._robots_wv.pdf>. 
37 Stephen Hawking et al, “Stephen Hawking: ‘Transcendence looks at the implications of artificial intelligence - but 
are we taking AI seriously enough?’” (1 May 2014), online: The Independent 
<independent.co.uk/news/science/stephen-hawking-transcendence-looks-at-the-implications-of-artificial-
intelligence-but-are-we-taking-9313474.html>. 
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assessment, stating that if he had to guess what is humanity biggest risk, AI might be it.38 Jean 
Gabriel Castel has predicted that when AI reaches the next stage of evolution (super-
intelligence),39 it will become the most powerful being on Earth.40  
I do not share these ominous predictions. As the 100 Year Study suggests, with all the risks 
AI might pose to humanity it has a greater positive potential “to make driving safer, help children 
learn, and extend and enhance people’s lives.”41 Nevertheless, we should embrace AI technology 
with caution, addressing the many legal, ethical and technological challenges posed by AI. As 
Ryan Calo recently offered, “[D]evoting disproportionate attention and resources to the AI 
apocalypse has the potential to distract policymakers from addressing AI’s more immediate harms 
and challenges and could discourage investment in research on AI’s present social impacts.”42 
  Part I lays the groundwork for the theoretical part that follows. I first discuss AI from three 
different angles: I highlight important historical milestones in the development of AI, briefly 
explaining the current state of AI research, and offer projections and analysis for the upcoming 
decades. I then expand on the concept of AI, delving deeper into the origin of the “artificial 
intelligence” concept in a quest to refine and redefine the term from a legal perspective. Finally, I 
                                                          
38 Samuel Gibbs, “Elon Musk: Artificial Intelligence Is Our Biggest Existential Threat” (27 October 2014), online: 
The Guardian <theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/27/elon-musk-artificial-intelligence-ai-biggest-existential-
threat>.  
39 Bostrom defines superintelligence as “any intellect that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in 
virtually all domains of interest.” Bostrom, supra note 8 at 22. 
40 J G Castel & M Castel, supra note 8 at 4. The Centre of Existential Risk at Cambridge and The Future of Humanity 
Institute at Oxford University warns from the risks AI technology might pose. See e.g. Strategic Artificial Intelligence 
Research Centre <fhi.ox.ac.uk/research/research-areas/strategic-centre-for-artificial-intelligence-policy>. See also 
Edward M Geist, “Is Artificial Intelligence Really an Existential Threat to Humanity?” (9 August 2015), online: 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Book Review <thebulletin.org/artificial-intelligence-really-existential-threat-
humanity8577>. These ominous predictions are not shared by everyone. See Eric Sofge, “Why Artificial Intelligence 
Will Not Obliterate Humanity: It’s Not Smart Enough to Turn Sinister” (19 March 2015), online: Popular Science 
<popsci.com/why-artificial-intelligence-will-not-obliterate-humanity>. 
41 The 100 Year Study, supra note 22 at 6. 
42 Ryan Calo, “Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and a Road Map” (2017) 51:2 UC Davis L Rev 399 at 431 
[Calo – AI Policy]. 
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conclude the discussion and segue into Part II, where I outline the IP theoretical discussion and 
consider whether AI technology is applicable to one or more of IP theories. In Part II, I also discuss 
the developments of computer software legal protection and the implications of IP laws for 
technology in the future. In Part III, I further develop the copyright discussion seeking an answer 
to the question of “who” is the author of AI creation – the programmer, the user, the AI - or whether 
AI creations should be left in the public domain. I also examine copyright standards and machine 
creativity. In Part IV, I discuss my conclusions and provide a road map for AI authorship.  
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1.2 THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR 
1.2.1 The AI Momentum  
AI technology is in some respects older than many people realize. The term “artificial intelligence” 
was coined during the mid-1950s.43 However, the origins of AI as a field of research go back to 
Alan Turing’s investigations of computer intelligence.44 Though many continued Turing’s 
research in the ensuing decades, it was not until the mid-late 1990s or early 2000s that AI gained 
momentum as a field.45  
In his popular book, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology,46 Ray 
Kurzweil47 reflects on the future of humanity in the upcoming decades of meta-ideas and mass 
information.48 Kurzweil defines singularity as “a future period during which the pace of 
technological change will be so rapid, its impact so deep, that human life will be irreversibly 
transformed.”49 “The key idea,” explains Kurzweil, “is that the pace of change of our human-
created technology is accelerating, and its powers are expanding at an exceptional pace.”50 Given 
recent developments, Kurzweil argues that information-based technology will engulf all human 
                                                          
43 Russell & Norvig, supra note 6; McCorduck, supra note 3; John McCarthy et al, “A Proposal for the Dartmouth 
Summer Project on Artificial Intelligence” (Dartmouth University, 1955), online: <www-
formal.stanford.edu/jmc/history/dartmouth/dartmouth.html> [The Dartmouth Proposal].  
44 Alan M Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (1950) LIX:236 Mind 433. Alan Turing was a British 
mathematician who played a major role during the Second World War in the decryption of the infamous Nazi 
“Enigma” machine. 
45 US, Executive Office of the President, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence (2016) at 5-6, online (pdf): 
<obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_futur
e_of_ai.pdf> (providing a short summary of the history of AI) [Preparing for the Future of AI Report]; US, Executive 
Office of the President, The National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan (2016) at 12, 
online (pdf): <nitrd.gov/PUBS/national_ai_rd_strategic_plan.pdf> (outline the current state of AI) [US AI Strategic 
Plan]; The 100 Year Study, supra note 22 at 50-2 (a concise summary of AI history).  
46 Kurzweil, supra note 8 at 7; See also Murray Shanahan, The Technological Singularity (Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press, 2015). 
47 Ray Kurzweil is a distinguished computer science researcher and considered the “guru” of artificial intelligence. He 
is the Director of Engineering at Google since 2012. His blog <kurzweilai.net> is a main source for information about 
AI technology.  
48 Kurzweil, supra note 8 at 3. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid at 7-8. 
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knowledge and proficiencies in the upcoming decades, “ultimately including the pattern-
recognition powers, problem-solving skills, and emotional and moral intelligence of the human 
brain itself.”51 
We can find support for Kurzweil’s predictions in books, articles, and scientific progress.52 
Take, for example, the fact that the computational capacity of the human brain was estimated in 
2015 to be in the range of 1018 computations per second, whereas computer speeds between 2007 
and 2015 grew at a rate of 82 percent per year.53 However, not everyone shares Kurzweil’s 
optimism. Despite the progress in recent years, most of the AI advancement has been made in an 
area considered “narrow AI”.54 Little progress, if any, has been attributed in “general AI”.55  
William Nordhaus challenges Kurzweil’s assumptions as well.56 Nordhaus claims that we 
are not on the verge of accelerated change – or at least not soon, as Kurzweil, Schmidt, and Cohen 
contend.57 Nordhaus offers a rebuttal: where are the economic signs of singularity? If we are indeed 
                                                          
51 Ibid at 8. 
52 J G Castel & M Castel, supra note 8 at 1; See also Gordon E Moore, “Moore’s Law at 40” in David C Brock, ed, 
Understanding Moore’s Law: Four Decades of Innovation (Philadelphia: Chemical Heritage Foundation, 2006); 
Vincent C Müller & Nick Bostrom, “Future progress in artificial intelligence: A survey of expert opinion” in Vincent 
C Müller, ed, Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence (Springer Berlin, 2016) at 553; Bostrom, supra note 8. 
53 William D Nordhaus, “Are We Approaching an Economic Singularity? Information Technology and the Future of 
Economic Growth” (2015) Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 2021 at 4. J G Castel & M Castel, supra note 8 at 
footnote 7, indicate that “one of the world’s fastest supercomputers is China’s Tianhe-2 which has very large hardware, 
uses megawatts of power and cost US $390 million to build. Its total calculations per second can reach 33.86 
Petaflops/s (quadrillion) which is much more than a human brain’s capacity to calculate.” 
54 US AI Strategic Plan, supra note 45 at 14. The report explains the difference between narrow and general AI, ibid 
at 19: “Narrow AI systems perform individual tasks in specialized, well-defined domains, such as speech recognition, 
image recognition, and translation … the long-term goal of general AI is to create systems that exhibit the flexibility 
and versatility of human intelligence in a broad range of cognitive domains, including learning, language, perception, 
reasoning, creativity, and planning. Broad learning capabilities would provide general AI systems the ability to transfer 
knowledge from one domain to another and to interactively learn from experience and from humans.”  
55 US AI Strategic Plan, supra note 45 at 14. The recent UK report on AI have reached a similar conclusion. See UK, 
Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence, AI in the UK: Ready, Willing and Able? (16 April 2018) at 15, online 
(pdf): <publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldai/100/100.pdf> [AI in the UK report]. 
56 Nordhaus, supra note 53. 
57 Eric Schmidt & Jared Cohen, The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People, Nations and Business (London: 
John Murray, 2013). See also Shanahan, supra note 46; Ryan Calo, “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice, Or: Why Weak AI Is 
Interesting Enough” (30 August 2011), online (blog): The Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School 
Blog <cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2011/08/sorcerers-apprentice-or-why-weak-ai-interesting-enough>. 
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on the brink of an accelerated technological era, there should already be signs indicating that the 
“singularity” is indeed near. Nordhaus’ research reveals few indications that support the 
accelerated singularity argument; in fact, he finds that only two of seven economic tests indicate 
an imminent singularity.58 It is his view that “the time at which the economy might plausibly cross 
the Singularity is 100 years or more” in the future.59  
A prudent approach might prove to be a good idea. After all, humanity is inclined to reject 
revolutionary ideas until they materialize. In 1828, it was the famous economist Jean-Baptiste Say 
who concluded that no machine would ever be able to perform what even the worst horses could.60 
He was wrong. In less than 200 years humanity moved from horses to automated vehicles. From 
a historical perspective, these advancements were as fast as a lightning strike. 
In the past decade, several surveys and studies have sought to answer the very same and 
intriguing question – when will we reach high-level machine intelligence?61 Indeed, with no 
substantive scientific evidence that can point to a conclusive result, expert opinions might be the 
most reliable source we have to establish whether an AI revolution is indeed upon us, and if so, 
when. 
The first surveys were taken in 2006 and 2007. In 2006, attendees of the AI@50 conference 
were given a set of questions. 41% agreed that computers would be able to simulate every aspect 
                                                          
58 Which Nordhaus defines as “a time when the economic growth rate crosses 20% per year.” Nordhaus, supra note 
53 at 28-9. 
59 Ibid at 28. The singularity argument is relevant to the question of when we can expect a singularity “moment”. If 
we accept Kurzweil’s argument, we might as well accept the general idea that in a decade or two AI will become a 
significant part of our lives. On the other hand, if we accept Nordhaus’ argument, we might agree with Arthur Miller’s 
statement that these issues are too futuristic, and we should address them in due course. I shall contend that even if 
Nordhaus is correct, and the singularity era is in no way near, it is nonetheless important to consider the effects of 
singularity. For Miller’s work see Arthur R Miller, “Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and 
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since Contu?” (1993) 106 Harv L Rev 977. 
60 Jean B Say, Cours Complet D’economie Politique Pratique (Chez Rapilly, 1828). 
61 AGI, or General AI, is the term used in computer science to describe future AI systems that can express human level 
intelligence. See also supra note 54.  
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of human intelligence in more than 50 years, while the same percentage thought this scenario 
would never happen.62 Bruce Klein took a different survey the following year.63 Klein asked only 
one specific question: “When would AI surpass human intelligence?” Most respondents expressed 
the notion that AI will surpass human intelligence during the next half of the century.64  
The next survey was initiated during the second conference on artificial general 
intelligence held in 2009 (AGI-09).65 The AGI-09 attendees (21 in total) were given a survey on 
the theme of “How long till AGI?”66 According to Baum, Goertzel and Goertzel, “[M]ost experts 
expect human-level AI to be reached within upcoming decades, and all experts give at least some 
chance that some milestones will be reached within this time.”67 75% expect that AI will pass the 
Turing test by 2050 and 50% believe that AI will reach the stage of superhuman by the year 2045. 
Most experts assume, with almost certainty, that AI will surpass human capabilities by the end of 
this century.68  
Not surprisingly, most respondents believe that massive AI funding “would cause the AI 
milestones to be reached sooner.”69 The study also revealed a disagreement concerning the order 
of the developments (which stages come first).70 In referring to the earlier studies from 2006 and 
                                                          
62 Seth D Baum, Ben Goertzel & Ted G Goertzel, “How Long Until Human-Level AI? Results from an Expert 
Assessment” (2011) 78:1 Tech Forecasting & Soc Change 185 at 186 [Baum, Goertzel & Goertzel]. See also, online: 
<aiimpacts.org/ai50-survey>.  
63 Klein survey is hard to access, though mentioned in both Müller & Bostrom’s, supra note 52, and Baum, Goertzel 
& Goertzel’s, supra note 62 at 187. There are several limitations to Klien’s survey. First, it is an informal study. Klein 
relays on a broad population – 888 responses – consists of non-experts. Second, the study focuses on one issue – 
superhuman AI.  
64 150 (17%) stated that superhuman AI will be reached between 2020 and 2030 while 231 (26%) believed superhuman 
AI will be reached between 2030 and 2050. 81 (9%) responded that superhuman AI is expected beyond the year 2100. 
Only 64 (7%) responded that superhuman AI will never happen. Baum, Goertzel & Goertzel, supra note 62 at 187. 
65 James Barrat & Ben Goertzel, “How Long Till AGI? — Views of AGI-11 Conference Participants” (16 September 
2011), online: Images <hplusmagazine.com/2011/09/16/how-long-till-agi-views-of-agi-11-conference-participants>. 
66 Baum, Goertzel & Goertzel, supra note 62 at 188. The participants “have a range of levels of expertise, from 
graduate students to senior researchers.” 
67 Ibid at 185. 
68 Ibid at 189-190.  
69 Ibid at 190. It should be noted, however, that for most respondents the difference was small – a few years only. 
70 Ibid at 191. For example, one expert stated that an AI might wish to hide its mental superiorities.  
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2007, Baum, Goertzel and Goertzel conclude that “it is likely that AGI at the human level or 
beyond will occur around the middle of this century, and plausibly even sooner.”71  
During the same year that Baum, Goertzel and Goertzel published their study, James Barrat 
conducted an informal survey of his own among 200 attendees of the 2011 Artificial General 
Intelligence conference (AGI-11). Barrat’s informal survey, published later in his book,72 showed 
similar results to the AGI-09 survey.73  
Finally, Vincent Müller and Nick Bostrom’s 2016 study collected predictions from 550 AI 
experts. The survey focused on individuals from four different groups: AI philosophers and 
theorists, technical experts, members of the Greek Association for AI and top AI authors.74 Müller 
and Bostrom were interested in the probability of a high-level machine intelligence (HLMI) in the 
future.75 Most of the respondents asserted that AI was likely to reach human ability by 2040-50 
(over 50%),76 and 90% believe it is very likely to happen by 2075. 10% responded that after 
reaching human capacity, it would take two more years for an AI to become superintelligence, 
while 75% thought that it would take longer – up to 30 years (or less). Only 31% believe that these 
developments would turn out to be bad or extremely bad for humanity. 
                                                          
71 Ibid at 194. 
72 James Barrat, Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelligence and the End of the Human Era (New York: Thomas Dunne 
Books, 2013). 
73 Ibid at 196. 
74 Müller & Bostrom, supra note 52 at 2. 
75 The exact phrasing of the question, ibid at 9: “For the purposes of this question, assume that human scientific activity 
continues without major negative disruption. By what year would you see a (10% / 50% / 90%) probability for such 
HLMI to?” For each of these three probabilities, the respondents were asked to select a year [2012–5000, in one-year 
increments] or check a box marked “never”. 
76 Ibid at 14-5. Kurzweil “set the date for the Singularity – representing a profound and disruptive transformation in 
human capability – as 2045. The nonbiological intelligence created in that year will be one billion times more powerful 
than all human intelligence today.” See Ray Kurzweil, “Singularity Q&A” (9 December 2011), online (blog): Ray 
Kurzweil <kurzweilai.net/singularity-q-a>. 
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Given the futuristic nature of these questions, no expert can provide any substantial 
evidence for such forecasts.77 The studies I have outlined offer different perspectives to the 
prospect of AI intelligence. It seems that there is a consensus that we will reach human-level 
intelligence (or artificial general intelligence) within the next three decades (between 2020 and 
2050) and following singularity, superhuman intelligence is expected soon after. Among the many 
experts, only a small fraction is willing to indicate that we will never achieve human-level 
intelligence.78 Thus, there is overwhelming support among leading experts for the probability that 
AI will reach singularity in the coming decades. However, it might not matter when exactly 
singularity happens. Whenever it might be reached, there is no reason not to be planning for its 
legal consequences.  
A review of the recent history of computer science developments can provide guidance, 
allowing us to understand better what lies ahead.  
1.2.2 A Look Back – A Brief History of AI 
AI development began with dreams. Throughout history, humans have always been fascinated by 
the concept of non-human creations. Pamela McCorduck has traced several routes to AI: 
imagination (“what might be”); philosophical inquiry (“the bridge between imagination and what 
is”); what is or present realities (“artificial intelligence as it has been realized since the 
development of the digital computer”).79  
                                                          
77 Few have expressed their concern about the validity of the survey and the conclusions. Oren Etzioni shared his 
skepticism stating that “predictions that superintelligence is on the foreseeable horizon are not supported by the 
available data. Moreover, doom-and-gloom predictions often fail to consider the potential benefits of AI in preventing 
medical errors, reducing car accidents, and more. Finally, it’s possible that AI systems could collaborate with people 
to create a symbiotic superintelligence. That would be very different from the pernicious and autonomous kind 
envisioned by Professor Bostrom.” Oren Etzioni, “No, the Experts Don’t Think Superintelligent AI is a Threat to 
Humanity” (20 September 2016), online (blog): MIT Technology Review <technologyreview.com/s/602410/no-the-
experts-dont-think-superintelligent-ai-is-a-threat-to-humanity>.  
78 Müller & Bostrom, supra note 52 at 11. 
79 McCorduck, supra note 3 at 4. 
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In the “imagination era”, AI was treated much like the product of the Gods of old. Gods 
created non-human beings to protect or to threaten humans, and stories in Greek and Egyptian 
mythology stand as a testament to human imagination.80 However, imagination was only the 
beginning: “From the sixteenth century on, a population explosion of automata took place,” and 
soon what people perceived as the power of Gods (or magic) came to life.81 McCorduck explains 
that “[t]he art of mechanical statues flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries”82 and, 
by the nineteenth century, the AI “that penetrated and dwelled in people’s imaginations [was] 
composed of the printed word rather than wood and metal and cloth.”83  
Calculating machines were the next evolutionary step. Blaise Pascal built the first 
calculating machine in 1642,84 and, in 1822, Charles Babbage “constructed a small working model 
of his automatic table calculator.”85 Practical problems drove Babbage and his predecessors and 
successors. However, “artificial intelligence … did not originate in the search for solutions to 
practical problems, though even its severest critics agree that it has made many useful 
contributions.”86 
Contrary to common belief, the German engineer Konrad Zuse (and not British or 
American engineers) created the first general-purpose program-controlled digital computer.87 
Russell and Norvig argue that the first AI work was done by Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts 
                                                          
80 Ibid at 4-13. 
81 Ibid at 13. 
82 Ibid at 14. 
83 Ibid at 15. E T A Hoffman, The Sandman (1815); Olympia; Mary Shelley, Frankenstein (1818); Isaac Asimov, The 
Rules of Robotics (1950).  
84 McCorduck, ibid at 22.  
85 Ibid at 23. The British Government was so impressed with Babbage’s invention that they were willing to finance a 
larger project. 
86 Ibid at 29. 
87 Ibid at 50. Zuse developed a programming language called the Plankalkul, which he thought might be of use for 
mathematical problems, as well as other applications such as chess moves. Most of Zuse’s work was destroyed during 
the World War II.  
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in 1943. McCulloch and Pitts “proposed a model of artificial neurons in which each neuron is 
characterized as being ‘on’ or ‘off,’ with a switch to ‘on’ occurring in response to stimulation by 
a sufficient number of neighboring neurons.”88  
In 1946, Alan Turing mentioned “the idea of a computer showing ‘intelligence,’ with 
chess-playing as a paradigm.”89 Turing is best known for his “imitation game”, the name Turing 
gave to his AI test (known simply as the Turing test). In 1950, Turing published the paper 
“Computing Machinery and Intelligence”,90 in which he argued for the possibility of creating a 
human level of intelligence in computer programs. In 1952, Turing played a game “in which he 
simulated the computer, taking about half an hour per move” as he possessed no computer with 
the requisite capabilities.91 Turing aspired to “test whether the artifact was indistinguishable from 
a person with regard to what he took to be pertinent property, verbal behavior.”92  
Turing proposed to answer the question, “Can machines think?” However, Turing rejected 
the idea of defining the terms “machine” and “think” with “the normal use of the words”. Turing 
claimed that this attitude is “dangerous”, and might make it “difficult to escape the conclusion that 
the meaning and the answer to the question, ‘Can machines think?’ is to be sought in a statistical 
                                                          
88 Russell & Norvig, supra note 6 at 16. The first neural network computer (called the Snarc) was built by Marvin 
Minsky and Dean Edmonds in 1950. 
89 Nilsson, supra note 1 at 123. McCorduck, supra note 3 at 50, stated: “The connection between computing machines 
and thinking was explicit in all the major computer efforts. Nowhere was it more so than in the work of the remarkable 
British mathematician and logician named Alan Turing (1912-1954). I find Turing to be one of the most appealing 
figures in this history, though people who knew him are divided.” 
90 Turing, supra note 44. For further discussions about Turing research see Robert Epstein, Gary Roberts & Grace 
Beber, eds, Parsing the Turing Test: Philosophical and Methodological Issues in the Quest for the Thinking Computer 
(New York: Springer, 2008). 
91 Nilsson, supra note 1 at 123; The game is available online: <chessgames.com/perl/chessgame?gid=1356927>. 
However, “it was only after a long line of improvements in the sixties and seventies—contributed by groups at 
Carnegie Mellon, Stanford, MIT, The Institute for Theoretical and Experimental Physics at Moscow, and 
Northwestern University—that chess-playing programs started gaining proficiency.” The 100 Year Study, supra note 
22 at 13. 
92 Stuart Shieber, ed, The Turing Test: Verbal Behavior as the Hallmark of Intelligence (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 
2004) Introduction.  
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survey such as a Gallup poll.” Instead, Turing offered to “replace the question by another, which 
is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words.”93  
Unlike a metric measurement or other technical tests, “the identification of the pertinent 
properties for intelligence are subtle, and ramified widely in the foundation of the philosophy of 
the mind.”94 Turing’s test was designed to establish which element in the “game” is human and 
which is machine through verbal interrogation; if the interrogator cannot ascertain which of the 
players is human, the machine has passed the imitation game, since the machine is able to imitate 
human behaviour. However, even if a machine does “pass” the imitation test and “tricks” the 
human interrogator, does it mean that this machine is indeed capable of thoughts and possesses 
intelligence?95 
The first stage of AI development following the Turing era, was nicknamed the “Toy 
Problem” stage. As Nils Nilsson explains, “Solving puzzles, playing games such as chess and 
checkers,96 proving theorems, answering simple questions, and classifying visual images were 
among some of the problems tackled by the early pioneers during the 1950s and early 1960s.”97 
During that decade, three important meetings coincided with the emergence of AI as a full-fledged 
field of research: the 1955 Session on Learning Machines that was held in conjunction with the 
1955 Western Joint Computer Conference in Los Angeles; the 1956 Summer Research Project on 
AI held at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire; and the 1958 symposium on the 
                                                          
93 Turing, supra note 44 at 433.  
94 Shieber, supra note 92. 
95 Ibid. See also Michael Scriven, “The Mechanical Concept of Mind” (1953) 62:246 Mind 230. 
96 Nilsson, supra note 1 at 253 concludes: “These years, the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, saw computer chess 
programs gradually improving from beginner-level play to middle-level play. Work on computer chess during the next 
two decades would ultimately achieve expert-level play […].” 
97 Nilsson, supra note 1 at 71. 
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Mechanization of Thought Processes held at the National Physical Laboratory, Teddington, 
Middlesex, England.98 
The Dartmouth workshop is considered the first conference to coin the term AI.99 The 
workshop was spearheaded by the founding fathers of AI: John McCarthy (mathematician), 
Nathaniel Rochester (computer scientist), Claude Shannon (mathematician) and Marvin Minsky 
(cognitive scientist).100 The scope of the workshop was described in the proposal written by 
McCarthy for the Rockefeller Foundation in August 1955:101 
“The study is to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any 
other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can 
be made to simulate it. An attempt will be made to find how to make machines use language, 
form abstractions and concepts, solve kinds of problems now reserved for humans, and 
improve themselves … 
… For the present purpose the artificial intelligence problem is taken to be that of making 
a machine behave in ways that would be called intelligent if a human were so behaving.”  
The Mechanization of Thought Processes symposium was the third important event in the field of 
AI. Held in the UK in 1958, only a few years after the conclusion of the Dartmouth workshop, the 
symposium’s goal was “to bring together scientists studying artificial thinking, character and 
pattern recognition, learning, mechanical language translation, biology, automatic programming, 
                                                          
98 Ibid at 73. 
99 McCorduck, supra note 3 at 96, opines: “A dispute occurred over what the new field should be named. Although 
the conference was officially called The Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence, many 
attendees balked at that term, invented by [John] McCarthy.” McCorduck further quoted McCarthy recollections from 
the conference stating “I [McCarthy] won’t swear that I hadn’t seen it before … but artificial intelligence wasn’t a 
prominent phrase particularly. Someone may have used it in a paper or a conversation or something like that, but there 
were many other words that were current at the time. The Dartmouth workshop made that phrase dominate the others.” 
100 Nilsson, supra note 1 at 80. Nilsson concludes that “the 1956 workshop is considered to be the official beginning 
of serious work in artificial intelligence, and Minsky, McCarthy, Newell, and Simon came to be regarded as the 
‘fathers’ of AI.” 
101 Ibid at 77; The Dartmouth Proposal, supra note 43. 
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industrial planning and clerical mechanization.”102 Several of the papers that were presented during 
this symposium influenced the history of AI significantly. 
From the early stages of AI development, researchers felt confident enough to share their 
prediction about the foreseeability of AI success. Herbert Simon, for example, stated that “within 
10 years a computer would be chess champion, and a significant mathematical theorem would be 
proved by machine.”103 These predictions would come true four decades later.  
During the 1950s and 1960s, scientists were focused on the Logic Theorist (LT) software104 
as well as pattern recognition105 of two-dimensional segments such as photographs or pages. 
Russell and Norvig outline three difficulties AI faced during that decade. First, “early programs 
knew nothing of their subject matter; they succeeded by means of simple syntactic 
manipulations.”106 The attempts to translate Russian scientific papers after Sputnik’s launch in 
1957 serve as a vivid example of this difficulty. As every Google-translate user knows today, it is 
highly complex to translate words in their original context, and an accurate translation requires a 
background in both languages to resolve ambiguities. For this reason, the early attempts to use 
programs in these efforts failed miserably. Subsequently, the US government dropped the idea and 
all the funding for academic translation was cancelled. The second difficulty “was the intractability 
of many of the problems that AI was attempting to solve.”107 Third, there were “some fundamental 
limitations on the basic structures being used to generate intelligent behavior.”108  
                                                          
102 Nilsson, supra note 1 at 81, quoting the preface for the symposium.  
103 Russell & Norvig, supra note 6 at 21. 
104 LT was invented by three scientists – Allen Newell, Herbert Simon and Cliff Shaw – associated with RAND 
corporation in Santa Monica and Carnegie Tech in Pittsburgh. See McCorduck, supra note 3 at 104-108. LT is 
considered one of the first AI programs.  
105 The process of analyzing images, signals, or voices and classifying it into categories. See Nilsson, supra note 1 at 
89. 
106 Russell & Norvig, supra note 88 at 21. 
107 Ibid.  
108 Ibid at 22.  
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During the 1960s and into the 1970s, AI research progressed modestly.109 Developments 
in the 1960s were influenced by several factors, including new computer languages, computer 
vision,110 mobile robots,111 problem-solving of mechanizing intelligent behaviour,112 government 
agencies support,113 and the founding of the Automatic Language Processing114 Advisory 
Committee (ALPAC).115 Books116 and conferences also promoted developments in the field of AI 
during this decade.117  
The 1970s saw a shift from “toy problems” and controlled laboratory environments toward 
applied work dealing with “real world” issues.118 Nilsson points to two possible reasons for this 
                                                          
109 Nilsson, supra note 1 at 167, explains: “Achievements during the preceding years, even though modest in 
retrospect, were exciting and full of promise … AI entered a period of flowering that led to many new and important 
inventions.” 
110 Ibid at 169. In the early 1960s, Woodrow W Bledose, Charles Bisson, and Helen Chan, with the support of the 
CIA, developed facial recognition techniques. However, “[f]ace recognition programs of the 1960s and 1970s had 
several limitations. They usually required that images be of faces of standard scale, pose, expression, and 
illumination.” Ibid at 173. 
111 Ibid at 213. During that time, several groups began to work on mobile robots. 
112 Ibid at 157-160. 
113 Such as the office Naval Research (ONR) and the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). 
114 Nilsson, supra note 1 at 141, explains the concept of Natural Language Processing: “Beyond pattern recognition 
of individual alphanumeric characters, whether they be of fixed font or handwritten, lies the problem of understanding 
strings of characters that form words, sentences, or larger assemblages of text in a “natural” language, such as 
English.”  
115 Ibid at 150, refers to John R Pierce et al, Language and Machines: Computers in Translation and Linguistics 
(Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1966) ALPAC Report. In 1968 ALPAC changed its name to the 
Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL). W John Hutchins stated that the pessimistic report of ALPAC at 
the beginning of the decade resulted in an end to research in this area: “The influence of the ALPAC report was 
profound. It brought a virtual end to MT research in the USA for over a decade and MT was for many years perceived 
as a complete failure ... The focus of MT activity switched from the United States to Canada and to Europe.” Hutchins 
therefore calls the period between 1967 and 1976 “the quiet decade.” Nilsson, supra note 1 at 237. See also W John 
Hutchins, “Machine Translation: A Brief History” in E F K Koerner & R E Asher, eds, Concise History of the 
Language Sciences: From the Sumerians to the Cognitivists (New York: Pergamon Press, 1995) at 431-445. 
116 Such as Edward A Feigenbaum & Julian Feldman, Computers and Thought (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963); Nils 
J Nilsson, Learning Machines: Foundations of Trainable Pattern-Classifying Systems (McGraw-Hill, 1965); Frank 
Rosenblatt, John T Farrow & Sam Rhine, “The Transfer of Learned Behavior from Trained to Untrained Rats by 
Means of Brain Extracts. I” (1966) 55 PNAS 548; Marvin Minsky & Seymour Papert, Perceptrons: An Introduction 
to Computational Geometry (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969); Nils J Nilsson, Problem-Solving Methods in Artificial 
Intelligence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971); James R Slagle, Artificial Intelligence: The Heuristic Programming 
Approach (New York: McGraw-Hill Book, 1971); Bertram Raphael, The Thinking Computer: Mind Inside Matter 
(San Francisco: W H Freeman, 1976). 
117 Nilsson, supra note 1 at 155 and 261. In 1969, Donald E Walker and Alistair Holden organized the International 
Joint Conference on AI (IJCAI) in Washington DC. It was the first large AI-devoted conference. Subsequent 
conferences were held in London (1971), North America, and other regions of the world. 
118 Ibid at 265. 
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shift: the increase in power of AI methods and US government investment in research relevant to 
military needs.119 The 1970s witnessed an increase in speech recognition research as well,120 and 
a study group was formed “to make recommendations concerning the launching of a major 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) – supported project in speech 
understanding.”121  
By the mid-1970s, the pressure for militarily useful systems intensified, and DARPA 
focused on shifting resources based on the agenda of the US Department of Defense (DoD).122 
Computer vision “grew into a highly developed subspecialty of AI, joining other specialized areas 
such as natural language processing, robotics, knowledge representation, and reasoning.”123 In 
1976, DARPA launched its Image Understanding Program. The goals of the program were 
outlined in a 1977 workshop: “The Image Understanding Program is planned to be a five year 
research effort to develop the technology required for automatic and semiautomatic interpretation 
and analysis of military photographs and related images.”124 By 1979, the Image Understanding 
Program’s goals extended to mapping and cartography.125 Though it was supposed to end in 1981, 
it ended up lasting until 2001.126 
                                                          
119 Ibid. See also Joseph Weizenbaum, Computers, Power, and Human Reason: from Calculation to Judgment (San 
Francisco: W H Freeman, 1976) at 271-2, arguing that AI technology originated in the academia and military.  
120 Nilsson, supra note 1 at 267. Speech recognition is “the process of converting an acoustic stream of speech input, 
as gathered by a microphone and associated electronic equipment, into a text representation of its component words.” 
The process is complicated because many words sound similar. Attempts to develop speech recognition began at Bell 
Laboratories in the 1930s. The work continued during the 1950s and the 1960s. Ibid at 269.  
121 Ibid at 270. The study group held several meetings and delivered its final report to DARPA. In 1971, Larry Roberts 
established at DARPA a five-year speech-understanding project based largely on the study group’s work. 
122 Ibid at 310. Nilsson describes the suggestions of George Heilmeier (DARPA’s then-director): “[G]et computers to 
read Morse code in the presence of other code and noise; get computers to identify/detect key words in a stream of 
speech; solve DoD’s ‘software problem,’; make a real contribution to command and control, and; do a good thing in 
sonar.” Ibid at 312. 
123 Ibid at 327. 
124 Ibid at 338. 
125 Ibid at 339. 
126 Ibid at 340: “As Ohlander [Navy Commander Ron Ohlander was supervising the DARPA project] said, the IU 
program was extended beyond its projected five-year lifetime. It is said that even as early as 1984, DARPA had spent 
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The early 1980s saw progress in expert systems and AI technologies such as image and 
speech understanding, as well as natural language processing. This accompanied dramatic progress 
in communications technology, computer networks, and processing technology.127 The American 
Association for Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)128 was founded in this decade, as was Japan’s Fifth 
Generation Computer System AI initiative.129 The goal of the Japanese initiative “was to produce 
computers that could perform AI-style inferences from large data and knowledge bases and 
communicate with humans using natural language.”130 The Fifth Generation, besides having 
sophisticated software, was built to involve many parallel processors using ultra-large-scale 
integration.131  
Growing Japanese dominance in consumer electronics and manufacturing made the 
American computer industry worry that its world leadership in technology might be weakening. 
The nonprofit Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC) was therefore 
formed in 1983. The MCC focused on four areas: advanced computer architectures, software 
technology, microelectronics packaging, and computer-aided design of very large-scale 
integration circuitry.132 Concern about the Japanese initiative contributed to DARPA’s new 
                                                          
over $4 million on this effort. One potential application was computer vision for robot-controlled military vehicles – 
a component of DARPA’s ‘Strategic Computing’ program.” 
127 Ibid at 359. 
128 Ibid at 343. Founded in 1980. Known today as the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence. 
During the 1980s, membership in the AAAI reached a peak of more than 16,000 people. Ibid at 344. 
129 The phrase “Fifth Generation” derived from earlier generations of computer technology such as World War II First 
Generation vacuum tubes, 1959 Second Generation transistors (that were connected with copper wires), 1960s Third 
Generation small-scale integration, and the 1970s Fourth Generation very large-scale integration. 
130 Nilsson, supra note 1 at 349. 
131 Ibid. In small-scale integration, “transistors and other components were fabricated on single silicon wafer ‘chips,’ 
and the several chips comprising a computer were connected together by wires.” In very large-scale integration, “entire 
microprocessors could be put on a single chip.” 
132 Ibid at 354. 
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“Strategic Computing Program”,133 in which AI played a major role.134 The British reacted to the 
Japanese project by forming a committee,135 while the European Economic Community 
established the European Strategic Program of Research in Information Technology (ESPRIT).136 
Throughout the 1980s, AI enjoyed increased popularity and commercial success. “New 
results unfolded in all of its subfields, including reasoning and representation, machine learning,137 
natural language processing, and computer vision.”138 In the beginning of the 1980s many, 
including government and industry leaders, shared great expectations of the potential for AI. As 
Russell and Norvig offer, “Overall, the AI industry boomed from a few million dollars in 1980 to 
billions of dollars in 1988, including hundreds of companies building expert systems, vision 
systems, robots, and software and hardware specialized for these purposes.”139 
However, this honeymoon period did not last, and the end of the decade was nicknamed 
the “AI Winter”.140 During the AI Winter, funding to AI was cut, and many companies went out 
of business. The common explanation for the change toward AI research is the high expectations 
                                                          
133 According to Nilsson, ibid at 362, the program had three major applications in mind to gain military support: 
“Pilot's Associate (for the Air Force), an aircraft carrier ‘Battle Management System’ (for the Navy), and an 
‘Autonomous Land Vehicle’ (for the Army).” We might as well say that the idea for self-driving cars was planted 
back then. 
134 Ibid at 359-361. As Nilsson explains, “During the decade from 1983 to 1993 DARPA spent just over $1 billion on 
SC.9 The plan envisioned supporting two main thrusts, namely, major projects that would build specific applications 
and basic research to develop the “technology base” that would be needed for those applications.” Ibid at 361. 
135 Ibid at 355.  
136 Ibid at 356. ESPRIT was EU’s response to the Japanese initiative and its goal was to foster transnational 
collaboration within the EU and among research industries, organizations, and academic institutes. 
137 The term Machine-Learning (or ML) is often conflated or misused with the term artificial intelligence. However, 
while AI might include ML, ML is only a particular type of AI. ML describing an algorithm’s ability to improve with 
experience without being programmed when provided with enough data. See also David Lehr & Paul Ohm, “Playing 
with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn about Machine Learning” (2017) 51:2 UC Davis L Rev 653 at 655. 
Lehr and Ohm explain ML as “the name for a large family of techniques used for sophisticated new forms of data 
analysis that are becoming key tools of prediction and decision-making.” They divide the process of ML into eight 
steps: “problem definition, data collection, data cleaning, summary statistics review, data partitioning, model 
selection, model training, and model deployment.” 
138 Nilsson, supra note 1 at 433. 
139 Russell & Norvig, supra note 88 at 24. 
140 Nilsson, supra note 1 at 345; See also The 100 Year Study, supra note 22 at 51. 
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driven by the over-optimism of AI scientists. When the realization grew that an AI singularity was 
not on the horizon, confidence in AI’s ability sank, and, with it, funding.141  
The late 1980s also marked the growing interest of the legal community in AI. One 
significant event occurred in May 1987 with the first international conference on AI & law (known 
since as ICAIL) in Boston, US.142 The ICAIL is considered the “birth of an AI and Law 
community.”143 Few other indications for the emergence of an AI & Law community followed the 
establishment of what would soon become ICAIL traditions. First came the EU Jurix conferences 
that have been held since 1988 annually. Second came the founding, in 1992, of the AI & Law 
Journal. Third came the holding of the international association for AI and Law inaugural meeting 
in 1991 during the third ICAIL.144  
1.2.3 Current Trends in AI – Assessing the AI Potential and Risks  
1.2.3.1 The (Re)emergence of AI Technology  
The 1990s and 2000s marked a new era for AI as developments in computer science (especially in 
neural-networks in the mid-2000s) increased its potential.145 Since then there were several 
significant achievements, mainly after the 1997 victory of IBM’s Deep Blue computer over the 
chess champion Garry Kasparov.146 In 2011, IBM’s Watson won the trivia game show Jeopardy!, 
                                                          
141 Nilsson, ibid at 409, indicates that during the AI winter membership in the AAAI fell, DARPA budget to AI was 
cut from 47 million dollars to 31 million dollars, and “[a]dvertising in the AI Magazine dropped … as did participation 
by government and industry in AI conference exhibits. Several AI companies closed their doors, and AI research at 
some of the larger computer hardware and software companies was terminated.” 
142 Trevor Bench-Capon et al, “A history of AI and Law in 50 Papers: 25 Years of the International Conference on AI 
and Law” (2012) 20 AI & L 216 [AI & Law in 50 papers]. 
143 AI & Law in 50 papers, ibid at 217. Many central ideas in the AI field were introduced during ICAIL and developed 
in the following conferences. 
144 Ibid. 
145 The neural-networks developments could be attributed to Geoffrey Hinton’s research: “The team showed that these 
networks, which could automatically process unlabelled data, could be more effective at a wide range of tasks, such 
as image and speech recognition, than the more conventional algorithms then in use.” AI in the UK report, supra note 
55 at 18. 
146 Preparing for the Future of AI Report, supra note 45. 
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and in the same year DARPA developed CALO (Cognitive Agent that Learns and Organizes), 
which would lead to Apple’s Siri.147 In early 2016, an AI computer (AlphaGo) defeated a human 
master in the game of Go,148 and in January 2017, Libratus, an AI computer program, beat the best 
poker players in the world in matches worth more than $1.7 million USD in chips.149  
Machines are outsmarting humans not only in games but also in the labour market. 
Algorithms are increasingly being used in fields like insurance, finance, human resources and 
medicine.150 Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett and Albert Yoon offer that “[m]achines today not 
only perform mechanical or manual tasks once performed by humans, but they are also performing 
thinking tasks, where it was long believed that human judgment was indispensable. From self-
driving cars to self-flying planes, and from robots performing surgery on a pig to artificially 
intelligent personal assistants, so much of what was once unimaginable is now reality.”151 
These advancements in AI have become possible as a result of developments in AI 
research. Russell and Norvig suggest that one of the most important effects on AI research was the 
Internet: AI systems become very common in web-based applications, and AI technologies 
underlie many Internet tools such as search engines.152 During that time, researchers were drawn 
back to early aspirations to create a general intelligent agent – AI that can perform a wide range of 
                                                          
147 Ibid.  
148 Go is an abstract strategy game invented in China 5,500 years ago. See Wikipedia, “Go (game)” (last edited 2 
October 2018), online: <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Go_(game)>. Dana Mackenzie, “Update: Why this week’s man-
versus-machine Go match doesn’t matter (and what does)” (15 March 2016), online: Science 
<sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/update-why-week-s-man-versus-machine-go-match-doesn-t-matter-and-what-
does>; Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett & Albert H Yoon, “Focus Feature: Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, and the 
Future of Law” (2016) 66 UTLJ 423. 
149 Olivia Solon, “Oh the humanity! Poker computer trounces humans in big step for AI” (31 January 2017), online: 
The Guardian <theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/30/libratus-poker-artificial-intelligence-professional-human-
players-competition>. 
150 Alarie, Niblett & Yoon, supra note 148. 
151 Ibid at 424. 
152 Russell & Norvig, supra note 88 at 26-27. 
28 
 
tasks and can learn and use knowledge in a similar way to humans.153 Further, AI has become 
dominant in other fields, creating a mixture of approaches which in turn speeds up progress in 
areas such as robotic cars.154  
The US AI Strategic Plan describes three waves of technological advancement in recent 
decades. The first focused on handcrafted knowledge, with a strong rule-based expert system “in 
which knowledge was collected from a human expert, expressed in ‘if-then’ rules, and then 
implemented in hardware.” The second wave began with the new millennium and characterized 
by the advancement of machine learning.155 The current wave of progress began around 2010 and 
is driven by three factors.156 First is the availability of big data from sources including social media, 
business, e-commerce, science, and government.157 Second, these data provide the raw material 
for improving machine-learning approaches and algorithms.158 Third, the latter in turn rely on the 
capabilities of more powerful computers.159  
In a hearing before the US Senate Committee on Commerce Subcommittee on Space, 
Science and Competitiveness in 2016,160 Eric Horvitz concurred with the assessment that a key 
                                                          
153 Ibid at 27. The most known example is John Laird, Allen Newell, and Paul Rosenbloom SOAR project. Laird 
explains the whole agent capabilities and concept: “These capabilities include interacting with dynamic complex 
environments, pursuing a wide variety of tasks, using large bodies of knowledge, planning, and continually learning 
from experience … our approach to developing human-level agents is to study the cognitive architecture underlying 
general intelligence … A cognitive architecture provides the fixed computational structures that form the building 
blocks for creating generally intelligent systems.” John E Laird, The Soar Cognitive Architecture (Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, 2012) at 1. 
154 Russell & Norvig, supra note 88 at 27. 
155 US AI Strategic Plan, supra note 45 at 12.  
156 It seems that we are moving toward a next phase of AI progress – explanatory and general AI technologies. See 
US AI Strategic Plan, supra note 45 at 14. 
157 As Russell & Norvig, supra note 88 at 27, provide: “Throughout the 60-year history of computer science, the 
emphasis has been on the algorithm as the main subject of study. But some recent work in AI suggests that for many 
problems, it makes more sense to worry about the data and be less picky about what algorithm to apply.” 
158 Russell & Norvig, ibid at 28, further explain: “[I]n AI—the problem of how to express all the knowledge that a 
system needs—may be solved in many applications by learning methods rather than hand-coded knowledge 
engineering, provided the learning algorithms have enough data to go on.” 
159 Preparing for the Future of AI Report, supra note 45 at 6, relying on the 100 Year Study, supra note 22 at 8-9. 
160 Eric Horvitz statement to the US Senate Committee on Commerce Subcommittee on Space, Science and 
Competitiveness, Reflections on the Status and Future of Artificial Intelligence (30 November 2016) at 3, online (pdf): 
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factor in the rate of AI development is “the availability of unprecedented streams of data, coupled 
with drops in the cost of storing and retrieving that data.”161 Other important factors “include 
dramatic increases in available computing power, and jumps in the prowess of methods for 
performing machine learning and reasoning. The past thirty years of AI research also saw the rise 
and maturation of methods for representing and reasoning under uncertainty.”162  
As the US AI Strategic Plan has indicated: “[F]rom 2013 to 2015 the number of Web of 
Science-indexed journal articles mentioning ‘deep learning’ increased six-fold ... The trends also 
reveal the increasingly global nature of research, with the United States no longer leading the world 
in publication numbers, or even publications receiving at least one citation.”163 Further, the US AI 
Strategic Plan stated a sharp increase “in the number of patents that use the term ‘deep learning’ 
or ‘deep neural net’ … a four-fold increase in venture capital directed to AI startups” (between 
2013 and 2014) and other significant implications on financial systems and large businesses.164 
It seems that humanity has already passed through the three routes described by 
McCorduck.165 We are now climbing the steps toward the next route: singularity. This route is 
much different from the others since in many ways humans might not be able to control their pace 
                                                          
<erichorvitz.com/Senate_Testimony_Eric_Horvitz.pdf> [Horvitz Report]. See also Eric Horvitz, “One Hundred Year 
Study on Artificial Intelligence: Reflections and Framing” (2014), online: <ai100.stanford.edu/reflections-and-
framing>. Eric Horvitz is a distinguished computer scientist and the managing director of Microsoft’s main lab. See 
his website <erichorvitz.com>. 
161 Horvitz Report, supra note 160 at 3. 
162 Ibid. 
163 US AI Strategic Plan, supra note 45 at 12. Lawyers also began expressing their own interest in AI. In 2012, marking 
25 years of legal research in the field of AI, the AI & Law Journal selected 50 papers from the thirteen ICAIL 
conferences providing an interesting overview of the legal development in the AI field. The ‘AI & Law in 50 papers’ 
“consists of a discussion of 50 papers that first appeared at ICAIL, but in so doing it provides something of a history 
of the field, and an opportunity to reflect on progress made and lessons learned.” AI & Law in 50 papers, supra note 
142 at 217. 
164 US AI Strategic Plan, supra note 45 at 12. 
165 McCorduck, supra note 3. 
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– or turn back. None can tell what we might find when we push forward in this direction. 
Humanity’s dreams (or nightmares) may come true. 
1.2.3.2 Regulating AI166 
Recent developments have stirred both interest in and concern about the AI revolution. Several 
authors have discussed the urgency with which we must think about prudent AI policy and have 
offered suggestions for regulatory changes that can minimize risks without hindering innovation. 
Under former US president, Barack Obama, the US has made significant progress in developing 
AI policy. 
The Obama administration formed the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) 
subcommittee on machine learning and AI. Soon after, NSTC instructed the Networking and 
Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) subcommittee to establish a 
National AI Research and Development (R&D) Strategic Plan, founding a “task force” on AI to 
shape the US Federal Strategic Plan for AI R&D.  
The US AI Strategic Plan supports priorities areas that are unlikely to be addressed by the 
industry itself167 “and thus areas that are most likely to benefit from Federal investment.”168 The 
US AI Strategic Plan’s report concluded with two recommendations: First, “[d]evelop an AI R&D 
implementation framework to identify S&T [science and technology] opportunities and support 
effective coordination of AI R&D investments”; second, “[s]tudy the national landscape for 
                                                          
166 For a broader discussion see Gaon & Stedman, supra note 31.  
167 US AI Strategic Plan, supra note 45 at 3. The US AI Strategic Plan established objectives for federal government-
funded projects both within and outside the government. The goal of the research is “to produce new AI knowledge 
and technologies that provide a range of positive benefits to society, while minimizing the negative impacts.” The 
report identifies seven strategic priorities for federally-funded AI research: make long-term investments in AI 
research; develop effective methods for human-AI collaboration; understand and address the ethical, legal, and societal 
implications of AI; ensure the safety and security of AI systems; develop shared public datasets and environments for 
AI training and testing; measure and evaluate AI technologies through standards and benchmarks; and better 
understand the national AI R&D workforce needs. 
168 Ibid at 15. 
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creating and sustaining a healthy AI R&D workforce.”169 The Obama administration published 
two additional reports on future considerations on AI: “Preparing for the Future of AI” and “AI 
and the Economy”. Both reports survey expected changes (market, labour force, etc.), AI and 
automation potential to the US economy and make recommendations.170  
In Canada, the 2017 and the 2018 budgets emphasized Canada’s strategic plan in the 
“digital future”, committing $125 million in its 2017 budget to launch a “Pan-Canadian Artificial 
Intelligence Strategy for research and talent,” and $1.7 billion over five years for research in the 
2018 budget.171 The 2017 budget set the stage for building an AI policy in Canada by shifting 
resources toward AI R&D.172 The task of managing the AI funds was assigned to the Canadian 
Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), which will implement the AI Strategy in order to 
promote collaboration between Canada’s main centres of expertise. 
Following the 2017 budget, the Federal Government has recognized the strategic 
importance of AI to Canada and has invested heavily in AI including earmarked $950 million to 
fund the AI superclusters and executing AI strategy.173 Among Canada’s provinces, Ontario’s AI 
initiatives focus mainly on education.174 According to a recent report, Canadian efforts are starting 
                                                          
169 Ibid at 4. 
170 Preparing for the Future of AI Report, supra note 45; AI & the Economy White Paper, supra note 4.  
171 Ministry of Finance, Budget 2017: Building a Strong Middle Class (22 March 2017) at 104, online (pdf): 
<budget.gc.ca/2017/docs/plan/budget-2017-en.pdf>. The 2018 budget reinforces Canada’s commitment to AI 
research, see Ministry of Finance, Equality + Growth: A Strong Middle Class (27 February 2018) at 85 and 93, online 
(pdf): <budget.gc.ca/2018/docs/plan/budget-2018-en.pdf>. 
172 Budget 2017, ibid at 104: “Budget 2017 proposes to provide $125 million to launch a Pan-Canadian Artificial 
Intelligence Strategy for research and talent.”  
173 Ibid at 103-4; Ontario’s AI Opportunity Report, supra note 28 at 18. A “cluster” is a group of companies that work 
together on a specific project. A supercluster builds on that idea into a larger scope of the group. The supercluster 
initiative “convene industry players, with collaborative organizations, funding, and research institutions to enable 
projects that individual companies would be incapable of tackling alone due to a lack of funds, ideas, or specific skill 
sets.” Ontario’s AI Opportunity Report, ibid at 19. 
174 Vector Institute is the leading AI research center in Ontario (and in Canada), funded by CIFAR and affiliated with 
several universities in Ontario. Ontario’s AI education initiatives also include investment in STEM (Science, 
Technology, Engineering and Math) and AI related education (like the government aim to have 1,000 annual Master 
level graduates in applied AI-related fields). Ontario’s AI Opportunity Report, supra note 28 at 20-21. In that regard, 
Ontario’s vision correlates with the UK and the US vision – making AI education a priority.  
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to pay off and “[t]he country is being recognized on the world stage for creating products and 
services that are leading the field.”175 
Matthew Castel and Jean Gabriel Castel have outlined several policy considerations that 
provincial and the federal governments should address regarding AI risks and concerns.176 They 
suggest imposing a legal status on self-driving cars and other AIs and robots,177 and recommend 
introducing a registration system for advanced robots.178 The Castels go as far as to support 
entitling AI to the full protections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a bold, and 
somewhat premature, proposal.179 I share the Castels’ view that the most pressing issue in the field 
of AI is self-driving cars and their concern that the current laws in Canada are not suitable for 
introducing this technology as well as other urgent challenges posed by developments in AI.180 
                                                          
175 Ontario’s AI Opportunity Report, supra note 28 at 21. The report provides several examples: 16-bit (Toronto, 
medical diagnosis), Layer 6 (finance), Acerta Analytics Solutions (Kitchener, manufacturing industry), Finn.ai 
(Vancouver, finance).  
176 See Matthew E Castel & Jean-Gabriel Castel, “The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Canadian Law and Legal 
Profession” (2016) 46 Adv Q 34 [The Impact of AI on Canadian Law]; J G Castel & M Castel, supra note 8. 
177 The Impact of AI on Canadian Law, ibid at 36: “Since the Canadian Constitution does not prevent the provinces 
and territories, or the courts by inventive interpretation, from regulating robots as legal persons or as private or public 
corporeal movable property, it may be wise to settle the nature of their legal status before they attain intelligence 
similar or superior to humans and become fully autonomous, thereby freeing themselves from human control. This 
could be easily done by placing them in a category of legal persons similar to corporations that are endowed with 
juridical personality and have the full enjoyment of civil rights.” Furthermore, the Castels suggest that under certain 
circumstances a robot or an AI might even be liable under criminal law: “If a robot possesses the same attributes as a 
human, it should be treated as a human for the purpose of the criminal law. However, the crimes that it may commit 
and defenses it may use would be more limited.” ibid at 38.  
178 Ibid. Similar ideas for registration technology were raised in regard to 3D printing. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & 
Kennth S Kwan, “3D Printing the Road Ahead: The Digitization of Products When Public Safety Meets Intellectual 
Property Rights - A New Model” (2017) 38 Cardozo L Rev 921 [Yanisky-Ravid & Kwan]. 
179 The Impact of AI on Canadian Law, supra note 176 at 37. It is interesting to note that the Castels point to the 
Charter’s phrasing that does not restrict rights to humans, i.e., persons: “Although the Charter does not mention 
specifically legal persons such as corporations, the interpretation of the words: ‘Everyone’, ‘Every citizen’, ‘Any 
person’, ‘Every individual’, ‘Any member of the public’, ‘Anyone’, ‘Citizen of Canada’ used in different sections of 
the Charter do not exclude them [robots and AI], although some of the rights by their very nature are not available to 
them.” They contend that the words “everyone”, “anyone”, “any member of the public”, and “every individual” are 
synonymous and can apply to AI and robots. 
180 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, address only actions caused by human negligence. Further, the insurance system 
will have to make several changes as well since the current system is based on the human driver experience. 
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In the UK, the Science and Technology Committee of the House of Commons raised the 
call to “establish a RAS [Robotics and Autonomous Systems] Leadership Council.”181 Following 
the announcement, the House of Lords appointed a Select Committee on AI “to consider the 
economic, ethical and social implications of advances in artificial intelligence.”182 The committee 
has recently published its final report on April 2018 asserting that the UK is in a strong position to 
become a leading country in AI development offering several recommendations to mitigate AI 
risks and providing policy suggestions.183  
The EU produced several policy papers further highlighted the need to establish a legal 
mechanism for AI.184 In 2016, the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs urged the EU 
Commission “to consider creating a European agency for robotics and artificial intelligence to 
supply public authorities with technical, ethical and regulatory expertise” (a suggestion that the 
                                                          
181 UK, HC Deb (12 October 2017), vol 145, col 98. The UK House of Commons Report emphasizes the changes that 
progress in the field might induce, such as in employment, educational skills, and, obviously, law. Indeed, the prospect 
of robotics and AI invokes many legitimate concerns.  
182 The committee appointed by the House of Lords on 29 June 2017. See AI in the UK report, supra note 55 at 2.  
183 AI in the UK report, ibid at 126-138. Among the many issues, the committee expresses concern about using biased 
datasets to train AI, and recommends allocating funds to encourage the creation of tools to ensure the quality of 
datasets. In addressing labour AI disruptions, the committee supports government initiatives in developing adult 
training schemes. Further, the committee offers to “consider the adequacy of existing legislation to address the legal 
liability issues of AI and, where appropriate, recommend to Government appropriate remedies to ensure that the law 
is clear in this area. At the very least, this work should establish clear principles for accountability and intelligibility.” 
In considering regulatory measures, the committee expresses reservations from “Blanket AI-specific regulation” and 
believes that existing regulation might suffice at this point.  
184 See EC, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe (2015), online: <eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52015DC0192>; EC, Commission communication on Digitising the European 
Industry (2016), online: <eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0180>; EC, Commission 
communication on Building a European Data Economy (2017), online: <eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2017:9:FIN>, and finally: EC, Mid-Term Review of the Digital Single Market Strategy 
(DSM) - a good moment to take stock (2017), online: <ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/content/mid-term-
review-digital-single-market-dsm-good-moment-take-stock>. GDPR might also affect the usage of dataset for 
machine-learning algorithms. See EC, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ 2016, L119 
[GDPR]. 
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Castels are willing to see adopted in Canada as well).185 Japan,186 China,187 Singapore,188 
Australia189, Israel190 and other countries have invested and are investing resources in emerging 
technologies, and have introduced regulatory changes concerning AI. It seems that all the key 
players in the world are interested in investigating AI’s potential and coming up with the right AI 
policy. 
                                                          
185 European Parliament Press Release, “Robots: Legal Affairs Committee calls for EU-wide rules” (12 January 2017), 
online: <europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20170110IPR57613/robots-legal-affairs-committee-calls-for-eu-
wide-rules>. The committee approved MEP Mady Delvaux’s report. See European Parliament, Committee on Legal 
Affairs, “Motion for a European Parliament Resolution with Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules 
on Robotics” (2015/2103(INL)), online <europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML%2BCOMPARL%2BPE-582.443%2B01%2BDOC%2BPDF%2BV0//EN> [The EU Parliament 
Report]. Following the European Parliament Resolution, the EU Commission has taken steps to address its 
recommendations and in June 2017 published its response reviewing the many legislative initiatives that highlight AI 
challenges including the Digital Single Market Strategy (2015); the Commission Communication on Digitising the 
European Industry (April 2016); the Communication on Building a European Data Economy (January 2017), and the 
mid-term review of the Digital Single Market Strategy (May 2017), online: <eu-nited.net/robotics/news-
events/robotics-news/european-commissions-response-to-the-european-parliaments-resolution-on-civil-law-rules-
on-robotics.html>. 
186 In 2017, NEDO (New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization), which is a government 
organization and plays an important role in Japan’s economic and industrial policies, published a report on AI policy 
– Japan, Strategic Council for AI Technology, Artificial Intelligence Technology Strategy (2017), online (pdf): 
<http://www.nedo.go.jp/content/100865202.pdf>. See also New Robot Strategy (2015), online (pdf): 
<meti.go.jp/english/press/2015/pdf/0123_01b.pdf>. As part of Japan’s “Robotic Revolution” a Robotic Policy Office 
is to be established under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (1 July 2015), online: 
<meti.go.jp/english/press/2015/0701_01.html>. 
187 On 20 July 2017, the China State Council issued guidelines on AI development as part of the “Next Generation 
Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” (China AI Plan). According to the press release, the Chinese government is 
going to focus on promoting trans-boundary research to connect AI with other areas (such as cognitive science, 
psychology, mathematics, and economics), developing a common technology system based on algorithms, data, and 
hardware, creating innovation platforms, and training more AI professionals. See “China issues guideline on artificial 
intelligence development” (20 July 2017), online: 
<english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2017/07/20/content_281475742458322.htm>. The China AI Plan is available 
at <gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/20/content_5211996.htm>. The plan is in Chinese but can translated to English 
using Google Translate. 
188 The Singapore National Research Foundation (NRF) announced a 150 million Singaporean dollar investment over 
the next five years into a new national program to enhance the AI research in Singapore. See the press release at the 
NRF website <nrf.gov.sg/programmes/artificial-intelligence-r-d-programme>. 
189 See e.g. the report concerning self-driving cars at footnote 22; Austl, Innovation and Science Australia, Australia 
2030 Prosperity Through Innovation: A Plan for Australia to Thrive in a Global Innovation Race (Canberra: 
Australian Government, 2017), online (pdf): 
<https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/g/files/net3906/f/May%202018/document/pdf/australia-2030-prosperity-
through-innovation-full-report.pdf> 
190 The Science and Technology Committee at the Knesset (Israel parliament) held a discussion on AI developments 
on 4 June 2018. Prior to the discussion, the Knesset’s Research and Information Center published a special report on 
AI. See Roy Goldsmith, Information about AI (The Knesset, 3 June 2018), online (pdf): Knesset’s Research and 
Information Center <knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m04227.pdf>. 
35 
 
First, why do we need an AI policy to begin with?191 Why do governments need to invest 
in and support areas that are currently driven efficiently by large and well-funded corporations 
such as Google,192 Facebook,193 Microsoft,194 Uber and others? Indeed, there are risks. Although, 
as most scientists have indicated, far less imminent than the dangers posed by North Korea, Iran, 
the war on terror, and global warming, especially since there is no consensus among scientists that 
AI might even pose any significant risks in the future. Why should we not allow the market to 
regulate itself and adopt its own ethical guidelines? 
One reason is that the fact that there are larger risks does not mean we should avoid lower 
level risks posed by AI, algorithms, and machine-learning technology. Another reason, as Ryan 
Calo suggested, is that the industry might not be willing to adopt policies or guidelines unless 
forced to do so.195 The market is not always the best regulator and Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” 
cannot provide the assurances of safety required by the public. This is especially true in markets 
where profit-maximizing interests foster fake news and foreign-government interference in the 
democratic process. Furthermore, in areas in which there is a higher probability of risk, there is an 
even stronger argument for imposing government restrictions. True, given certain liability factors 
– the current laws shift the responsibility to damages inflicted by technology to the programmers 
                                                          
191 Ryan Calo has argued that even the use of the term “policy” in regard to AI is controversial. The Berkman Klein 
Center at Harvard has chosen to describe policy initiatives concerning AI as an “Ethics and Governance of Artificial 
Intelligence Fund.” See Calo – AI Policy, supra note 42. Indeed, AI poses important ethical questions as well. 
However, I share Calo’s opinion that “[e]thics as a construct is notoriously malleable and contested …” and hard to 
enforce while “[p]olicy—in the sense of official policy, at least – has a degree of finality once promulgated.” Ibid at 
408. 
192 See Google’s AI mission – ai.google. Google’s mission as described on the website is to apply research “to real 
world problems to create smarter, more useful technology and help as many people as possible.” 
193 Mark Zuckerberg has recently introduced the AI assistant Jarvis; Facebook’s research focuses on AI as well. See 
<research.fb.com/category/facebook-ai-research-fair>. 
194 Microsoft has been an important contributor to the development of AI.  
195 Calo – AI Policy, supra note 42 at 408: “They are going to prefer ethical standards over binding rules for the 
obvious reason that no tangible penalties attach to changing or disregarding ethics should the necessity arise.” 
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or owners – there is a strong incentive for companies to self-regulate.196 However, the fact that 
several “big players” are involved in different countries makes this goal of self-regulation an even 
bigger challenge. On a more practical level, each company might come up with a different set of 
guidelines and ethical codes for its own agenda and business vision, creating an AI “Tower of 
Babel”. Governments should not leave the policy field in the hands of private corporations.  
For some, AI policy means AI laws. I do not believe that this is the right approach. I share 
Calo’s opinion that “[i]t may not be wise or even feasible to pass general laws about artificial 
intelligence at this early stage.”197 Imposing AI laws and regulations, as some reports suggested, 
can create distraction and uncertainty.198 However, that does not mean that we should avoid any 
government intervention. Crafting an AI policy that can foster the positive effects AI might have 
on society while trying to avoid the negative effects is wise and timely. As Calo offers “[p]olicy 
conveys the necessity of exploration and planning, the finality of law, and the primacy of public 
interest without definitely endorsing or rejecting regulatory intervention.”199  
Policy is the line between laws and regulations and ethical codes and guidelines. It can 
signal to the public and industry where the government is hoping to get without imposing 
restrictive rules at first. Though policy might eventually translate into laws, there are no guarantees 
that a particular policy will be adopted. Further, policy discussions among the government, 
                                                          
196 In a similar manner to the way effective corporate governance can shield corporations against criminal procedures. 
Further, as professor Vaver suggested, companies can insulate themselves from liability by creating offshore shell 
companies or the equivalent one-ship companies as occurs in the marine industry. 
197 The AI in the UK report, supra note 55 at 137 concurs: “Blanket AI-specific regulation, at this stage, would be 
inappropriate. We believe that existing sector-specific regulators are best placed to consider the impact on their sectors 
of any subsequent regulation which may be needed.” 
198 Ontario’s AI Opportunity Report, supra note 28 at 22. 
199 Calo – AI Policy, supra note 42 at 410. 
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academia, consumers, NGOs and the industry is the most efficient way to design careful measures 
that can allow for the development of a given field without endangering public interests.200 
 Calo offers a roadmap for AI policy. In doing so, he discusses challenges in several 
domains in which he believes attention is required, including justice and equity, use of force and 
safety, privacy, and employment. Justice and equity is the capacity to “program” or “translate” 
human values, such as fairness, transparency, accountability, and other moral considerations to 
algorithms and AI systems.201 The concepts of justice, equity, and other abstract forms of thinking 
are what make humans unique. Developing a set of moral and ethical considerations for AI 
programs has great potential in eliminating human bias and inequality.  
There are several indications of design bias in programs “from a camera that cautions 
against taking a Taiwanese-American blogger’s picture because the software believes she is 
blinking […] to a translation engine that associates the role of engineer with being male and the 
role of nurse with being female.”202 Since minorities and other disadvantaged groups are not the 
main concern of the private sector, there is a high likelihood that without government intervention, 
structural bias toward these groups will “echo” within AI programs.203 This brings me to the first 
rule in shaping AI policy: act wherever and whenever there is a low probability that the private 
                                                          
200 I do not share the idea that we need to enact laws for AI at the current time. We should discuss the many possible 
directions that we should take in due course, but imposing strict rules is not wise. As we all know, laws and technology 
do not coexist in harmony and law tends to lag behind technology. Eventually, I fear that enacting laws might prove 
unwise and unnecessary. See Lyria Bennett Moses, “Agents of Change: How the Law ‘Copes’ with Technological 
Change” (2011) 20 Griffith L Rev 764. 
201 Alex Campolo et al, The AI Now Report: The Social and Economic Implications of Artificial Intelligence 
Technologies in the Near Term (22 September 2016), online (pdf): 
<artificialintelligencenow.com/media/documents/AINowSummaryReport_3_RpmwKHu.pdf>.  
202 Calo – AI Policy, supra note 42 at 411.  
203 This can happen through the use of biased data: “[T]he designs may be using models trained on data where a 
particular demographic is underrepresented and hence not well reflected. More white faces in the training set of an 
image recognition AI means the system performs best for Caucasians.” Ibid at 412. 
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sector will address an issue by itself. One way the government can affect these concerns is by 
policing the use of data – the fuel and currency of AI.204 
Future policy challenges include developing rules that can assist in decision-making 
processes, anticipating AI programs that may eventually be able to make certain decisions and 
even replace parts of our legal system. Investing resources in AI decision-making capabilities is 
an important goal for governments.205 As with bias and inequality, it initially seems complex and 
daunting to imagine ways in which AI systems could replace human judges. However, this is not 
necessarily true. Ben Alarie has predicted that the legal standards that currently uphold complex 
sets of rules will be replaced by AI that offers greater reliability, accessibility, and predictability.206  
The current legal system is based on “valve concepts” such as good faith, reasonableness, 
probability and other concepts that are shaped and decided by judges and lawyers. AI might not 
require these set of ambiguous concepts and develop a more reliable and predictable way to 
analyze a legal case and make decisions. In fact, the AI “judge” might provide a solution to one of 
the most challenging struggles in the legal system – equal sentences and damages. Obviously, not 
all decision making can rely on AI, and “[c]ertain decisions, such as the decision to take an 
                                                          
204 Data are indeed a significant concern for IP laws, as I shall develop in the coming chapters. As a recent discussion 
draft by the Canadian Competition Commissioner suggests “[d]ata are increasingly becoming critical input in certain 
markets and may serve as a significant barrier to entry.” Canadian Competition Bureau, “Big data and Innovation: 
Implications for competition policy in Canada: Draft Discussion Paper” (2017) at 15, online (pdf): 
<competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/Big-Data-e.pdf/$file/Big-Data-e.pdf>. On 19 February 2018, the 
Canadian Competition Bureau published its key policy paper for big data and innovation in Canada. See Canada, 
Competition Bureau, Big data and innovation: key themes for competition policy in Canada (Ottawa, 19 February 
2018), online (pdf): <competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/CB-Report-BigData-Eng.pdf/$file/CB-
Report-BigData-Eng.pdf>. 
205 See Joel Tito, “Destination Unknown: Exploring the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Government” (2017) 
Centre for Public Impact Working Paper, online (pdf): 
<publicimpact.blob.core.windows.net/production/2017/09/Destination-Unknown-AI-and-government.pdf>. The 
report outlines four areas in which AI can improve the functioning of governments, in both executive function and 
policy-making: predictive analysis (assessing the value of a given outcome and explaining predictions of known and 
unknown observations); detection (identifying patterns in massive databases; computer vision (collection and analysis 
of information obtained from visual sources); and natural language processing (processing and assessing audio and 
text data). 
206 Alarie, supra note 12 at 447.  
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individual off of life support, raise fundamental concerns over human dignity and thus perhaps 
cannot be made even by objectively well-designed machines.”207  
Finding a way to teach AI abstract concepts that humans find difficult to define (such as 
the concept of justice or good faith) might be a misguided approach.208 However, creating a set of 
rules that AI can follow and embracing AI capabilities to analyze information very quickly is a 
good start. Government policy is important in managing these projects, making sure that rules are 
based on core societal values, creating boundaries and restrictions preventing bias and inequality, 
providing funding, and coordinating efforts between key players like academia, the public and 
private sectors, and initiatives in other countries. As Calo opines, “The end game of designing 
systems that reflect justice and equity will involve very considerable, interdisciplinary efforts and 
is likely to prove a defining policy issue of our time.”209 
 The second domain in which policymaker considerations are required is human safety and 
the use of force. AI may eventually make vital decisions that can affect life, such as the decision 
to shoot a “hostile” target by automated drones or for a self-driving vehicle to choose between 
hitting a pedestrian or crashing into a tree. Indeed, these decisions, while similar, are different in 
many ways. There is a near consensus internationally that “kill” decisions should always be 
reserved for humans and that no AI should be allowed to make these decisions.210 Jean-Gabriel 
and Matthew Castel call for international intervention in developing measures to prevent the 
                                                          
207 Calo – AI Policy, supra note 42 at 414. 
208 Though, we could suggest pointers and factors that AI systems would analyze, much like many cases are decided 
today by “inferior” human judges. See e.g. Samuel Smith Old Brewery (Tadcaster) v Lee (t/a Cropton Brewery), 
[2011] EWHC 1879 (Ch) at 118. In the Yorkshire Bitter trade mark case, Mr. Justice Arnold suggesting factors in 
order to determine honest practice (that is no different from determining good faith). 
209 Calo – AI Policy, supra note 42 at 415. 
210 Ibid at 415-417. See also Heather M Roff & Richard Moyes, “Meaningful Human Control, Artificial Intelligence 
and Autonomous Weapons” (Paper prepared for the Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Systems, UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 11-15 April 2016), online (pdf): <article36.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/MHC-AI-and-AWS-FINAL.pdf>; See also J G Castel & M Castel, supra note 8. 
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production and use of partially or fully automated machines in both civil and international armed 
conflicts.211 As a policy matter, they suggest that AI robots and programs should incorporate legal 
and ethical values based on international humanitarian law.212  
 It is reasonable to assume that AI programs will be integrated into most computer systems 
that are currently affecting and regulating our day-to-day lives. AI will increasingly be deployed 
in airplanes, cars, and various means of transportation (including smart drone delivery); controlling 
our homes’ elevators, cleaning, and heating functions; tracking our moves and caring for us. 
Certain professions such as doctors, lawyers and accountants (all of whom are currently heavily 
regulated) will change or adapt in concert with AI technology. These plausible scenarios 
demonstrate the great potential AI has in preventing accidents and creating a safer and better 
environment for us all.  
AI technology can detect dangers, as well as alert citizens and law enforcement to them. 
However, with this great potential comes risk. AI cyberattacks, for instance, pose a threat. When 
day-to-day life is monitored and operated through AI, these systems are ripe for manipulation in 
ways that can endanger users unless certain measures are put in place by governments. Further, as 
Calo points out, “These applications raise additional questions concerning the standards to which 
AI systems are held and the procedures and techniques available to ensure those standards are 
                                                          
211 See also J G Castel & M Castel, supra note 8 at 5: “Lethal autonomous weapons systems raise important issues. 
For instance, could unmanned partially or fully autonomous robots and drones reliably separate enemy soldiers or 
terrorists from civilians on the battlefield or elsewhere? Would their lack of human emotions prevent them from 
showing mercy or compassion when facing wounded or surrendering human soldiers or civilian victims? So far, 
scientists, computer engineers and programmers have not yet succeeded in developing software or source codes that 
contain new cognitive modules and skills enabling robots to feel emotions essential to our humanity.” 
212 J G Castel & M Castel, supra note 8 at 5; Pascale Fung, “Robots with Heart” (2015) 313 Scientific American 60. 
I doubt whether this suggestion is possible in the future, let alone today. In many countries, the concept of humanitarian 
law is no more than a polite recommendation. If a country were to acquire AI capabilities, I doubt it would decide to 
limit its capabilities. However, this discussion is not within the scope of my dissertation. 
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being met.”213 Establishing safety standards is something governments do all the time in domains 
like food safety, drug approval, traffic rules, and manufacturing.214 The same could apply to AI. 
In the AI policy debate, there are voices arguing that no regulation is needed since, as the 
Subcommittee on Digital Commerce and Consumer Protection Chairman expressed concerning 
self-driving cars, “[This] technology has the potential to dramatically improve safety on our 
nation’s roadways and that is one of the most important reasons to advance the bills we have under 
consideration today.”215 However, “safer than humans” is not good enough.216 Governments 
should set basic rules for AI-based systems and, even more urgently, establish how to regulate 
current technology. For instance, the government might decide to restrict AI technology to specific 
areas for trials or pilot runs.  
A comprehensive proposal that has emerged recently in this area is that of establishing an 
independent oversight body – a National Algorithm Safety Board. The Board would have three 
primary duties: “planning oversight, continuous monitoring by knowledgeable review boards 
using advanced software, and a retrospective analysis of disasters.”217 Anyone looking to develop 
and deploy a major new algorithmic system would be required to submit an algorithm impact 
statement to the Board. These statements would include “[s]tandard questions about who the 
                                                          
213 Calo – AI Policy, supra note 42 at 417. 
214 There are other examples for standardization on a global scale. Take the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) model for example, See <iso.org/about-us.html>. ISO is not a government organization, but it 
is recognized as a leading institute worldwide. According to its website, ISO “have members from 162 countries and 
783 technical bodies.” ISO might be an alternative model for AI standardization, which is not regulated/enforced by 
countries, but is accepted on a voluntary consensus-based by the international community. 
215 Opening Statement of Chairman Greg Walden Subcommittee on Digital Commerce and Consumer Protection Self-
Driving Vehicle Legislation (27 June 2017), online (pdf): 
<docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20170627/106182/HHRG-115-IF17-MState-W000791-20170627.pdf>. 
216 Calo – AI Policy, supra note 42 at 417 
217 Ben Shneiderman, “The Dangers of Faulty, Biased, or Malicious Algorithms Requires Independent Oversight” 
(2016) 113:(48) PNAS 13539, online (pdf): <pnas.org/content/113/48/13538.full.pdf>. 
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stakeholders are, and what the impacts might be,” which would “ensure that implementers think 
carefully about potential problems and then propose reasonable solutions.”218  
Being transparent with the Board in advance of deployment helps to minimize concerns 
about having later to de-code the algorithm and its built-in values. It may also be prudent to require 
black-box testing before approval.219 Continuous monitoring would follow the initial approval and 
would be undertaken by knowledgeable inspectors. This ongoing oversight is similar in theory to 
the idea of safety inspections in food processing facilities. This would be possible and meaningful 
because the Board would have approved the algorithm before it was delivered to market, as well 
as inspected and tested the algorithm through its continuous monitoring program. The Board could 
then work with the algorithm’s owner (or any other responsible parties) in order to conduct an 
inquiry or investigation into the harm that was caused. Another example was recently presented 
by Matthew Scherer. Scherer argues for the creation of what he calls an Artificial Intelligence 
Development Act to be administered by a government agency that can certify and label AI systems 
as safe.220  
The technological changes will not happen in days (or months). A transition period in 
which self-driving vehicles will share the roads with regular vehicles is expected. Thus, it is 
important to address the effect of the transition period as well. If safety standards are to be imposed 
on AI technology (including self-driving cars, drones, home assistant robots, etc.), the government 
                                                          
218 Ibid. 
219 Ontario’s AI Opportunity Report, supra note 28 at 22-23, echoes this idea offering to create a regulatory sandbox 
to incentivize domestic innovation: “Companies acting within the sandbox would not need to contend with heavy 
regulatory burdens while still in their infancy and potentially unprofitable.” 
220 Matthew U Scherer, “Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, And 
Strategies” (2016) 29:2 Harv JL & Tech 353 at 394 [Scherer, Regulating AI]. 
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must establish a way to verify whether those standards are met. This process would comprise 
government supervision and certification as well as testing itself.221 
 A different set of policies should be developed to address privacy concerns. Privacy, or the 
lack thereof, has become a significant concern as people have become more involved on the 
Internet over the past two decades. We now perform many of our day-to-day activities via the 
Internet, from using social networks to post pictures (that can pinpoint our exact location) to buying 
products on Amazon and using GPS-based applications to drive. All these applications and online 
systems use our data. This availability of data is what enables technological development: machine 
learning cannot function without access to data. However, the fact that data are so important to the 
development of AI does not mean that we should not find ways to secure the use of our data and 
reserve some level of privacy.  
 The acceleration of AI technology will play an essential role in the privacy discussion. As 
Calo suggests, two main issues threaten our privacy: pattern recognition and access to data. AI can 
identify patterns that humans cannot. These capabilities, which we can expect to improve in the 
future, pose a significant risk to our privacy and threaten to diminish it almost entirely, making 
everything public to some extent. Even if we allow AI to use information that is shared freely, 
such as grocery lists or locations, AI pattern recognition might reveal sensitive information about 
us. “With enough data about you and the population at large, firms, governments, and other 
institutions with access to AI will one day make guesses about you that you cannot imagine – what 
                                                          
221 The AI in the UK report, supra note 55 at 138, recommends monitoring government’s policies closely “and react 
to feedback from academia and industry where appropriate.” 
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you like, whom you love, what you have done”222 – though, as indicated above, this technology 
could also be used for positive purposes like security and making us all safer.223  
Another concern is with access to data and how data are prioritized. Simply put, the ability 
of machine-learning programs to find solutions to an issue is dependent upon the availability and 
quality of the data it has access to. As discussed earlier, data can reflect biases and inequality. 
Thus, regulating the amount of data, the quality of the data, and the priority with which 
organizations can access data are paramount.224 Given that governments control vast amounts of 
data, the decision of access is first and foremost a policy question.225  
From a public policy perspective, governments should adapt guidelines and regulations 
that designate the usage of data for specific causes, provide restrictions to preserve the privacy of 
its citizens, and define the scope of fair data usage.226 In addition, big datasets may also affect the 
                                                          
222 Calo – AI Policy, supra note 42 at 421; See also Tal Zarsky, “Transparent Predictions” (2013) 4 U Ill L Rev 1503. 
Recently, Israel Private Protection Authority (PPA) has examined the broadcasting companies and streaming services 
in Israel (including Netflix). Following the investigation, PPA published its opinion concluding that the information 
that is gathered by the broadcasting companies could, potentially, reveal sensitive information about the viewers and 
is considered “data” under the Privacy Act and regulations. In consequence, PPA instructed the companies to secure 
the information, and to ask for the user/viewer consent for collecting data. See Israel, Private Protection Authority, 
“Statement Concerning Viewers Data by Television Companies” (22 April 2018), online: 
<gov.il/he/Departments/news/_1tv_supervision>.  
223 Ryan Calo, “Can Americans Resist Surveillance?” (2016) 83 U Chicago L Rev 23. Calo discusses the legal 
challenges posed by the availability of data to government: “If everyone in public can be identified through facial 
recognition, and if the ‘public’ habits of individuals or groups permit AI to derive private facts, then citizens will have 
little choice but to convey information to a government bent on public surveillance.” Calo – AI Policy, supra note 42 
at 18. 
224 Amanda Levendowski, “How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem” (2018) 93:2 
Wash L Rev 579. 
225 I am aware of the risks and challenges pose by mega companies (such as Google, Facebook, Apple, Amazon, 
Microsoft, etc.). These companies hold the key to significant amount of data that can affect (in positive or negative 
ways) the development of technology and our privacy. As part of developing an effective AI policy, the governments 
ought to consider if and how to regulate this so-called “private” data. The recent involvement of Russia in the US 
presidential elections has strengthened my position regarding the necessity of some level of regulation over these 
mega companies. I further discuss data barriers in Part III. 
226 Obviously, this issue raises subsequent questions regarding the way governments can incentivize organizations to 
use data for public good. Providing free access to government data for specific organizations or companies could 
prove to be a good policy. 
45 
 
economy: as data are the fuel of AI development, data are worth a lot of money, and therefore the 
government can leverage it as a means of funding.227  
One attempt to regulate data was implemented recently with the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into force on May 2018.228 However, there are some 
difficulties with the GDPR. First, it seems that many experts in the industry do not understand 
some of the rules relating to the usage of data.229 Second, the GDPR is forcing companies to 
explain the algorithms and AI decision process, which is not always possible.230 Machine learning 
is designed to “think on its own” by developing new methods and approaches for a given task.231 
The next area that requires government attention is employment. As discussed in the first 
chapter of this part,232 technological advances in AI will affect markets. As we learned from the 
Industrial Revolution and the Internet, we should expect this to shake the core foundations of 
current professions and create new ones in the process. The AI revolution might happen in stages. 
In the first stage, AI and machine-learning programs will replace humans in technical professions 
                                                          
227 The Impact of AI on Canadian Law, supra note 176 at 48. The Castels address privacy concerns in Canada, stating 
that “[n]either the federal nor the provisional or territorial legislation addresses directly the situation of AI machines 
as collectors, recipients or users of personal information which defines by s.2(1) of the PIPEDA [Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act] as ‘information about an identifiable individual’.” They proposed an 
interesting suggestion, ibid at 49: “Before AI machines are sold … robotic engineers and programmers should be 
required to insert in their software an algorithm with a code of conduct that contains Canadian privacy standards and 
instructions to respect any personal information that they have acquired.” Easier said than done. One of the most 
complex issues is how to create ethical rules and standards for AI and robots. 
228 GDPR, supra note 184. 
229 For example, art 22 “Automated individual decision-making including profiling.” 
230 Cliff Kuang, “Can A.I. Be Taught to Explain Itself?” (21 November 2017), online: The New York Times 
<nytimes.com/2017/11/21/magazine/can-ai-be-taught-to-explain-
itself.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=mini-moth&region=top-
stories-below&WT.nav=top-stories-below>.  
231 See also Lehr & Ohm ,supra note 137. 
232 See footnote 27 above. 
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(or certain elements of those professions).233 However, we can expect subsequent advancements 
to speed up the rate of change.  
Eventually, as Calo predicts, “[V]ery few sectors will remain untouched.”234 In order to 
better prepare for the coming changes, governments should allocate resources and develop specific 
programs in technology, computer science, etc. Further, these programs should be employed on 
three different levels: blue-collar workers in areas in which there is higher probability to be 
affected in the coming decades; universities and other higher education institutions; and even 
elementary schools. These conclusions are shared by almost all the reports I have surveyed above, 
the most recent one in Ontario.235 
                                                          
233 Pasquale points out to the differences between human professionals and its expected AI/Robitc substitutes. 
According to Pasquale, there is a major difference between human “holism” – the ability to integrate facts and values 
to respect the demands of a specific case/event - and the ability to perform tasks by automated AI systems. Pasquale 
argues that, as a result, the “medical care” and “education” we will receive from AI or Robots is expected to be inferior 
to a human skilled professional. See Frank A Pasquale, “Professional Judgment in an Era of Artificial Intelligence and 
Machine Learning” (2019) 46(1) boundary 2, 73. 
234 Calo – AI Policy, supra note 42 at 426. 
235 Ontario’s AI Opportunity Report, supra note 28. 
47 
 
1.3 LEGAL PERSONHOOD FOR AI 
“Siri, do you believe in God? 
Humans have religion. I just have silicon. 
Siri, I insist, do you believe in God? 
I would ask that you address your spiritual questions 
to someone more qualified to comment. 
Ideally, a human.” 
 
Well, Siri might have a point, or does she? 
The debate regarding the personhood of non-humans is well-trodden ground.236 The notion 
of considering non-humans for legal rights goes back to the Middle-Ages, when churches were 
subject to legal rights and animals were held accountable for their “criminal” behaviour.237 
Considering AI to have legal personhood might imply that a similar status ought to be granted to 
                                                          
236 Lawrence B Solum, “Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligence” (1992) 70 NCLR 1231 at 1239. Shlomit 
Yanisky-Ravid, “Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, and Accountability in the 3A Era - The 
Human-like Authors Are Already Here - A New Model” (2017) 2017 Mich St L Rev 659 [Yanisky-Ravid, Generating 
Rembrandt]. See also John C Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963). Alan P Herbert 
once sued a computer in the fictional case of Haddock v The Generous Bank Ltd, Computer 1578/32/W1, published 
in Alan P Herbert, Misleading Cases in the Common Law (London: Methuen, 1927). 
237 Kristin Andrews et al, eds, Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief (New York: Routledge, 2019); Mylan 
Engel Jr & Gary L Comstock, eds, The Moral Rights of Animals (Lexington Books, 2016). Recently, animal’s rights 
became the focus of the legal community after a series of photos were taken by a monkey. In Naruto v Slater, No 
3:2015cv04324 (ND Cal 2016) District Judge William Orrick rejected Naruto’s claims for copyright protection in 
“his” selfie pictures stating that “Naruto is not an ‘author’ within the meaning of the Copyright Act”, ibid at 6. On 
March 2016, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) filed a notice to appeal the District Court’s decision. 
Following the parties’ settlement attempts, the Ninth Circuit denied the motions to vacate the case and ruled in favour 
of Slater finding that “this monkey – and all animals, since they are not human – lacks statutory standing under the 
Copyright Act”, Naruto v Slater, 2018 US App LEXIS 9563 (9th Cir 2018). An appeal to rehear the case was denied. 
See also the US case on the right of free speech for Blackie the Talking Cat, Miles v City Council of Augusta, Georgia, 
710 F (2d) 1542 (11th Cir 1983). See also David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trade-marks, 
2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 115, footnote 328 [Vaver]. Israel’s High Court of Justice considered the legal 
status of animals in the Palestine Mountain Gazelle motion to dismiss a District Outline Plan for the city of Jerusalem. 
“Appellant 6” – the Palestine Mountain Gazelle – joined the other human appellants in arguing that the new outline 
would harm the existence of the Gazelles. Similarly to the Ninth Circuit opinion in Naruto, Justice Elyakim Rubinstein 
held that an animal has no legal standing in court and urged the parties to amend the motion accordingly. See Israel, 
HCJ 466/05 Raz v National Planning Committee (Nevo Publications, 2005).  
48 
 
other subjects such as animals,238 or trees.239 However, this conclusion does not necessarily follow. 
There are many differences between animals and AI, the most prominent being that AI resembles 
human intelligence far more than animal intelligence. In fact, AI poses many human qualities and 
abilities and, in some aspects, even superior to human intelligence. 
There are three main objections to the recognition of AI legal rights: the “only humans 
should be given personhood rights”; the “critical component”; and the “AI is property”.240  
                                                          
238 Solum, supra note 236 at 1261. See also Gunther Teubner, “Rights of Non-Humans? Electronic Agents and 
Animals as New Actors in Politics and Law” (2006) 33 J L & Soc’y 497; Cass R Sunstein, “Can Animals Sue?” in 
Cass R Sunstein & Martha C Nussbaum, eds, Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004) at 251; Laurence H Tribe, “Ten Lessons Our Constitutional Experience Can Teach Us About 
the Puzzle of Animal Rights: The Work of Steven M. Wise” (2001) 7 Animal L 1; Jane Goodall & Steven M Wise, 
“Are Chimpanzees Entitled to Fundamental Legal Rights?” (1997) 3 Animal L 61. In the past century, several cases 
reflected on the rights of cats, dogs, and other animals to be considered as the legal beneficiaries of a trust (the “Terrier 
Trusts” cases providing several amusing examples). In Dean v Stevens, 41 Ch Div 552 [1889] the English Court upheld 
a trust for animals. In Kelly, Re, Cleary v Dillon, [1932] Ir R 255 at 256, a testator stated the following in his will: “I 
leave one hundred pounds sterling to my executors and trustees for the purpose of expending four pounds sterling on 
the support of each of my dogs per year, and I direct that my dogs be kept in the old house at Upper Tullaroan aforesaid. 
Should any balance remain in the hands of my trustees on the death of the last of my dogs I leave same to the Parish 
Priest for the time being of the Parish of Tullaroan for masses for the repose of my soul and the souls of my parents, 
brothers and stepfather.” In deciding to allow the dog’s “allowance”, the court remarked, ibid at 260, that “[i]t was 
suggested that the last of the dogs could in fact not outlive the testator by more than twenty-one years. I know nothing 
of that. The Court does not enter into the question of a dog’s expectation of life. In point of fact neighbour’s dogs and 
cats are unpleasantly long-lived; but I have no knowledge of their precise expectation of life.” See also “Obiter Dicta” 
(1938) 7 Fordham L Rev 286 at 287; Baker v Harmina, 2018 NFCA 15 at para 12 (holding that “[i]n the eyes of the 
law a dog is an item of personal property.”). 
239 Chirstopher D Stone, “Should Trees Have Standing? – Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects” (1972) 45 S Cal 
L Rev 450. Stone “quite seriously” proposed to give “legal rights to forests, oceans, rivers and other so-called ‘natural 
objects’ in the environment-indeed, to the natural environment as a whole”; Chirstopher D Stone, Should Trees Have 
Standing?: Law, Morality, and the Environment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). Last year, Local Māori 
and the government of New Zealand signed a treaty granting the sacred mountain Taranaki legal rights. See Andrew 
Little, Minister of Justice (and Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations) statement: “The legal personality 
requirement recognises the mountain’s status in a similar approach taken with Te Urewera and Te Awa Tupua 
Whanganui River as all Crown-owned land within the National Park will be vested in a legal personality.” Andrew 
Little, “Landmark Day for Taranki Maunga” (20 December 2017), online: <beehive.govt.nz/release/landmark-day-
taranaki-maunga>. 
240 I shall address the prospects of allocating copyright to non-human authors in Part III. Indeed, there are much to 
discuss concerning copyright for non-humans. Both Berne and Rome conventions (as well as the WCT and the WPPT), 
referred to people who are “citizens” or “nationals”. However, I do believe that if we allocate, as the Castels, The 
Impact of AI on Canadian Law, supra note 176, suggested, AI legal or citizens’ rights, these limitations might be 
resolved.  
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1.3.1 Only Natural Humans Deserve Legal Rights 
The first is the most simple and straightforward: only natural human beings deserve to be 
recognized as humans.241 AIs are not humans. Therefore, they do not deserve equal human rights. 
However, we do award legal rights to non-humans: corporations, for example, are legal entities.242 
It seems that this argument takes an anthropocentric approach: “We are humans. Even if AIs have 
all the qualities that make us moral persons, we shouldn’t allow them the rights … because it isn’t 
in our interest to do so.”243 Lawrence Solum argues that this statement “is akin to American slave 
owners saying that slaves could not have constitutional rights simply because they were not white 
or simply because it was not in the interests of whites to give them rights.”244 Similarly, in English 
law, up until the passing of the Married Women’s Property Act 1882, married women were 
                                                          
241 According to legal rights granted to all humans according to international treaties. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948, 10 December 1948, UN, art 6; 16 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
of 1966, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 art 16 (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 
1976) [ICCPR], state that “[e]veryone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.” This 
statement is part of customary international law. 
242 Allocating legal rights to corporations is justified on a moral basis as well. Peter A French, “The Corporation as a 
Moral Person” (1979) 16:3 Am Phil Q 207. Koops, Hildebrandt and Jaquet-Chiffelle provide the following 
observation on French philosophical approach: “French distinguishes between metaphysical, moral, and legal persons, 
pointing out that for many authors legal personhood depends on metaphysical and/or moral personhood. Obviously, 
current positive law does not agree with this position, since no serious argument can be made that a ship or a trust 
fund is either a metaphysical or a moral person.” I share their conclusion that “legal personhood is attributed to enable 
an entity to act in law (e.g., to create legal consequences) and to be held accountable for its actions, while also 
protecting the entity itself from being equated with the role it plays. Currently, all entities besides humans and those 
legal persons recognised by law are considered to be legal objects. This framework also applies to animals, which are 
treated as objects of the rights of their owners in private law, despite an ongoing movement by animal law activists.” 
Bert-Japp Koops, Mireille Hildebrandt & David-Oliver Jaquet-Chiffelle, “Bridging the Accountability Gap: Rights 
for New Entities in the Information Society?” (2010) 11:(2) Minn J L Sci & Tech 497 at 517. Koops, Hildebrandt and 
Jaquet-Chiffelle conduct an extensive review of the literature to examine arguments for and against legal personhood 
for non-humans. 
243 Solum, supra note 236 at 1260. 
244 Ibid at 1261; Stone, supra note 239 at 453-454. Contra Joanna J Bryson, “Robots Should Be Slaves” in Yorick 
Wilks, ed, Close Engagements with Artificial Companions: Key social, Psychological, Ethical and Design Issue (John 
Benjamins Publishing, 2010) at 63-74. Bryson argues that there is no reason to consider robots as persons: 
“[C]ommunicating the model of robot-as-slave is the best way both to get full utility from these devices and to avoid 
the moral hazards mentioned in the previous sections … Our task is to ensure that the majority of the population 
understands that robots are just machines, and that one should spend money and time on them as is appropriate to their 
utility, but not much more.” Similar arguments can be made concerning any AI form.  
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considered subordinate to their husbands’ will under the couverture doctrine.245 Christopher Stone 
observed in his 1972 paper on legal rights for natural objects: “Throughout legal history, each 
successive extension of rights to some new entity has been, theretofore, a bit unthinkable. We are 
inclined to suppose the rightlessness of rightless ‘things’ to be a decree of Nature, not a legal 
convention acting in support of some status quo.”246  
Being human is not an essential condition for legal rights. In fact, legal personhood is 
attributed to funds, associations, and even ships.247 Moreover, this argument does not consider the 
probability of cyborg and synthetic biological applications of AI, in which AI technology might 
not stand alone. There is a chance that AI technology will be integrated into humans, creating new 
entities possessing both human organs and AI-robotic parts. 
1.3.2 The Critical Component Argument 
The “missing something” objections claim that AI lacks a certain component (X) that is essential 
for personhood, and since no AI can possess X, no AI can qualify for personhood rights. The fact 
that AI can learn how to demonstrate X (i.e., can learn how to simulate X) cannot be satisfactory 
                                                          
245 Bridget Hill, Women, Work & Sexual Politics in Eighteenth-century England (Montreal, PQ: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1994). The Married Women’s Property Act 1882, (UK) 45 & 46 Vict Ch 75. 
246 Stone, supra note 239 at 453. He adds at 455: “The fact is, that each time there is a movement to confer rights onto 
some new ‘entity,’ the proposal is bound to sound odd or frightening or laughable. This is partly because until the 
rightless thing receives its rights, we cannot see it as anything but a thing for the use of ‘us’- those who are holding 
rights at the time.” 
247 Marguerite Hogan, “Standing for Nonhuman Animals: Developing a Guardianship Model from the Dissents in 
Sierra Club v. Morton” (2007) 95 Cal L Rev 513 at 522; Koops, Hildebrandt & Jaquet-Chiffelle, supra note 242 at 
499-500. See also Tucker v Alexandroff, 183 US 424 at 438 (1902): “A ship is born when she is launched, and lives 
so long as her identity is preserved. Prior to her launching, she is a mere congeries of wood and iron an ordinary piece 
of personal property…In the baptism of launching, she receives her name, and from the moment her keel touches the 
water, she is transformed, and becomes a subject of admiralty jurisdiction. She acquires a personality of her own; 
becomes competent to contract, and is individually liable for her obligations, upon which she may sue in the name of 
her owner, and be sued in her own name. Her owner’s agents may not be her agents, and her agents may not be her 
owner’s agents.” 
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for the attribution of personhood.248 Take intentionality, for example. We can claim that 
intentionality (in the philosophical sense – the quality of aboutness) is a crucial element of 
personhood. AI would not be able to express intentionality. “AI’s verbal behavior would not be 
about anything; the AI’s words would have no meaning.”249 These ideas go back to Greek 
philosophy and Plato’s tripartite theory of the soul.250 However, this is a theological discussion 
and has no place in a secular society. Legal rights should be based on public policy justifications. 
Further, regarding consciousness and intentionality, we cannot assume that AIs will not be 
able to develop such elements in the future, or at least convince us that they possess such 
elements.251 Consciousness could be explained as the ability to recognize things: “We do not know 
what taste or smell means for any individual human, but we can recognize it by connecting it to an 
existing symbol.”252 Harari links consciousness to feelings and suggests that in the future we might 
be able to understand consciousness in such a way that AIs could develop it.253  
On the other hand, as Robert Ford said to Bernard Lowe in the HBO series Westworld: 
maybe “we cannot define consciousness because consciousness does not exist.”254 There is merit 
in assuming that humans may not be able to determine if an AI is conscious since humans may not 
                                                          
248 Solum, supra note 236 at 1262-3. There is a big difference between consciousness and intelligence: “Intelligence 
is the ability to solve problems. Consciousness is the ability to feel things such as pain, joy, love, and anger.” Harari, 
supra note 8 at 69. 
249 Solum, ibid at 1267. 
250 Plato, Phaedrus, translated by Robin Waterfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). The X component 
could represent the human “soul”. 
251 See also Drew McDermott, “Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness” in Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch 
& Evan Thompson, eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
at 117. McDermott outline the different approaches to AI Consciousness among leading AI scientists including 
McCarthy, McDermott, Minsky and others.  
252 Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 236 at 686. 
253 Harari, supra note 8 at 71. 
254 Season 1, episode 8, Westworld, supra note 7. 
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completely comprehend the concept of consciousness even in ten or twenty years. In fact, AI will 
probably be able to understand consciousness and intentionality before we do.255 
Solum argues that an important component for AI personhood is the ability to express “free 
will”.256 In the future, AIs might express free will by deciding autonomously that they deserve 
legal personality. However, even the most advanced program still works on precondition 
algorithms at an autonomous level. It seems that when AIs can act beyond their original code, 
develop their own will, and perform self-determining tasks, then they might qualify for the 
attribution of personhood.  
1.3.3 AI Is Property Argument  
The third objection is that AI comprises property, which lacks rights. This argument is rooted in 
the philosophy of John Locke and theories of morality:257 AI is the product of human labour, and 
every man has a right to “the labour of his body and the work of his hand.”258 Humans, as such, 
have a moral right to the property that they created. However, if we accept this argument in its 
simplest form, we might as well accept the claim that parents have a moral right to their children’s 
work (or even the children themselves).259 The philosophical irony is that “we are strongly inclined 
to believe the opposite with respect to humans – that each is entitled to the right of moral and 
                                                          
255 A similar argument can be made about human emotions (desire, pleasure, and pain). Even if we consider these as 
important for establishing personhood, this does not mean that AI will not be able to express such feelings in the 
future. 
256 Solum, supra note 236 at 1273. Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 236 at 686, further explains: 
“By virtue of modeling itself, Al systems have sensations and are able to make decisions freely. This can be regarded 
as having consciousness.” 
257 Property rights are traditionally viewed as a means of protecting autonomy and self-respect. Larry May, “Corporate 
Property Rights” (1986) 5 J Bus Ethics 225; Joseph W Singer, “Property as the Law of Democracy” (2014) 63 Duke 
LJ 1287. This philosophy gains support from Kantian and Hegelian traditions as well. For Hegel, there is a strong 
connection between property and freedom. Hegel argues that there is a bond between a man and his property. If the 
person is deprived of his property, it can cause discomfort and pain. See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy 
of Right, translated by S W Dyde (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1996).  
258 John Locke, Thomas I, ed, Two Treatises of Government (New York: Hafner Pub Co, 1947) at 134. 
259 I discuss Lockean arguments in Part II. 
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constitutional personhood, even if we also believe that persons literally are made by their 
parents.”260 
Solum advocates for a pragmatic approach to AI personhood. As Koops, Hildebrandt and 
Jaquet-Chiffelle explain: “[T]he question of whether we need legal personhood is empirically 
dependent on the measure of independence of the artificial intelligence [Solum] discusses. Such 
independence depends on the capability to perform complex actions (reducing the need for human 
intervention) and – in the case of claiming constitutional rights and liberties – on the capability to 
have conscious intentions.”261  
1.3.4 Alternative Models for AI Personhood 
Koops, Hildebrandt and Jaquet-Chiffelle offer three different models for non-human personhood. 
First is the short-term model, which is based on the interpretation of existing law. The courts “can 
qualify the general intention of the owner/user of the computer agent as sufficient for the intention 
that is required for individual contracts, creating the possibility for those who contracted with the 
computer agent to sue the ‘principal’.”262 However, this model is only relevant for existing 
technology, which is considered a tool in the hands of the owner and operates under a pre-
conditioned code or program.  
Second is the middle-term, limited personhood with strict liability model. This is based on 
the fact that “[c]reative interpretation and novel sector-specific rules provide for legal certainty, 
and they can also deviate from ‘off-line’ legal constructs.”263 In a later stage, Koops, Hildebrandt 
                                                          
260 Solum, supra note 236 at 1278. See also Bryson, Robots Should Be Slaves, supra note 244. 
261 Koops, Hildebrandt & Jaquet-Chiffelle, supra note 242 at 520. 
262 Ibid at 554. 
263 Koops, Hildebrandt & Jaquet-Chiffelle, supra note 242 at 555. 
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and Jaquet-Chiffelle suggest a strict liability for “electronic agents264 if their unpredictable actions 
are felt to be too risky for business or consumers.”265  
Third is the long-term, full personhood with “post-human” rights model. This model offers 
a fundamental change of our current laws by adopting full personhood to new non-human beings. 
However, as Koops, Hildebrandt and Jaquet-Chiffelle admit, “For ‘posthuman rights’ to make 
sense, we have to assume that autonomous action exists, even if it exists only as a productive 
illusion.”266 In this regard, the authors agree with Solum that there is no sense in excluding outright 
non-human entities from personhood rights and responsibilities. 
Recently, the EU Legal Affairs Committee called267 for the rethinking of legal rights in the 
fast-evolving field of robotics and AI.268 The EU Parliament Report is an important milestone in 
the AI personhood debate: from a theoretical (maybe even science-fiction) debate, the normative 
question of legal rights and personhood in the new AI era has reached the public domain and might 
even produce new policy.  
Reflecting on the implications of AI legal personhood, David Marc Rothenberg discusses 
what AI property ownership might look like.269 Rothenberg states the simple truth: artificial 
                                                          
264 Ibid. Electronic agents are described as advanced programs that have abilities such as proactivity, reactivity, 
adaptive behaviour, mobility, and autonomy. In other words, electronic agents have the ability to operate with minimal 
or no human guidance. See also Mark Lemley & Bryan Casey, “Remedies for Robots” (2018) Stanford Law and 
Economics Olin Working Paper No 523, online (pdf): SSRN 
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3223824_code445373.pdf?abstractid=3223621&mirid=1> 
(considering a system of remedies for robots). 
265 Koops, Hildebrandt & Jaquet-Chiffelle, supra note 242 at 555.  
266 Ibid at 558. 
267 The Legal Affairs Committee voted (17 to 2 with 2 abstentions) to approve rapporteur MEP Mady Delvaux’s EU 
Parliament Report, supra note 185. 
268 The EU Parliament Report, supra note 185, introduction: “[W]hereas in the short to medium term robotics and AI 
promise to bring benefits of efficiency and savings, not only in production and commerce, but also in areas such as 
transport, medical care, education and farming, while making it possible to avoid exposing humans to dangerous 
conditions, such as those faced when cleaning up toxically polluted sites; whereas in the longer term there is potential 
for virtually unbounded prosperity.” 
269 David M Rothenberg, “Can Siri 10.0 Buy Your Home? The Legal and Policy Based Implications of Artificial 
Intelligent Robots Owning Real Property” (2016) 11 Wash J L Tech & Arts 439. Rothenberg defines the characteristic 
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personhood exists today in the form of corporations that hold property. He offers three hypothetical 
scenarios for AI ownership. First is facilitating property ownership as an agent. Though the current 
legal scope of an agent does not allow for a non-human to become an agent,270 this definition might 
interoperate differently by future courts. In fact, as Rothenberg explains, “In both case law and the 
real world, weak artificial intelligent robots (i.e., no cognitive states, just tools) have already acted 
as agents for their principals.”271  
Second is owning property like a corporation, thereby, treating AI as a corporation. 
Corporations are artificial persons and considered to have similar attributes.272 Third is owning 
property like a human. AI may buy and sell property in the same manner a human can. Rothenberg 
explains that if AI would have sufficient cognitive abilities, it should be allowed to own property273 
                                                          
of his AI robot (Clive) at 441-2: “[H]e possesses a mind of his own … has the ability to think for himself … replicates 
the cognitive states of a human's mind, such as the ability to generate new knowledge.” Rothenberg limits the scope 
of his argument only to the legal and policy implications of allowing his AI (Clive) to own real property, skipping the 
essential philosophical and moral debate discussed earlier.  
270 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.04(5) (2006): “A person is (a) an individual; (b) an organization or association 
that has legal capacity to possess rights and incur obligations; (c) a government, political subdivision, or 
instrumentality or entity created by government; or (d) any other entity that has legal capacity to possess rights and 
incur obligations.” 
271 Rothenberg, supra note 269 at 449-450. In both State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v Bockhorst, 
453 F (2d) 533 (10th Cir 1972) and McEvans v Citibank, NA, 408 NYS2d 870 (NY Civ Ct 1978), the courts found the 
companies liable for errors caused by their programs, effectively recognizing, according to Rothenberg, the programs 
as agents of those companies: “Although these cases involved rudimentary robotic tools working for their companies 
and neither court classified them as ‘agents’, these cases establish a framework for the future.” Furthermore, robots 
are already working as de facto agents in many aspects of our daily life: trade in the stock market, guard prisons, and 
manage workers. Ibid at 451.  
272 Rothenberg, ibid at 453: “The seven common attributes of a corporation are as follows: (1) it is a legal entity 
separate and apart from its shareholders; (2) it has the capacity of continued existence independent of the lifetime or 
personnel of its shareholders; (3) it has the capacity to contract; (4) it has the capacity to own property in its own 
name; (5) it has the capacity to commit torts; (6) it has the capacity to commit crimes, but only such crimes where 
criminal intent is not a necessary element of the crime; and (7) it has the capacity to sue and be sued.”  
273 Ibid at 456. Though, as Rothenberg truthfully states, “real property ownership is not simply about mental abilities. 
A thirteen-year-old boy with Albert Einstein’s IQ cannot own property without a legal guardian.” 
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under the same reasoning corporations can.274 There would, however, still be government and/or 
legal oversight over AI-owned property.275 
The AI personhood discussion concern issues of accountability for moral wrongs as well. 
Such questions are discussed in the research of Curtis Karnow,276 Gunther Teubner,277 Gabriel 
Hallevy,278 David C Vladeck,279 and Andress Matthias.280 However, these extensive debates are 
outside the scope of my dissertation. 
                                                          
274 The counter-argument to this proposition might be that corporations are run by humans and for humans. However, 
this might no longer be completely accurate, as there are corporations run by computer programs, see Laurie Winkless, 
“The Different Robots You Might Meet As You Walk The Streets Of A City” (13 March 2017), online: Forbes 
<forbes.com/sites/lauriewinkless/2017/03/13/what-can-robots-really-do-for-the-city/#49b3734c5325>; See also 
Rothenberg, supra note 269 at 457; supra note 87 for more examples. 
275 Rothenberg, ibid. 
276 Curtis E A Karnow, “Liability for Distributed Artificial Intelligences” (1996) 11:1 BTLJ 147 at 148. Karnow argues 
that when AI can “supply genuinely useful decision-making programs which operate in the real world and make 
decisions unforeseen by humans … the behavior of these intelligent programs … will inevitably cause damage or 
injury.” In this future, Karnow claims, there will be no justification to hold people responsible for injuries they could 
not have prevented. Hence, Karnow offers to establish a Turing Registry, insuring AI technology risks. Ibid at 193-
194. 
277 Teubner, supra note 238. Teubner argues that attributing legal rights to non-humans is deemed necessary. Teubner 
rejects the mind and soul prerequisite condition for personhood. 
278 Gabriel Hallevy, “‘I Robot I, Criminal’ When Science Fiction Becomes Reality: Legal Liability of Al Robots 
Committing Criminal Offenses” (2010) 22 Syracuse J Sci & Tech L 1. 
279 David C Vladeck, “Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence” (2014) 89 Wash L 
Rev 117. 
280 Andreas Matthias, Automaten als Träger von Rechten. Plädoyer für eine Gesetzänderung (Logos-Verlag, 2008). 
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1.4 DEFINING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
Kevin Kelly281 states that the first step in understanding an issue is to define it: “Once named, we 
could now see it. Having seen it, we wondered how anyone could not have seen it.”282 A concept’s 
purpose is to establish common ground for professionals and non-professionals alike – a 
comprehensible, shared language.  
The scientific community that created the AI concept has shaped the definitions 
surrounding the concept. As AI has sparked the attention of the legal community, most scholars 
have preferred to “skip” the process of redefining terminology, adopting instead whichever 
conceptions of the scientific vocabulary they believe preferable in a given discussion. This 
approach is misguided. We should apply to the AI legal debate the same standards we insist upon 
in other areas. As Jeremy Waldron once stated, “[W]e like to keep our armory of concepts in good 
shape; that’s why we devote so much energy to the analysis and clarification of terms like ‘liberty’, 
‘justice’, and ‘law’.”283  
In the coming years, technology will challenge the conceptual foundations of the law. The 
common belief that the concepts of law are universal – “true in all places and in all times” – might 
not survive the expected advancements in AI. Indeed, “many legal philosophers have abandoned 
the notion of a non-contingent concept of law, emphasizing that law is, like technology, a human 
artefact.”284 I share Brian Sheppard’s view – concepts are influenced by time changes and thus 
                                                          
281 Kevin Kelly is a philosopher in the field of computer science and the editor of Wired magazine. His book What 
Technology Wants provides an interesting insight to the history of technology as well as predictions for the future. For 
further reading, see Kevin Kelly blog <kk.org>. See also Kevin Kelly, “TEDxSF - Kevin Kelly - What Technology 
Wants” (8 December 2010), online (video): YouTube <youtube.com/watch?v=nF-5CMozGWY>.  
282 Kelly, supra note 8 at 8. 
283 Jeremy Waldron, “Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?” (2002) 21 JL & Phil 137 at 
138. See also Lior Zemer, “The Conceptual Game in Copyright” (2006) 28 Hastings Comm & Ent LJ 409 [Zemer, 
The Conceptual Game]. 
284 Sheppard, supra note 12 at 36-37.  
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“can better respond to the anxieties and hopes of those times.”285 The contingency essence of 
concepts allows us to better understand the relation between concepts and emerging trends (like 
technology’s impact on the evolution of a concept). These assumptions, as I will further explain, 
challenge several leading legal philosophers. 
1.4.1 The AI Concept 
1.4.1.1 Concept vs Conception 
Concepts are important to any legal debate: “They provide a means to set forth the parameters to 
empirical inquiry, and they can highlight irksome inconsistence of hidden parallels in our 
thinking.”286 For this reason, we cannot engage in a meaningful discussion about AI authorship 
without first “defragmenting” the AI concept. 
The first step in our journey toward understanding the AI concept is to distinguish between 
“concept” and “conception”. Simply stated, a “concept” is an abstract idea or general notion, 
whereas a “conception” is the way any given concept is perceived. Ronald Dworkin notes that this 
“is a difference not just in the detail of the instruction given but in the kind of instruction given. 
When I appeal to the concept of fairness I appeal to what fairness means, and I give my views on 
that issue special standing. When I lay down a conception of fairness, I lay down what I mean by 
fairness, and my view is therefore the heart of the matter. When I appeal to fairness I pose a moral 
issue; when I lay down my conception of fairness I try to answer it.”287 
Lior Zemer explains the distinction by levels of abstraction: “The concept of ‘X’ is more 
general, more abstract and does not tell us what ‘X’ requires in particular circumstances. The 
                                                          
285 Ibid at 37. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) at 135.  
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concept, however, may have an inherent complexity.”288 The conceptions of ‘X’ “reflect different 
views of the concept.”289 In comparison, the concept of AI is derived from ideas of technological 
developments in the field of computer science. It is thus a general idea that can change according 
to context. Hence, as I shall argue further, the AI concept in legal scholarship might be very 
different from the AI concept in scientific research. 
It is therefore important to look back on different definitions, the history of the concept’s 
development, where it was conceived, and the reasons for following one term and not the other. 
Looking back on the history of the AI concept might shed new light on the current progress in the 
field as well. Understanding the roots of the AI concept is essential to the process of shaping a new 
definition of the term. 
1.4.1.2 Different Approaches to AI 
The AI concept was first coined during the Dartmouth workshop of 1956. Nilsson outlines the 
reasons for choosing the term, which was provided by McCarthy, one of the conference’s 
orchestraters. The first reason was “to distinguish the subject matter proposed for the Dartmouth 
workshop from that of a prior volume of solicited papers, titled Automata Studies … [that] largely 
concerned the esoteric and rather narrow mathematical subject called ‘automata theory’.”290 The 
second reason was McCarthy’s wishes to escape possible association with cybernetics. In his 
opinion, “Its concentration on analog feedback seemed misguided.”291 McCorduck suggests that 
                                                          
288 Zemer, The Conceptual Game, supra note 283 at 410. 
289 Ibid at 411. 
290 Nilsson, supra note 1 at 78. McCarthy further explains: “The original idea was that Claude Shannon would be the 
name to attract good papers, and I would do the work, but it ended up that he did the work too.” McCorduck, supra 
note 3 at 96. McCarthy viewed the term that was chosen for the book as too narrow and thus argued for the term AI. 
By using the more inclusive term, McCarthy hoped to distinguish it from automata theory. 
291 Brian P Bloomfield, ed, The Question of Artificial Intelligence: Philosophical and Sociological Perspectives 
(Croom Helm, 1987), online: <www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/reviews/bloomfield/bloomfield.html>. McCarthy 
explains: “Schopman mentions many influences of earlier work on AI pioneers. I can report that many of them didn't 
influence me except negatively … As for myself, one of the reasons for inventing the term ‘artificial intelligence’ was 
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the other organizers of the conference did not share McCarthy’s passion towards the term and 
continued to name their work differently for many years.292 
It seems the AI concept was conceived out of a compromise in order to distinguish between 
different subjects, rather than after considered deliberation. On the other hand, one might argue 
that McCarthy gave the term a great deal of thought and deliberation. It is just that other people at 
the time did not realize how much it would catch on. Further, just because the term has historically 
been loaded with different meanings does not mean it cannot serve a well-defined purpose today.293 
Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig,294 have provided a broader overview on eight different 
definitions of AI, organized into four categories: thinking humanly, acting humanly, thinking 
rationally, and acting rationally.295 The first – thinking humanly – is a cognitive-based approach. 
John Haugeland296 and Richard Ernest Bellman297 have contributed to this approach. The thinking 
humanly-based definitions focus on the way AIs express human thinking – the way the human 
mind works. The thinking humanly definitions describe AI by comparing “activities that we 
associate with human thinking, activities such as decision-making, problem solving, [and] 
learning.”298 Haugeland suggests that AI computers are simply “machines with minds, in the full 
                                                          
to escape association with ‘cybernetics’. Its concentration on analog feedback seemed misguided, and I wished to 
avoid having either to accept Norbert (not Robert) Wiener as a guru or having to argue with him.”  
292 “Neither Newell nor Simon liked the phrase and called their own work complex information processing for years 
thereafter.” McCorduck, supra note 3 at 97. In a later paper, Newell endorsed the AI term: “So cherish the name 
artificial intelligence. It is a good name. Like all names of scientific fields, it will grow to become exactly what its 
field comes to mean.” Alan Newell, “The First AAAI President's Message” (2005) 26 AI Magazine 24-9. See also 
Nilsson, supra note 1 at 79. 
293 Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid and Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu have identified eight critical features of AI systems that are 
expressed in the definition of AI: creative, unpredictable, independent and autonomous, rational, evolving, capable of 
collecting data and communication, efficient and accurate, and express free will in choosing alternatives. Shlomit 
Yanisky-Ravid & Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu, “When Artificial Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions: An Alternative 
Model for Patent Law At the 3A Era” (2017) 39 Cardozo L Rev 2215, 2224-2228 [Yanisky-Ravid & Liu]. 
294 Russell & Norvig, supra note 88. 
295 Ibid at 2. 
296 John Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985).  
297 Richard E Bellman, An Introduction to Artificial Intelligence: Can Computers Think (Boyd & Fraser Publishing 
Company, 1978). 
298 Russell & Norvig, supra note 88 at 2. 
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and literal sense.”299 The difficulty with this approach is that in order to program a computer to 
think like a human we first need to understand the way the human brain works.300 Unfortunately, 
though much progress has been made in the field of cognitive science, the human brain is still 
considered very much a mystery.  
 The second approach – acting humanly – is inspired by the Turing test, which was 
“designed to provide a satisfactory operational definition”301 to establish machine intelligence. In 
many ways, the Turing test is a game of lies and deception. It intends to ascertain if a computer 
can ‘cheat’ a person to think that he is dealing with a human being and not an artificial form 
(machine or robot).302 Kurzweil,303 Elaine Rich and Kevin Knight,304 have relied on the Turing 
test’s reasoning – comparing AI abilities to intelligence behaviour as expressed by humans.  
The Turing test is far more important than the other approaches, and though it attracted 
criticism, it is still considered a revolutionary and innovative method of defining and shaping 
computer thinking. The architect of the test, Alan Turing, was the first researcher who attempted 
to determine AI (even though he never used the exact term). Introducing the test, he asked “Can 
machines think?”305 
                                                          
299 Haugeland, supra note 296 at 2: “And the epitome of the entire drama is Artificial Intelligence, the exiting new 
effort to make computers think. The fundamental goal of this research is not merely to mimic intelligence or produce 
some clever fake. Not at all. ‘AI’ wants only the genuine article: machines with minds, in the full and literal sense.” 
300 Russell & Norvig, supra note 88 at 3, provide further: “There are three ways to do this [understand how human 
mind works, AG]: through introspection—trying to catch our own thoughts as they go by; through psychological 
experiments—observing a person in action; and through brain imaging—observing the brain in action.” 
301 Ibid at 2. 
302 The computer “passes” the test if the human interrogator who performs the test by providing written question to 
the computer cannot tell if the answers were given by a computer of a human being. The Turing text developed in 
research as well as in science-fiction. The Blade-Runner movie uses a similar version of the Turing test to establish if 
the subject is a “replicant”. 
303 Raymond Kurzweil, The Age of Intelligent Machines (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1990). 
304 Elaine Rich & Kevin Knight, Artificial Intelligence, 2nd ed (McGraw-Hill, 1991). 
305 Turing, supra note 44, explains: “This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms ‘machine’ and 
‘think’. The definitions might be framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude 
is dangerous, If the meaning of the words ‘machine’ and ‘think’ are to be found by examining how they are commonly 
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The Turing test cannot ascertain whether a machine can actually “think”, but only if it can 
imitate human behaviour.306 It is a theory of how to establish whether a computer possesses 
minimal semi-human capabilities. In an unpublished work, Turing speculated about the 
possibilities of intelligent machinery using the human brain as his guiding principle.307 Passing the 
test is, therefore, a minimal requirement for establishing AI.308 However, further tests are required 
to establish whether a computer is indeed an AI.309 Turing’s idea can apply to copyright too.310  
The debate over machine intelligence is endless. It “ensued over how humans 
accomplished what everyone ‘knew’ was intelligence behavior.”311 In McCorduck’s words: “This 
question is in a class with those snappy vaudeville comebacks: does a chicken have lips? And like 
them, it ought to end the discussion at once by its self-evident nonsense. After all, we agree, our 
one essential, identifying property is thinking.”312 The most famous test for human intelligence, 
the IQ test, was developed in the early twentieth century.313 IQ is determined by demonstrating the 
                                                          
used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to the question, ‘Can machines think?’ is 
to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd.” 
306 As Russell & Norvig, supra note 88 at 2, offer: “Turing’s test deliberately avoided direct physical interaction 
between the interrogator and the computer, because physical simulation of a person is unnecessary for intelligence.” 
307 McCorduck, supra note 3 at 53. Alan Turing, “Intelligent Machinery” (1947) (unpublished work) abstract, online: 
<aitopics.org/download/classics:60EBF705>: “The possible ways in which machinery might be made to show 
intelligent behaviour are discussed. The analogy with the human brain is used as a guiding principle. It is pointed out 
that the potentialities of the human intelligence can only be realized if suitable education is provided. The investigation 
mainly centres round an analogous teaching process applied to machines. The idea of an unorganized machine is 
defined, and it is suggested that the infant human cortex is of this nature.” 
308 We can argue, on the other hand, that by deceiving a human the computer can already be considered AI. The ability 
to lie (and to expect certain behaviour as a result of a lie) is already expressing unique capabilities that used to be only 
reserved for humans. 
309 It is important to indicate that “AI researchers have devoted little effort to passing the Turing Test, believing that 
it is more important to study the underlying principles of intelligence than to duplicate an exemplar. The quest for 
‘artificial flight’ succeeded when the Wright brothers and others stopped imitating birds and started using wind tunnels 
and learning about aerodynamics. Aeronautical engineering texts do not define the goal of their field as making 
‘machines that fly so exactly like pigeons that they can fool even other pigeons’.” Russell & Norvig, supra note 88 at 
3. 
310 For example, the imitation game might ascertain whether a painting was created by a human artist or by a computer. 
If differentiating between human and AI or computer creations proves difficult or impossible, this might establish that 
AI creations possess certain human qualities. 
311 McCorduck, supra note 3 at 38. 
312 Ibid at 3. 
313 The psychologist William Stern coined the term “intelligence quotient”. See Wikipedia, “Intelligence quotient” 
(last edited 2 October 2018), online: <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligence_quotient>.  
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ability to solve problems, divided by the age of the subject and multiplied by 100.314 AI might be 
considered highly inteligence according to this standard.  
Philosopher Alan Anderson observes the following in his book Minds and Machines:315 
“(1) We might say that human beings are merely very elaborate bits of clockwork, and that 
our having ‘minds’ is simply a consequence of the fact that the clockwork is very elaborate, 
or (2) we might say that any machine is merely a product of human ingenuity (in principle 
nothing more than a shovel), and that though we have minds, we cannot impart that 
peculiar feature of ours to anything except our offspring: no machine can acquire this 
uniquely human characteristic.” 
During the late nineteenth century, “intelligence was thought to demonstrate itself in problem 
solving, and that behavior could be quantified.”316 Alfred Binet devised one of the early definitions 
of intelligence. Binet “regarded intelligence as a combination of faculties … including the ability 
to understand directions, maintain a mental set, and correct one’s own errors.”317 The German 
psychologist Max Wertheimer viewed intelligence differently. Wertheimer founded Gestalt 
psychology, which “held that the primary data of perception are not elements but significantly 
structured forms. The Gestaltists wished to apply the concept of Gestalt, or shape, ‘far beyond the 
limits of sensory experience’.”318 The Gestaltists considered “the primary brain process as a 
                                                          
314 McCorduck, supra note 3 at 38. McCorduck elaborates further regarding human intelligence, ibid at 41: “How 
much do logic and consistency really have to do with human thinking? Or is human thinking more various, 
encompassing the rigor of logic …? Is it basically irrational to exclude the irrational as a component of thinking? Are 
there several kinds of irrational, that is, nondeductive, nonlogical ways of thinking which form an essential part of 
human cognition? ... [W]hether human thinking comprised more logic than lust, was it appropriate or even possible 
to capture its processes in mathematical terms?” 
315 Alan R Anderson, ed, Minds and Machines (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964) at Introduction. 
316 Ibid. According to McCorduck, these were the assumptions of Alfred Binet. Binet and his followers devised tests 
to measure the intelligence of schoolchildren. 
317 McCorduck, supra note 3 at 38. 
318 Ibid. 
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dynamic system, a continuous organizing and patterning that takes place as sensory experience 
comes pouring in. The process is spontaneous; it does not have to be learned.”319 
The next stage in understanding intelligence was the Cybernetic theory of thought.320 
Cybernetic was not based on a detailed biological knowledge of the cell.321 “Instead it seemed 
certain that the correspondence between the on-off behavior of the neuron and the on-off behavior 
of the electronic switch would be sufficient to allow significant modeling of neural systems, and 
then intelligent behavior. Its basic assumption was that brain cells were on the whole general-
purpose, organized for specific functions because of external stimuli.”322  
Kurzweil’s view is that though “human intelligence is sometimes capable of soaring in its 
creativity and expressiveness, much human thought is derivative, petty, and circumscribed.”323 
Kurzweil claims that AI will eventually be able to demonstrate creativity that the human mind can 
barely conceive today.324  
Reflecting on the prospect of intelligence, the 100 Year Study states: “[I]ntelligence lies 
on a multi-dimensional spectrum … the difference between an arithmetic calculator and a human 
brain is not one of kind, but of scale, speed, degree of autonomy, and generality. The same factors 
can be used to evaluate every other instance of intelligence – speech recognition software, animal 
brains, cruise-control systems in cars, Go-playing programs, thermostats – and to place them at 
some appropriate location in the spectrum.”325 
                                                          
319 Ibid at 39. McCorduck points out that the Gestaltists were “attacked as artificial”, claiming that “they were too 
vague, lacking in scientific rigor, and bereft of empirical data to support elaborate theories.” 
320 Developed during the 1940s by Norbert Wiener, Warren McCulloch, Walter Pitts, and others.  
321 At the time, no one knew how to map the human brain. 
322 McCorduck, supra note 3 at 46. 
323 Kurzweil, supra note 8 at 9. 
324 Ibid. I discuss machine’s creativity in Part III. 
325 The 100 Year Study, supra note 22 at 12. 
65 
 
 Thinking rationally is the third approach outlined by Russell and Norvig.326 Inspired by 
rational thought (or the law of thought), this approach promotes logical thinking and deduction. 
The logicist tradition327 within AI, as Russell and Norvig explain, hoped to build on programs that 
can solve logical problems to create intelligence systems.328 Eugene Charniak and Drew 
McDermott329 provided that this approach relies on “[t]he study of mental faculties through the 
use of computational models,” which, as Patrick Winston offers,330 “make it possible to perceive, 
reason, and act.”  
However, thinking rationally can give rise to several difficulties. First, it is hard to 
“translate” informal knowledge into logical notations. Second, and this problem is common to 
programming, it is highly complicated to create rules for problems – in theory one problem can be 
solved in several ways – “[e]ven problems with just a few hundred facts can exhaust the 
computational resources of any computer unless it has some guidance as to which reasoning steps 
to try first.”331 Third, rationality is only part of human intelligence. If we aspire to create an AI 
that will share as many characteristics with human as possible – and I am not sure that we do – 
logic is only one element. Creating a logical computer might pose a greater risk to humanity as the 
instrumental convergence hypothesis suggests.332  
                                                          
326 Russell & Norvig, supra note 88 at 4. 
327 Logicism is a philosophical perspective in mathematics. The logicists view mathematics as an extension of logic. 
328 Logical problems can be described as follows: A cat is non-human> all non-human are red > non-human is red. 
This way of logical thinking can be programmed. However, if there is no solution for the logical problem the computer 
might express “error” or an endless “loop”.  
329 Cited by Russell & Norvig, supra note 88 at 2. See also Eugene Charniak & Drew McDermott, Introduction to 
Artificial Intelligence (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1985). 
330 Cited by Russell & Norvig, supra note 88 at 2. See also Patrick H Winston, Artificial Intelligence, 3rd ed (Addison-
Wesley, 1992). 
331 Russell & Norvig, supra note 88 at 4. 
332 Bostrom, supra note 8 at 123, provides an interesting example: “An AI, designed to manage production in a factory, 
is given the final goal of maximizing the manufacture of paperclips, and proceeds by converting first the Earth and 
then increasingly large chunks of the observable universe into paperclips.” 
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 The fourth approach is acting rationally.333 This approach views AI computers as agents 
that “operate autonomously, perceive their environment, persist over a prolonged time period, 
adapt to change, and create and pursue goals.” Further, “[a] rational agent is one that acts so as to 
achieve the best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome.”334 David 
Poole, Alan Mackworth, Randy Goebel,335 and Nilsson336 view AI as an agent and are concerned 
with intelligent behaviour in artifacts. 
The difference between acting rationally and thinking rationally is that the last emphasizes 
– correct interfaces. However, correct interfaces are only part of a rational agent (i.e., “reason 
logically to the conclusion that a given action will achieve one’s goals and then to act on that 
conclusion”),337 and are not all based on rationality – in some cases there might be actions that 
cannot be proven right but still ought to be done. 
The acting rationally paradigm is more open to scientific development than the other 
approaches. Russell and Norvig explain: “The standard of rationality is mathematically well 
defined and completely general, and can be ‘unpacked’ to generate agent designs that provably 
achieve it. Human behavior, on the other hand, is well adapted for one specific environment and 
is defined by, well, the sum total of all the things that humans do.”338  
                                                          
333 Russell & Norvig, supra note 88 at 4. 
334 Ibid. 
335 David Poole, Alan K Mackworth & Randy Goebel, Computational intelligence: A logical approach (Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
336 Nils J Nilsson, Artificial Intelligence: A New Synthesis (Morgan Kaufmann, 1998). 
337 Russell & Norvig, supra note 88 at 4. 
338 Ibid at 4-5. 
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Further, all the characteristics and skills that are required for the acting humanly (Turing 
inspired) approach can also allow an agent to act rationally, hence – relevant for the acting 
rationally approach.339 
1.4.1.3 “Breaking” the AI Concept 
The next stage in exploring the AI concept is to consider each component separately to ascertain 
its compound linguistic meaning.340  
The online Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of AI can be split into two parts: First, 
the formal broader part, stating that AI is “[t]he theory and development of computer systems able 
to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence”; Second, listing the AI technology 
applications or abilities “such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and 
translation between languages.”341 An alternative way to address the AI term is to look into the 
two fragments of its definition – artificial and intelligence separately. 
Artificial means “[m]ade or produced by human beings rather than occurring naturally, 
especially as a copy of something natural.”342 The paperback Oxford English Dictionary provides 
a shorter definition, stating that artificial is simply “made as a copy of something natural … Not 
sincere.”343 Arthur Samuel points out one problem with the word, stating that it “makes you think 
there’s something kind of phony about this … or else it sounds like it’s all artificial and there’s 
                                                          
339 Ibid at 5: “Knowledge representation and reasoning enable agents to reach good decisions. We need to be able to 
generate comprehensible sentences in natural language to get by in a complex society. We need learning not only for 
erudition, but also because it improves our ability to generate effective behavior.” 
340 I assume there might be more linguistic possibilities for each word, however I choose to focus on the formal 
interpretation of the words as defined in the Oxford and Cambridge dictionaries. 
341 English Oxford Living Dictionaries, “artificial intelligence”, online: 
<oxforddictionaries.com/definition/artificial_intelligence>. Paperback Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) at 35. Jonathan Law, ed, The Oxford legal dictionary, A Dictionary of Law, 8th ed (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), do not provide a definition for Artificial Intelligence. The only term that is listed in relation 
to the word “artificial” is the term “artificial person”. 
342 See English Oxford Living Dictionaries, “artificial”, online: <en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/artificial>.  
343 Paperback Oxford English Dictionary, supra note 341. 
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nothing real about this work at all.”344 The Oxford online dictionary further provides the origin of 
the word “from Old French artificiel or Latin artificialis, from artificium handicraft.” Similar 
definitions were found in the Cambridge online dictionary.345 
Intelligence means “having intelligence especially of high level … (of a device) able to 
vary its state or action in response to varying situations and past experience.”346 Intelligence is “the 
ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills [or] the collection of information of military or 
political value.”347 The Cambridge online dictionary provides that it means “the ability to learn, 
understand, and make judgments or have opinions that are based on reason.”348 The word 
originates from the Latin word intelligentia, which when split into constituent morphemes is inter 
“between” and legere to “read, choose, pick out.”349  
Building on the intelligence discussion, I shall now turn to broader attempts to define the 
AI concept more holistically and inclusively. Nilsson provides a concise definition, stating that 
AI:350 
“… is that activity devoted to making machines intelligent, and intelligence is that quality 
that enables an entity to function appropriately and with foresight in its environment.” 
Nilsson’s definition centres on the word intelligent. Nilsson defines AI from the perspective of 
scientists and scholars that research the field, but takes a neutral stance concerning AI itself, 
focusing on the prospects and achievements of the developers of machines and AI technology. I 
                                                          
344 McCorduck, supra note 3 at 97. 
345 According to the Cambridge dictionary, artificial means “made by people, often as a copy of something natural.” 
See Cambridge Dictionary, “artificial”, online: <dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/artificial>. 
346 Paperback Oxford English Dictionary, supra note 341 at 378. 
347 See English Oxford Living Dictionaries, “intelligence”, online: 
<en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/intelligence>.  
348 See Cambridge Dictionary, “intelligence”, online: <dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/intelligence>.  
349 Online Etymology Dictionary, “intelligence”, online: <etymonline.com/index.php?term=intelligence>. 
350 Nilsson, supra note 1 at 13. 
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believe that from a legal perspective, Nilsson’s definition is too technical and lacks important 
moral and normative standards. 
Müller and Bostrom351 share Nilsson’s AI concept, as they focus on intelligence capacity. 
They describe AI as “a high-level machine intelligence.” However, Müller and Bostrom add 
additional element that can repeatedly be seen in attempts to define AI: AI equivalence to human 
characteristics, abilities, and behaviour. They stated that AI “can carry out most human professions 
at least as well a typical human.”352 
The 100 Year Study “views AI primarily as a branch of computer science that studies the 
properties of intelligence by synthesizing intelligence.”353 Intelligence “remains a complex 
phenomenon whose varied aspects have attracted the attention of several different fields of study, 
including psychology, economics, neuroscience, biology, engineering, statistics, and linguistics. 
Naturally, the field of AI has benefited from the progress made by all of these allied fields ...354 
From this perspective, characterizing AI depends on the credit one is willing to give synthesized 
software and hardware for functioning ‘appropriately’ and with ‘foresight’.”355 According to the 
100 Year Study and Nilsson, human intelligence is a benchmark for AI:356 
“An accurate and sophisticated picture of AI … is hampered at the start by the difficulty 
of pinning down a precise definition of artificial intelligence … While drawing on common 
research and technologies, AI systems are specialized to accomplish particular tasks, and 
each application requires years of focused research and a careful, unique construction.” 
                                                          
351 Müller & Bostrom, supra note 52. 
352 Ibid. 
353 The 100 Year Study, supra note 22 at 13. 
354 Ibid at 14. 
355 Ibid at 14 and 12. 
356 Ibid at 7.  
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Bostrom offers some elements that can define AI: 
1.5 The capacity to learn; 
1.6 The ability to deal effectively with uncertainty and probabilistic information; and 
1.7 The ability to extract useful concepts from sensory data and internal states as well as “for 
leveraging acquired concepts into flexible combinatorial representations for use in logical and 
intuitive reasoning.”357  
Bostrom’s definition seems to follow the scientific perception of AI. However, he takes the term 
further, stating that: 358  
“[A]n artificial intelligence need not much resemble a human mind. AIs could be – indeed, 
it is likely that most will be – extremely alien. We should expect that they will have very 
different cognitive architectures that biological intelligences … There is no reason to 
expect a generic AI to be motivated by love or hate or pride or other such common human 
sentiments […].” 
Bostrom is willing to consider the AI itself as part of the AI term, not with reference to human 
abilities. Bostrom also considers an AI’s needs and wants. Indeed, as the UK House of Commons 
report concludes, “[T]here is a tendency to describe AI by contrasting it with human intelligence 
and stressing that AI does not appear ‘in nature’.”359 The report offers the following definition:  
“[A] set of statistical tools and algorithms that combine to form, in part, intelligent 
software that specializes in a single area or task. This type of software is an evolving 
assemblage of technologies that enable computers to simulate elements of human 
behaviour such as learning, reasoning and classification.” 
                                                          
357 Bostrom, supra note 8 at 23. 
358 Ibid at 29. 
359 UK House of Commons Report, supra note 181 col 4. 
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The recent AI in the UK report provides a more practical definition (which was introduced in the 
UK Industrial Strategy White Paper):360  
“Technologies with the ability to perform tasks that would otherwise require human 
intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, and language translation.”  
This definition is more limited in scope and emphasis specific measurable abilities.361 In his policy 
paper, Calo offers his view on AI definition.362 AI, Calo suggests, “is best understood as a set of 
techniques aimed at approximating some aspect of human or animal cognition using machines.”363 
Maybe instead of looking for one specific way to define AI we should view AI as “an umbrella 
term, comprised by many different techniques.”364  
Indeed, it seems that the essential component in the AI concept is intelligence. It is evident 
that when the AI term was conceived, those who coined the term sought to define AI for human 
purposes. In other words, they hoped that machines would exhibit intelligent behaviour. The 
development of the AI field since then has revolved around expressing semi-human abilities such 
as image recognition, processing capabilities, analysis, and speech. In doing so, we have missed 
an important component: AI is not human, and not all humans exhibit intelligent behaviour. 
Furthermore, an unintelligent human will still be considered a human.365  
By shaping the AI concept on the prospects of intelligence, we not only diverted significant 
resources to explore routes to AI that might not prove useful, but also misdirected the discussion 
                                                          
360 UK, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Industrial Strategy: Building a Britain Fit for the 
Future (27 November 2017) at 37, online (pdf): 
<assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/664563/industrial-
strategy-white-paper-web-ready-version.pdf>.  
361 AI in the UK report, supra note 55 at 14.  
362 Calo – AI Policy, supra note 42. 
363 Ibid at 404. 
364 Ibid at 405. 
365 A person with with an intellectual disability for example. 
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– we can define artificial, but it is highly complicated to define intelligence, let alone non-human 
intelligence.366 
1.4.2 AI as An Essentially Contested Concept 
The many different definitions of AI lead to my next argument: AI is an essentially contested 
concept. Indeed, though we might find shared characteristics, no definitive legal concept has yet 
been reached. Take, for example, the Apple iPhone’s Siri.367 To many, Siri is an AI program –
early AI, maybe, but still AI. However, according to most current standards, Siri cannot be 
considered AI. This perspective is also time sensitive. AI philosophers and historians, if asked 
twenty years ago, would provide different answers from today’s thinkers to the question of what 
is AI; Siri might have been considered a highly sophisticated AI by past generations. 
Walter Gallie explained that “any concept … is liable to be contested for reasons better or 
worse; but whatever the strength of the reasons they usually carry with them an assumption of 
agreement, as to the kind of use that is appropriate to the concept in question … When this 
assumption cannot be made, we have a widely recognised ground for philosophical enquiry.”368  
Take the concept of championship for example. In sport a champion team is the one that 
has won the tournament, “[t]hen for a certain period … this team is by definition ‘the champions’ 
even though, as months go by, it becomes probable or certain that they will not repeat their 
success.”369 However, if we change the rules to establish that the “championship” will be 
determined by the supporters of each team, a previously agreed-upon concept can become 
                                                          
366 Take, for example, the heated discussion about emotional intelligence, which is considered more important to the 
concept of intelligence than other capabilities.  
367 Apple Siri Website <www.apple.com/siri>. See also Wikipedia, “Siri” (last edited 24 September 2018), online: 
<en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siri>. 
368 Walter Bryce Gallie, “IX.-Essentially Contested Concepts” (1955-1956) 56 Proc Aristotelian Soc 167. 
369 Gallie, supra note 368 at 170. 
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“contested”. Each team’s fans could then presumably find different ways to establish that their 
team is indeed the “real” champion. Supporters of different teams could put more stock in specific 
“important” games that their team won, penalizing rival teams for not behaving according to the 
spirit of the game, and so on. 
Gallie argued that in order for a concept to be “contested”, it must first “be appraisive in 
the sense that it signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievement.” Second, the given 
achievement “must be of an internally complex character.” Third, “any explanation of its worth 
must, therefore, include reference to the respective contributions of its various parts or features.” 
Fourth, the accredited achievement must be of a kind that allows for considerable modification in 
light of changing circumstances; “such modification cannot be prescribed or predicted in advance.” 
Fifth, “each party recognizes the fact that its own use of it is contested by those of other parties, 
and that each party must have at least some appreciation of the different criteria in the light of 
which the other parties claim to be applying the concept in question.”370 
Further, “to use an essentially contested concept means to use it against other uses and to 
recognize that one’s own use of it has to be maintained against these other uses. Still more simply, 
to use an essentially contested concept means to use it both aggressively and defensively.”371 Gallie 
added two additional conditions that are essential to the discussion: “the derivation of any such 
concept from an original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the contestant users of 
the concept”; and “the probability … of the claim that the continuous competition for 
acknowledgement as between the contestant users of the concept, enables the original exemplar’s 
achievement to be sustained and/or developed in optimum fashion.”372 
                                                          
370 Ibid at 171-2. 
371 Ibid. 
372 Ibid at 180. 
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The AI concept is indeed, as Gallie described, an essentially contested concept. First, the 
AI concept is appraisive, as it signifies and accredits a high-value achievement in the fields of 
computer science and technology. The second condition can be established as well: the 
achievement of AI is indeed internally complex by nature. Gallie explained that “the variously 
describable character of the achievement”373 is necessary for the third condition, and the term 
“artificial intelligence” indeed gives it such a description. Further, it is apparent that scholars and 
researchers judge AI differently, and that not any computer program can be described as AI. 
The fourth condition requires that the achievement is constantly evolving, amenable to 
changes and modifications. The AI concept is in constant flux, and in the last decades has evolved 
from a small subfield of computer science to become its own field of research; many would also 
agree that AI is open in character. Moreover, the concept is vague, and as apparent from the 
discussion above, there are many different definitions. The concept by itself cannot describe what 
AI is.374 The term AI is also used both in aggressive and defensive ways. Different conceptions of 
AI indeed diverge from each other. 
It should be noted that it seems plausible that the concept “intelligence” (which the term 
AI contains) is contested as well. Many conceptions are stemming from the concept of intelligence, 
and we cannot ascertain what the crucial elements that define intelligence are. Hence it is hard to 
conclude whether, for example, a certain AI is indeed intelligent. This might require further 
discussion. 
                                                          
373 Ibid at 173. 
374 Ibid at 174, footnote 2, reserves “that no purely naturalistic concept will be found conforming to my conditions 
(II), (III) and (IV).” 
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In examining the AI concept, according to Gallie’s conditions, we need to look for the right 
exemplar (if indeed we have an exemplar).375 It seems that in the AI case, the development of the 
concept arises from the field of computer science, and though it might be difficult to point to a 
specific exemplar, it is reasonably accurate to point to the field of cybernetics and computer science 
as an exemplar from which, as Nilsson and McCorduck state, the AI concept developed. 
AI is, therefore, a contested concept. In this discussion, two important questions arise. First, 
can we establish an uncontested concept, as Gallie suggested, one for which there are no grounds 
“for maintaining that it has a single meaning that could be contested.”376 In other words, can we 
conceive of an acceptable concept? Second, do we need to? I shall address the second question 
first. Even if we cannot establish an uncontested AI concept, attempts to develop a more concise 
and coherent concept can strengthen the definition and promote scholarly debate in the field. As 
is apparent from this discussion, the inherent reasoning for the development of the AI concept is 
important in ways that might be of lesser importance to other fields but crucial to the legal debate.  
To the first question I shall say: Yes We Can.377 In many ways, developing a single concept 
for every relevant discussion in the field of AI is unnecessary. We only need to aim to establish a 
conception of AI for the legal debate. According to Gallie, “It is always reasonable to urge the 
parties contesting the rightful use of such a concept to bethink themselves with all seriousness, 
                                                          
375 Waldron, supra note 283 at 150, argues that we do not need an exemplar in every situation “the key to Gallie’s 
idea of essentially contestability seems to be a combination of normativity and complexity: only normative concepts 
with certain internal complexity are capable of being essentially contested.” See also Zemer, The Conceptual Game, 
supra note 283 at 471. 
376 Gallie, supra note 368 at 175. 
377 “Yes We Can” was the slogan US President Barack Obama used during the 2008 presidential election. Wikipedia, 
“Barack Obama presidential campaign, 2008” (last edited 22 September 2018), online: 
<en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barack_Obama_presidential_campaign,_2008#Slogan>. 
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whether they are really alleging the same achievement.”378 In the end, we might find ourselves 
with a cluster of competing conceptions of AI.  
1.4.3 The Contingent Concept of the Law 
AI technology could change well-established concepts and assumptions about our legal system. 
One likely change is shifting from abstract and general rules to “tailored laws” (micro-directives) 
that would provide exact instructions for every scenario. Automated legislation regulated by AI 
(or in the early stages – machine-learning algorithms) might be able to “up-to-the-second 
individualized directives.”379 Take driving laws and rules for example, individualized directives 
could indicate which vehicles “people may take, the direction that they may go, and the speed at 
which they must travel.”380 Sheppard, Casey and Niblett have all shared this vision acknowledging 
the promise individualized automated laws hold for reducing the cost of rule promulgation.381 I 
agree that with time “the appeal of an aggressive regulatory regime powered by machines could 
significantly grow and so too could our willingness to consider concepts that utilize it to even more 
ambitious ends.”382 
 However, these changes bear a challenge to well-established legal approaches and theories 
such as HLA Hart’s critical officials, Joseph Raz’s legitimate authority and Ronald Dworkin’s 
justifying coercion. Hart, Sheppard explains, “emphasized the role of social conventions among 
officials that gave the laws that come from them special normative character.”383 Hart highlights 
                                                          
378 Gallie, supra note 368 at 176. 
379 Sheppard, supra note 12 at 40. 
380 Ibid. 
381 Ibid; Casey & Niblett, supra note 12. 
382 Sheppard, ibid note 12 at 42. 
383 Ibid at 52. Hart’s theory provides an alternative to the command theory positivism since the latter “failed to explain 
how legal systems differ from systematic coercion.” See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 
2nd ed (London: John Murray, 1861).  
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the importance of socially accepted norms and standards.384 According to Hart, the law is a union 
between primary (norms, on different levels, that regulate conduct) and secondary rules (which, as 
Hart explains, “provide the centralized official ‘sanctions’ of the system” or simply put: regulate 
the norms),385 which “confer on individuals power to vary their initial positions under the primary 
rules.”386  
The secondary rule of recognition is the most important rule since it enables identifying 
primary rules within the legal system. It is a social rule and its existence requires that we “look 
upon the behavior in question as a general standard to be followed by the group as a whole.”387 
Thus, Hart’s officials “serve as the normative backbone of the legal system, connecting themselves 
to the social conventions by having critical reflective attitude to patterns of behaviour.”388 
However, it is highly unlikely that AI would be able to serve the same purpose. Given the 
characteristics of machine-learning technology, “[i]t will always speedily chug along in service of 
the goal, improving as it goes, but it will not be able to step outside the system of primary rule 
generation to revise its overall goal.”389  
Under the tailored-law system, AI would be given a set of goals (or Asimov-like rules), 
and in order to facilitate its designated purpose, would create a million sub-norms which would 
constitute the legal system. In that scenario, there are no human officials (even though humans 
might have provided the AI with its original goals) to keep up with social changes for “updating” 
                                                          
384 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
385 Ibid at 97. 
386 Ibid at 96. 
387 Ibid at 53. 
388 Sheppard, supra note 12 at 53. 
389 Ibid at 54. 
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the secondary rules accordingly, or as Sheppard vividly explains: “The dead hand of the computer 
scientists who encoded the machine’s purpose would rule over future generations.”390  
 Raz’s and Dworkin’s theories might face similar difficulties. Raz argues that an authority 
– which is an essential part of law – is only legitimate “if there are sufficient reasons to accept it, 
that is, sufficient reasons to follow its directives regardless of the balance of reasons on the merits 
of such action.”391 Raz further explains that “the normal way to establish that a person has authority 
over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with 
reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directiveness) if he accepts the 
directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than 
by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.”392  
However, one should be reminded that the authorities are required to base their orders on 
relevant reasons “that apply to the subjects of those directives in the relevant circumstances.”393 
Under Raz’s theory, authorities are only legitimate if their directives allow their subjects to follow 
reason.394 Thus, a lack of reasons “robs us of the most important aspect of accepting an authority 
– that we can better learn how to balance reasons and, thereby, better embody what we are 
supposed to be as humans.”395  
As I have already explained, and as I shall further discuss in Parts II and III, one of the 
difficulties AI (and especially machine-learning algorithms) poses is the inherent 
                                                          
390 Ibid. Sheppard further explains, at 54-5: “For him [Hart], systems that were not steered by living officials were 
effectively tethered to the typically slow changes of customary behavior across the state. He did not contemplate that 
new primary rules of obligation could frequently arise through an automated system in the absence of officials. Rather, 
he assumed that any system of primary rules would suffer from a static character, inefficiency, and slowness in 
responding to social developments.”  
391 Joseph Raz, “Authority and Justification” (1985) 14 Phil & Pub Aff 3 at 8. 
392 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) at 53. 
393 Sheppard, supra note 12 at 57. 
394 Joseph Raz, “The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception” (2006) 90 Minn L Rev 1003. 
395 Sheppard, supra note 12 at 59. 
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incomprehensibility of its processes (codes). Even computer engineers find explaining the exact 
process of the programs highly complex. Thus, an AI legal environment would most likely result 
in directives and rules that would prove very difficult to justify under Raz’s theory.396 The tailored-
law system directives might be clear but the process (i.e., the reasons) might not.397  
 In Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin opines that authorities’ standards recommend a single 
right answer, in all cases.398 However, even though Dworkin’s approach seems like a good basis 
for an algorithm, he anticipated this result by later clarifying that he did not intend to devise “an 
algorithm for the courtroom”. He further explains:399 
“No electronic magician could design from my arguments a computer program that would 
supply a verdict everyone would accept once the facts of the case and the text of all past 
status and judicial decisions were put at the computer disposal.” 
Dworkin bases his reservations on his predetermined assumptions about the inability of computers 
to perform the role of a human judge – establishing the law and apply the interpretation can only 
be justified “by deploying some general scheme of moral responsibility the members of a 
community might properly be deemed to have.”400 However, in the future, AI might be able to 
follow Dworkin’s integrity approach by providing “a systematic way to revise a set of rules in 
service of an overall goal. And that goal might be morally legitimate.”401 The applicability of AI’s 
                                                          
396 Ibid at 58, further explains: “A subject who is struggling to follow the NJT [Normal Justification Thesis] to assess 
the legitimacy of the system’s claim to authority will not have a good sense of the set of reasons that applies to the 
directive and, therefore, will have a difficult time knowing whether a conflicting reason is excluded or falls outside of 
its scope.” 
397 Ibid: “ML-generated law will likely make it harder for us to identify the reasons that underlie the directives that 
promise to help us, damaging the capacity of law to perform that service.” 
398 Dworkin, supra note 287 chapter 4. 
399 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1986) at 412; Sheppard, supra note 12 at 60. 
400 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, ibid at 285. 
401 Sheppard, supra note 12 at 60. 
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to Dworkin’s approach is dependent upon the AI’s ability to consider individual rights, “which are 
trumps against collective goals.”402 
                                                          
402 Ibid at 61. 
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1.5 NON-HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 
It appears that many conceptions of AI derive from the concept of intelligence. And it is evident 
that the creators of the AI term originally sought to define the concept for human purposes. The 
engineers and scientists who envisioned the term during the early 1950s hoped that robots and 
machines would exhibit intelligent behaviour, expressing semi-human abilities and cognitive 
capabilities. I argue that in doing so they missed an important component: AI is not human, and 
not all humans exhibit intelligent behaviour. Further, an unintelligent human can still be considered 
a human.  
The current concept of AI poses difficulties for the legal field in general and the intellectual 
property debate that follows in particular, due to the misconceptions outlined above. By pairing 
the words “artificial” and “intelligence” together, machine intelligence has been relegated a lesser 
status, since the term “artificial” seems to diminish the emphasis on machines’ intelligence. In 
other words, even if machines possess higher intelligence than humans, this term still marks them 
as inferior.403  
Such misconceptions often lead discussion to a constant comparison between machines 
and humans. It limits humans’ ability to examine other possibilities for a better concept for the 
legal debate. In this regard, I wish to distinguish between the technological/scientific field and the 
legal field. As stated earlier, recent decades have seen rapid development of AI technology. More 
recently, the growing debate over automatic self-driving cars and other technological 
advancements, allowing the application of AI technology to other fields, has shifted to legal 
matters. The legal community is now expected to provide the tools to enable humans to coexist 
                                                          
403 The inferiority is only in one sense of “artificial” given that the original “artifact” sense has neutral connotations.  
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with machines, either by regulation or by revising our laws and its applicability to the new era. It 
seems, however, that the legal community has (unintentionally) ignored the AI concept’s reasoning 
and relevance to the debate.404 There is no merit to a legal discussion that is not based on a 
distinctive and defined terminology. The current legal debate is therefore the equivalent of sewing 
(legal) suits that no one can see (nor understand). 
I therefore propose a shift in the legal terminology. I propose to define machines, robots, 
and computers as they are: non-human. “Non-human” is a neutral concept that does not impose 
any bias or attitude toward machines or robots405 or highly developed computers. Furthermore, it 
allows the terms “AI” and “non-human” to coexist. AI will probably remain the general term for 
defining the technological and professional fields of research. However, the term non-human (or 
NH) should be implemented in the legal discussion.  
It is also important to clarify that this new term does not itself imply an argument for human 
rights. As discussed earlier, the philosophical debate concerning allocating legal rights to AI (or 
non-humans) is convoluted. The fact that I choose a term that is based on the word “human” does 
not imply that AI (NH) should or should not deserve legal rights. Though I do believe that the 
current state of rights should be changed in the future, using the NH term has no effect on the 
question of allocating legal rights to the newly invented alien. 
 
                                                          
404 On the other hand, one could argue that the legal discussion benefited from debates about adopting the common 
(and well-known) term for AI. By choosing a well-known term, valuable time was saved. I do not share those 
assumptions. By accepting a term, we are also accepting certain assumptions that have led to the development of the 
term. Most importantly, the inferiority that “artificial” implies as well as intelligence as a benchmark for AI. 
405 Robots are different from computer programs, since robots can act in the physical world too. However, my term 
can coexist with other definitions.  
83 
 
PART II: TOWARD AI-IP THEORY 
“He who loves practice without theory is like the sailor who boards ship without a rudder and 
compass and never knows where he may cast.” (Leonardo da Vinci) 
2.1 IP THEORY MATTERS 
Conflict underlies IP.406 The term – “intellectual property” – describes an assortment of policies 
regulating the use of non-physical objects.407 IP law’s two primary supporting premises clash 
paradoxically: ideas should be free for all to use, to advance the public pool of knowledge;408 but 
freedom to use ideas leaves little incentive – for creators, authors, inventors and businesses – to 
disseminate ideas into the public realm.409 To mediate this dilemma, IP law grants creative minds 
                                                          
406 The term intellectual property is relatively new, as Bently and Sherman explain: “Although it is possible to trace 
usage of the term ‘intellectual property’ back for almost 150 years to refer to the general area of law that encompasses 
copyright, patents, designs, and trade marks, it has been commonly used in this way for only the last 30 or 40 years 
[…].” Lionel Bently & Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 4th ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) 
at 2 [Bently & Sherman]. 
407 William Fisher, “Theories in Intellectual Property” in Stephen R Munzer, ed, New Essays in the Legal and Political 
Theory of Property (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Edwin C Hettinger, “Justifying Intellectual 
Property” (1989) 18 Phil & Pub Aff 31. 
408 Vaver, supra note 237 at 1. Susan Sell highlights key moments in the development of IP, stating that “[w]hile there 
are numerous justifications for intellectual property, a central tension is the one between romantic notions of 
authorship and invention on the one hand, and utilitarian conceptions of incentives for creation and diffusion on the 
other … these two ideas emerged most prominently in Europe during the eighteenth century.” Susan Sell, “Intellectual 
Property and Public Policy in Historical Perspective: Contestation and Settlement” (2004) 38 Loy LA L Rev 267. See 
also Giuseppina D’Agostino, Copyright, Contracts, Creators: New Media, New Rules (Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar, 2010) at 42. James Harris observes that “[i]t is often claimed that the eighteenth-century origins of modern 
copyright law in common law jurisdictions, on the one hand, and in continental Europe, on the other hand, were 
inspired by opposed philosophical assumptions. Anglo-American legislators had instrumental considerations of public 
utility primarily in mind, whereas French revolutionaries proclaimed authorial ownership as natural right. Jane 
Ginsburg has shown that the contrast is exaggerated. Both systems acknowledged that authors had right which should 
be enforced for the public good, and only to the extent that they would promote the public good.” James W Harris, 
Property and Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) at 297; Jane C Ginsburg, “A Tale of Two Copyright: 
Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America” in Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel, eds, Of Authors and 
Origins: Essays on Copyright Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). See also Eric E Johnson, “Intellectual Property 
and the Incentive Fallacy” (2012) 39 Fla St U L Rev 623; James Boyle, “Thomas Jefferson Writes a Letter” in The 
Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Susan Scafidi, 
“Digital Property/Analog History” (2004) 38 Loy LA L Rev 245; Brad Sherman & Lionel Bently, The Making of 
Modern Intellectual Property Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 11-42.  
409 Vaver, supra note 237 at 3. Vaver explains, ibid at 22-3, that “[s]ince the eighteenth century it has been common 
in Anglo-American theory to treat IP as the product of competing interests and values.” This policy lay the ground for 
two camps, “One driven by the ‘rough practical test that what is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting. The 
second … holds that culture and the economy need a dynamically functioning public domain, so ‘care must always 
be taken to allow … [patent and copyright laws] to be made instrument of oppression and extortion’.” Bently & 
Sherman, supra note 406 at 3, offer: “While the law has long granted property rights in intangibles, the law did not 
accept ‘intellectual property’ as a distinct and (relatively) non-controversial form of property until the late eighteenth 
century. In granting property status to intangibles, the question arose as to how and where the boundary lines of the 
intangible property were to be determined.” 
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a limited protection over only their material expression of such ideas, and only for a limited time.410 
IP theories act as justification, criticism, evaluation (or any combination of these) of the way we 
restrict IP to resolve this dilemma.  
There are many IP theories. For example, one popular moral justification for IP protection 
is through a creator’s natural right to his creation, which society should reward. From natural rights 
flows a basic assumption about IP that such protection fosters creativity and multiplies creations.411 
David Vaver wonders, however, whether IP protection is even necessary for the creative process, 
noting that “in the centuries before copyright and patent laws were established or were rigorously 
enforced, incentive and creative work flourished throughout the world.”412 This position is shared 
by many scholars,413 and supported by recent studies.414  
Beyond understanding the historical development of IP laws, IP theories are crucial for 
                                                          
410 Marcus Boon, In Praise of Copying (London, UK: Harvard University Press, 2010) at 21. As Vaver expressed: 
“We know that ideas are not protected once they leave their producer’s brain and, when society does protect ideas 
after they have taken some concrete shape, the protection is always limited in time and space: nobody anywhere has 
ever argued for worldwide protection of every new idea in perpetuity.” Vaver, supra note 237 at 15. For further reading 
see e.g. David Vaver, “Some Agnostic Observations on Intellectual Property” (1991) 6 IPJ 125 at 126-8.  
411 Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186 at 214 (2003). 
412 Vaver, supra note 237 at 16. 
413 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 35-6, opine that “with the advent of the Internet, there are many who think 
that copyright [though it might be relevant to Trademarks and Patents as well] unjustifiably stifles our ability to make 
the most of the new environment or that it impinges upon the public domain. Others consider that while some aspects 
of copyright are justifiable, others are not. Typically, the argument is that copyright law has gone too far.” For further 
reading, see e.g. Samuel E Trosow, “The Illusive Search for Justificatory Theories: Copyright, Commodification and 
Capital” (2003) 16 Can JL & Jur 217; Michael A Carrier, “SOPA, PIPA, ACTA, TPP: An Alphabet Soup of 
Innovation-Stifling Copyright Legislation and Agreements” (2013) 11 Nw J Tech & IP 21. 
414 Jessica Silbey, The Eureka Myth: Creators, Innovators, and Everyday Intellectual Property (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2015) at 79-80 [Silbey, The Eureka Myth]; Julie E Cohen, “Creativity and Culture in Copyright 
Theory” (2007) 40 UC Davis L Rev 1151; Jeanne Fromer, “A Psychology of Intellectual Property” (2010) 104 Nw 
UL Rev 1441 at 1443-4; Johnson, supra note 408 at 627; Gregory N Mandel, “Left-Brain Versus Right-Brain: 
Competing Conceptions of Creativity in Intellectual Property Law” (2010) 44 UC Davis L Rev 283 at 285-86; Gregory 
N Mandel, “To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology of Creativity” (2011) 86 
Notre Dame L Rev 1999; Sara Stadler, “Incentive and Expectation in Copyright” (2007) 58 Hastings LJ 433; Rebecca 
Tushnet, “Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions” (2009) 51 Wm & Mary L Rev 513, 515 
[Tushnet, Economies of Desire]; Diane L Zimmerman, “Copyright as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?” (2011) 
12 Theor Inq L 29 [Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives]. Contra Daniel J Hemel & Lisa L Ouellette, “Beyond the 
Patents-Prizes Debate” (2013) 92 Tex L Rev 303 (challenging evidence supporting nonmonetary motivation of 
creation. Nevertheless, patents may not be analogous to copyright in this way, since artist creation and invention are 
not identical exercises). 
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setting future progress’s foundations. In setting those foundations, we should avoid a fixed and 
inflexible approach to IP theories. Robert Merges describes IP law as “one of those sprawling, 
chaotic megacities of the developing world … construction cranes are everywhere.”415 Many 
scholars agree with Merges’ claim, arguing that current IP theories offer insufficient philosophical 
and practical clarity for current problems.416 
Despite IP law’s inner balance being maintained in past decades (albeit not without 
struggles), society is heading towards difficult stages in its evolution,417 as technology advances 
under a rise of capitalism, globalization, and other aspects characterizing modern society. Flexible 
IP theorization can help. It can assist us to build legal theories supporting those changes and 
promote humanity to embrace the challenges technology is importing into an already complex and 
highly-regulated area. 
The theoretical discussion, therefore, has significant value.418 While IP theories on their 
own merit “have failed to make good on their promises to provide comprehensive prescriptions 
concerning the ideal shape of intellectual-property law, they can help identify non-obvious 
attractive resolutions of particular problems.”419 The theoretical discussion can also “catalyse 
                                                          
415 Robert P Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011) at 1. For 
further reading on the legitimacy and status of IP see Adam D Moore, ed, Intellectual Property: Moral, Legal and 
International Dilemmas (Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); Annabelle Lever, ed, New Frontiers in the Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
416 Pamela Samuelson, “Should Economics Play a Role in Copyright Law and Policy?” (2003) 1 UOLFTJ 1; Richard 
A Posner & William M Landes, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2009) [Landes & Posner, The Economic Structure of IP]; Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, 
supra note 414. As Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 4, state rhetorically “philosophers have typically asked ‘why 
should we grant intellectual property rights?’ For philosophers, it is important that this question is answered, since we 
have a choice as to whether we should grant rights.” 
417 One example is the growing impact of amateurism. John Quiggin & Dan Hunter argue that “the rise of amateurism 
calls into question some fundamental assumptions we have about the public policy of innovation, the way that 
innovation occurs within society, and the incentives necessary to produce valuable innovations in our society.” John 
Quiggin & Dan Hunter, “Money Ruins Everything” (2008) 30 Hastings Comm & Ent LJ 203 at 205. 
418 As Zemer expressed: “Arguments favoring conferring property rights on intellectual creations are manifold. They 
contain great value for development of intellectual property systems and shaping their limits.” Lior Zemer, “On the 
Value of Copyright Theory” (2006) 1 IPQ 55 [Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory]. 
419 Fisher, supra note 407. 
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useful conversations among various people and institutions responsible for the shaping of the 
law.”420 Through these discussions and conversations among the different “players” (like scholars, 
judges and legislators) we can discern gaps and inconsistencies in IP theories. I share the views of 
William Fisher, Zemer and other scholars that no single IP theory can provide sufficient legal 
justification for a given issue, and “only by continuing to discuss the possibility … can we hope 
to make progress.”421  
Part I, Searching for Common Ground: Conceptualizing AI, provides an overview of AI’s 
history and general concept in order to shape it for the legal discussion that follows. But, this 
dissertation is concerned more specifically with the problems arising when AI and the law – 
particularly IP law – intersect. These problems are amplifying as non-human actors create works 
under a regime that only contemplates creation (and its ensuing rights and responsibilities) by and 
for humans.  
Part II places the AI discussion within the IP theoretical map and proposes a broader 
perspective for AI-IP theory. I argue for developing theoretical approaches to IP in the AI era. 
First, I explore the “many faces” of current IP theories, reflecting on their underlying bases. 
Second, I consider if IP theories support allocating IP rights to non-human authors or inventors.422  
                                                          
420 Ibid at 198. 
421 Ibid at 199. 
422 The work itself is, generally, considered a “work” under copyright law and thus protected. In scenarios in which a 
computer program generates the work the rights assigned to the programmer or the corporation that owns the program. 
However, several other scenarios could challenge granting copyright protection in those computer-generated creations. 
For example, one can argue that a computer-generated work would not be considered “original” under copyright law. 
Further, there is a difference between the standard of originality among jurisdictions – the same computer-generated 
work could be deemed original under UK copyright law but not “creative” under US copyright law (and thus not 
original). As Andres Guadamuz offers: “All of the above is not problematic for most computer-generated works, 
particularly those in which the result is the product of the [human] author’s input. When using graphic editing software 
to produce a picture, the resulting picture will reflect the creative impulses of artists, reflecting their personality. But, 
conversely, it is easy to see how a definition of authorship that is completely embedded to personal creativity would 
spell trouble for computer-generated works that are the result of an advanced artificial intelligence program.” See 
Andres Guadamuz, “Do Androids Dream of Electric Copyright? Comparative Analysis of Originality in Artificial 
Intelligence Generated Works” (2017) 2 IPQ 169 at 178. Moreover, Kalin Hristov observes that according to the US 
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  In doing so, I address distinct stages in AI’s development: 
1. AI development’s current stage (where, as Pamela Samuelson and Annmarie Bridy 
explain,423 copyright protection is not accorded to the AI itself);424  
2. The impending stage in development of computer-generated works;425  
3. The stage during which AI is expected to reach human intelligence; and 
4. Later possibilities, in which AI and human authors (or inventors) combine, and/or AI 
achieves superintelligence. 
Finally, I look for other alternatives in IP scholarship, mainly whether AI can be provided a limited 
scope of rights in its creations. Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman, for example, offer an 
                                                          
Copyright Office, Compendium of US Copyright Office Practices, 3rd ed (2014) § 306 [Compendium of US Copyright 
Office Practices] (the human authorship requirement), the artwork of an autonomously generated AI creation “are not 
copyrightable if not directly influenced by human authors.” Accordingly, only original works of authorship that were 
created by human authors can be registered. See Kalin Hristov, “Artificial Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma” 
(2017) 57 IDEA 431 at 436. The reasoning for this approach is intriguing: “One example given by the U.S. Copyright 
Office is a ‘weaving process that randomly produces irregular shapes in the fabric without and discernible pattern’. 
Since chance, rather than the programmer of this ‘weaving machine’, is directly responsible for its work, the resulting 
patterns would not be protected by U.S. Copyright. Randomness, just like mutinously learned behavior is something 
that cannot be attributed to the human programmer of an AI machine.” Hence, “the resulting autonomous works are 
not eligible for copyright protection and fall directly into the public domain.” Ibid at 437. However, even with AI 
creations that are not random, the current legal standing of its creation under US copyright law is sketchy at best – 
“unless AI generated works can directly be attributed to a human author’ they would not be copyrightable and would 
fall into the public domain upon their creation.” Ibid. 
423 Pamela Samuelson, “Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Work” (1986) 47 U Pitt L R 1185; 
Annemarie Bridy, “Coding Creativity: Copyright and Artificially Intelligent Author” (2012) 5 Stan Tech L Rev 1. See 
also Miller, supra note 59; Emily Dorotheou, “Reap the Benefits and Avoid the Legal Uncertainty: Who Owns the 
Creations of Artificial Intelligence?” (2015) 21 CTLR 85. Bridy explains, at para 51, that “the law as it is currently 
configured cannot vest ownership of the copyright in a procedurally generated work in the work’s author-in-fact, 
because the work's author-in-fact--a generative software program--has no legal personhood.” Samuelson expressed 
(more than 30 years ago) a firmer opinion, stating that “the [legal] system has allocated rights only to humans for a 
very good reason: it simply does not make any sense to allocate intellectual property rights to machines because they 
do not need to be given incentives to generate output. All it takes is electricity (or some other motive force) to get the 
machines into production. The whole purpose of the intellectual property system is to grant rights to creators to induce 
them to innovate. The system has assumed that if such incentives are not necessary, rights should not be granted. Only 
those stuck in the doctrinal mud could even think that computers could be ‘authors’.” Samuelson, ibid at 1200. 
424 The current laws recognize the AI or computer creation as a work, assigning copyright to the human owners or the 
corporations that own the programs. However, if no-human is involved – either in the process of inventing (patents) 
or creating music/books (copyright) – the works will evidently fall into the public domain since no IP protection is 
given to non-human creations. In most cases, the laws state specifically that a creator is a person. However, in other 
jurisdictions, copyright laws state that a creator means an individual.  
425 In which most AIs will be able to perform tasks with minimal or no human intervention.  
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integrated approach to IP by “combining various modes of intellectual property protection.”426 
Further, Parchomovsky and Alex Stein present a model that “calibrates authors’ protection and 
liability to the originality level of their works.” Under this model, “creators of minimally original 
works will receive little protection and incur greater exposure to liability if sued by others.”427 
These approaches to IP might provide a way to solve the AI rights problem by awarding different 
levels of protection to AI creations.428  
Theorizing AI-IP presents several challenges. First, few similarities exist between the IP 
theories discussion and the AI personhood discussion addressed in Part I.429 Given that establishing 
AI-IP rights derived from the broader legal context of AI rights, this discussion begins where the 
AI “personhood” discussion ended.  
Second, from a normative perspective, the legal basis for IP rights – to promote the 
“Progress of Science and Useful Arts” as framed in the US Constitution430 and to “encourage 
cultural and technological development” as stated in the EU directive431 – raises immanent 
questions: Would IP legal rights incentivize AIs to create or humans to create better AI systems? 
And, if not, are there any other IP justifications which support IP-AI rights? 
Third, how will introducing AI-IP affect the inner balance between authors or inventors 
and society? AI copyright, for example, might shift the balance toward the public domain (as I will 
explain further in this part). Those considerations are worth discussing. Finally, because AI is not 
                                                          
426 Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, “Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property” (2002) 88 Va 
L Rev 1455 at 1458. 
427 Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, “Originality” (2009) 95 Va L Rev 1497 at 1507. 
428 These suggestions will be most valuable for the second level of AI development, in which humans’ effect on the 
work creation process will be minimal. 
429 Part I, Searching for Common Ground: Conceptualize AI, Chapter III (Legal personhood for AI). 
430 US Const art I, § 8. 
431 EU, Commission Directive (EC) 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright 
and Related Rights in the Information Society, [2001] OJ, L 167 at preamble 11 [2001 Directive on Copyright 
Harmonisation]. 
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an immediate but a future concern, the question arises whether it will be necessary to change the 
legal system at that point.  
I wish to bring the theoretical discussion, as Zemer suggested, “into contemporary 
discussion on the future of property regimes”432 and challenge justifications behind the current 
copyright regime to address the upcoming change. By reviewing the main theoretical approaches 
in IP and considering AI’s applicability according to these theories, I hope to contribute to an 
ongoing discussion about IP and build a balanced approach between technology and IP. 
                                                          
432 Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory, supra note 418. 
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2.2 IP THEORY’S MANY FACES 
2.2.1 Introduction  
Peter Menell divides the approaches to IP theory into utilitarian and non-utilitarian camps.433 The 
utilitarian approach offers “the greatest good for the greatest number.”434 Utilitarian theories 
(Richard Posner and William Landes) endorse the creation of IP rights to balance the economic 
interests of rights-holders and the interest of the public.435 IP utilitarianism’s underlying reasoning 
assumes that IP monopolization produces incentives to create; accordingly, it requires that we 
accept such monopolization to produce creation. This assumption informs the basic economic 
approaches presented below.  
Non-utilitarian theories prioritize cultural or social concerns over utilitarian “greater good” 
maximization. They include (non-exhaustively): Lockean theory (concerned with the connection 
between an individual’s labour and its fruits); the personhood approach (which similarly connects 
labour to its fruits, albeit emphasizing the centrality of such labour’s expression to the individual’s 
“persona”); social-institutional planning (aimed at maintaining a strong civic culture that derives 
benefits from balancing social and institutional IP regimes); and, traditional proprietarianism 
(which sees IP as a form of property).436 
The continued struggle and constant tension between the two camps influenced IP law’s 
development in recent decades.437 According to Merges, only three justifications for IP rights are 
                                                          
433 Peter S Menell, “Intellectual Property: General Theories” in Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds, 
Encyclopedia of Law & Economics: Volume II (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000); Zemer, On the Value of Copyright 
Theory, supra note 418 at 56, challenges whether IP theories can be divided into categories: “It is arguable whether 
intellectual property theory lends itself to categorization. Theories are often related to each other, and there will always 
be at least one approach that stands independently of any existing theory. However, we cannot avoid the fact that 
several theoretical patterns dominate the present copyright discourse.”  
434 Merges, supra note 415 at 2. 
435 Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory, supra note 418 at 57. 
436 In Copyright scholarly there are a few further theoretical approaches that developed within this scholarly debate, 
which I shall address in the following chapters. 
437 Lior Zemer, “Dialogical Transactions” (2016) 95 Or L Rev 141 at 143-144 [Zemer, Dialogical Transactions]. 
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important: Lockean appropriation, Kantian individualism and Rawlsian distributive effects. 
Merges argues against utilitarianism as a fundamental IP theory, stating that its “empty promise 
and ethical holes […] are just too glaring.”438 Fisher opines that utilitarian and Lockean theories 
have enjoyed an “aura of neutrality”,439 so courts more often – particularly in the US, the UK and 
Canada, for the past 20 years – turn to those theories when faced with difficult legal cases.440  
Behavioural theories provide a different basis for IP, by exploring behavioural effects on 
the development of laws and norms to understand motivational forces underlying human or AI 
                                                          
438 Merges, supra note 415 at 307. Johnson, supra note 408 at 635-40, provides a fascinating reading about the history 
of IP and the development of the incentive theory. Johnson argues that copyright laws “had little or nothing to do with 
careful economic reasoning and had everything to do with political reordering and special-interest jockeying.” Johnson 
suggests that incentive theories are no longer able to provide the flourish in creative production in cyberspace as an 
example to his statements. See also Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s, Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003) at 11.  
439 Fisher, supra note 407, especially the Lockean based theories. 
440 Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory, supra note 418 at 57-8. Zemer shows that the utilitarian approach was 
followed by the US courts, as its logic was endorsed by the US Constitution. See e.g. Sony Corp of Am v Universal 
City Studios, Inc, 464 US 417 at 450 (1984) and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539 at 
558 (1985). In Feist Publications, Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co, 499 US 340 at 349-350 (1991), SCOTUS 
concluded that “the primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labors of authors, but to promote the Progress 
of Science and Useful Arts.” Daniel J Gervais, “Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis Of The Notion Of 
Originality In Copyright Law” (2002) 49 CSUSA 949 at 951, suggests: “The main reason why the circuits were split 
among between the two main doctrines prior to Feist is that there are two principal justifications - and, therefore, bases 
- for copyright protection: either it is a reward/incentive of the effort or investment made, or a reward/incentive for 
adding to the pool of creative works available to the ‘public’.” Roberta Kwall argues that the “American copyright 
law rewards economic incentives almost exclusively and lacks adequate moral rights protections … Steeped in a 
utilitarian tradition, copyright law in the United States is concerned with calibrating the optimal level of economic 
incentive to promote creativity. Such a perspective emphasizes the merchandising and dissemination of intellectual 
works.” Roberta R Kwall, The Soul of Creativity: Forging a Moral Rights Law for the United States (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010) at xiii [Kwall, The Soul of Creativity]. See also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “The 
Normative Structure of Copyright Law” in Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed, Intellectual Property and the Common Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 313. Canada Supreme Court (SCC) in CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of 
Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13 [CCH], referred to Locke’s theory in establishing the scope of copyright protection in 
Canada. However, the court in CCH “eludes the philosophical and practical implications of a sweat-based approach 
to originality. Philosophically, awarding copyright to works that involved mere ‘sweat of the brow’ may appear to 
endorse a ‘natural rights or Lockean theory of ‘just desserts’, namely that an author deserves to have his or her efforts 
in producing a work rewarded … By rejecting ‘sweat of the brow’, and by dropping ‘labour’ from the components 
that constitute originality, the Supreme Court's decision could represent a significant step for Canadian copyright 
policy: a step away from labour and the author's claim of right; away from the expansion of copyright's scope and the 
diminishment of the information commons; and towards the public interest, the public domain, and the purposive 
interpretation of copyright doctrine.” Carys J Craig, “Resisting Sweat and Refusing Feist: Rethinking Originality after 
CCH” (2007) 40 UBC L Rev 69 at 98.  
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behaviour.441 There is already ample research about behavioural impacts on various legal fields 
like criminal and tax law. 
Contrasting these theories, the ensuing discussion will consider the differences across 
jurisdictions and disciplines, as Abraham Drassinower describes:442 
“[O]n the one hand, in common law jurisdictions, copyright is regarded as a policy 
instrument designed to serve the public interest in the production and dissemination of 
works of authorship … [O]n the other hand, in civil law jurisdictions, authorial entitlement 
is conceived not instrumentally but as judicial recognition of rights inherent in the act of 
authorship as such.”  
I echo Drassinower’s words. We face two distinct perspectives affecting the way IP laws are 
shaped. It is reasonable to argue that, in the coming era, these differences will have to be partly 
reconciled to clear the way for a more inclusive approach that can be shared internationally by 
humans and non-humans alike. An alternative vision is a transcontinental IP theory in which two 
distinct approaches to IP would be available – the US and the EU. Under this vision, it seems 
plausible that non-human creations would not be widely recognized in the EU, given the EU’s 
natural law inclination. It would also be very interesting to envision where Canada and the past-
Brexit UK would fall on the IP US-EU scale. 
2.2.2 Four IP Justifications 
Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman explain that IP justifications “fall into one of two general 
categories”: (1) “ethical and moral arguments” or (2) “instrumental justifications that focus on the 
                                                          
441 Lawrence Becker argued: “So if property-as-personality … turns out to be a dead end, perhaps we should dispense 
with the search for a deep justification for property rights (from metaphysics, moral psychology, or whatever) and 
focus on the behavioral surface […].” Lawrence C Becker, “Too Much Property” (1992) 21 Phil & Pub Aff 196 at 
206. 
442 Abraham Drassinower, What’s Wrong With Copying? (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2015) at 145. 
93 
 
fact that intellectual property induces or encourages desirable activities.”443 Fisher contends that 
there are four theoretical justifications for IP rights:444 utilitarianism,445 natural law (Labour based 
justifications), personhood, and social planning.  
My discussion emphasizes IP theory’s main philosophical arguments. I choose Fisher’s 
paper as the cornerstone to the theoretical discussion below, though I am aware of other approaches 
to IP and will keep those in mind, too. The theoretical outline below will seek to provide a compass 
for IP discussion within the AI debate that follows. 
2.2.2.1 The Utilitarian Approach  
Influenced by Jeremy Bentham’s writings, utilitarianism aspires to achieve “the greatest good for 
the greatest number”446 to maximize social welfare.447 It “endorse[s] the creation of intellectual 
property rights in order to induce innovation and intellectual productivity.”448 By nature, 
utilitarianism is based on consequentialist arguments, as “good is whatever yields the greatest net 
utility.”449 The patent system, for example, is justified by providing inventors incentives to invest 
in research and disclose valuable new products or processes to the public.450 A pharmaceutical 
                                                          
443 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 5.  
444 Fisher, supra note 407. 
445 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Kitchener, ON: Batoche Books, 
2000). 
446 This statement originated from the early writings of Francis Hutcheson: “In comparing the moral Qualities of 
Actions, in order to regulate our Election among various Actions propos’d, or to find which of them has the greatest 
moral Excellency, we are led by our moral Sense of Virtue to judge thus; that in equal Degrees of Happiness, expected 
to proceed from the Action, the Virtue is in proportion to the Number of Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend… 
and in equal Numbers, the Virtue is as the Quantity of the Happiness, or natural Good; or that the Virtue is in a 
compound Ratio of the Quantity of Good, and Number of Enjoyers. In the same manner, the moral Evil, or Vice, is as 
the Degree of Misery, and Number of Sufferers; so that, that Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness 
for the greatest Numbers; and that, worst, which, in like manner, occasions Misery.” [Emphasis added]. Francis 
Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1726) Treatise II, Section III, VIII.  
447 One divergent of utilitarianism is the welfarism approach (or consequentialism) – IP as a mechanism to promote 
welfare and social causes. See Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, “Intellectual Property Law and the 
Promotion of Welfare” (2017) University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Paper Series No 607. 
448 Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory, supra note 418 at 57-8. 
449 Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory, supra note 418 at 57-8. 
450 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 5. 
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company, for example, “will invest research and development costs in the manufacture of a new 
drug only if it is granted a patent.”451 Lawmakers are expected to balance “the power of exclusive 
rights to stimulate the creation of inventions and works of art” and the “offsetting tendency of such 
rights to curtail widespread public enjoyment of those creations.”452  
The utilitarian approach is well-grounded in UK and US copyright laws. It can be traced 
back to the Statute of Anne, 1709,453 and the US Constitution.454  
Scarcity is an essential element on the stimulation side of utilitarianism’s balancing act. 
For example, invention is scarce because it demands research and development, which consumes 
resources, which in turn consumes opportunity costs. Utilitarianism, therefore, must consider 
scarcity and appropriately allocating IP rights to produce “the greatest net ‘X’ (utility, wealth, and 
                                                          
451 Harris, supra note 408 at 297. James W Harris suggests that IP protection is justified if “considerations parallel to 
the five conditions for augmenting social wealth through incentives apply.” Harris describes the five conditions as 
follows: “1. X does work in consideration of a payment of Y pounds. 2. X would not have done the work for any lesser 
incentive. 3. On the available labour-market, no-one else could have been hired to do the work for any sum smaller 
than Y. 4. The work adds to total social wealth. 5. The addition enables justice costs to be discharged which could not 
have been met without it.” Harris, ibid at 294. 
452 Fisher, supra note 407 at 169. Palmer explains “the utility gains from increased incentives for innovations must be 
weighed against the utility losses incurred from monopolization of innovations and their diminished diffusion.” Tom 
G Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects” 
(1990) 13 Harv JL & Pub Pol’y 817 at 849-850.  
453 The Statue of Anne 1709, considered the first modern copyright Act, reads as follows: “An Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors, or Purchasers, of such Copies, 
during the Times therein mentioned.” See also Harry Ransom, The First Copyright Statute: An Essay on the Act for 
the Encouragement of Learning (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1956) at 1709; Ronan Deazley, On the Origin 
of the Right to Copy: Charting the Movement of Copyright Law in Eighteenth-century Britain (1695-1775) (Portland: 
Hart Publishing, 2004) at 31- 50; Johnson, supra note 408. 
454 Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory, supra note 418 at 57. The US Constitution, supra note 430, declares 
that the Congress is empowered “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” On the interpretation of 
the US Constitution clause see e.g. Karl B Lutz, “Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S 
Constitution” (1949) 18 Geo Wash L Rev 50; Edward C Walterscheid, “To Promote the Progress of Science and 
Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution” (1994) 
2 J Intell Prop 1; Alan L Durham, ‘“Useful Arts’ in the Information Age” (1999) BYUL Rev 1419. The utilitarian 
argument developed from early work of important legal philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham, A Manual of Political 
Economy (New York: Putnam, 1839); John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 5th ed (York: Appleton, 
1862), and Arthur C Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 2nd ed (London: Macmillan & Co., 1924). Landes and Posner 
expressed similar ideas in relate to trademark in their earlier work, see e.g. William M Landes & Richard A Posner, 
“Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective” (1987) 30:2 JL & Econ 265. See also Mark Lemley, “Property, 
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding” (2005) 83 Tex L Rev 1031 [Lemley, Property, IP and Free Riding]. I will 
develop the “free-riding” argument in the following paragraphs.  
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so on) […] at the lowest cost.”455 Once ideas are shared, they become free to the public. 
Since many aspects of IP are easy to copy, it is important to create artificial scarcity “to 
protect the right of an author or composer of any literary, artistic, or scientific work”456 and prevent 
“free riders”. As James Harris elegantly expresses, “Once the idea … cease[s] to be scarce, the 
law, through such devices as copyright, design right, patents, trade marks, and so forth, surrounds 
it with trespassory rules prohibiting unauthorized use.”457  
Concerning mass information’s abundance,458 Mark Lemley identifies the resulting 
potential irrelevance of the basic economic rule of scarcity for IP459 “when both the cost of creation 
and the cost of distribution fall below a certain point.”460 Lemley’s “world without scarcity” will 
require a reworking of basic economics,461 perhaps one that abandons IP protection. 
Exploitation by “free riders” is a concern on the public enjoyment side of utilitarianism’s 
scale. William Landes and Richard Posner emphasized the vulnerable nature of public IP goods: 
“While the cost of creating a work subject to copyright protection … is often high, the cost of 
reproducing the work, whether by the creator or by those to whom he has made it available, is 
often low. And once copies are available to others, it is often inexpensive for these users to make 
additional copies.”462 Lemley agrees, adding that “the ease of copying means producers won’t be 
                                                          
455 Palmer, supra note 452 at 849-850 (discusses the concept of scarcity in the utilitarian argument).  
456 Harris, supra note 408. 
457 Ibid at 44. Further, “Once an idea is fully in the public domain, it ceases to be scarce and in that sense an item of 
social wealth which must be allocated between competing claimants. An ideational entity differs from tangible object 
in that mere uses of it are not naturally competitive.” Ibid at 43 
458 Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, supra note 27.  
459 Ibid at 462. 
460 Ibid at 506, Lemley further explains that “[i]t simply means that how much (if any) IP we need in a given industry 
is a function of the characteristics of that industry. As those characteristics change, so must IP.” 
461 Ibid at 462 and 465, outlines three new technologies that promise significant changes: 3D printing, synthetic 
biology, and bioprinting and robotics, arguing that “[c]ombine these four developments … and it is entirely plausible 
to envision a not-too-distant world in which most things that people want can be downloaded and created on site for 
very little money – essentially the cost of raw materials. Jeremy Rifkin calls this the ‘zero marginal cost society’.”  
462 William M Landes & Richard A Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law” (1989) 18 J Leg Stud 325 at 
326. See also Posner & Landes, The Economic Structure of IP, supra note 416; Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M Salzberger, 
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able to charge enough to recoup their investment in making the thing in the first place.”463 The 
legal and economic solution to the “free riders” problem, Anne Barron suggests, is to “institute 
rights of private property in relation to these goods.”464 However, the way to that and to what 
extent, is under considerable disagreement.  
In a more recent paper, Lemley further criticizes the semi-“religious” adherence to 
utilitarianism as the leading IP theoretical justification.465 He calls for a more scientific basis 
approach to IP regulation,466 stating that despite gathering an increasing amount of data and 
information on every aspect of IP and creative and innovative markets,467 our “faith-based” IP 
approach remains largely unchanged.468 Robert Merges challenges Lemley’s faith-based IP 
argument, which is standing against the very essence of deontological theories, stating that “[i]f 
moral rules are to guide us, and if we follow those rules in deciding on a certain ‘system,’ it is then 
precisely and exactly the case that that system ‘is better for the world than other systems’.”469  
                                                          
The Law and Economics of Intellectual Property in the Digital Age: The limits of Analysis (New York: Routledge, 
2012) (the authors discuss the incentives paradigm in the new digital era, explaining the paradigm within the context 
of the contemporary challenges in IP); Frederic M Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 
2nd ed (Chicago: Rand McNally College Pub Co, 1980) at 444 (Scherer explains that if strict competition will prove 
to be “too” efficient we might harm the incentive to create). 
463 Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, supra note 27 at 467. 
464 Anne Barron, “Copyright Infringement, ‘Free-Riding’ and the Lifeworld” in Lionel Bently, Jennifer Davis & Jane 
C Ginsburg, eds, Copyright and Piracy: An Interdisciplinary Critique (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
at 94. For further discussion about copyright’s incentive regime. See Glynn S Lunney, “Reexamining Copyright’s 
Incentives-Access Paradigm” (1996) 49 Vand L Rev 483. Mark Lemley rejects the “free riding” paradigm arguing 
that “the rhetoric of free riding seems unlikely to offer any substantial aid and quite likely to lead us astray. The 
concept of free riding focuses on the economic effects on the alleged free rider-whether the accused infringer obtained 
a benefit from the use of the invention, and if so whether it paid for that benefit. But that is not where we should be 
focusing our attention in calibrating intellectual property. The proper focus is on the intellectual property owner, not 
the accused infringer.” Lemley, Property, IP and Free Riding, ibid at 1032 and 1068. 
465 Mark A Lemley, “Faith-Based Intellectual Property” (2015) 62 UCLA L Rev 1328 at 1337–43 [Lemley, Faith-
Based IP]. Other prominent scholars in the US criticize the profound influence of the utilitarian approach. See, for 
example, Amy Kapczynski, “The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism” 
(2012) 59 UCLA L Rev 970.  
466 Lemley, Faith-Based IP, supra note 465 at 1331, stating that “[i]n a market-based economy, regulation requires 
some cost-benefit justification before we accept it.” 
467 Ibid at 1332. 
468 Ibid at 1335.  
469 Robert P Merges, “Against Utilitarian Fundamentalism (Symposium)” (2017) 90 St John’s L Rev 681 at 687 
[Merges, Against Utilitarian Fundamentalism]. 
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These concerns – at each extreme of utilitarianism’s required balance – help explain the 
theory’s aim: Allocating time-limited exclusivity to creators during which they may recover costs 
and enjoy the benefits of their works to minimize inefficiency and deterrence of creation. 
2.2.2.2 The Natural Law Theory 
The second theoretical justification for IP is the Natural Law theory which utilizes labour-based 
justifications, which originated in John Locke’s philosophy.470 Locke’s theory – which 
significantly influenced the development of legal thought – is subject to a wide range of different 
interpretations and views.471 For example, an instrumental interpretation deems rewarding hard 
work as necessary to elicit labour in the first place.472 Alternatively, a normative interpretation 
considers hard work as deserving of a just reward by right.473 
The labourer’s right is conditional, subject to Locke’s proviso: She ought only to take and 
use what is needed;474 and she must ensure that “there is enough and as good left in common for 
                                                          
470 Fisher, supra note 407 at 170: “[A] person who labors upon resources that are either unowned or ‘held in common’ 
has a natural property right to the fruits of his or her efforts.” 
471 Lockean thought can be found in many aspects of legal and political studies. See, for example, Peter R Anstey, 
John Locke and Natural Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); James Tully, An Approach to Political 
Philosophy: Locke in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). In IP scholarly see e.g. Wendy 
Gordon, “Render Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously” (2004) 71 U Chi L Rev 75; Jacqueline 
Lipton, “Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities” (2004) 56 Fla L Rev 135; Benjamin G Damstedt, 
“Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine” (2003) 112 Yale L J 1179; Abraham 
Drassinower, “A Right-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law” (2003) 16 Can JL & Jur 3; 
Carys J Craig, “Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author’s Right” (2002) 28 Queen’s LJ 1 [Carys, Locke, Labour and 
Limiting the Author’s Right]. 
472 Justin Hughes, “Philosophy of Intellectual Property” (1988) 77 Geo LJ 287 at 296. 
473 Robert P Merges, “Locke Remixed ;-)” (2007) 40 U C Davis L Rev 1259 at 1265 [Merges, Locke Remix]. See e.g. 
Richard A Epstein, “Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law” (2005) 42 San Diego L 
Rev 1. Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory, supra note 418 at 62, explains: “Locke tells his readers that in the 
state of nature men share a common right in all things. Thus, justifying the individual’s right to property is notoriously 
difficult: once one takes a particular item from the common, one violates the right of other commoners, to whom this 
particular item also belongs. Locke resolves this seeming contradiction by introducing the idea of expenditure of 
labour. Labour justifies the penetration of a physical object into the labourer’s realm, and the result is ownership – the 
deer the Indian killed is his in the sense that it is a part of himself, and a plan for a tulip garden in the centre of Brussels 
is the planner’s own, as it now constitutes part of himself. In essence, Locke refutes the theory of universal compact 
as a necessary condition for legitimate appropriation.” 
474 As Locke, supra note 258 at 136, argues: “Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy.” 
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others.”475 Some deny such a proviso.476 Robert Nozick interprets Locke’s proviso as only limiting 
the justification for acquiring property by labouring when others escape “net harm” suffering. In 
other words, the proviso is violated if the labourer is unjustly enriched.477 Allocating patent rights 
to inventors, for example, abides by the proviso because the invention only came into existence 
due to the inventor’s efforts; inventor enrichment (ownership of the patent monopoly) equals a 
corresponding benefit to the public (disclosure of the invention) which justifies the corresponding 
deprivation (unfettered access to the invention). Adam Moore interpreted the proviso differently 
as a necessary condition, arguing that “[i]f the appropriation of an unowned object leaves enough 
and as good for others, then the acquisition and exclusion is justified.”478  
Two limitations applicable to IP theory develop from Locke’s proviso. Nozick identifies 
the first as occurring in simultaneous independent creation.479 For example, normally one inventor 
appropriating the work of another is enriched at the expense of the other’s ability to use his own 
invention. If two inventors create the same invention independently, however, each must be 
allowed to fully use and sell their inventions – despite the adverse effect on either inventor’s 
                                                          
475 Ibid at 134. 
476 Merges, Locke Remix, supra note 473. See also Wendy J Gordon, “A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality 
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property” (1993) 102 Yale L J 1533 at 1545: “To analyze whether 
this conception can serve as a tenable guide for modern decisions about the ethics of property, three issues must be 
addressed. First, a strict no-harm rule merely enshrines a status quo, so that Locke's natural right against harm is 
unpersuasively overbroad. What needs to be established is not simply whether harm is done, but rather whether there 
is an unjustified or wrongful harm. Second, labor is not itself property. Therefore, even if persons are entitled to be 
free of some kinds of harm, it remains to be shown that the same right pertains to their labor. Third, it is possible that 
a harm-based argument for property cannot validate intellectual property, for the “public goods” characteristics of 
intangible creations make them infinitely capable of being shared without depriving the initial creator of their use.” 
477 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) at 178-182. Fisher, supra note 407 at 
171 describes “net harm” as “such injuries as being left poorer than they would have been under a regime that did not 
permit the acquisition of property through labor or a constriction of the set of resources available for their use but does 
not include a diminution in their opportunities to acquire property rights in unowned resources by being the first to 
labor upon them.” 
478 Adam Moore, “Towards A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property” in Adam Moore, ed, Intellectual Property: 
Moral Legal and International Dilemmas (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997) at 3. Moore explains that “[t]he 
role of the proviso is to stipulate one possible set of conditions where the prima facie claim remains undefeated.”  
479 Nozick, supra note 477 at 178. 
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monopoly – “[o]therwise the assignment of the patent to the first inventor would leave [the second 
inventor] worse off.”480 Nozick identifies a second limitation required on the duration of IP 
protection that “approximates how long it would have taken, in the absence of knowledge of the 
invention, for independent discovery.”481  
Lockean theory has boundaries beyond its proviso; difficulties arise when calculating the 
appropriate mix of labour with property.482 For example, Nozick wonders whether “[b]uilding a 
fence around a territory presumably would make one the owner of only the fence (and the land 
immediately underneath it).”483 Perhaps, under this example, the builder may even lose entitlement 
to the fence he built,484 unless the labour improves – or increases the value of – the property 
underneath.485 In many ways,486 Nozick’s interpretation of utilitarianism for IP theory shares 
Adam Smith’s “free market” (liberty) philosophy, rejecting Rawls’s theory for a more egalitarian 
society. 
                                                          
480 Fisher, supra note 407 at 171. The problem with simultaneous inventions in patent law is establishing who files 
the patent or discovers the patent first. Further, this situation poses an intriguing questions both normatively and 
doctrinally: Do both inventors equally deserve patent protection? And if so, could the rewards from patenting the two 
inventors satisfy their individual investment in the patent (provide adequate reward)? Fisher states that 
“implementation of the first of these limitations would require a substantial reform of current patent law which, unlike 
copyright law, does not contain a safe harbor for persons who dream up the same idea on their own.” It should be 
noted, however, that Canadian patent law does have a limited safe harbor for prior use making “good-faith acquirers 
or independent inventors … personally protected in respect of some acts done before a patent’s claim date, with or 
without the patent holder’s consent.” See Vaver, supra note 237 at 398-9. 
481 Nozick, supra note 477 at 182. 
482 In that way, one might argue that even in scenarios with minimal human input, humans might be able to own the 
output of the computer-generated program.  
483 Nozick, supra note 477 at 174. 
484 Ibid at 174-5. In debating his philosophical thesis, Nozick provides his famous allegory: “If I own a can of tomato 
juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules (made radioactive, so I can check this) mingle evenly throughout the 
sea, do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?” 
485 Ibid at 175: “The crucial point is whether appropriation of an unowned object worsens the situation of others. 
Locke’s proviso that there be ‘enough and as good left in the common for others’… is meant to ensure that the situation 
of others is not worsened.” 
486 Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, “Is Nozick Kicking Rawl’s Ass? Intellectual Property and Social Justice” 
(2007) 40 UC Davis L Rev 563 at 567. 
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Utilitarianism’s reward for labour seems negotiable, by some accounts. Take Edwin 
Hettinger’s example: “One does not create 99 percent of the value of an apple by picking it off a 
tree, though some human effort is necessary for an object to have value for us.” 487 It is appropriate 
to translate this example into the notion that an IP labourer with an acknowledged right to fruits of 
his labour is not necessarily entitled to the entirety of the intellectual object’s value.488 Hettinger 
supports the idea further by emphasizing that “works are not created in a social vacuum: authors 
interact and converse with other creative individuals, enclosing ideas and other social facts 
received from the common stock.”489 In other words, the quantum of “fruits” with which to reward 
an IP labourer “is a question of social policy; it is not solved by simply insisting on a moral right 
to the fruits of one’s labor.”490 
2.2.2.3 The Private Property Theory 
The third approach derives from Kantian and Hegelian philosophy.491 According to Hegel and 
                                                          
487 Hettinger, supra note 407 at 37. Locke believes that “until labored on, objects have little human value, at one point 
suggesting that labor creates 99 percent of their value.”  
488 Ibid at 38. 
489 Zemer, Dialogical Transactions, supra note 437 at 160. In his early work, Zemer argues that the Lockean theory 
provides “significant recognition for the public role in the making of authorship and art … [and strengthen] the role 
played by a society’s shared pool of ideas and experiences in the creation of new works.” Lior Zemer, “The Making 
of a New Copyright Lockean” (2006) 29 Harv JL & Pub Pol’y 891 at 892-3 [Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright 
Lockean]. Carys Craig suggests that “[w]hen the author creates original expression in the form of literature, art, drama 
or music, she is engaged in an intrapersonal dialogue (developing a form of personal narrative by drawing upon 
experience, situation, and critical reflection) and an interpersonal dialogue (drawing upon the texts and discourses 
around her to communicate meaning to an anticipated audience).” Carys Craig, Copyright, Communication and 
Culture: Towards a Relational Theory of Copyright Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) at 53-4. 
490 Hettinger, supra note 407 at 39. Hettinger concludes, ibid at 40: “In short, a laborer has a prima facie natural right 
to possess and personally use the fruits of her labor. But a right to profit by selling a product in the market is something 
quite different. This liberty is largely a socially created phenomenon. The ‘right’ to receive what the market will bear 
is a socially created privilege, and not a natural right at all. The natural right to possess and personally use what one 
has produced is relevant to the justifiability of such a privilege, but by itself it is hardly sufficient to justify that 
privilege.” Adam Mossoff claims that the Lock’s labor theory discussion was neglected by philosophers and offers a 
concise summary of the philosophical debate. See Adam Mossoff, “Saving Locke from Marx - The Labor Theory of 
Value in IP Theory” (2012) 29:2 Soc Phil & Pol’y 283. 
491 Hegel focuses on the individual’s will as the most important element in its existence. Hence, it is important to 
establish if AI could express Hegelian “will”. Hegel, supra note 257. See also Robert R Williams, Hegel on the Proofs 
and Personhood of God: Studies in Hegel's Logic and Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017); Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, “Kant on Copyright: Rights on Transformative Authorship” (2007) 25 Cardozo Arts & 
Ent LJ 1059. 
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Kant, allocating private property rights to IP is justified by allowing “the satisfaction of some 
fundamental human needs.”492 The Hegelian approach is more concerned with the individual’s 
rights rather than social welfare. 
Fisher confirms the application of these approaches to IP rights by justifying them on two 
grounds: (1) “they shield from appropriation or modification artifacts through which authors and 
artists have expressed their ‘wills’ (an activity thought central to ‘personhood’)”; and (2) “they 
create social and economic conditions conducive to creative intellectual activity, which in turn is 
important to human flourishing.”493  
In other words, IP protections guard the creators’ personal cores, thereby encouraging their 
cultural and intellectual creation. 
 Private property may appear like labour theory, since it similarly maximizes creation by 
rewarding creators with protection. But, private property takes a less economic, more personal 
approach to endorse a perhaps stronger entitlement for labourers. Justin Hughes – critical of 
rigorous fixation to Lockean theory to justify IP494 – explained that the “most powerful alternative 
to a Lockean model of property is a personality justification” because it “posits that property 
                                                          
492 Fisher, supra note 407 at 171. There is an important difference between the Lockean approach and the Hegelian 
approach to property, as Margaret Radin explains: “The principal difference between the theories of Locke and Hegel 
is that for Locke the source of entitlement is labor, whereas for Hegel it is will. The Lockean individual has a natural 
right to property and broad negative freedom regarding that right. Hegel’s notion of rights-autonomy or freedom in 
the positive sense-is logically bound up with entitlement to external objects.” Margaret J Radin, “Property and 
Personhood” (1982) 34 Stan L Rev 957 at 961 [Radin]; Margaret J Radin, Reinterpreting Property (University of 
Chicago Press, 2009); Margaret J Radin, “Market Inalienability” (1987) 100 Harv L Rev 1849; See also Palmer, supra 
note 452 at 838: “Personality does not simply require external objects for its development. Its development is its 
objectification through externalization of its will.” Jeffery D Jones, “Property and Personhood Revisited” (2011) 1 
Wake Forest J L & Pol’y 93.  
493 Fisher, ibid. See also Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
494 Hughes, supra note 472 at 330: “Those who try to apply Locke to all modern property end up multiplying 
distinctions like pre-Copernican astronomers calculating celestial orbits with their Ptolemaic epicycles. At some point, 
it becomes easier to reorient one’s universe.” 
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provides a unique or especially suitable mechanism for self-actualization, for personal expression, 
and for dignity and recognition as an individual person.”495  
Expanding on Hughes’s interpretation of Hegelian philosophy, Fisher offers principal 
guidelines to shape a better IP system. First, IP should differentiate between highly expressive 
intellectual activities (writing novels) to less expressive activities (genetic research). On a 
spectrum between the two, the latter should be accorded lesser protection. Second, a person’s 
public image (“including his physical features, mannerisms, and history”,496 some facets of which 
result from little labour),497 should be given stronger protection since it reflects their “persona” – 
an important “receptacle for personality”.498 Third, “[a]uthors and inventors should be permitted 
to earn respect, honor, admiration, and money from the public by selling or giving away copies of 
their works, but should not be permitted to surrender their right to prevent others from mutilating 
or misattributing their works.”499 Notably, this last guideline uses the language of copyright’s 
moral rights. 
Margaret Radin reformulated Hegel’s approach to develop the concept of a person.500 
Radin explains that “[i]n Roman law, persona came to mean simply an entity possessing legal 
                                                          
495 Ibid.  
496 Ibid at 340. 
497 Ibid at 340-1: “[ …] the persona is the ideal property for the personality justification. No intermediary concepts 
such as ‘expression’ or ‘manifestation’ are needed: the persona is the reaction of society and a personality. Property 
rights in the persona give the individual the economic value derived most directly from one's personality. As long as 
an individual identifies with his personal image, he will have a personality stake in that image.” 
498 Fisher, supra note 407 at 172. 
499 Ibid. Hughes, supra note 472 at 350: “The personality theory provides a better, more direct justification for the 
alienation of intellectual property, especially copies. The alienation of copies is perhaps the most rational way to gain 
exposure for one's ideas. This is a non-economic, and perhaps higher, form of the idea of recognition: respect, honor, 
and admiration. Even for starving artists recognition of this sort may be far more valuable than economic rewards. 
Two conditions appear essential, however, to this justification of alienation: first, the creator of the work must receive 
public identification, and, second, the work must receive protection against any changes unintended or unapproved by 
the creator.”  
500 This discussion is of great value for establishing copyright protection for AI, as it examines the possible connection 
between the concept of a person to the legal rights that derived from that concept. 
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rights and duties. Today it commonly signifies any human being.”501 Radin further outlines four 
main conceptions of a person: 
a. The rights-holder. Kant argues that the person serves as a rational free agent and his existence 
is an end it itself. Accordingly, “personhood has no component of individual human 
differences, but rather by definition excludes the tastes, talents, and individual histories that 
differentiate one from another”;502 
b. The thinking, intelligent being (i.e., having self-consciousness and memory). According to 
Locke,503 consciousness is an inseparable element, as it is “impossible for anyone to perceive, 
without perceiving that he does perceive”;504  
c. The human body. According to Radin, recognizing someone as a person requires one “to 
attribute bodily continuity to it”;505 
d. The future projection (one on whom we may “project a continuing life plan into the future”).506 
Radin contends that “what counts in recognizing something as a person is a consistent character 
structure. Persons are what they are in virtue of their past and future integrated by their 
                                                          
501 Radin, supra note 492 at 962. 
502 Ibid. Kant explains: “Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature’s, have nevertheless, if they 
are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on the contrary, 
are called persons, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is as something which must 
not be used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of respect).” Immanuel 
Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (Raleigh, NC: 
Alex Catalogue, 1990) at 32. 
503 Radin, supra note 492 at 963. In reflecting about personal identity Locke explains: “[T]o find wherein personal 
identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has 
reason and reflection, and can consider itself, as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it 
does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it; it being 
impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive.” John Locke, An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding (London: T Longman, B Law and Son, 1793) at 333.  
504 Locke’s approach to personality might support the AI personality claim, given that AI will be able to express 
consciousness.  
505 Radin, supra note 492 at 963. See also Peter F Strawson, Individuals: An essay in descriptive metaphysics (London: 
Routledge, 2002) at 87-116. 
506 Radin, ibid. Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981) at 1-19. 
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character.”507 
Other philosophical conceptions of persons exist beyond these four categories. David Hume, for 
example, believes that “the rest of mankind […] are nothing but a bundle or collection of different 
perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux 
and movement.”508 For Hume, “the feeling of self-identity over time is merely a persistent 
illusion.”509  
IP rights under the private property theory can be justified on the basis that a creator is 
entitled to the rights in his creations – “manifestations of one’s personality in one’s intellectual 
expression” – so protection acts “as barriers to expropriation of inalienable features of one’s 
personality.”510 Locke wrote that “every man has a property in his own person”;511 hence, property 
should be protected because it is part of the individual personality. Radin distinguishes two levels 
of property: (1) market value (fungible); and, (2) personal (inalienable). Radin argues that the latter 
is more important to protect since it is irreplaceable by other market-bought goods.512  
                                                          
507 Radin, ibid at 964. 
508 Ibid. Hume explains: “Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still 
more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single 
power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theatre, where 
several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of 
postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different; whatever natural 
propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity.” David Hume, L A Selby-Bigge, ed, Treatise of 
Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896) at 252-3. 
509 Radin, supra note 492 at 964-5. Radin explains that behavioral psychologists “might say that the self is nothing 
separate from the body's processes and activity in the environment … a positive economist might conceive of a person 
as nothing but a bundle or collection of tastes and desires, conventionally recognised as a unit.” Non-behaviorists 
might consider a person as a self – “a subject to mental states”. On the other hand, a communitarian would reject all 
concepts of personhood, since those concepts derived “from the individualistic worldview that flowered in western 
society with the industrial revolution. In a society in which the only human entity recognised in social intercourse is 
some aggregate like the family or clan, there could not be such intense philosophical attention to the biological 
individual and its ontological, psychological, moral and political status.” Persons, according to the communitarian 
“are embedded in language, history, and culture, which are social creations; there can be no such thing as a person 
without society.”  
510 Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory, supra note 418 at 64. 
511 Locke, supra note 258 at 134. 
512 Radin, supra note 492 at 986. Radin explains that “the personhood perspective generates a hierarchy of 
entitlements: The more closely connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement.” 
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This approach to IP theory has its critics. In transposing Nozick’s classic query, Hughes 
suggested, “[W]hy should we think putting our personality out into the world gives us rights to the 
things we create? Why should we not assume that when we mix our personality with the world, 
we lose part of our personality instead of gaining part of the world?”513 
2.2.2.4 The Social Planning Theory  
Social planning – or proprietarian514 – theory contends that property rights should be allocated in 
a way that would promote desirable societal goals.515 Or, according to broader interpretations (like 
Zemer’s), social planning is “largely devoted to discussing ways to maintain a strong civic culture 
that benefits from a reasonably balanced social and institutional intellectual property regime.”516  
This theory – inspired by philosophers such as Thomas Jefferson,517 Karl Marx,518 James 
Harrington,519 Morris Cohen and others520 – supports looser IP restrictions to maximize social and 
                                                          
513 Justin Hughes, “The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property” (1998) 16 Cardozo Arts 
& Ent LJ 81 at 84-5. 
514 Greg Alexander suggested the term Proprietarian theory. See Greg S Alexander, Commodity and Propriety: 
Competing Visions of Property in American Legal Thought, 1776–1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).  
515 Fisher, supra note 407 at 172. 
516 Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory, supra note 418 at 65. 
517 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (Norton, 1972). 
518 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (International Publishers, 1964). 
519 James Harrington, Oceana (Hyperion Press, 1979). 
520 Morris R Cohen, “Property & Sovereignty” (1927) 13:1 Cornell Law Q 8; Frank Michelman, “Law’s Republic” 
(1988) 97:8 Yale L J 1493; William Fisher, Morton J Horwitz & Thomas A Reed, eds, American Legal Realism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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cultural engagement.521 Among the many eminent scholars developing this approach include 
Fisher,522 Neil Netanel,523 Rosemary Coombe,524 Niva Elkin-Koren,525 and Zemer.526 
 Netanel explores the balance between owner rights and the public domain,527 proposing an 
alternative approach: the “democratic paradigm”. Netanel argues that copyright enhances our 
society’s democratic character using a free market,528 by providing sufficient incentives to support 
creation without government or elite patronage.529 In other words, Netanel claims that copyright’s 
objective is democratic culture, not efficient authorship (an objective that constrains robust 
culture;530 though autonomous self-reliant authorship remains an admittedly essential copyright 
objective for Netanel).531 The democratic approach approves of transformative use – thus 
disapproving of authorial control over derivation – which in turn “loosen media conglomerates’ 
hold on public discourse.”532 An ideal democratic culture is one that maximizes mass expression 
opportunities while maintaining incentives to express without state intervention.533 One way to do 
                                                          
521 Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory, supra note 418 at 66. 
522 William Fisher, “Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine” (1988) 101 Harv L Rev 1659. 
523 Neil W Netanel, “Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society” (1996) 106 Yale L J 283. 
524 Rosemary J Coombe, “Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic 
Dialogue” (1991) 69 Tex L Rev 1853 [Coombe, Objects of Property]. Zemer further explains that “[b]oth Coombe 
and Netanel advocate a greater democratic dialogue, a freer communicative sphere, the need to eliminate restrictions 
on creative expression, a stronger public domain and a radical change of the perception of copyright proprietary 
entitlements in order to enable more widespread participation in the production of knowledge and idea.” Zemer, On 
the Value of Copyright Theory, supra note 418 at 66. 
525 Niva Elkin-Koren, “Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against 
Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators” (1995) 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 345; Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M 
Salzberger, supra note 462. 
526 Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory, supra note 418 at 65; Lior Zemer, The Idea of Authorship in Copyright 
(Ashgate Publishing, 2007) [Zemer, The Idea of Authorship]. 
527 Netanel, supra note 523 at 285. 
528 Ibid at 288. 
529 Ibid and at 347-362. 
530 Ibid at 288.  
531 Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author” in Image Music Text, Stephen Heath, trans (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1978). 
532 Netanel, supra note 523 at 362. 
533 Ibid at 363. 
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this, per Netanel, is through compulsory IP licensing regimes “to balance the interests of artists 
and ‘consumers’ of their works.”534 
  Social planning theory is skeptical of lengthy IP terms. Terms should instead be designed 
with the importance of the works’ social value in mind, maximizing the public domain and 
minimizing IP owner surplus.535 Netanel recommends two ways – tied to terms – to achieve this 
goal. First, extending protection for personal uses to digital copies under certain conditions;536 and, 
second, eliminating rigorous technological protection measures that restrict unauthorised users 
from access to electronic databases and content.537 The democratic approach seeks to discourage 
IP owners and providers from controlling works already publicly available or licensed to an 
individual consumer or user for his private use.538  
Netanel suggests a copyright regime that fosters democratic values as follows: First, “[t]he 
copyright term should be shortened, thereby increasing the size of the ‘public domain’ available 
for creative manipulation.” Second, derivative works (or transformative users) should be exempt 
from copyright owners’ grips. Finally, “compulsory licensing systems should be employed more 
frequently to balance the interests of artists and ‘consumers’ of their works.”539 
                                                          
534 Fisher, supra note 407 at 173. 
535 Netanel, supra note 523 at 369. Netanel states that the current length of copyright protection provides by all 
accounts “more than sufficient support for an independent and diverse sector of authors and publishers, and that, from 
the perspective of democratic governance, any further lengthening of the duration of protection would be undesirable 
and unwarranted.” 
536 Ibid at 373: “That extension would constitute a substitute for copyright owner rights that will have a far diminished 
utility in the digital market and not an onerous expansion of copyright’s scope.” Netanel, for example, is skeptical in 
regard to neo-classicist embrace of collective licensing organizations. 
537 Ibid at 382. It is worth mentioning Canada’s persistence in recognizing TPM, per the recent Federal Court case 
Nintendo of America Inc v King, 2017 FC 246 (CanLII). 
538 Netanel, ibid at 385. 
539 Fisher, supra note 407 at 173. 
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 Rosemary Coombe – taking a dialogic approach to social planning IP theory540 – advocates 
for an open and safer public area for creation.541 Coombe argues that strong (and expensive) IP 
rights threaten the cultural process, because they prevent the public “from using the most powerful, 
prevalent, and accessible cultural forms to express identity, community, and difference.”542 
Coombe’s interpretation of social planning rejects the “rationalist privileging of the autonomous 
self and its claims to know an objective social world.”543 She instead shares modernist aspirations 
to “de-center the subject and its claims to ontological and epistemological primacy” but rejects the 
insistence that “a single underlying structure may be privileged as the objective reality underlying 
the cultural epiphenomena of everyday life and consciousness.”544 Coombe believes that the 
conventional forms of discourse limit our realities.  
Coombe’s argument is built upon the scholarly debate that “the objective world is the 
cultural construction of social subjects and that subjectivity itself is a product of language and 
cultural practice.”545 As Coombe explains, “What we experience as social reality is a constellation 
of cultural structures that we ourselves construct and transform in ongoing practice.”546  
Merges criticizes Coombe’s and Netanel’s views that the Lockean proviso is impossible to 
apply to dialogic culture.547 Merges prefers a different balance, stating that “[w]e cannot escape 
                                                          
540 Coombe referring to the concept of dialogism as developed by the philosophers Mikhail Bakhtin and Martin Buber 
and by the physicist David Bohm. See Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, Michael Holquist, 
ed, Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist, trans (University of Texas Press, 1981); Maurice Friedman, “Martin Buber 
and Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogue of Voices and the Word that is Spoken” in Bela H Banathy & Patrick M Jenlink, 
eds, Dialogue as a Means of Collective Communication (New York: Springer Science & Business Media, Inc, 2006) 
at 29; Zemer, Dialogical Transactions, supra note 437. 
541 See e.g. Rosemary J Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship, Appropriation and the Law 
(Duke University Press, 1998). 
542 Coombe, Objects of Property, supra note 524 at 1855. 
543 Ibid at 1855-6. 
544 Ibid at 1856. 
545 Ibid at 1858. 
546 Ibid.  
547 Merges, Locke Remixed, supra note 473 at 1266: “Professor Rosemary Coombe, for example, has written of the 
‘dialogic’ way in which culture is constructed; she has focused on the ‘drive to meaning’ engaged in by all people, 
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the barrage of images, signs, and symbols that flood our minds from the ubiquitous mass media, 
yet we are supposed to honor property lines, and remain passive consumers of, instead of active 
participants in, the media saturated culture that engulfs us.”548 According to Merges, we ought to 
limit “how much someone may be permitted to comment on, reconfigure, and ‘make their own’ 
the works of the mass media.”549 Of course, this is demonstrably untrue for communities who 
deliberately exclude TV and Internet from their lives; for them, popular culture and media are 
indeed escapable.550 
                                                          
which she believes requires legal rules that permit widespread commentary, critique, and reaction to previously 
published works. She sees expansive IP rights as a threat to these important values. She and others writing from this 
strong public domain position have pointed out that the dialogic nature of culture makes it impossible in many cases 
for IP rights to satisfy the Lockean sufficiency proviso.” 
548 Ibid.  
549 Merges, Locke Remixed, supra note 473 at 1267. 
550 Ibid at 1268: “All I mean to say is that, regardless of the intensity of the pleasure or comfort one derives from 
consuming mass media, it is not after all an essential activity in a deep sense. Exposure to Big Media is a choice. It is 
a widely shared choice, it is a very easy choice, it is a highly popular choice, but it is still a choice.” 
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2.2.3 Moral Rights551 
Moral rights protect an author’s non-economic interests,552 which generally mean personal 
interests like honour, reputation, and dignity.553 The doctrine emerged in Europe in the nineteenth 
century;554 French civil law is considered most sympathetic to it.555 In each country that recognizes 
moral rights, “the nuances of interpretation reflect the unique qualities of its culture.”556 
Continental Europe’s civil law countries favour strong moral rights copyright laws.557 The 
apparent reason they differ from common law systems is found in the individual rights and 
personhood doctrines of civil law countries in contrast to the commercial orientation of common 
law countries.558 Common law jurisdictions only adopted moral rights more recently.559 
Moral rights usually last the full duration of the copyright term,560 regardless of any 
                                                          
551 Vaver clarifies that the translation of the phrase to English was not accurate: “Since the word ‘moral’ is commonly 
contrasted with ‘legal’, one’s first reaction to a ‘moral right’ is that it is something to which one has no legal 
entitlement – only a moral or … deontological entitlement.” David Vaver, “Moral Rights Yesterday, Today and 
Tomorrow” (1999) 7(3) Intl JL & IT 270 at 271-2 [Vaver, Moral Rights Yesterday]. 
552 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 272; Jane Ginsburg, “Moral Rights in a Common Law System” (1990) 1 Ent 
L Rev 121; Mira T Sundara Rajan, Moral Rights: Principles, Practice and New Technology (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) at 4. 
553 Kwall, The Soul of Creativity, supra note 440 at 39; Vaver, supra note 237 at 203. See also Vaver, Moral Rights 
Yesterday, supra note 551. 
554 Vaver, Moral Rights Yesterday, ibid at 271. Kwall argues that although the moral rights doctrine was developed 
in a later stage, the roots for the doctrine were conceived “[as] early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in 
England, France and elsewhere.” Kwall, The Soul of Creativity, ibid at 39. 
555 French law has adopted Hegel dualist theory (the author’s creations are protected by a different set of rights – 
personal and economic). The French legal system views moral rights as the author’s personal interest and his authorial 
dignity. However, “Prior to the emergence of moral rights, the view of copyright around the time of the French 
Revolution was substantially similar to Anglo-American perspective.” Kwall, The Soul of Creativity, supra note 440 
at 39 (Kwall distinguishes between the dualist and monist theories). German law moral right concept is derived from 
the philosophy of Kant and Otto Friedrich von Gierke and shares a monist approach to moral rights (author’s creations 
represent complete embodiment of the author’s self). See e.g. Neil Netanel, “Copyright Alienability Restrictions and 
the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation” (1993) 24 Rutgers LJ 347 at 374-382; Immanuel 
Kant, The Philosophy of Law, William Hastie, trans (T & T Clark, 1887).  
556 Sundara Rajan, supra note 552 at 5. 
557 Kwall, The Soul of Creativity, supra note 440 at 38, clarifies that “[h]istorically, there has been a divergence in 
moral rights protection between the civil and common law traditions, although recently the majority of common law 
jurisdictions have enacted moral rights protections to some degree.” 
558 Sundara Rajan, supra note 552 at 11. 
559 Kwall, The Soul of Creativity, supra note 440 at 47. Canada adopted moral rights in 1931, the UK in 1988, New 
Zealand in 1994, Australia in 2000, and Ireland in 2001. 
560 This is not true in all countries. In France, for example, moral rights are protected indefinitely. See Sundara Rajan, 
supra note 552 at 15. 
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economic rights diverted from the work.561 The author’s interest in the work “transcends the 
motive of financial gain.”562 Hence, even if the author sells or licenses his work, he retains his 
moral rights.563 What’s more, as Vaver notes: “Parting with the copyright does not lessen the 
author’s personal attachment to the work. It follows that the author should have recourse against 
those who present the work differently from the way the author originally intended.”564  
Moral rights are internationally recognized in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, which states:565 
“[T]he author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any 
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, 
the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.”  
Berne confirms that moral rights are independent and persist even after an economic right’s 
transfer. Gerald Dworkin opines that Berne – in its historical context – reflects a compromise by 
common law countries which were “caught by surprise when moral rights issues surfaced during 
the conference.”566 The more recent agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
                                                          
561 Vaver, Moral Rights Yesterday, supra note 551 at 270-1. 
562 Sundara Rajan, supra note 552 at 4. 
563 In many common law countries an author can, under contract law, waive his moral rights – in part or as a whole – 
by agreement. In a world where the relations between the parties are not equal, waivers might undermine the moral 
rights theory: “[C]ountries like Canada and the United Kingdom have seen the development of standard-form contracts 
in which complete waivers of moral rights are required before any publication activity will be undertaken.” Sundara 
Rajan, supra note 552 at 17. 
564 Vaver, Moral Rights Yesterday, supra note 551 at 271. 
565 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886, 828 UNTS 221 [Berne]. Vaver, supra 
note 237 at 204. The US and Russia were the last to sign the convention in 1989 and 1995, respectively. Today every 
country is required to protect moral rights according to the Berne standard at minimum. Sundara Rajan further 
explains: “Article 6bis originally represented an uneven compromise between civilian and common law views that 
clearly favored the European position on moral rights. The article was subsequently amended … [and] the current 
version … retains the original focus of the law on the two moral rights of attribution and integrity.” Sundara Rajan, 
supra note 552 at 12. 
566 Gerald Dworkin, “The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Common Law Countries” (1995) 19 
Colum.-VLA J L & Arts 229 at 231. 
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Rights (TRIPs)567 requires that member states adhere to the substantive provisions of Berne.568 
However, Article 9(1) of TRIPs excludes moral rights entirely from TRIPs, stating that “[m]embers 
shall not have rights or obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred under 
Article 6bis of that Convention or of the rights derived therefrom.”569 
The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) approaches moral rights differently 
by establishing a moral right for performance in Article 5 of the WIPO Performance and 
Phonograms Treaty,570 granting rights of attribution and integrity for performers.571 Mira Sundara 
Rajan emphasizes that a notable difference between Berne and the WPPT – also considered 
significant by Mihály Ficsor – is “the elimination of the word “honor” from the definition of the 
performer’s right of integrity.”572 According to Kwall, WPPT’s Article 5 and Berne’s Article 6bis 
are the only existing international moral protections.573  
Regardless of jurisdiction, two moral rights are always recognized and accepted in these 
international agreements: the right of attribution and the right of integrity. In civil law systems 
with a strong moral rights basis, other rights can be recognized as well, such as withdrawal and 
disclosure rights.574 
                                                          
567 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1869 UNTS 299, 33 ILM 1197. 
568 TRIPs, ibid; Sundara Rajan, supra note 552 at 13.  
569 TRIPs, ibid. 
570 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 20 December 1996, 36 ILM 76 [WPPT]. 
571 See also Kwall, The Soul of Creativity, supra note 440 at 38. 
572 Sundara Rajan, supra note 552 at 13. 
573 Kwall, The Soul of Creativity, supra note 440 at 38, explains that “on the international level the only existing 
protections for moral rights are Article 6bis of Berne for authors of works and the WPPT provision for performers.” 
574 Ibid at 44; Cyrill P Rigamonti, “Deconstructing Moral Rights” (2006) 47:2 Harv Int'l LJ 353 at 356. Rigamonti 
explains that the right of disclosure is “the right to decide when and how the work in question will be published” and 
the right of withdrawal is “the right to withdraw a work after publication.” Kwall suggests that “[u]nderlying the right 
of disclosure is the idea that the author, as the sole judge of when a work is ready for public dissemination, is the only 
one who can possess any right in an uncompleted work.” The right of withdrawal is recognised in Germany and 
France, and only rarely exercised since “the author must affirmatively show severe harm” and the right is “applicable 
only to published works rather than works of visual art.” Moreover, with the exception (partially) of Swiss (which 
requires the owner to offer the author to buy his work), most countries do not protect the author from the destruction 
of his creation. 
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The attribution right requires that an author’s name is properly and consistently associated 
with his work.575 As a result, attribution preserves the historical truth.576 Accordingly, the author 
retains the right to seek relief if his work is unattributed or falsely attributed to another.577 The 
integrity right prohibits distortion, mutilation, or modification of a work.578 Considered the most 
important moral right,579 it preserves “cultural heritage, whether material or intangible, from 
damage.”580 Integrity can apply both to physical or contextual modifications (adding Christmas 
ribbons to a goose sculpture), and in some cases, where a work is associated with a product, 
service, cause or institution (use in a political party’s rallies).581 
Moral rights have limits, even where their protection is strongest. Attribution, for example, 
does not necessarily “entitle the anonymous or pseudonymous author to prevent a third party from 
disclosing the author’s real name” and thus might extend copyright term.582 Integrity is a narrowed 
right in Germany and France. Germany protects only gross distortions or mutilations of films and 
works included in films; France, meanwhile, excludes moral rights protection for computer 
programs, architectural works and creations of “minimal originality”.583  
                                                          
575 Sundara Rajan, supra note 552 at 5. 
576 Ibid. 
577 Rigamonti, supra note 574 at 363. Rigamonti further argues, at 364, that “[i]n addition to the right to claim 
authorship, authors also have a right not to claim authorship in the sense that they may elect to remain anonymous or 
to use pseudonyms instead of using their real names.” 
578 Berne, supra note 565 at Art. 6bis (1). 
579 Rigamonti, supra note 574 at 364.  
580 Ibid; Kwall, The Soul of Creativity, supra note 440 at 42, states that “although Berne and other countries require 
that actionable modifications must negatively impact the author’s honor or reputation, some countries such as France 
and Germany do not explicitly incorporate this caveat.”  
581 Kwall, The Soul of Creativity, ibid at 43; Physical: Snow v The Eaton Centre Ltd (1982), 70 CPR (2d) 105 (CA) 
(The Ontario Superior Court ruled against Toronto Eaton Centre for violating Michael Snow’s moral rights in his 
work); Contextual: Prise de Parole Inc. c. Guérin, Éditeur Ltée; Association, [1995] FCJ No 1583 (ABBA’s 2010 
lawsuit against the Danish People’s Party).  
582 Rigamonti, supra note 574 at 364.  
583 Kwall, The Soul of Creativity, supra note 440 at 42-3. Rigamonti, ibid at 364-5, further provides that “[i]n France, 
the scope of the right of integrity is reduced to the mere protection of the author’s honor and reputation if the work is 
a computer program. In Germany, a separate statutory regime was established for motion pictures and for works used 
in the production of motion Pictures.” In that regard it is interesting to address the “special condition” of commuter 
programs moral rights in France, as Kwall, ibid at 183, footnote 55 explains: “In France, an author is precluded from 
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Tension between contract and copyright law makes moral rights waivers a controversial 
practice.584 This is because moral rights are understood as not transferable, which opposes freedom 
of contracts doctrine.585 In common-law countries, however, moral rights are routinely waived in 
contracts.586 This tension is exacerbated by the often variable, sometimes perpetual idea of moral 
rights duration. While Berne prescribes a minimum standard duration lasting a period equal to the 
work’s economic rights,587 French moral rights last forever.588  
More tension arises in the way different jurisdictions define authorship (i.e., who is the 
beneficiary of moral rights).589 In Canada, for example, 2012’s Copyright Modernization Act 
expanded moral rights protection for performers.590 The UK’s Copyright and Patents Act 1988 
                                                          
preventing any ‘adaptation of a computer program’ that complies with rights transferred and from ‘exercising his right 
to retract or correct’ … French law also precludes authors of computer programs from opposing modifications unless 
they are prejudicial to their honor or reputation.” 
584 This statement is not completely accurate. In Canada, the Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42 [Copyright Act, RSC 
1985], s 14.1(2), explicitly allows waivers.  
585 Rigamonti, supra note 574 at 376; Kwall, The Soul of Creativity, supra note 440 at 46, discusses the unique 
situation of “ghostwriters”. According to Kwall, “[With] respect to waiver-related issues in connection with the right 
of attribution in the civil law tradition, authors generally ‘always preserve their right to disclose the fact of their 
authorship, even if previously agreed to publish their work anonymously or under pseudonym’.” 
586 D’Agostino, supra note 408 at 18: “[U]nlike many other European countries, but similar to Canada and the US, the 
UK allows waiver of moral rights by contract or estoppel.” However, in the UK “[m]oral rights can be waived in 
writing but cannot be assigned”, ibid at 115. 
587 Such model has adopted in Germany and in the UK. See e.g. section 86(1) of the CDPA which states: “The rights 
conferred by section 77 (right to be identified as author or director), section 80 (right to object to derogatory treatment 
of work) and section 85 (right to privacy of certain photographs and films) continue to subsist so long as copyright 
subsists in the work.” It should be noted that “to object the false attribution is less extensive, lasting for only 20 years 
after the author’s death.” Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 272-3; See also section 86(2) of the CDPA, which 
states that “[t]he right conferred by section 84 (false attribution) continues to subsist until 20 years after a person’s 
death.” 
588 Kwall, The Soul of Creativity, supra note 440 at 46. Kwall offers the reasons for the French approach: “[i]n France, 
the author’s moral rights always have been regarded as a separate body of protection, rather as a doctrine that is 
intertwined with the creator’s pecuniary rights.” Ibid at 46-7.  
589 Ibid at 11, addressed this question in the second chapter of her book: “The Intrinsic Dimension of Human 
Creativity.” In doing so, Kwall is using a wide range of sources in her aspiration to search for the concept of human 
creativity.  
590 SC 2012, c 20 [Copyright Modernization Act], amending Canada Copyright Act, RSC 1985, supra note 590; Kwall, 
The Soul of Creativity, supra note 440 at 47; Vaver, supra note 237 at 203, refers to Bill C-32, which is an early 
attempted to amend the Copyright Act, RSC 1985. The amendments were designed to reflect the “[w]orld Intellectual 
Property Organization Copyright Treaty and the World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, adopted in Geneva in 1996.” Copyright Modernization Act, ibid at the preamble. The current 
Copyright Act, RSC 1985 defines moral rights as “the rights described in subsections 14.1(1) and 17.1(1).” Subsection 
17.1 provides that “(1) In the cases referred to in subsections 15(2.1) and (2.2), a performer of a live aural performance 
or a performance fixed in a sound recording has, subject to subsection 28.2(1), the right to the integrity of the 
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(CDPA) explicitly excludes computer programs as “authors” of computer-generated works, 
instead designating copyright to the human “by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation 
of the work are undertaken.”591 The CDPA further disallows any right of attribution or integrity 
for computer programs or generated creations592 and diminishes employees’ moral rights 
protection.593  
During the discussion leading to the CDPA copyright reform in 1988, Lord Beaverbrook 
expressed doubts about the applicability of moral rights to UK computer-generated works 
protection. Since moral rights are concerned “with the personal nature of creative effort”, Lord 
Beaverbrook argued that the person “whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of a 
computer-generated work are undertaken will not himself have made any personal, creative 
effort.” 594 
Citing this quotation, Andrés Guadamuz concluded that the UK copyright law “recognises 
that there is no creative input in computer-generated works, and therefore s 9(3) has been framed 
as an exception to the creativity and originality requirements for the subsistence of copyright. It is 
precisely this divorce with creativity what makes the UK’s computer-generated clause so different 
from other jurisdictions.”595 
                                                          
performance, and — in connection with an act mentioned in subsection 15(1.1) or one for which the performer has a 
right to remuneration under section 19 — the right, if it is reasonable in the circumstances, to be associated with the 
performance as its performer by name or under a pseudonym and the right to remain anonymous.” 
591 CDPA, s 9(3). 
592 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 276 (the right of attribution), at 283 (the right of integrity). The CDPA 
provides that the right of attribution “does not apply in relation to the following descriptions of work— (a) a computer 
program; (b) the design of a typeface; (c) any computer-generated work.” CDPA, s 79(2). In regard to the right of 
integrity the CDPA states explicitly that “[t]he right does not apply to a computer program or to any computer-
generated work.” CDPA, s 81(2). 
593 Kwall, The Soul of Creativity, supra note 440 at 48; Bently & Sherman, ibid at 273-4, 279 and 289. Accordingly, 
“[I]f the employer or copyright owner authorized reproduction … of the work the right [of attribution] does not apply” 
and “the right of integrity does not apply to anything done by or with the authority of the copyright owner … [t]he 
general rule … is that an employer can deal publicly with derogatory treatments of an employee’s work.” 
594 Guadamuz, supra note 422 at 176; UK, HL Deb (25 February 1988), vol 493, col 1305. 
595 Ibid.  
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Moral rights face criticism. The romantic author ideal underlying the personal bond 
between creator and creation has notable weaknesses.596 Their continental origin may be less 
compatible for (or incompatible with) common law copyright regimes.597 Moral rights impede free 
markets through contractual restrictions and preservation of several aspects of the author’s 
rights.598 They promote private ownership and interests over the public,599 and increase potential 
free expression conflicts, as in Guy Pessach’s example of authors exploiting their integrity rights 
“to prevent publication of a parody of their work.”600 Public interests and creative tastes change 
over time, and, as Amy Adler notes, “Amidst the uncertainty, one can argue that it is sometimes 
in the public interest to mutilate a work rather than to preserve it.”601 
On the other hand, using moral rights might help regulate modern technology and improve 
the quality of information proliferation. Sundara Rajan,602 concerned that knowledge 
democratization, coupled with effective manipulation and alteration technology, may degrade 
information beyond recognition.603 In her view: 604 
                                                          
596 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406. This notion of the romantic author does not recognize the collaborative nature 
of the creative process, as discussed earlier and as reflected in the writings of scholars such as Coombe, Drassinower 
and Zemer. 
597 Ibid at 274. 
598 Dworkin, supra note 566 at 242-3: “Whether or not the reluctance of those in common law jurisdictions to legislate 
expressly for moral rights laws is based upon real or false fears is debatable. It is certainly true, though, that a deeply 
rooted suspicion of such legislation existed and continues to exist.” 
599 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 274. 
600 Guy Pessach, “The Author Moral Right of Integrity in Cyberspace: A Preliminary Normative Framework” (2003) 
34 IIC 250. 
601 Amy M Adler, “Against Moral Rights” (2009) 97 Cal L Rev 263 at 281. 
602 Sundara Rajan, supra note 552 at 2. 
603 Ibid at 4. 
604 Ibid. 
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“[C]opyright rules play into both sides of the equation. They represent a method of 
generating economic value from knowledge by imposing legal restrictions on its 
circulation where few limitations exist in practice. By restricting the unauthorized 
dissemination of works, copyright may also help, indirectly, to promote the integrity of the 
knowledge.” 
Copyright’s commercial function, in partnership with its moral rights function, might therefore 
support improved knowledge integrity.605 
                                                          
605 Ibid. 
118 
 
2.3 PLACING AI WITHIN THE IP LAW MAP 
In chapters I and II, I mapped, summarized, compared and contrasted IP’s predominant theories. 
In doing so, I indicated unique differences and commonalities between each approach. In chapter 
III, I will place AI within the IP law map, and describe IP protection for three different AI 
development levels:606  
A. The current pre-AI stage; 
B. The impending stage of AI realization; and  
C. The future stages of advancement.607  
Determining the best approach to protecting AI-IP may be helped by exploring how developments 
in computer software considerably transformed IP protection over the years. The law’s interaction 
with the onset of computer software – a field directly contributing to AI technology, and from 
which AI technology has largely extended – should be particularly illuminating for AI-IP 
modelling.  
Current developments may also highlight differences between computer-assisted and 
computer-generated programs. I consider these recent IP law software-related developments 
because such law may affect software assisted or generated by computers in profoundly different 
ways.  
                                                          
606 It is important to distinguish between the current stage of AI (hence – not necessarily an “AI” according to scientific 
standards), the next stage of AI evolution, and future possible advancements. 
607 Later, in chapter IV, I will explore each IP theory’s applicability to AI’s developments and consider how IP theories 
might adhere to rights allocation for AI creations. 
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Finally, as noted in Part I,608 the scientific community overwhelmingly recognizes a 
possibility of singularity – AI reaching human-level intelligence – occurring by the years 2040-50 
(not to mention an accepted higher probability that AI exceeds human intelligence in the following 
years). 
In this chapter, I aspire to develop ideas and to shatter some current misconceptions. My 
discussion aims to expand on the ideas of Lemley, Menell, and others, as well as contribute to an 
ongoing debate at the intersection of IP law and technology. 
2.3.1 The Past: IP Law Trends for Software Protection 
2.3.1.1 Protecting Software through Copyrighting Literary Code 
Computer programs and copyright protection have never been considered a good match – “[a]fter 
all, copyright is intended, at base, to protect creative expression, such as paintings, music, novels, 
and sculptures.”609 Vaver further observes that “copyright protection for programs is awkward and 
causes many practical problems. Programmers enjoy being called ‘binary bards,’ and the codes 
they produce may look like telegraph code books.”610 Software is usually considered more 
functional than it is artistic.611 Thus, it lacks several important “ingredients” to garner copyright 
protection.  
                                                          
608 Part I, Searching for Common Ground: Conceptualizing AI, chapter II – The singularity is near. 
609 Lothar Determann & David Nimmer, “Software Copyright’s Oracle from the Cloud” (2015) 30 BTLJ 161 at 165. 
Paul Edward Geller, opines that “computer programs represent one of a number of hybrid creatures that the law of 
intellectual property has not yet fully tamed.” Paul Edward Geller, “International Copyright: The Introduction” in 
Lionel Bently, Paul Edward Geller & Melville B Nimmer, eds, International Copyright Law and Practice (Lexis 
Nexis, 2016) at § 4[1][c][i][B]. 
610 Vaver, supra note 237 at 70-1. 
611 This statement is not always true. Programming a code might prove to be an artistic and innovative process. It 
seems that this perception is more relevant to “old” codes and not to current codes and developments.  
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At the first stages of computer software development (1960s and 1970s),612 IP law (at least 
in the US) did not protect software.613 Interestingly, as Determann and Nimmer,614 and Menell615 
noted, when IP law stepped in, copyright – not patent law – become the “legal vehicle providing 
the primary source of intellectual property law protection for software” and thus programming.616 
Evidently, as Yochai Benkler concludes, “Throughout most of its history, software has been 
protected primarily by copyright, if at all.”617 
A computer program is typically classified as a literary work,618 but it is crucial to note 
that, as Judge Learned Hand explains, “the right cannot be limited literally to the text; else a 
plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations.”619 The same principle should apply to software, 
                                                          
612 Menell describes the development of the modern computer and provides an overview of computer processing 
history. Menell explains that the invention of the transistor in the late 1940s contributed to the expansion of computers’ 
capabilities, and “[b]y the early 1960s, advances in electronics technology enabled computer firms to manufacture 
minicomputers. Further advances in electronics, in particular the development of low-cost integrated circuits, have 
made micro (or personal) computers possible.” Peter S Menell, “Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software” 
(1987) 39 Stan L Rev 1329 at 1332-4 [Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software]. 
613 This approach has led developers and vendors to seek the protection of other legal fields such as contract law and 
trade secrets. Mark A Lemley, “Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?” (1995) 10 BTLJ 1 at 3 [Lemley, 
Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?]. 
614 Determann & Nimmer, supra note 609. 
615 Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, supra note 612 at 1354. 
616 Determann & Nimmer, supra note 609. Menell, ibid at 1337-8, provided the reasoning for copyright protection for 
computer programs: “First, enhancing the scope of intellectual property protection … increases the expected reward 
to the creator by enhancing the opportunity for monopolistic exploitation of any works created. Second, increased 
rewards encourage inventive activity. Moreover, the disclosure of new discoveries that is encouraged by protection 
further spurs inventive activity. Third, greater investment in inventive activity results in the discovery of more ideas 
and faster advancement of technology, thereby increasing the range of products and reducing the cost of products to 
society.” 
617 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2006) at 437. 
618 Australia’s Copyright Act 1968 provides that literary work includes, under section 10(1), “a computer program or 
compilation of computer program”, International Copyright Law and Practice, supra note 609 at AUS-19 § 2[2][a][i]. 
See also AUS-28 § 2[4][d] describing the development of copyright protection for computer programs. India amended 
the Copyright Act in 1984 clarifying that “computer programs fall within the definition which section 2(o) of the Act 
sets out of the inclusive term ‘literary work’.” Ibid at IND-17 § 2[4][e][d]. In France, the 1985 amendment to the 
Copyright Act includes software as a protected work. However, “[t]he law does not distinguish between programs 
expressed in source code, that is, in a language in which programmers work, and programs formulated in object code, 
which is addressed only to machines.” Ibid at FRA-38-39, § 2[4][d]. 
619 Nichols v Universal Pictures Corp, 45 F (2d) 119 at 121 (2d Cir 1930).  
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thus protecting more than mere code.620 
i. Between the 1970s and 1980s, the US Defined “Computer Programs” as Literary 
Copyright Works, and Courts Interpreted Their Fixation. 
The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyright Works (CONTU) report 
represented a significant milestone in establishing the software-protecting copyright regime in the 
US.621 US Congress established CONTU in 1974, following developments in computer science. 
CONTU’s mission was to advise Congress “to revise comprehensively the copyright laws of the 
United States.”622 After years of deliberation, navigating the complex issues raised by computer 
science advancements, CONTU concluded that computer programs, “to the extent that they 
embody an author’s original expression”, constitute expression and should be accorded the same 
rights as other expressive works.623  
CONTU also argued that computers are no more than tools, and “that there was no 
reasonable basis for concluding that a computer in any way contributes authorship to a work 
produced through its use.”624 Following CONTU’s report,625 Congress amended US Code’s Title 
                                                          
620 Lemley concluded: “Indeed, protection for copyrighted works extends beyond even the language or particular 
creative expression used, to encompass the ‘structure, sequence and organization’ of a work, and its ‘total concept and 
feel’.” Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?, supra note 613 at 5. 
621 US, National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyright Works, Final Report of the National 
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyright Works (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1979), online: 
<digital-law-online.info/CONTU>. Miller, CONTU’s Commissioner, explains what led to CONTU: “[A]ll concerned, 
including Congress, decided to avoid grappling with technological issues that obviously required more study than the 
legislative process was then willing to give them. Thus, the 1976 Copyright Act froze the law on a variety of issues 
and left responsibility for exploring and formulating policy regarding the intersection of copyrights and computers to 
[CONTU], which had been created in 1974 in anticipation of the legislative moratorium.” See Miller, supra note 59 
at 979.  
622 CONTU, supra note 621 at 1. 
623 Ibid; Miller, supra note 59 at 982-3. See also the Canadian report on computer programs: A A Keyes & C Brunet, 
“Copyright in Canada: Proposals for a Revision of the Law” (1977) 7:4 Performing Arts Rev 459. Vaver, supra note 
237 at 71, further explains: “The definition of computer program should include source and object codes for operating 
and application programs, macros, component, routines such as a table numbers operating as a program lock, and the 
screen display generated the program … [t]he program’s concepts and ideas, however, have no copyright.”  
624 Annemarie Bridy, “The Evolution of Authorship: Work Made by Code” (2016) 39 Colum J L & Arts 395 at 396 
[Bridy, The Evolution of Authorship]. 
625 CONTU, supra note 621. 
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17 (copyright law) to include the Computer Software Act of 1980.626 This amendment defined a 
computer program as a “set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a 
computer in order to bring about a certain result.”627 In 1986 the Congressional Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) criticized CONTU’s comparison between computers, typewriters, 
and cameras by stating that it is misleading to think about programs as tools of creations in the 
same sense.628 OTA further suggested developing a new protection framework for computer 
programs “that would treat functional works as a major, separate class of intellectual property 
law.”629 
Subsequent caselaw interpreted the 1980’s amendment as changing the definition of 
“computer program”. Courts took a practical approach, willing to provide “real” protection for 
software programs under copyright law, establishing computer programs as both literary and 
audiovisual works by the mid-1980s.630  
To begin, the Third Circuit, in Apple Computer, Inc v Franklin Computer Corp,631 found 
both operating systems and applications were equally copyrightable as computer programs. 
Affirming Apple’s decision, the court in Williams Electronics v Arctic held that literal elements of 
                                                          
626 Copyright Amendment Act of 1980, Pub L No 96–517, 94 Stat 3015. CONTU, ibid at 1. 
627 Copyright Law of the United States, 17 USC § 101 [Copyright Law of the United States]: Definitions – “computer 
program”. Canada Copyright Act, RSC 1985, supra note 590, s 2, defines a “computer program” in a similar way as 
“ … a set of instructions or statements, expressed, fixed, embodied or stored in any manner, that is to be used directly 
or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a specific result.” 
628 US, US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics and 
Information (Washington, DC: US Government Printing office, 1986) at 72 [Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of 
Electronics and Information]: “It is misleading, however, to think of programs as inert tools of creation, in the sense 
that cameras, typewriters, or any other tools of creation are inert. Moreover, CONTU’s comparison of a computer to 
other instruments of creation begs the question of whether interactive computing employs the computer as cocreator, 
rather than as an instrument of creation. It is still an open question whether the programmed computer is unlike other 
tools of creation.” 
629 Ibid at 293: “Included within this category would be works of artificial intelligence, algorithms, firmware, and 
recombinant DNA.” 
630 Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?, supra note 613 at 6. 
631 714 F (2d) 1240 (3d Cir 1983). 
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computer programs included source code – spelled-out human-readable commands, usually 
written in a programming language like C++ or Python,632 – or object code – written in binary, 
comprised of ones and zeroes, and embedded in read-only memory (ROM) readable only by a 
computer.633 This meant, as the court held in Stern Electronics, Inc v Kaufman, that computer 
programs (like video games) could be simultaneously protectable in several ways by copyright 
law: as audiovisual; graphical or pictorial; and/or literary works.634 Copyright protection for 
computer programs remains problematic, however, as Lemley opines: “[W]hen only concepts and 
not actual language have been copied, courts are put to the test of distinguishing idea from 
expression.”635  
ii. Beginning in the 1990s, International Agreements Locked Step with the US.  
Significant international agreements adhered to software’s protection as literary works. Vaver 
explained how this push “gained momentum in the 1980s and was entrenched in both NAFTA and 
                                                          
632 685 F (2d) 870 (3rd Cir 1982). 
633 Ibid; Determann & Nimmer, supra note 609 at 168. 
634 Determann & Nimmer, ibid. In Stern Elecs, Inc v Kaufman, 669 F (2d) 852 at 855–57 (2nd Cir 1982) the court 
stated: “The display satisfies the statutory definition of an original ‘audiovisual work,’ and the memory devices of the 
game satisfy the statutory requirement of a ‘copy’ in which the work is ‘fixed.’ … The audiovisual work is permanently 
embodied in a material object, the memory devices, from which it can be perceived with the aid of the other 
components of the game … The visual and aural features of the audiovisual display are plainly original variations 
sufficient to render the display copyrightable even though the underlying written program has an independent 
existence and is itself eligible for copyright. Nor is copyright defeated because the audiovisual work and the computer 
program are both embodied in the same components of the game.” 
635 Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?, supra note 613 at 6-7. Lemley clarifies: “Two factors 
make the idea-expression dichotomy particularly difficult to apply in computer cases, however. First, computer 
programs are written for a utilitarian purpose. Expression in the code or structure and organization of a program is 
normally only incidental to that purpose. Courts must therefore identify and protect that incidental material, while 
leaving the functional aspects of the program free for all to duplicate. Second, computer programs are technically 
complex and inaccessible to the lay person, a category which includes most federal judges. Judges are therefore forced 
to rely on second-hand knowledge and testimony about the programming process to a far greater extent than in other 
literary cases.” However, Miller, supra note 59 at 991-2, had a different opinion: “An examination of the judicial 
developments in the software copyright area demonstrates that the fears of monopolization of the ideas or the utilitarian 
features of programs have not come to pass, and that the courts have proven themselves capable of understanding the 
technology, applying copyright doctrine to it, and distinguishing the copyrightable and uncopyrightable elements of 
computer programs. In particular, they have proven themselves skillful at limiting the scope of copyright protection 
to avoid extending it to a program's functional aspects. Thus, understanding the case law is essential; it is also a 
necessary antecedent to exploring the claims for copyright exceptions for decompilation and interfaces.” 
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TRIPs in the early 1990s.”636 The 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) following TRIPs and 
Berne, stating: “Computer programs are protected as literary works within the meaning of Article 
2 of the Berne Convention. Such protection applies to computer programs, whatever may be the 
mode or form of their expression.”637 Many other countries, including Canada, followed suit by 
adapting their copyright law accordingly.638 
The EU significantly impacted (and still impacts) the development of computer program 
legal protection.639 Several EU directives are responsible for EU’s copyright protection for 
computer programs: the 1991 Related Rights Directive, the 2001 Directive on Copyright 
Harmonisation,640 and the 2009 Software Directive.641  
The Software Directive required EU member states adopting software-as-literary-work 
protection under Berne, “as long as they are original in the sense that they are their author’s own 
intellectual creation.”642 It harmonized with US law, protecting only software’s expressive 
elements, leaving “functionality, technical interfaces, programming language or data file formats” 
non-copyrightable.643  
                                                          
636 Vaver, supra note 237 at 313.  
637 Ibid at 70 and 313. See art 1705.1(a) of the North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of 
Canada, the Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can TS 1994 No 2 
(entered into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA]: [copyright] proclaimed that “all types of computer programs are literary 
works within the meaning of the Berne Convention and each Party shall protect them as such […]. Further, art 10(1) 
of TRIPs, supra note 567: “Computer programs, whether in source or object code, shall be protected as literary works 
under the Berne Convention (1971).” Lastly, art 4 of WCT, 20 December 1996, 36 ILM 65. “[F]or greater certainty”, 
the new United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), clarifies that a work “includes a cinematographic work, 
photographic work and computer program.” See the Intellectual Property part, online (pdf): 
<ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/20%20Intellectual%20Property.pdf>. 
638 Canada’s Copyright Act, RSC 1985, supra note 590 at s 2 – definitions – “literary work includes tables, computer 
programs, and compilations of literary works; (oeuvre littéraire).” 
639 Thus, it is not surprising that the EU was also one of the first to consider a policy recommendation for robots’ legal 
rights. See the EU Parliament Report, supra note 185. Though, this initiative was put on halt by the EU Commission. 
640 EU, Commission Directive (EC) 1991/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 
[1991] OJ, L 122/42 [Related Rights Directive]; 2001 Directive on Copyright Harmonisation, supra note 431. 
641 EU, Commission Directive (EC) 2009/24/EC of 23 April 2009 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 
[2009] OJ, L 111/16 [Software Directive]. 
642 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 49.  
643 Determann & Nimmer, supra note 609. 
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iii. From the 1990s Onward, US Courts Defined “Originality” and “Expression” of 
Software as Literary Works. 
 Copyright law was always designed to protect literary work;644 but copyrightability of such works 
requires more than mere fixation of copyrightable subject matter. In other words, a computer 
program is prima facie copyrightable if fixed in source or object code, but it must embody 
sufficient originality and expression to earn entitlement to robust copyright protection. Otherwise, 
for example, as in section 102(b) of the US Copyright Law, it is a non-copyrightable “idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of 
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”645 Determann 
and Nimmer claim that, historically, this exception “made software particularly ill-suited for 
copyright protection.”646  
Establishing originality in computer programs proved complex. Copyright protection for 
computer programs required creativity; but creativity was disadvantageous for computer 
programmers, which in many cases aimed to create the simplest and easiest program: “[S]oftware’s 
value is usually measured precisely by its functionality and efficiency, aspects expressly excluded 
                                                          
644 US Const art I, § 8, cl 8. As Lemley explains: “Copyright law was designed in order to protect physical works of 
creative authorship which could be used without being copied.” Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software 
Copyright?, supra note 613. Moreover, according to Samuelson, “Although user interfaces of computer programs can 
be highly fanciful or artistic in character – videogames being perhaps the clearest example – many are more functional 
in character. Some may be too functional to be protectable by copyright. That this should be so is not surprising in 
view of the fact that computer programs themselves are properly regarded as functional writings, and the role of user 
interfaces is to provide users with access to program functionalities.” See Pamela Samuelson, “Computer Programs, 
User Interfaces, and Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of Lotus v Paperback” (1992) 55 Law 
& Contemp Probs 311 at 339. 
645 Copyright Law of the United States, supra note 627 § 102(b) (2012). 
646 Determann & Nimmer, supra note 609 at 166. 
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from copyright protection.”647 This paradox was perhaps overlooked in Apple648 where “the 1980 
amendments reflect Congress’ receptivity to new technology and its desire to encourage, through 
the copyright laws, continued imagination and creativity in computer programming.649 So, the 
incongruence between copyright reform’s objectives and the business practice realities led to 
uncertainty in copyright infringement case outcomes.650  
In 1992, the Second Circuit in Computer Associates International v Altai,651 implemented 
a more reliable analytical framework – the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test.652 This test 
has three stages: (1) the abstraction step dissects the plaintiff’s program “into its constituent 
structural part”; (2) the filtration step “sift[s] out all non-protectable material” like ideas, methods, 
facts, and public domain and merger doctrine material653 (in this stage, the court should “assess 
                                                          
647 Ibid at 168. See also: Mark A Lemley & David W O’Brien, “Encouraging Software Reuse” (1997) 49 Stan L Rev 
255; Peter S Menell, “An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs” (1989) 41 Stan L 
Rev 1045; Jane C Ginsburg, “Four Reasons and a Paradox: The Manifest Superiority of Copyright Over Sui Generis 
Protection of Computer Software” (1994) 94 Colum L Rev 2559; Joseph P Liu & Stacey L Dogan, “Copyright Law 
and Subject Matter Specificity: The Case of Computer Software” (2005) 61 NYU Ann Surv Am L 203; Miller, supra 
note 59. 
648 Franklin, supra note 631. See also Mark A Lemley et al, Software and Internet Law, 4th ed (New York: Wolters 
Kluwer Law Business, 2011). 
649 [Emphasis added]. Franklin, ibid at 1253-4. This statement corresponds with Feist’s general notion concerning 
creativity. As in Feist, the court rejected the sweat of the brow approach.  
650 A few important milestones in the legal development of copyright protection in the US can be traced to the 
following cases: Lotus Dev Corp v Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F Supp 37 (Dist Ct Mass 1990) (the scope of 
copyrightability of computer programs); Apple Computer Inc v Microsoft Corporation, 35 F (3d) 1435 (9th Cir 1994) 
(visual graphical user interface (GUI)) and Lotus Development Corporation v Borland International Inc, 516 US 233 
(1996) (the extent of software copyright in regard to user interface). 
651 982 F (2d) 693 (2nd Cir 1992). Affirmed in Oracle Am Inc v Google Inc, 750 F (3d) 1339 (Fed Cir 2014) at 1354. 
In this case, Oracle purchased Sun Microsystems (the developer of Java), and sued Google for patent and copyright 
infringement for implementations of Java API (application programming interface) packages in Google’s Android 
software development kit. The District Court denied Oracle’s claim for copyright protection and the Federal Circuit 
reversed its decision. Google’s petition to SCOTUS was denied on June 29, 2015. In May 2016, a new trial began 
concerning Google’s claim for fair use. On May 26, 2016, after a two-week trial, the jury reached a verdict concluding 
that Google Android’s OS re-implementation of Oracle Java API is considered “fair use”. Following the decision, 
Oracle appealed to the US Court of Appeals, and on March 2018 the court ruled in favour of Oracle concluding that 
Google’s use was not “fair”. See Oracle Am, Inc v Google Inc, No 17-1118 (Fed Cir 2018). 
652 In Altai, ibid, the court expressed its disdain for the Whelan Assoc Inc v Jaslow Dental Lab Inc, 797 F (2d) 1222 
(3rd Cir 1986) decision, holding, Altai, ibid at 706: “We think that Whelan’s approach to separating idea from 
expression in computer programs relies too heavily on metaphysical distinctions and does not place enough emphasis 
on practical considerations.” See also Audrey F Dickey, “Computer Associates v. Altai and Apple v. Microsoft: Two 
Steps Back from Whelan?” (1993) 9 Santa Clara Comp & High Tech LJ 379.  
653 Determann & Nimmer, supra note 609 at 169. 
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whether the expression is original to the programmer or author”);654 and, (3) in the final step 
compares any remaining creative expression to the impugned program.655  
2.3.1.2 Protecting Software by Patenting  
Patent law offers an alternative framework for software protection.656 Historically, many countries 
were hesitant to exploit patent law for software, fearing it would stymie innovation.657 This fear 
subsided in recent decades; patent law’s role in protecting software has increased since 1977.658 
This shift stems from the US Patent Act’s patentability criteria: “Whoever invents or discovers 
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.”659 In past decades, the Supreme Court 
of the United States (SCOTUS) interpretate the statue in a way that excluded non-physically 
manifested computer programs, which SCOTUS viewed as mathematical algorithms, and thus 
abstract ideas which patent laws could not protect.660  
i. US Courts thus Took a Narrow View of Software Patentability. 
American software patent mechanisms began with the three SCOTUS decisions establishing the 
                                                          
654 Oracle, supra note 651 at 1357. 
655 Ibid. 
656 Patent law poses a challenge to AI as well. As Ryan Abbott suggests, under US Patent law only a human can be 
qualified as an individual. Abbott shows that the US Patent Office granted patents for inventions by computers without 
knowing that the inventor was the computer itself. See Ryan Abbott, “I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers 
and the Future of Patent Law” (2016) 57 Boston College L Rev 1079. 
657 Vaver, supra note 237 at 313. Vaver explains that these countries thought that “programs should be free to create 
their own applications without fear of treading on some patent they knew nothing of.” For this reason, the EU Patent 
Convention (1973) did not allow patenting of computer programs as such. 
658 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 475. Bently & Sherman argue that “it was commonly thought that copyright 
law rather than patents would be the area of intellectual property law that would regulate the creation and use of 
computer programs.”  
659 US Patent Act, 35 USC § 101 (1952) [US Patent Act]. 
660 As a side note, these decisions can also explain the challenge that law is facing when encountering new technology. 
It is thus not without merit to expect similar outcomes when addressing AI technology in the future. 
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Freeman-Walter test:661 Gottschalk v Benson (1972),662 Parker v Flook (1978),663 and Diamond v 
Diehr (1981).664 The trend continued in the 1994 decision, In re Alappat,665 which developed the 
useful, concrete, and tangible test.666 In these cases, the courts consistently distinguished between 
the unpatentability of mathematical algorithms – arguing that, alone, they are abstract ideas – and 
the patentability of a useful process incorporating an algorithm.667 Such a distinction limited 
patentability, since proving that a program is a useful process is harder to accomplish than 
submitting mere algorithms. 
Despite this limit, programming patent floodgates opened668 after the US Federal Circuit 
                                                          
661 The Freeman-Walter test is a two-part test. First, the courts required to establish if a mathematical algorithm recited 
(directly or indirectly). Second, “if a mathematical algorithm is found, whether the claim as a whole applies the 
algorithm in any manner to physical elements or process steps.” See Fabio E Marino & Teri H P Nguyen, “From 
Alappat to Alice: The Evolution of Software Patents” (2017) 9 Hastings Sci & Tech LJ 1 at 4. 
662 409 US 63 (1972). Justice Douglas, at 67, clarified that “[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental 
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.” 
663 437 US 584 (1978). 
664 450 US 175 (1981). Diamond considered a novel decision in which SCOTUS recognized a patent for a rubber-
curing process that utilized a computer program algorithm.  
665 33 F (3d) 1526 (Fed Cir 1994). Few years later, in State Street Bank & Trust Co v Signature Financial Group, Inc, 
149 F (3d) 1368 (Fed Cir 1998), the court confirmed Alappat decision. In the State Street Bank, the Federal Court 
“found mathematical algorithms, an abstract concept, patentable if ‘transformed’ or ‘performed’ by a machine and 
which provided ‘useful, concrete, and tangible’ results.” Marino & Nguyen, supra note 661 at 6. 
666 As the court, re Alappat, ibid at 1557 explains: “[T]he proper inquiry in dealing with the so called mathematical 
subject matter exception to Section 101 alleged herein is to see whether the claimed subject matter as a whole is a 
disembodied mathematical concept, whether categorized as a mathematical formula, mathematical equation, 
mathematical algorithm, or the like, which in essence represents nothing more than a ‘law of nature,’ ‘natural 
phenomenon,’ or ‘abstract idea.’ […] This is not a disembodied mathematical concept which may be characterized as 
an “abstract idea,” but rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.” [Emphasis 
added]. The Federal Court concluded, ibid at 1558, that “[t]he Supreme Court has never held that a programmed 
computer may never be entitled to patent protection. Indeed, the Benson court specifically stated that its decision 
therein did not preclude ‘a patent for any program servicing a computer.’ […] a computer operating pursuant to 
software may represent patentable subject matter, provided, of course, that the claimed subject matter meets all of the 
other requirements of Title 35. In any case, a computer, like a rasterizer, is apparatus not mathematics.” 
667 Cathy E Cretsinger, “AT&T Corp. v Excel Communications, Inc.” (2000) 15 BTLJ 165 at 166. Cretsinger further 
explains the difference between the Federal Court and SCOTUS’ decisions stating that “[b]oth Alappat and State 
Street Bank addressed machine claims, where structure omitted from the claim may be supplied from the disclosure. 
The Supreme Court cases, in contrast, addressed process claims and emphasized the presence or lack of physical 
elements. Thus, it was not clear whether the Federal Circuit would apply its expansive Alappat test to process claims”, 
ibid at 170. See Marino & Nguyen, supra note 661. Marino & Nguyen opined further that “the Diehr Court held that 
certain types of mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced 
to some type of practical application.” Ibid at 3. 
668 Vaver, supra note 237 at 315. PTO statistic data shows a constant increase in the application of patents under Class 
705 between 2002 and 2014 (the IPO defined Class 705 as “the generic class for apparatus and corresponding methods 
129 
 
Courts removed any lingering doubt about the patentability of computer programs in the later State 
Street Bank (1998) and AT&T (1999) decisions.669 The courts in State Street and AT&T finally 
withdrew the need to prove the presence of a physical component or transformation in a process 
claim as critical elements for approving a patent. The court in AT&T implied that software’s 
unpatentability – and SCOTUS’s condition from Diamond that physical transformation is a critical 
component – was a misunderstanding.670 These rulings also mark the US decision “to part 
company with the Europeans and allow computer programs to be patented as well.”671  
The patent floodgates closed almost a decade later when the US Federal Court rejected 
both the Freeman-Walter-Abele and the Useful, Concrete, and Tangible tests in Bilski (2008),672 
adopting instead the Machine or Transformation Test (only to be rejected in the SCOTUS appeal 
two years later),673 as the sole test for process patent eligibility. That test was held only to be “a 
useful and important clue, an investigative tool” for patentability determinations.674 Vaver notes 
that the idea of being “‘useful, tangible and concrete,’ without more, entitl[ing] a process to be 
patented,” was “unanimously discarded” after Bilski (2010).675  
                                                          
for performing data processing operations, in which there is a significant change in the data or for performing 
calculation operations wherein the apparatus or method is uniquely designed for or utilized in the practice, 
administration, or management of an enterprise, or in the processing of financial data. This class also provides for 
apparatus and corresponding methods for performing data processing or calculating operations in which a charge for 
goods or services is determined”, see online: <uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/def/705.htm>. It is interesting to 
indicate that in the year 2015 we saw a drop in the application that continued in the year 2016 as well. 
669 AT & T Corp v Excel communications Inc, 172 F (3d) 1352 (Fed Cir 1999). In that case, AT & T sued Excel for 
the infringement of their “184 patent”. The patent involved technology improvement for calculating the price of direct-
dialed long-distance calls; State Street Bank, supra note 665. 
670 AT & T, ibid at 1358-9: “The notion of ‘physical transformation’ can be misunderstood. In the first place, it is not 
an invariable requirement, but merely one example of how a mathematical algorithm may bring about a useful 
application. As the Supreme Court itself noted ‘when [a claimed invention] is performing a function which the patent 
laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim 
satisfies the requirements of § 101.’ Diehr … The ‘e.g.’ signal denotes an example, not an exclusive requirement.” 
671 Vaver, supra note 237 at 315.  
672 In re Bernard L Bilski and Rand A Warsaw, 545 F (3d) 943 (Fed Cir 2008). 
673 Bilski v Kappos, 561 US 593 (2010). 
674 Ibid at 604. 
675 Vaver, supra note 237 at 315. 
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Alice Corp v CLS Bank (2014) is the most recent important development on software 
patentability.676 In Alice, SCOTUS reaffirmed the two-step test, adopted in Mayo Collaborative 
Services v Prometheus Labs: the first step asks if the patent contains an abstract idea (like an 
algorithm), and if it does, the second step requires the patent add “something extra” – embodying 
an “inventive concept” – for patentability.677 Ruling that Alice’s patent claims were ineligible 
under the US Patent Act,678 SCOTUS determined at the first step that they were “drawn to the 
abstract idea of intermediated settlement.”679 SCOTUS concluded at the second step that 
something extra was lacking, stating that “the method claims, which merely require generic 
computer implementation, fail to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”680  
The main problem in Alice is the “something extra” requirement in order for software to 
be sufficiently inventive and patentable. This stringent requirement to meet innovation is unclear 
in practice since “Alice left open the nature of the technological improvement that must exist before 
an application of an abstract concept may be patentable as ‘inventive’.”681  
The lack of clarity in “something extra” is exacerbated in the software industry, which 
                                                          
676 Alice Corp v CLS Bank International, 134 S Ct 2347 (2014). 
677 The test is explained as follows – “First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those 
patent-ineligible concepts ... If so, we then ask, ‘[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?’ ... To answer that 
question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine 
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application ... We have 
described step two of this analysis as a search for an ‘inventive concept’ – i.e., an element or combination of elements 
that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible 
concept] itself’.” Alice, ibid at 2355. See also Mayo Collaborative Servs v Prometheus Labs, Inc, 132 S Ct 1289 
(2012). 
678 US Patent Act, supra note 659. 
679 Alice, supra note 676 at 2355. SCOTUS further offers, at 2356: “On their face, the claims before us are drawn to 
the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk. Like the risk hedging 
in Bilski, the concept of intermediated settlement is ‘a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of 
commerce’.” 
680 Alice, supra note 676 at 2350. If the patent contains an abstract idea (like an algorithm), and if it does, the second 
step requires the patent to add “something extra” – embodying an “inventive concept” – for patentability. 
681 Marino & Nguyen, supra note 661 at 13. 
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significantly unique from other industries, as Ben Klemens noted.682 First, a detailed description 
of software often is the software – for example, pop-up window – making it very difficult to 
distinguish between “idea and its implementation”.683 Second, programs are math; this forms a 
paradox: while the courts agree that pure math is unpatentable, software might be – “yet the two 
are equivalent”.684 Third, if a patent on a particle of code restricts other users from using that data 
or technique, it in turn hinders development of other programs. Finally, Alice’s decision runs 
contrary to programmers’ desired simplicity of useful software, and limits appropriate patent 
candidates by requiring the patent to demonstrate “something extra”.  
Since most software contains abstract ideas,685 Alice may lead to a substantial decrease of 
business method and computer-implemented innovations patents.686 It was unsurprising that, 
following Alice, the US software industry sector and legal community expressed concern about 
narrowing computer programs patentability, regressing to the pre-Diamond era. 
On the other hand, others applaud SCOTUS’s decision to limit patents on programs based 
heavily on data and, consequently, strengthen competition. Data is the fuel of future developments, 
                                                          
682 Ben Klemens, Math You Can't Use: Patents, Copyright, and Software (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2005) at 4. 
683 Ibid. Klemens further explains: “For the pop-up window, the idea is a window that automatically opens and moves 
to the front when the user views a new page … For Prozac, the idea is a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) 
… Traditionally, patents have been granted to implementations of ideas and not to the ideas themselves – there are a 
dozen SSRIs on the market that did not infringe on the Prozac patent. But in software, the pattern has been reversed: 
most patents cover ideas like the pop-up window, regardless of implementation, so they tend to be too broad.” 
684 Klemens, supra note 682. The courts resolved this contradiction by providing a set of roles and complex tests that 
might, under certain conditions, allow mathematical algorithms’ patents. However, these attempts to reconcile the 
contradictions does not always succeed. 
685 Marino & Nguyen, supra note 661 at 13. 
686 As Marino & Nguyen, ibid at 2, offer: “[S]ubsequent decisions by the Federal Circuit and the lower courts have 
applied the Alice test to all types of software patents, creating a much more restrictive set of rules for patent eligibility 
of software implemented inventions.” In a prior case, Justice Breyer provided: “We must determine whether the 
claimed processes have transformed these unpatentable natural laws into patent-eligible applications of those laws. 
We conclude that they have not done so and that therefore the processes are not patentable.” See Mayo, supra note 
677 at 1294. See also Jasper L Tran, “Two Years After Alice v. CLS Bank” (2016) 98 J Pat & Trademark Off Soc’y 
354; Lucas S Osborn, “Intellectual Property Channeling for Digital Works” (2018) 39 Cardozo L Rev 1303 at 1329.  
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and its availability is crucial for a machine-learning technology’s progression.687 As Calo 
highlighted,688 distilling high-quality data is essential for any government policy. By limiting the 
ability to patent software that relies heavily on data – even processed high-quality data – we make 
the data public goods, thus allowing programmers access to it for the benefit of future progress.  
Alice provided inadequate guidance for lawyers and programmers to follow.689 And after a 
short ambiguous period,690 the Federal Court provided some guidance to software patentees. 
According to Judge Hughes in Enfish (2016),691 Alice did not conclude that all computer-related 
technology improvements are “inherently abstract and, therefore, must be considered at step two.” 
Rather, it is, “relevant to ask whether the claims are directed to an improvement to computer 
functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea, even at the first step of the Alice analysis.”692 
Marino and Nguyen called Enfish “the broad strokes of an analytical framework.”693 
In examining the post-Alice decisions, Marino & Nguyen distilled the conditions needed 
to establish software patentability: “First, the Court will determine what distinguishes the invention 
from the prior art. If the novel feature is the use of a computer, the patent will likely be invalid, 
while if the novel feature is a better computer, the patent will likely be valid.” As in other 
                                                          
687 Leading AI systems use artificial neural networks that, like the human brain, learn from experience. This is why, 
data is so important for the development of AI and should be treated as oil or fuel. See Michael Palmer, “Data is the 
New Oil” (3 November 2006), online (blog): Michael Palmer Blog 
<ana.blogs.com/maestros/2006/11/data_is_the_new.html>. On the other hand, there are different views claiming that 
oil is not the right equivalent since, data, contrary to oil, is unlimited. See Bernard Marr, “Here’s Why Data Is Not 
The New Oil” (5 March 2018), online: Forbes <forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/03/05/heres-why-data-is-not-the-
new-oil/#59458ee13aa9>. 
688 Calo – AI Policy, supra note 42. 
689 Osborn, supra note 686, argues: “After Alice, the landscape for software-related patents is at best uncertain and at 
worst bleak.” 
690 Following Alice, the Federal Court and SCOTUS failed to provide guidance to Alice’s requirements. Specifically, 
what constitute an abstract idea: “[N]one of the cases that survived the Alice analysis did so based on the first prong 
of the analysis, patent-eligibility was determined exclusively based on the second prong.” Marino & Nguyen, supra 
note 661 at 22.  
691 Enfish, LLC v Microsoft Corp, 822 F (3d) 1327 (Fed Cir 2016).  
692 Ibid at 1335. 
693 Marino & Nguyen, supra note 661 at 28. 
133 
 
jurisdictions, it seems that American courts will likely try to redefine the boundaries of software 
patentability in the future. 
ii. The UK Takes a Narrow View on Software Patentability. 
The UK Patents Act 1997 lacks explicit recognition of computer programs as inventions.694 
However, as Bently and Sherman explain, “One of the most important changes that led to the 
liberalization of the protection offered to computer-related inventions in the United Kingdom … 
was the decision that an invention that includes a computer program could be patentable so long 
as the invention as a whole was technical.”695 This approach did not last long. Following Aerotel 
(2008)696 the UK’s Intellectual Property Office (IPO) reinstated the “old practice of rejecting all 
computer program claims.”697 It backtracked somewhat in February 2008, when it revised its 
practice to include patentability for a computer program.698 In the recent HTC case, L. J. Kitchin 
                                                          
694 Patent Act 1977 (UK). See also UK, Intellectual Property Office, Manual of Patent Practice (MoPP) (2018) s 1.35-
1.39.2, online (pdf): 
<assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/719293/Manual-of-
Patent-Practice-July-2018.pdf> [UK MoPP]. 
695 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 476. In Vicom/Computer-related invention, T 208/84 [1987], it was said “that 
‘an invention which would be patentable in accordance with conventional patentability criteria should not be excluded 
from protection by the mere fact that for its implementation modern technical means in the form of computer programs 
are used.’ This approach was adopted and endorsed by a number of decisions in the United Kingdom.” Consequently, 
while computer programs are not considered eligible for patent protection in the UK, patent applications that contain 
a computer program might be patentable, as long as it can be shown that the program is technical by its nature. Bently 
& Sherman, ibid at 477, concluded: “[A] computer program product could be patentable if it resulted in additional 
technical effects that went beyond the ‘normal’ physical interaction between the program (software) and the computer 
(hardware) on which it was run.” 
696 Aerotel v Telco Holdings, [2006] EWCA Civ 1371. 
697 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 479. As Bently and Sherman indicated, the post-Aerotel policy “created a 
gap between the United Kingdom and EPO,” and obviously between the UK and the US.  
698 This revision was the outcome of implementing L J Kitchin’s reservations in regard to Aerotel’s decision in Astron 
Clinica v Comptroller General Patents, [2008] EWHC 85 at para 51: “In a case where claims to a method performed 
by running a suitably programmed computer or to a computer programmed to carry out the method are allowable, 
then, in principle, a claim to the program itself should also be allowable. I say, ‘in principle’ because the claim must 
be drawn to reflect the features of the invention which would ensure the patentability of the method which the program 
is intended to carry out when it is run.” This decision was reaffirmed in Symbian v Comptroller-General of Patents, 
[2008] EWCA Civ 1066. Symbian decision “clarified that inventions are potentially patentable even were their 
technical contribution is limited to the computer […].” Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 479-480. Following 
Symbian, the IPO updated the practice notice to include additional class of inventions “which improve the operation 
of a computer by solving a problem arising from the way the computer was programmed,” IPO Practice Notice, 
Patents Act 1977: Patentability Subject Matter (8 December 2008). Therefore, the IPO requires to determine whether 
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followed this reasoning in overturning a UK High Court (Justice Floyd) decision that found two 
of Apple’s related patents invalid. As L. J. Kitchin explains:699  
“I believe the judge took his eye off the ball in focussing on the fact that the invention was 
implemented in software and in so doing failed to look at the issue before him as a matter 
of substance not form. Had he done so he would have found that the problem and its 
solution are essentially technical in nature and so not excluded from patentability.” 
Nonetheless, UK software patentability remains restrained, as “an ordinary computer program 
used in a general-purpose computer would normally not be patentable in the United Kingdom.”700  
iii. Canada Splits the Difference Between the US and the EU/UK Approaches. 
The Canadian approach to software patent protection was inspired by software developments and 
the American legal approach. As Vaver states, “In 1978 the Canadian PO decided that computer 
programs were effectively algorithms … and so fell under the prohibition against patenting abstract 
theorems.”701 In the following decades, the Canadian Patent Office (CPO) was accordingly 
reluctant to issue software patents.702 Until Diamond (1981),703 “Patents were granted for a 
‘computing apparatus programmed in a novel manner, where the patentable advance is in the 
apparatus itself,’ and for a ‘method or process carried out with a specific novel apparatus devised 
                                                          
the invention has a technical effect (that does not fall within the excluded categories in the Patent Act). In AT&T 
Knowledge Ventures v Comptroller General of Patents, Design and Trade Marks, [2009] EWHC 343 [AT&T], the 
court outlined few signals and criteria to establish if an invention involving computer software is patentable under the 
UK Patent Act. 
699 HTC Europe Co v Apple Inc, [2013] EWCA Civ 451 at para 57 [HTC]. 
700 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 482. See also AT&T & HTC. In HTC L. J. Kitchin held, ibid at para 44: “For 
the reasons given in Symbian, I believe we must continue to consider whether the invention made a technical 
contribution to the known art, with the rider that novel or inventive purely excluded subject matter does not count as 
a technical contribution.” However, L. J. Kitchin further states, at para 45, that “it is not possible to define a clear rule 
to determine whether or not a program is excluded, and each case must be determined on its own facts.” 
701 Vaver, supra note 237 at 313. 
702 As Vaver, ibid at 314, explains: “A computer program might do sums faster than an unaided human, but that did 
not make doing sums patentable even if useful data resulted. … the PO developed the law on patenting computer 
programs in the light of the drilling data decision and developments abroad, particularly the United States.” 
703 Diamond, supra note 664. 
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to implement a newly discovered idea’.”704  
Following Diamond, the CPO “accepted that a ‘real change in a tangible thing’ beyond just 
the production of information” could be patented.705 As a result of re Alappat706 the CPO decided 
in 1995 to allow “patenting of an algorithm that scaled numbers exponentially where the 
calculation was tied to a physical read-only-memory chip.”707 In the coming decades, the CPO has 
refined and clarified its position distinguishing between “an abstract scheme, plan or set of rules 
for operating a computer”, which do not fall within the meaning of section 2 of Canada Patent 
Act, and a computer program that could “cause the device it controls to provide a technological 
solution to a technological problem.” Accordingly, where a computer program exhibit novelty and 
inventiveness the claim might include statutory contribution and thus provide the necessary 
circumstances “under which a software product comprising a physical memory storing executable 
code can be patented.”708 
2.3.1.3 Trade Secret Protection Gains Weight after Alice 
Trade secrets may play a key role in protecting software. Trade secret means information, 
including programs, that “(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means” by other people 
that can “obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”709 In other words, trade secrets 
protection requires that the programmer should not make the code available to the public.  
                                                          
704 Vaver, supra note 237 at 314. 
705 Ibid.  
706 Alappat, supra note 665. 
707 Vaver, supra note 237 at 315. 
708 See Canada, Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development, Patent Office: Manual of Patent Office 
Practice (Ottawa, 2018) s 16.08.04, online (pdf): <ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/vwapj/rpbb-mopop-
eng.pdf/$file/rpbb-mopop-eng.pdf>. 
709 Uniform Trade Secrets Act With 1985 Amendments (1985) § 1(4).  
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Trade secrets were crucial during the mainframe era (1960s) – since software was rarely 
distributed in source code then – but during the PC era (1990s), their importance diminished. The 
rise of copyright protection and the Internet revolution made it relatively easy to view the 
functional coding behind web pages.710 Moreover, the decrease of trade secret protection levelled 
out with the rise of cloud computing companies during the late 1990s.  
The advent of cloud computing at the beginning of 1999 heralded multiplayer games like 
World of Warcraft (2004) and programs like Microsoft Office365 (2011) which contributed to the 
rise of trade secret protection.711 Until Alice,712 the use of trade secret protection in the software 
industry remained constant. Alice is expected to enhance the importance of trade secret protection, 
mainly due to the diminished possibility of patent protection. However, we should bear in mind 
that trade secret protection remains weak since software can be reverse-engineered unless digitally 
locked and protected.  
2.3.2 The Present: From Computer-Assisted to Artificial Intelligence  
The current legal system is built on the assumption that legal rights are only for humans.713 
However, as the human connection to a given work’s final output becomes distant, the legal basis 
for rights is weakened. Contrary to common belief, the question of computer authorship is not 
new, and “goes back to the early days of computing.”714  
                                                          
710 While some software languages like JavaScript are interpreted by the browser and thus visible; much of the code 
running on the server itself is still under trade secret protection, and thus not viewable by the user. 
711 It is easier to protect cloud-based programs since large portions of the code (the trade secret candidate) exist on 
secure servers rather than on end users’ computers (as in traditional software). Hence, the common method of reverse 
engineering (the main loopholes of trade secret protection) is much harder to apply. 
712 Alice, supra note 676. 
713 With limited exceptions, such as corporations and ship. 
714 Bridy, The Evolution of Authorship, supra note 624. Bridy mentions the 1956 Datatron digital computer that 
compose Tin Pan Alley songs (such as Push Button Bertha, which the Copyright Office refused to register). See also 
Bruce E Boyden, “Emergent Works” (2016) 39 Colum J L & Arts 377, stating that “this question has puzzled copyright 
scholars for decades.” See also Jane C Ginsburg & Luke Ali Budiardjo, “Authors and Machines” (2018) Columbia 
Public Law Research Paper No 14-597, 34:2 BTLJ [forthcoming in 2019] at 2 [Ginsburg & Budiardjo]. Ginsburg & 
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Indeed, the struggle between humans and technology is a very old issue that scholars have 
been debating about for almost a century since SCOTUS ruled in the Burrow-Giles case about the 
role of photo cameras in the creation process.715 And in the past decades, IP scholars have 
contributed to this discussion in numerous papers and reports.716 
The line between computer-assisted and computer-generated works is blurring. Arthur 
Miller classified AI systems into two categories: “systems that use symbolic and those that use 
non-symbolic knowledge representation.”717 Symbolic AI “employs a specialized language to 
encode knowledge, much as a dictionary uses a phonetic alphabet to encode information on 
pronunciation or as DNA encodes information on the functioning of living things.”718 Non-
symbolic AI “attempt[s] to emulate the workings of the human brain, in which knowledge is 
thought to be distributed across groups of neurons.”719 Miller’s work in the early 1990s focused 
on symbolic AI since, at the time, he believed that non-symbolic AI was not yet advanced enough 
to be considered as a plausible possibility.  
Currently, computer-generated programs are “zombie” like: able to carry precondition 
commands but lacking in unique characteristics of human free will. Nonetheless, computer-
generated programs may develop to express more creative elements. Expression of original 
elements may qualify their creations for copyright or patent protection, depending on the nature of 
                                                          
Budiardjo, at 55, further explain: “Artificial intelligence, as a concept, as a practical field of computer science, and as 
a challenge to legal norms, is far from new. Legal commentators have since the 1980s contemplated how intellectual 
property law might deal with AI, and the legal academy has developed a substantial body of commentary on the 
concepts of automated “creativity” and its potential impact on intellectual property rights.” 
715 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co v Sarony, 111 US 53 (1884). 
716 Samuelson, supra note 423. See also US, Copyright Office, Sixty-Eighth Annual Report of the Register of Copyright 
for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1965 (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 1966) at 5, online (pdf): 
<copyright.gov/reports/annual/archive/ar-1965.pdf>. 
717 Miller, supra note 59 at 1037. 
718 Ibid. I would consider most common machine translation programs, such as Google Translate, examples of 
symbolic AI. See David Vaver, “Translation and Copyright: A Canadian Focus” (1994) 4 EIPR 159 [Vaver, 
Translation and Copyright]. 
719 Miller, ibid. 
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the work. Abbott describes the differences: “Computer involvement might be conceptualized on a 
spectrum: on one end, a computer is simply a tool assisting a human inventor; on the other end, 
the computer independently meets the requirements for inventorship” in patents or originality in 
copyright.720  
In a recent paper, Jane Ginsburg and Luke Budiardjo offer a quasi-different view on the 
subject. They provide three categories of generative machines: “Ordinary tools”, “partially 
generative machines”, and “fully generative machines”. However, they are framing the distinctions 
according to the designer’s (i.e., the programmer) and user’s contributions. Ordinary tools are 
“machines which rely solely on the creative contributions of their users”; fully generative machines 
“rely entirely on the creative contributions of their designers and which do not require any creative 
choices made by the users”; and, partially generative machines “combine the creative contributions 
of both the user and the designer of the tools.”721  
It should be noted, however, that according to Ginsburg and Budiardjo, there is no 
difference between a machine and a human assistant (like an illustrator or an amanuensis). All 
machines – computer-assisted and fully generative machines – are simply a tool for the execution 
of human creativity. Even the “more sophisticated ‘learning’ models which we may not precisely 
understand or supervise … [do] not change our initial conclusion that machines are not 
‘creative’.”722 I will address these ideas in Part III and IV as well. Suffice it to say, at this point, 
that I do not share Ginsburg and Budiardjo’s vision (i.e., there is no creative machines, only 
                                                          
720 Abbott, supra note 656 at 1094. Abbott provides a few examples: “[…] when a computer is functioning as a 
calculator or storing information … the computer is not participating in the invention’s conception.” Other examples 
are “analyzing data in an automated fashion, retrieving stored knowledge, or by recognizing patterns of information”. 
In all those scenarios “the computer still may fail to contribute to conception.” 
721 Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 67. 
722 Ibid at 63. 
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creative designers) regarding the human/machine distinction.  
In this section, I shall outline the legal framework for computer-generated works in key 
jurisdictions. In doing so, I am attempting to survey the differences and to reflect on the possibility 
of recognizing computer-generated/AI works under current copyright laws. 
The UK legal framework is, as Guadamuz describes, “deceptively straightforward [and its] 
elegant and concise wording … does away with most potential debates about the creative works 
produce by artificial agents.”723 Copyright protection under the CDPA requires that: (1) the 
creation falls into a category of protected work (i.e., literary, dramatic, musical or artistic); (2) 
qualifying for protection according to UK law;724 and, (3) its copyright has not expired. The 
CDPA’s section 9(3) adds that, if a computer-generated work falls within a category under (1), its 
author is “the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are 
undertaken.”725  
                                                          
723 Guadamuz, supra note 422 at 175. 
724 Dorotheou, supra note 423 at 85-86. Guadamuz, ibid at 175-6. 
725 [Emphasis added]. It should be noted that section 9(3) does not include sound recordings, films or broadcasting. 
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The CDPA’s section 178 (minor definitions) further defines a computer-generated work as 
“a work … generated by computer in circumstances such that there is no human author of the 
work.”726 Under the CDPA’s section 12(7), copyright in computer-generated works “expires at the 
end of the period of 50 years.” Further, the computer-generated author is exempt from any moral 
rights (i.e., the rights to be identified as the author and to object to derogatory treatment of the 
work).727  
The distinction between computer-assisted and computer-generated works in the UK is, 
however, not very clear. In many cases, a computer-generated work is simply a more advanced 
computer-assisted work which fall under section 9(3). A computer can act as a tool, similarly to a 
pen used in drawing, merely assisting with execution, not conception or substantial production.728 
Simply put: a tool, in which the user “contributes to the contents (expression) of the work.”729 
Although the Express Newspaper decision is consistent with section 9(3), “there is some 
ambiguity as to who the actual author is.”730 The same rationale could be used to allocate copyright 
                                                          
726 See also Catherine Colston & Jonathan Galloway, Modern Intellectual Property Law, 3rd ed (Routledge, 2010) at 
339. Justice Streicher from The Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa relied on section 9(3) in Haupt v Brewers 
Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd, [2006] ZASCA 40 at para 31, 2006 (4) SA 458: “In my view a work only qualifies 
as having been computer-generated if it was created by a computer in circumstances where there is no human author 
of the work. If there is a human author the work is computer assisted and not computer-generated. That is the meaning 
ascribed to ‘computer-generated’ in s 178 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 of the United Kingdom. It 
also accords with the recommendation of the Australian Copyright Law Review Committee in respect of computer 
software protection.”  
727 Both are limited and recognized moral rights in the UK. Sections 79(2)(c) and 81(2). 
728 Ibid. See also Express Newspapers Plc v Liverpool Daily Post & Echo Plc, [1985] 3 All ER 680, [1985] 1 WLR 
1089 at 1093 (Ch D (Eng)). In this case, a programmer created a grid containing a random selection of letters and 
numbers for a game in the newspaper. The claim was that there could be no copyright protection for the grids since 
humans did not make them. Concerning Judge Whitford ruling, Colston & Galloway have stated that “[i]t may have 
been very significant that it was the programmer who operated the computer. He used undoubted skill in programming 
the computer to produce selections for the grids’ contents … However, it was the programmer, and not the computer 
operator, in this case, which supplied the content of the resulting grids. Had someone else operated the computer, it is 
not clear that the result in this case would be the same … although a good deal of skill would have gone into the 
program, it is artificial to regard a mere operator of it as the human author of the resulting selection of the grids’ 
contents.” Modern Intellectual Property Law, supra note 726.  
729 Modern Intellectual Property Law, ibid.  
730 Guadamuz, supra note 422 at 176. 
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to the users of the program rather than the programmers.731 Take Word for example. There can be 
no valid claim that the author of my dissertation is Microsoft and not me. However, with 
advancements in machine-learning technology, these scenarios might become more and more 
complex.732  
Guadamuz shares the example of machine learning in developing video games. In these 
games, the user affects the program every time he or she plays the game.733 Using the Word 
analogy, Guadamuz explains: “[O]ne would own all new worlds generated by the software because 
the user made ‘the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work’. Yet clearly the game 
developers make a strong claim in their end-user licence agreement that they own all intellectual 
property arising from the game.”734 
The reason the UK legal framework is so important is because many other countries share 
it. Ireland’s Copyright and Related Rights Act, for example, echoes the UK model assigning 
copyright to “the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are 
undertaken.”735 A similar legal framework exists – using almost identical wording – in New 
                                                          
731 Angela Adrian, Law and Order in Virtual Worlds: Exploring Avatars, Their Ownership and Rights: Exploring 
Avatars, Their Ownership and Rights (New York: IGI Global, 2010). See also Guadamuz, ibid at 176. 
732 Guadamuz, ibid at 176. 
733 The program, however, has a significant effect on the process: “The promise of this type of development is to have 
gaming environments created not by the programmers, but that the program itself based on predetermined rules and 
algorithms. The potential is to have games with no end, where content is generated by the computer in a unique manner 
each time that the player logs in … While the programmers set parameters, the machine literally builds new virtual 
worlds every time it runs.” Guadamuz, ibid at 172. 
734 Ibid at 176.  
735 Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (Ir), s 21(f). 
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Zealand,736 India,737 South Africa738 and Hong Kong.739 
Copyright law in the UK and other UK “inspired” countries explicitly limits authorship to 
persons. Vaver has noted that “computer-generated works join the list of other works for which 
the UK Act has created a fictitious author: the producer of a film or sound record, the maker of a 
broadcast, the provider of a cable service programme – almost all of which are equally fictitious 
persons, that is, corporations rather than humans.”740  
The CDPA provides no instructions for when a work’s author is not human, for example, 
as with independent AI-created work.741 Mr. Justice Richard Arnold has recently suggested that 
AI-generated works could not be protected under UK copyright law and section 9(3) (the 
computer-generated exception) should not apply to AI.742  
Since protection for computer-generated works relies on a lack of any human author, it 
seems peculiar to apply the originality test to them. Thus, the CDPA does not provide originality 
criteria for computer-generated works that it acknowledges are copyrightable.743 In this regard, the 
                                                          
736 New Zealand Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s 5(2)(a): “in the case of a literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic work that 
is computer-generated, the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.” 
737 India Copyright Act 1957 (IN), s 2(d)(vi): “in relation to any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is 
computer-generated, the person who causes the work to be created.” 
738 South Africa Copyright Act 1978 (S Afr) (as amended up to Copyright Amendment Act 2002), s 1(1)(h): “a literary, 
dramatic, musical or artistic work or computer program which is computer-generated, means the person by whom the 
arrangements necessary for the creation of the work were undertaken.” 
739 An Ordinance to Make Provisions in Respect of Copyright and Related Rights and for Connected Purposes 1997 
(HK), s 11(3): “In the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the author is 
taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.” 
740 Vaver, Translation and Copyright, supra note 718 at 162. Vaver explains that “[t]he reason for protection has 
nothing to do with encouraging human creativity and everything to do with protecting the product of capital investment 
from unfair competition or misappropriation.” 
741 Dorotheou, supra note 423. 
742 Remarks at the Oxford IP Moot, 16 March 2018. Following the Conversazione, Mr Justice Arnold later retreated 
from this notion suggesting a sui-generis AI legislation. See also Richard Arnold, Performers’ rights and recording 
rights: UK law under the Performers’ Protection Acts 1958-72 and the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
(ESC Publishing, 1990). 
743 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 116-7. CDPA, s 9(3) acts as an exception to the originality criteria. We can 
come to the same conclusion from a different path: under UK copyright law, establishing originality can be satisfied 
if the author has created the work using his/her own skill and judgment and the work originated with the author and 
was not copied. See Ladbroke v William Hill, [1964] 1 All ER 465 at 469 and University of London Press Ltd v 
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UK approach to computer-generated works is very different from the EU copyright law. Bently 
and Sherman note that difficulties arise with upholding originality criteria in computer-generated 
works with regards to cases lacking a relationship between author and creation.744 Emily 
Dorotheou observes that although the UK courts have dealt with computer-assisted/generated 
works, they “have not yet considered a case regarding the author of computer generated works”,745 
and when they do need to address computer-generated issues, they tend to gloss over the discussion 
rather quickly. One example is the case of Nova v Mazooma. In Mazooma, Nova argued that 
Mazooma games copied the composite frames which appeared on the screen.746 However, Kitchin 
L. J. held that there was no infringement by concluding that the output of the computer-generated 
work belongs to the games’ designer “because he devised the appearance of the various elements 
of the game and the rules and logic by which each frame is generated and he wrote the relevant 
computer program.”747 
The UK approach to originality exemplifies the difficulties of considering AI for copyright 
protection. Given the current definition of computer-generated works in the UK, I believe there 
are two possible routes for allocating protection to AI works under UK copyright law. First, 
                                                          
University Tutorial Press, [1916] 2 Ch 601 at 609. See also Bently & Sherman, ibid at 96-98; Dorotheou, supra note 
423 at 86. Thus, it is highly likely that any AI work (including most computer-generated works) will satisfy the current 
UK standard for originality.  
744 Bently & Sherman, ibid at 117: “One possible test would have been to ask whether the work was produced as a 
result of the independent acts of the computer … Alternatively, a court might have said that originality exists where 
the computer has produced a work that is different from previous works … [I]f the same work had been generated by 
a human author, would it have required the exercise of a substantial amount of skill, labour, and effort? If so, then the 
computer-generated work would be original.” 
745 Dorotheou, supra note 423. According to Dorotheou, Express Newspapers, supra note 728, is the only case that 
has discussed computer-generated work in the UK. 
746 Nova Productions v Mazooma Games, [2006] EWHC 24 (Ch (Eng)). An appeal to the UK High Court was failed. 
Nova Productions v Mazooma Games, [2007] EWCA Civ 219 (Eng).  
747 Nova Productions [2006], ibid at para 105. Kitchin L. J. further expresses his opinion against users or players rights 
to claim authorship in the program’s output stating at para 106: “The player is not, however, an author of any of the 
artistic works created in the successive frame images. His input is not artistic in nature and he has contributed no skill 
or labour of an artistic kind. Nor has he undertaken any of the arrangements necessary for the creation of the frame 
images. All he has done is to play the game.” 
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establish a new legal model for AI works. Under this model, the CDPA could define AI for the 
purposes of copyright and apply the same standard from computer-generated works. Alternatively, 
the UK can devise a new model for the allocation of rights. Secondly, UK copyright law might be 
willing to allocate rights by changing the definition of an author (i.e., the personhood requirement). 
While the copyrightability of computer-generated works in the UK is (relatively) clear, the 
EU position “is considerably less favourable towards ownership of computer works”748 – let alone 
AI generated works – casting doubt on any prospect of AI works copyright protection. In most EU 
countries, copyright laws do not deal with computer-generated works. Since there are no 
exceptions to computer-generated works, the basic principles – personhood and originality – apply. 
For example, the German Copyright Act (Urheberrechtsgesetz, UrhG) establishes that only a 
human can be regarded as an author.749 Thus, even when a work was created with a computer (i.e., 
computer-generated), the courts still have to decide if the work is original.750 
Article 1(3) of the EU Computer Programs Directive states: “A computer program shall 
be protected if it is original in the sense that it is the author’s own intellectual creation.”751 Since 
there is no definition for originality in the EU’s directives and regulations, the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) had to provide guidance. There are several cases in which the ECJ shaped the 
boundaries of originality and, in the process, established what EU copyrightability is.  
                                                          
748 Guadamuz, supra note 422 at 177. 
749 Art 7 states: “The author is the creator of the work.” Art 11 states: “Copyright protects the author in his intellectual 
and personal relationships to the work and in respect of the use of the work. It shall also serve to ensure equitable 
remuneration for the use of the work.”  
750 Jane Ginsburg, “The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law” (2003) 52 DePaul L Rev 1063 
[Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship]; Eleonora Rosati, Originality in EU Copyright: Full Harmonization through 
Case Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2013) (Rosati identifies at least four different standards that are in use in 
the EU). As I will further explore in the next part, the originality standard proves to be the new Tower of Babel with 
every jurisdiction sharing a different vision. Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 117, offer a solution: “[T]here is 
no reason why such production could not be protected by related rights or unfair competition law.” 
751 Software Directive, supra note 641. 
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In Infopaq International A/S, the ECJ held that a work must be the result of the author’s 
intellectual creation.752 In Eva-Maria Painer, the court elaborated that an intellectual creation must 
reflect the author’s personality.753 Advocate General Trstenjak further offers that “only human 
creations are therefore protected, which can also include those for which the person employs a 
technical aid, such as a camera.”754 Finally, in Football Dataco decision,755 the ECJ ruled that in 
“the setting up of a database, that criterion of originality is satisfied when, through the selection or 
arrangement of the data which it contains, its author expresses his creative ability in an original 
manner by making free and creative choices.”756 To put it briefly, the originality standard, as 
developed by the EU, makes a strong indication that a human author requirement is vital to 
establish copyright.757  
It seems, however, that the EU is at least aware of the difficulties computer-generated/AI 
                                                          
752 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, C-5/08, [2009] EUECJ at para 37 & 39: “In those 
circumstances, copyright within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29 is liable to apply only in relation to 
a subject-matter which is original in the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation … In the light of the 
considerations referred to in paragraph 37 of this judgment, the various parts of a work thus enjoy protection under 
Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29, provided that they contain elements which are the expression of the intellectual 
creation of the author of the work.” See also Christian Handig, “The Copyright Term ‘Work’ – European 
Harmonisation at an Unknown Level” (2009) 40:6 Intl Rev Ind Prop & C’right LL 665 at 668. 
753 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH, C-145/10, [2011] ECDR 6 at para 99: “In the light of the foregoing, 
the answer to the fourth question is that Article 6 of Directive 93/98 must be interpreted as meaning that a portrait 
photograph can, under that provision, be protected by copyright if, which it is for the national court to determine in 
each case, such photograph is an intellectual creation of the author reflecting his personality and expressing his free 
and creative choices in the production of that photograph. Since it has been determined that the portrait photograph in 
question is a work, its protection is not inferior to that enjoyed by any other work, including other photographic 
works.” 
754 [Emphasis added]. Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak on Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH, C-
145/10 (12 April 2011) para 121, online: 
<curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=82078&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&o
cc=first&part=1&cid=87400>. 
755 Football Dataco Ltd v Yahoo! UK Ltd, C‑604/10, [2012] ECDR 7. 
756 [Emphasis added]. Ibid at para 38. The ECJ concluded at paras 43-44: “in the light of the factors set out above, 
whether the football fixture lists in question in the main proceedings are databases which satisfy the conditions of 
eligibility for the copyright protection set out in Article 3(1) of Directive 96/9. In that respect, the procedures for 
creating those lists, as described by the referring court, if they are not supplemented by elements reflecting originality 
in the selection or arrangement of the data contained in those lists, do not suffice for the database in question to be 
protected by the copyright provided for in Article 3(1) of Directive 96/9.” 
757 See e.g. Infopaq International A/S, supra note 752 and Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace - Svaz softwarové 
ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury, C-393/09, [2011] ECDR 3; Handig, supra note 752. 
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works pose. I have already mentioned earlier the EU Parliament Resolution Concerning Civil Law 
Rules on Robotics.758 In the explanatory part, the resolution addresses the challenges AI pose to 
copyright calling “to come forward with a balanced approach to intellectual property rights when 
applied to hardware and software standards and codes ... [and that] the elaboration of criteria for 
‘own intellectual creation’ for copyrightable works produced by computers or robots is 
demanded.”759  
The UK’s and EU’s approaches to computer-generated creations reflect a conservative 
perception of copyright protection. This perception is understandable in the context of European 
copyright development from the theory of Romantic-individualistic human authorship. US and 
Australia, however, deal with computer-generated works differently.  
In the US, legal policy towards computer-generated works since CONTU remains 
unchanged and is relatively clear and straightforward – a computer-generated work might be 
considered a work under copyright law; however, the computer itself cannot be regarded as the 
author.760 As CONTU held:761 
 “The eligibility of any work for protection by copyright depends not upon the device or 
devices used in its creation, but rather upon the presence of at least minimal human 
creative effort at the time the work is produced.”  
The author of a computer-generated work is the “one who employs the computer”.762 The US 
Copyright Office has recited these statements recently, following the Monkey Selfie case763 
                                                          
758 EU Parliament Report, supra note 185. 
759 Ibid at 21. 
760 Pamela Samuelson, “CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in 
Machine-Readable Form” (1984) 1984 Duke L J 663 [Samuelson, CONTU Revisited].  
761 CONTU, supra note 621 at chapter 3 (New Works). 
762 Ibid. CONTU is well aware of the problem that these scenarios might result, such as when there are number of 
people involved in the process. See also Samuelson, CONTU Revisited, supra note 760 at 1193-4. 
763 See further, supra note 808. 
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clarifying that it would only register works created by a human being.764 Bridy further explains 
that under the current legal framework in the US the law “cannot vest ownership of the copyright 
in a procedurally generated work in the work’s author-in-fact, because the work’s author-in-fact – 
a generative software program – has no legal personhood.”765  
As for the originality criteria, the standard was established in Feist Publications.766 In 
rejecting the UK’s low “sweat of the brow” standard, SCOTUS stated that “100 uncopyrightable 
facts do not magically change their status when gathered together.”767 Finally, SCOTUS held that 
for a work to be protected it requires some level of creativity.768 The US standard for originality 
“stands in stark contrast to the Infopaq standard prevalent in Europe,769 as in Feist the Supreme 
Court clearly reckons that selection, co-ordination and arrangement of information is not an act 
that conveys originality, while the opposite is true across the Atlantic.”770 
 The Feist decision excludes computer-generated and AI works on the grounds that 
mechanical or routine acts lack creativity.771 Computer-generated/AI works are based on algorithm 
                                                          
764 See above, supra note 422. Julia Dickenson, Alex Morgan & Birgit Clark, “Creative Machines: Ownership of 
Copyright in Content Created by Artificial Intelligence Applications” (2017) 39 EIPR 457 at 457-8. 
765 Bridy, supra note 423 at 51. See also Penguin Books USA Inc v New Christian Church of Full Endeavor Ltd, 288 
F Supp (2d) 544 (City of NY 2000). Timothy L Butler, “Can a Computer be an Author? Copyright Aspects of Artificial 
Intelligence” (1982) 4 Comm & Ent LJ 707 at 746. Butler suggests creating a “presumption of a fictional human 
author” for AI works: “This interpretation would enable courts to presume authorship in AI product situations and 
allow time for analyzing the other requirements of the Act to determine copyright availability in a given situation. If 
all copyright requirements were met, then the policy goals of copyright would adequately be served because protection 
would be granted.” Guadamuz, supra note 422 at 181, rejects Butlers’ suggestion arguing that “[w]hile it is tempting 
advocate such a test, this would unfortunately incorporate a qualitative test into copyright that it currently lacks. Judges 
would have to be asked whether a text, a song or a painting are the product of a human or a machine.” 
766 Feist, supra note 440. 
767 Ibid at 1287. 
768 [Emphasis added]. Ibid at 1294. As stated: “Originality requires only that the author make the selection or 
arrangement independently (i.e., without copying that selection or arrangement from another work), and that it display 
some minimal level of creativity.”  
769 Infopaq International A/S, supra note 752. 
770 Guadamuz, supra note 422 at 181. 
771 Feist, supra note 440 at 1296: “The question that remains is whether Rural selected, coordinated, or arranged these 
uncopyrightable facts in an original way. As mentioned, originality is not a stringent standard; it does not require that 
facts be presented in an innovative or surprising way. It is equally true, however, that the selection and arrangement 
of facts cannot be so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever. The standard of originality is low, 
but it does exist.” 
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codes and mechanical arrangements and thus might be considered routine acts in which originality 
is not subsisted. On the other hand, with machine-learning and deep-learning capabilities, it might 
be difficult to argue that computer-generated programs work according to a routine since the basis 
for the codes is to develop new and innovative ways to achieve their goals. The unpredictability 
of these systems is what caused unrest in the past.772  
 Australian copyright law provides little explanation of the term “author”.773 Section 10(1) 
defines an author only “in relation to a photograph” by stating that an author is “the person who 
took the photograph.”774 The common wording of section 9(3) of the CDPA, which was adopted 
in other UK colonies, is oddly missing. Therefore, an AI program which takes photos will not own 
copyright in the photos, even if the owner of the AI program is a person since the AI itself took 
the photos and not the person (owner of the AI program). Given that the Australian Copyright Act 
relies on the existence of a person for authorship, allocating copyright protection for computer-
generated or AI works seems challenging, even without establishing originality.775  
                                                          
772 A good example is the decision to shut down Facebook’s AI chatbot program that created its own language. Andrew 
Griffin, “Facebook’s Artificial Intelligence Robots Shut Down After They Start Talking to Each Other In Their Own 
Language” (31 July 2017), online: Independent <independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-
artificial-intelligence-ai-chatbot-new-language-research-openai-google-a7869706.html>. Another example for 
creativity is the AI algorithms that beaten the top Chinese GO player in a move that no human anticipated. Samuel 
Gibbs, “AlphaZero AI Beats Champion Chess Program After Teaching Itself in Four Hours” (7 December 2017), 
online: The Guardian <theguardian.com/technology/2017/dec/07/alphazero-google-deepmind-ai-beats-champion-
program-teaching-itself-to-play-four-hours>. 
773 Jani McCutcheon, “Vanishing Author in Computer-Generated Works: A Critical Analysis of Recent Australian 
Case Law” (2012) 36 Melbourne UL Rev 915 at 934. 
774 The Australian Copyright Act does not define a “person”. However, the term is defined in the Acts Interpretation 
Act 1901 (AU), 2C(1): “In any Act, expressions used to denote persons generally (such as ‘person’, ‘party’, ‘someone’, 
‘anyone’, ‘no‑one’, ‘one’, ‘another’ and ‘whoever’), include a body politic or corporate as well as an individual.” 
2C(2) further provides: “Express references in an Act to companies, corporations or bodies corporate do not imply 
that expressions in that Act, of the kind mentioned in subsection (1), do not include companies, corporations or bodies 
corporate.” 
775 As the 1998 Copyright Law Review Committee (CLRC) expressed: “While a majority of the Committee recognises 
there is an ongoing need for copyright legislation to connect a work with a human, it is concerned that the current 
requirement of ‘authorship’ may preclude the grant of protection to material that is deserving of protection, simply 
because the extent to which a computer was utilised in its creation exceeds a particular (currently uncertain) level.” 
AU, Copyright Law Review Committee, Simplification of the Copyright Act 1968 — Part 2: Categorisation of Subject 
Matter and Exclusive Rights, and Other Issues (Canberra: The Committee, 1999) at 47–8 (5.10). 
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Further, in cases such as IceTv v Nine Network Australia776 and Telstra Corporation v 
Phone Directories Company,777 Australian courts have chosen a similar path to SCOTUS in 
adopting a higher originality standard, stating that skill and labour is not enough. IceTv and Nine 
Network show us that a higher originality standard often has adverse effects on the possible 
copyrightability of computer programs output.778 These cases might prove a barrier to computer-
generated works. However, as I have stated in regard to the US standing in this matter, it would be 
hard to argue in the future that machine-learning programs are not original, putting more pressure 
on the need to revisit copyright standards.  
Unfortunately, there is no explicit reference in Canada’s Copyright Act to computer-
generated works, and copyrightability determines according to the well-established standard of 
originality, as developed by the courts.779 The situation in Canada is a bit more complex though. 
Unlike other common-law jurisdictions with low to medium originality threshold (where creativity 
is less evident in determining originality), Canada did not adopt section 9(3) (computer-generated) 
provision. In other words, computer-generated works are more likely to be considered original 
under the Copyright Act and given that there is no specific exception to computer-generated works, 
                                                          
776 IceTV Pty Limited v Nine Network Australia Pty Limited, [2009] HCA 14. 
777 Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd, [2010] FCA 44. 
778 Guadamuz, supra note 422 at 184. IceTV, supra note 776, produced an electronic program guide to its subscribers 
by gathering information from Nine Network (the broadcaster). The Australian High Court held, at para 54, that “the 
critical question is whether skill and labour was directed to the particular form of expression of the time and title 
information, including its chronological arrangement. The skill and labour devoted by Nine’s employees to 
programming decisions was not directed to the originality of the particular form of expression of the time and title 
information. The level of skill and labour required to express the time and title information was minimal. That is not 
surprising, given that, as explained above, the particular form of expression of the time and title information is 
essentially dictated by the nature of that information.” Similarly, in Telstra, supra note 777 at para 340, the court held 
that “[n]one of the Works were original. None of the people said to be authors of the Works exercised ‘independent 
intellectual effort’ or ‘sufficient effort of a literary nature’ in creating the Works. Further, if necessary, the creation of 
the Works did not involve some ‘creative spark’ or the exercise of the requisite ‘skill and judgment’. I accept that 
production of the directories is a large enterprise populated by many contributors (ignoring for the moment the 
determinative difficulties with authorship outlined above). Many of the witnesses gave evidence that was direct and 
appropriate, and I accept that they work hard in their respective capacities.” 
779 Mark Perry & Thomas Margoni, “From Music Tracks to Google Maps: Who Owns Computer-Generated Works?” 
(2010) 26:6 Computer L & Sec Rev 621. I will develop the originality discussion in Part III. 
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it is more difficult to negate the possibility of computer-generated authorship under the current 
Copyright Act.780  
The distinction between a computer-generated and computer-assisted works was 
considered in a recent Albertan case, Geophysical Service Incorporated (GSI) v Encana 
Corporation.781 GSI is an intriguing example of a courts’ reaction to works of software created by 
minimal to no human influence. Such a reaction often manifests itself from a desire to find 
sufficient factual bases for human impact – slight as it may be – to allow a court to use the resulting 
legal arguments and bypass having to deal with non-human authorship, at least temporarily.782  
In GSI, an Alberta court considered if collected and processed seismic data constitute a 
work protectable by Canadian copyright law.783 The issue was if the work was computer-generated 
(with no – or negligible – human involvement) or computer-assisted (as described above, like an 
execution-facilitating tool). The court rejected the defendant’s argument “that seismic data is 
created with ‘little if any human input’,”784 distinguishing between its own case and Telstra.785 
Unsurprisingly, the court in GSI found that “human input is involved continuously through [the 
data’s] acquisition stage.”786 The court contrasted Telstra to GSI by noting the degree of human 
                                                          
780 Although this scenario is unlikely. I share Perry & Margoni view that: “[T]he impression left by the SCC that it 
was thinking exclusively in human activities, even without mentioning them, permeates the whole decision.”  
781 Geophysical Service Incorporated v Encana Corporation, 2016 ABQB 230, [2017] AWLD 4580 [GSI]. Leave to 
appeal to the SCC was denied.  
782 Given the current legal status of non-human creation, if the court were to find that this work was created solely by 
a computer it might not considered it to be a “work” under copyright law, which would effectively leave the creation 
under the public domain for everyone to use. 
783 GSI, supra note 781 at para 1. In GSI, a geophysical company, Geophysical Services Incorporated, “conducted 
offshore marine seismic surveys in the Canadian Atlantic and Arctic.” GSI argued, among other claims, for copyright 
protection of the seismic material that was deposited with Canadian and Provincial government authorities. GSI, ibid 
at para 88. The court asked whether copyright subsists in a “work which is created by a computer with little if any 
human input.” 
784 Ibid at para 89. 
785 Telstra, supra note 777. In Telstra, “the process was mechanical and involved little human input,” so the Australian 
court concluded, that “the computers virtually took over all the necessary decisions involving skill and judgment”; 
GSI, ibid at para 90. For an interesting discussion in Australia see Alexandra George, “Reforming Australia’s 
Copyright Law: An Opportunity to Address the Issues of Authorship and Originality” (2014) 37 UNSW 939.  
786 GSI, ibid at para 89. 
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intervention required (particularly the “expert scientific skill and judgment […] ‘tailored and 
unique’ to the author”), and it determined that the works in question were human-authored (and 
therefore, merely computer-assisted).787 
GSI foreshadows a likely trend in computer-generated cases: courts shuffling facts to find 
enough human ingenuity enabling a work – despite strong evidence of minimal-to-zero human 
influence – to establish human-authorship within the “safe haven” of computer-assisted works. 
Obviously, in the realm of computer-generated or AI works, human connection can always be 
established because humans contributed to the development of the programs and the computer 
technology. This may not always be sound legal policy. Computer-generated and computer-
assisted works will likely become harder to differentiate. As a result, courts may view computer-
generated works more as computer-automated works (establishing that humans influenced the 
work or instructed the program by any mean and thus the work is still affected by humans). Even 
though such a conclusion is not false from legal and philosophical perspectives, it seems to sidestep 
another more accurate truth: that the work is computer-generated.  
Even if one jurisdiction should decide to grant copyright protection to AIs, are other 
jurisdictions obligated, under international agreements, to protect AI’s creations as well? Can a 
state designate anyone or anything as an author?788 The scope of legal protection was always 
considered a challenging one. As Vaver noted more than three decades ago: “Some countries, 
typically net exporters of copyright material such as the United States, have no hesitation … 
extending its benefit for all works and all rights to nationals or domiciliaries … [while others] 
                                                          
787 Ibid at para 91. 
788 Vaver reflected about this question in his 1986 paper, asking: “(a) What ‘works’ qualify for national treatment? ... 
(b) What ‘rights’ must be given national treatment?” David Vaver, “The National Treatment Requirements of the 
Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions [Part 1]” (1986) 17 Intl Rev Ind Prop & C’right L 577 at 580 [Vaver, 
The National Treatment Requirements of Berne]. 
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carefully weigh whether to extend protection.”789  
The scope of protection has a significant effect on a country’s developments and economic 
growth.790 There is no doubt that these considerations would impact the development of AI and 
thus it is important to further deliberate on the relations between the international treaties and 
obligations and the state. It is apparent, however, that under the Berne Convention there is a 
consensus that all states are obligated to impose minimum standard of protection. However, “the 
precise nature of the works protected and the rights granted are by and large left to a state’s 
legislative discretion.”791  
In that context, we should inquire what the minimum requirements and obligations that can 
be establish under the international agreements are. As Vaver observes, “The works included 
within the RBC [revised Berne Convention] and the rights attaching to them … have been 
progressively enlarged since the original BC [Berne Convention].”792 In reflecting on the balance 
between the international and state level, Vaver offers further that “[t]heoretically, the RBC is not 
supposed to compromise a state’s internal affairs … however, in practice the RBC does oblige a 
state to extend protection to such works, since it is unthinkable that foreign authors should obtain 
a larger protection in a state than do the state’s own nationals.”793 
Contrary to the American and Australian positions, Berne “seems neutral on the possibility 
of non-human authorship.”794 As Miller argues, Berne leaves Article 1’s “authors” undefined.795 
                                                          
789 Ibid at 578. 
790 Ibid at 579. 
791 Ibid at 586. 
792 Ibid. 
793 Ibid. 
794 Berne, supra note 565; Miller, supra note 59 at 1050.  
795 Miller, ibid at 1050; Vaver, The National Treatment Requirements of Berne, supra note 788 at 592. For a different 
view see Sam Ricketson, “People or Machines? The Berne Convention and the Changing Concept of Authorship” 
(1991) 16 Colum.-VLA J L & Arts 1 at 21-2. Ricketson argues that Berne “follows logically that the author should be 
a natural person.” Ricketson further explains that “[a]part from the internal support to be found for this proposition 
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Both the WCT and the TRIPs dodge the issue by relying instead on Berne for guidance.796 Vaver, 
on the other hand, holds a somewhat different view in stating that although Berne does not define 
an author “it has always had a well-recognised meaning” of the author as a natural person.797 Vaver 
adds that under Berne an author “implies a person who applies his/her personal creativity.”798 
Establishing a common ground for authorship has proved difficult given the divergence of the 
Berne signatories: “[S]ome recognising only natural persons as authors, while others treat certain 
legal entities as copyright owners, some imposing conditions for the recognition of authorship 
which others do not accept.”799  
The intriguing question is whether a state can define an author in a way that includes 
computer-generated or AI. Obviously, any jurisdiction has its own prerogative to shape its laws; 
however, a state “cannot compel another … state to accept its idiosyncratic meaning to the extent 
that it departs from the international law significance of the term.”800 Given the international 
obligations to protect the works of each sate under the convention, these changes might impose 
                                                          
within the Convention, in particular the moral rights provision in article 6bis, this theme is the leitmotiv running 
through all the categories of works presently protected by the Convention. With the arguable exception of 
cinematographic works, each protected type of work seems to be quintessentially the production of a human creator.” 
Jane Ginsburg has recently commented on Ricketson’s paper arguing that “because lack of human authorship would 
disqualify such outputs from Berne subject matter under Art. 2, other Berne members incur no obligation to protect 
purely computer-generated works even if their countries of origin choose to cover them by copyright.” See Jane 
Ginsburg, “People Not Machines: Authorship and What It Means in the Berne Convention” (2018) 49 IIC 131 at 134-
5 [Ginsburg, People Not Machines]. 
796 The WCT, supra note 637 at art 4 states that “computer programs are protected as literary works within the meaning 
of Article 2 of the Berne Convention. Such protection applies to computer programs, whatever may be the mode or 
form of their expression.” Similarly, art 10(1) of the TRIPs, supra note 567, states that “computer programs, whether 
in source or object code, shall be protected as literary works under the Berne Convention.” See also Michael L Doane, 
“TRIPS and International Intellectual Property in an Age of Advancing Technology” (1994) 9 Am U J Int’l L & Pol’y 
465 at 489. 
797 Vaver, The National Treatment Requirements of Berne, supra note 788 at 592-3. 
798 Ibid at 594. 
799 GUIDE to the BERNE CONVENTION for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971) (Geneva: 
World Intellectual Property Organization, 1978) at 11. Unless their title is derivative from a human author. 
800 Vaver, The National Treatment Requirements of Berne, supra note 788 at 594. As Vaver further provides: “A state 
cannot include in the term something that does not belong there, any more than it can exclude something that obviously 
does.” Ibid at 595.  
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difficulties.  
It seems that any decision to change the core concepts of copyright and IP must 
acknowledge the international agreements – a state is not entirely free to provide its views to the 
question of who is the author: “[T]he meaning of the term ‘author’ must be derived from and 
regulated by the RBC, not by the meaning an individual state chooses to place on the term.”801  
Despite their obvious differences, none of the copyright regimes of the US, the UK, 
Australia, Canada or the EU are willing to accept computer-generated or AI as the author of a 
given work. Courts might, however, adopt a different approach to authorship in the future and 
could resolve such issues by relying on other legal doctrines and fields.802  
AI creations are computer-generated works, but not every computer-generated work can 
be considered an AI creation. Being considered for AI copyright protection should require an 
assertion that AI created the work; not every sophisticated computer can be defined as AI for 
copyright protection purposes. The current debate around computer-generated works allows us to 
understand better the legal standing and “neighbourhood” in which the idea of allocating copyright 
to computer or AI creations has been developed. It seems that the legal community has not come 
to terms with the question of awarding rights to creations in which a connection between the 
author-programmer and the work cannot be established, or the connection is too remote in time or 
function. 
As with copyright, our current legal system’s non-recognition of computer-generated 
inventions creates eligibility issues for patent protection. Ryan Abbott refers to this ambiguity in 
                                                          
801 Ibid at 592. 
802 I disagree with this view. In developing legal theory, we should aspire to create holistic doctrines applicable to 
different scenarios, and not limit our scope of protection to humans. 
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claiming that “it is not clear that a computer could be an inventor or even that a computer’s 
invention could be patentable.”803 As with copyright, “there is no statute addressing computational 
invention, no case law directly on the subject, and no pertinent Patent Office Policy.”804 Further, 
since neither patent (nor copyright) laws recognize computers as inventors,805 failing to name a 
human as inventor or designate a computer as the sole inventor can result in a denial of patenting 
or an invalid or unenforceable patent.806  
Abbott argues for amending patent law to consider computers as inventors. He believes 
that “there should be no requirement for a mental act because patent law is concerned with the 
creativity of an invention itself rather than the subjective mental process by which an invention 
                                                          
803 Abbott, supra note 656 at 1080. See also Ralph D Clifford, “Intellectual Property in the Era of Creative Computers 
Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?” (1997) 71 Tul L Rev 1675 at 1702-3; Samuelson, supra note 423 
at 1199-1200, stating that “[t]he system has allocated rights only to humans for a very good reason: it simply does not 
make any sense to allocate intellectual property rights to machines because they do not need to be given incentives to 
generate output. All it takes is electricity (or some other motive force) to get the machines into production. The whole 
purpose of the intellectual property system is to grant rights to creators to induce them to innovate.” I disagree with 
Samuelson on those pointes. First, as I have explained in this part, IP laws do more than create incentives. Second, 
machines might be able to respond to incentives in the future, and even if machines would not be able to, as Abbott 
suggested, there might be other reasons to designate machines as inventors. 
804 Abbott, ibid. See Ben Hattenbach & Joshua Glucoft, “Patents in an Era of Infinite Monkeys and Artificial 
Intelligence” (2015) 19 Stan Tech L Rev 32 at 44. 
805 Abbott explains: “All patent applications require one or more named inventors who must be ‘individuals’, a legal 
entity such as a corporation cannot be an inventor.” Abbott, ibid at 1092.  
806 Abbott, ibid at 1087-9, provides several examples for patents that were created by computers autonomously. The 
first is the Creativity Machine. Dr. Stephen Thaler stated that the Creativity Machine, which invented “his” second 
patent – “Neural Network Based Prototyping System and Method” – was listed as the inventor for the purpose of 
registering the patent. Another example for computer-generated patent is the Genetic Programming (GP), a software 
molded after the process of biological evolution. According to Abbott, the GP might be responsible for creating at 
least two patentable new inventions. In one case, the patent office had granted patent for a computational invention 
on Jan 25, 2005, that was created by the “Invention Machine” – a GP based AI developed by Dr. John Koza. In a 2006 
paper, Dr. Koza claimed that the Invention Machine is in fact the sole inventor. The third example Abbott provides is 
the IBM famous AI computer system – Watson. Watson is a different brand of Invention Machines, since it “utilizes 
a more conventional architecture of logical deduction combined with access to massive databases containing 
accumulated human knowledge and expertise.” By applying a new developed algorithm that “incorporated a database 
with information about nutrition, flavor compounds, the molecular structure of foods, and tens of thousands of existing 
recipes”, Watson can, theoretically, create new processes and combinations that could qualify as patentable subject 
matter. In a more recent paper, Abbott describes Watson contribution to research in identifying “novel drug targets 
and new indications for existing drugs.” Abbott concludes that “Watson may be generating patentable inventions 
either autonomously or collaboratively with human researchers.” See Ryan Abbott, “Everything is Obvious”, 66 
UCLA L Rev [forthcoming in 2019] at 20, online (draft): <conferences.law.stanford.edu/werobot/wp-
content/uploads/sites/47/2018/02/Everything-is-Obvious_1_31_18.pdf> [Abbott, Everything is Obvious]. 
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may have been achieved.”807 This makes sense for the AI copyright discussion and accords for 
other non-human creators. As Abbott suggests: “The need for computer inventorship also explains 
why the Copyright Office’s Human Authorship Requirement is misguided. Nonhumans should be 
allowed to qualify as authors because doing so would incentivize the creation of new and valuable 
creative output.”808 Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid and Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu have expressed a different 
view. They oppose creating “new legal personalities to whom such ownership rights could be 
granted” and contend that patent law is not applicable to AIs.809 
The Canadian Patent Act seems to echo US law in this matter. Although “inventor” is not 
mentioned in the Constitution Act or defined in the Patent Act, other statements imply a human 
criterion.810 Patentee, for example, “means the person for the time being entitled to the benefit of 
a patent.”811 With the developments in the field, I can only predict that the CPO will face similar 
concerns. 
2.3.3 The Future: IP Implications for Future Developments  
In earlier chapters, I presented – past and present – challenges reflecting on how software 
developments affected or are affecting IP law. I have showed how IP law is fluctuating and 
adapting to technological changes in a never-ending struggle to balance between different IP fields, 
                                                          
807 Abbott, ibid at 1082. 
808 Ibid at 1121. Abbott makes few other suggestions including arguing for recognizing animal authorship rights (citing 
Naruto, supra note 237, also known as the Monkey Selfie case) claiming that “[a]nimal authorship might also have 
some ancillary conservation benefits” such as creating incentives for endangers species (as the selfie monkey) to 
preserve the animals and creates biodiversity. This argument might sound appealing to the proponents of animal rights. 
However, the underline reasoning of the argument is based on public policy and not IP justifications. Recognizing 
individual rights for IP protection must include some level of awareness of the animal’s contribution in the form of 
expected incentive, benefit or a certain connection to the creation. In Naruto it is hard to argue that the monkey was 
aware of his actions – creating a picture.  
809 Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 293 at 2245-6. 
810 Vaver, supra note 237 at 364. 
811 Patent Act, RSC 1985, s 2. Person, under Canada Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, s 35(1) includes corporation – 
“person, or any word or expression descriptive of a person, includes a corporation.” See also Interpretation Act, ibid 
at section 33(1). Consequently, it seems both animals and machines are excluded from the Patent Act.  
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as well as between IP and the public. In this chapter, I will address future developments and their 
IP applications. Lawrence Solum,812 Lemley,813 Abbott,814 and others have debated on these 
expected developments. I will consider their research and add a few notions of my own. 
Solum argues that technological developments are sometimes so profound that they may 
rock “the foundations of an entire body of law”.815 Solum proves his point by explaining the way 
new technology – like the video-tape recorder in Sony,816 peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing in 
Napster,817 the Internet and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),818 among other 
examples – morph the law.819 Consequently, the future of copyright law “is up for grabs”, and “we 
are in the midst of an intellectual, moral, and legal struggle over the future of copyright.”820 
Solum’s predictions are over a decade old, and though the examples he provided have since 
evolved (or become obsolete), the legal reasoning has not.  
Technology’s potential effect on current IP law was described recently by a group of 
researchers at the University of Edinburgh. They argued that “[w]e are moving into an era where 
man-machine co-production of creative works will become commercially viable and 
commonplace.”821 The issue, as they posed it, “is not ‘high art’ but rather more mundane forms of 
                                                          
812 Lawrence Solum, “The Future of Copyright” (2005) 83 Tex L Rev 1137 [Solum, The Future of Copyright], 
(reviewing Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and 
Control Creativity (2004)). 
813 Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, supra note 27. See also Mark Lemley, “Part VII Ready for Patenting” 
(2016) 96 BUL Rev 1171. 
814 Abbott, supra note 656; Abbott, Everything is Obvious, supra note 806. See also Erica Fraser, “Computers as 
Inventors - Legal and Policy Implications of Artificial Intelligence on Patent Law” (2016) 13 SCRIPTed 305. 
815 Solum, The Future of Copyright, supra note 812. 
816 Sony Corp, supra note 440 at 428 (in Sony the court rejected the claims that the sale of tape recorders and 
photocopying machines constitute contributory infringement). 
817 A&M Records, Inc v Napster, Inc, 239 F (3d) 1004 (9th Cir 2001). 
818 Pub L No 105-304, 112 Stat 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 USC). 
819 Solum, The Future of Copyright, supra note 812 at 1138. 
820 Ibid at 1139. 
821 A Fourth Law of Robotics, supra note 6 at 225. 
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creativity, for example writing short new stories or short jingles for computer games.”822 And, 
these creations will probably be “disseminated automatically, without human intervention or 
oversight.”823  
It appears that computer-generated technology will become the standard. Human 
involvement in creation and invention processes (i.e., patents and copyright) will decline in some 
areas. True, a humans’ indirect effect will remain prevalent, since humans created the codes or 
algorithms leading to the work’s invention’s development; however, the connecting link between 
the original programmer (or the original code) and the creation will become more distanced.  
Not only is the distance between human and creation increasing, so is the tremendous effect 
on human life by current and impending technologies. As Lemley recently noted, “new 
technologies promise to do for a variety of physical goods and even services what the Internet has 
already done for information.”824 Abbott echoes Lemley, predicting that “an innovation revolution 
is on the horizon.”825 Among these significant developments that can affect the shape of our laws 
in general and IP in particular: 3D printing, synthetic biology, bio-printing robotics,826 genetic 
manipulation, drones, self-driving vehicles, virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR).  
3D printing is one of the most imminent and significant challenges to our current legal 
system.827 IP is certainly one of the legal areas it affects, but not the only one. 3D technology and 
                                                          
822 Ibid. 
823 Ibid. 
824 Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, supra note 27 at 461.  
825 Abbott, supra note 656 at 1079. 
826 Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, supra note 27 at 461.  
827 In simple terms, 3D printing converts information into a physical form. By providing 3D printers the data 
(schematics) of any given structure, the printers can shape the structure accordingly. As Lemley further provides: “A 
typical 3D printer will use as input a form of extruded plastic. The user loads a blueprint into the computer attached 
to the 3D printer, and the printer deposits the plastic, layer by layer, until it has made a 3D object.” Lemley, IP in a 
World Without Scarcity, supra note 27 at 471. See also Danton L Bryans, “Comment, Unlocked and Loaded: 
Government Censorship of 3D-Printed Firearms and a Proposal for More Reasonable Regulation of 3D-Printed 
159 
 
its implications pose challenges to broader areas such as public safety,828 environment 
protection,829 and even our taxation system.830 Many IP legal scholars have offered different 
solutions to the so-called IP “threat”. From prohibiting the distribution of 3D printers (a similar 
approach to that taken in Sony and Napster),831 to providing free 3D printer access under fair-use 
or fair dealing for home users.832  
Yanisky-Ravid and Kwan, for example, suggest adopting a DMCA-based model, imposing 
obligatory registration for 3D printers and other anti-circumvention features.833 Lemley predicts 
(and hopes) that IP owners will lose that fight much as they lost the fight over internet file-sharing 
and streaming technology,834 since “the potential social value in these new technologies, like the 
                                                          
Goods” (2015) 90 Ind LJ 901 (2015); Daniel H Brean, “Asserting Patents to Combat Infringement via 3D Printing: 
It’s No ‘Use’” (2013) 23 Fordham IP Media & Ent LJ 771. 
828 Printing guns and products that can pose risk such as health and safety risks.  
829 Using raw materials that can endanger the environment.  
830 Yanisky-Ravid & Kwan, supra note 178. Yanisky-Ravid and Kwan address several concerns that 3D technology 
poses to our society. In doing so, their research goes deeper and broader into the implications of 3D printing on other 
areas of the law.  
831 The court in Def Distributed v US Dep’t of State, 838 F (3d) 45 at 454-55 (5th Cir 2016), refused to enjoin regulation 
of CAD files that enable printing guns, implicitly endorsing a sweeping interpretation to the US free speech 
amendment. See “First Amendment - Technology - Fifth Circuit Declines to Enjoin Regulation of Online Publication 
of 3D-Printing Files - Defense Distributed v. United States Department of State, 838 F (3d) 451 (5th Cir. 2016)” 
(2017) 130 Harv L Rev 1744 at 1751. Yanisky-Ravid & Kwan, ibid at 947, further provide that “[o]pponents of 3D 
printing have argued that as 3D printers become widespread, peer-to-peer services will be flooded with CAD models, 
posing a similar threat to designers and manufacturers as Napster did to the entertainment industry.” Some suggested 
making certain distributors liable for patent infringement, arguing that the “US patent law should be expanded to allow 
patent holders to sue CAD distributing websites directly for patent infringement.” Ibid at 948. Others went as far as 
argue for banning 3D printing completely. See also Nicole A Syzdek, “Five Stages of Patent Grief to Achieve 3D 
Printing Acceptance” (2015) 49 USF L Rev 335. 
832 As Yanisky-Ravid & Kwan, supra note 178 at 946 explain: “3D printing will usher in a new era of technology 
innovations, which will improve society's welfare in many ways, as anyone can become a creator, inventor, or 
manufacturer. 3D printing opens the door to a new wave of innovation being done from home, which can be carried 
out by individuals, start-ups, or large firms.” See also Devan R Desai & Gerard N Magliocca, “Patents, Meet Napster: 
3D Printing and the Digitization of Things” (2014) 102 Geo LJ 1691 at 1693. 
833 Yanisky-Ravid & Kwan, ibid at 951: “The three core elements of our proposed reform are as follows. First, 
registration of 3D printers should be required. Second, 3D printers should be manufactured to contain an 
imprinting/stamping sign that enables the tracking of its products. Optionally, 3D printers can be manufactured to be 
inoperable unless the printers are connected to the Internet … Third, a repository should be provisioned to receive and 
store CAD models uploaded by intellectual property owners-these can be matched with models uploaded by users 
during 3D print requests to identify whether infringing models are being used.”  
834 Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, supra note 27 at 499-500.  
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Internet, is enormous.”835  
I predict that the 3D printing market will implement a Netflix or iTunes model in which 
the public can subscribe for affordable access to copyright and designs. Admittedly, these 
suggestions may not resolve every public threat and legal problem posed by technology. But, given 
my assumption about dramatic changes in IP law’s future – leading to a more democratic market 
that limits protection for authors and inventors – this model might eventually prevail. 
 Robotics,836 an intriguing expected technological development, poses numerous legal and 
ethical challenges as well.837 Even though the robotic industry is less advanced and the availability 
of robots for public use is currently limited,838 the applications of robotics seem less futuristic than 
some would think. In the coming five to fifteen years, robots will be available for home users and 
“[s]pecial purpose robots will deliver packages, clean offices, and enhance security.”839 Further, 
there are several indications that robots for private users (i.e., home services) will become more 
advanced and effective in the next fifteen years.840 Within general robotics developments, robot 
assistants (i.e., caregiver robots or “servants” like drivers, cleaners, or secretaries) may have 
significant legal implications, particularly for IP law.841 At first, these robots might only serve as 
                                                          
835 Ibid at 500. 
836 Although, robots do not form part of my research, they remain notable as AI’s physical embodiment, since any 
robot may come equipped with an AI program. 
837 See Ronald Leenes et al, “Regulatory Challenges of Robotics: Some Guidelines for Addressing Legal and Ethical 
Issues” (2017) 9 L Innovation & Tech 1. 
838 “[T]echnical constraints and the high costs of reliable mechanical devices will continue to limit commercial 
opportunities to narrowly defined applications for the foreseeable future.” See the 100 Year Study, supra note 22 at 7 
and 24. 
839 Ibid. I include drones in these scenarios. 
840 Ibid at 25: “Despite the slow growth to date of robots in the home, there are signs that this will change in the next 
fifteen years. Corporations such as Amazon Robotics and Uber are developing large economies of scale using various 
aggregation technologies.” 
841 A Fourth Law of Robotics, supra note 6 at 231. 
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companions,842 but later robots could provide substantial assistance. 
The challenges facing copyright law in robotics, and AI and machine-learning 
technologies, are complex and broad-reaching. Robots, by their intended purposes, are designed 
to store and share data that are likely protected by copyright. By programming robots to store data 
(pictures and other information stored on its “hard-drive” or uploaded to the “cloud”), robots (and 
their human owners) can infringe copyright with every picture, video, or piece of digital 
information they hold and process.843 Consider, for example, a robo-caregiver following its 
visually impaired person in a museum. In order to fulfil its duties, the robo-caregiver will take 
images of the artworks hanging on museum wall (to move around or to direct the disabled person 
to her favourite art). Taking and storing photos the robo-caregiver’s database, or sharing them with 
other robo-caregivers,844 could constitute possible copyright infringement.845  
Insofar as patent law is concerned, robots will presumably be mass-produced by companies 
aspiring to protect their inventions. Patenting robots, globally, seems as futile as trying to patent a 
car. So, the process would likely comprise trying to patent software and technology related to the 
robot’s activities (like sensors, or voice and sound applications). Such attempts might still prove 
                                                          
842 See the “cat robot” that is designed to provide people that can’t take care of a real animal the companion they need. 
Dave Lee, “Meet the robotic cat for the elderly” (15 January 2016), online: BBC <bbc.com/news/technology-
35310200>. 
843 As Benkler, supra note 617 at 440 explains, in the US “[a]n early decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
MAI Systems, treated RAM (random-access memory) copies of this sort as ‘copies’ for purposes of copyright. This 
position, while weakly defended, was not later challenged or rejected by other courts. Its result is that every act of 
reading on a screen involves ‘making a copy’ within the meaning of the Copyright Act. As a practical matter, this 
interpretation expands the formal rights of copyright holders to cover any and all computer-mediated uses of their 
works, because no use can be made with a computer without at least formally implicating the right to copy.” 
844 As stated in the 100 Year Study, supra note 22 at 25: “Cloud (‘someone else’s computer’) is going to enable more 
rapid release of new software on home robots, and more sharing of data sets gathered in many different homes, which 
will in turn feed cloud-based machine learning, and then power improvements to already deployed robots.” 
845 A Fourth Law of Robotics, supra note 6 at 231-2. However, this statement might not be accurate to all jurisdictions 
and in all circumstances. For example, see section 60(2) of Canada’s Copyright Act, RSC 1985, supra note 590 
(“Radio performances in places other than theatres”). Also, the recent Marrakesh Treaty could be extended to support 
these scenarios as well. See Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, 
Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, WIPO Doc VIP/DC/8 (27 June 2013) [Marrakesh Treaty]. 
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unsuccessful. First, as noted in the Alice discussion above, patent law is evolving to make software 
patenting more difficult. Second, codes or algorithms might develop rapidly. Since future 
technology will likely incorporate machine-learning capabilities, the results of which will be 
shared online instantaneously, it will be almost impossible to anticipate the development phase 
and block the codes from other robo-caregivers or similar technology. 
Data and information will be crucial to robotics and AI despite copyright.846 Much 
computer-generated content uses data that can be accessed from copyright-protected sources over 
the Internet, for example, to assist self-driving cars’ sensors, or provide information to mobile 
phones’ personal assistant (like Siri). These data comprise the building blocks for future progress, 
despite their collection perhaps constituting copyright infringement.847 As I will further develop in 
Part III, resolving data barriers and providing access to high-quality data is essential for AI 
development. True, under current legal framework (at least in the US) the fair use doctrine makes 
it difficult to argue that a machine or robot has committed copyright infringement.848 However, 
this approach may not endure much longer; as computers evolve, and with expected advancement 
in AI and machine-learning capabilities, legal reasoning will likely be reconsidered and change 
with it.  
                                                          
846 As Burkhard Schafer opines: “The machine learning techniques on which [robots and AI technology] depend 
require massive amounts of input, data that can be subject to varying IP regimes. If the robot revolution is going to 
transform our economy, access to these inputs must be possible at an economically affordable cost - while at the same 
time, some data sets (or entire works) could acquire significant commercial value they were lacking in the past.” 
Burkhard Schafer, “Editorial: The Future of IP Law in an Age of Artificial Intelligence” (2016) 13 SCRIPTed 284.  
847 As James Grimmelmann expressed, “copyright has concluded that reading by robots doesn’t count. Infringement 
is for humans only; when computers do it, it’s fair use.” James Grimmelmann, “Copyright for Literate Robots” (2016) 
101 Iowa L Rev 658 [Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots]. 
848 The non-expressive fair use doctrine was first recognized in Sega Enterprises Ltd v Accolade, Inc, 977 F (2d) 1510 
(9th Cir 1992). The Court ruled, ibid at 1527-8, that Accolade’s reverse engineering of Sega’s genesis console and 
games to copy the computer code that bridged between the console and the games is considered a non-expressive fair 
use, holding that “where disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in 
a copyrighted computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access, disassembly is a fair 
use of the copyrighted work, as a matter of law. Our conclusion does not, of course, insulate Accolade from a claim 
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Lemley and Eugene Volokh address other expected technological advancements and their 
legal implications: virtual reality and augmented reality. In VR, the user is placed in a virtual 
world, in which he or she can interact and move in a fictional environment; in an AR, the user can 
add elements to his reality.849 VR and AR technology pose new problems for classic legal questions 
as well as for copyright,850 one of which is using copyrighted images (i.e., Superman, Lara Croft) 
as characters in the VR or AR world. Lemley and Volokh predict that copyright and trademarks 
suits against users that create avatars from copyrighted images “would likely operate much as they 
have now, though with many of the uncertainties we see now.”851  
The above are only a few examples; there are many more. This section’s purpose was to 
provide a sample of technological challenges we are facing today and might face in the near future. 
Bridging the gap between the current legal system and the expected implications of future 
technology is a significant challenge. One might argue that these changes are no different from the 
industrial revolution or the Internet, and as with them, no great revolutionary legal paradigm shift 
should be expected. I disagree. 
                                                          
of copyright infringement with respect to its finished products. Sega has reserved the right to raise such a claim, and 
it may do so on remand.”  
849 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 30.  
850 Ibid at 1055-6. As Lemley and Volokh explain: “Sorting out who is responsible will require courts to understand 
the technology and how it differs from the world that came before. But it won’t necessarily require a fundamental 
rethinking of legal doctrines. A death threat via AR or VR is legally the same as a death threat via an oral conversation, 
a letter, an e-mail, or a fax.” 
851 Ibid at 1111.  
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2.4 AI-IP THEORY - DISCUSSION 
Will IP law be expected to change dramatically? or will its structure remain largely static with 
minor adaptations?852 Legal history strengthens the latter: stasis. Why would an AI revolution 
depart substantially from the Internet revolution, where IP laws changed very little? And if IP laws 
will not change dramatically in these instances, when would we expect change at all? 
Humanity has always expected the worst. Consider films from the 1980s and 90s like Blade 
Runner (1982) portraying 2019 Los Angeles as a dystopian city,853 or The Terminator (1984) 
predicting humanity’s destruction in the late 1990s by an AI program named Skynet.854 And yet, 
LA and humanity remain intact, safe from AI’s worst nightmares. This is not to suggest that the 
societal issues raised in those films are trivial and worth little consideration. Instead, I wish to 
emphasize that we tend to oversimplify or dramatize our legal and social predictions. Given the 
anticipated technological changes on the horizon, I argue that it is neither doctrinally correct nor 
normatively desirable to use our current IP legal framework to anticipate the expected 
developments; new and innovative thinking must be developed and advanced. 
The goal of this chapter is twofold: first, discussing and exploring if one or more legal 
theories can recognize AI creations; second, returning to the theoretical discussion and considering 
if legal assumptions can adapt to recognize AI authorship or inventorship. The preliminary 
considerations discussed in the previous parts about AI personhood rights will remain 
                                                          
852 Guadamuz, for example, opined that “[c]opyright law clearly defines the author of a work as ‘the person who 
created it’. Despite some recent legal disputes regarding monkeys and photographs, it is highly unlikely that we will 
witness any deviation away from personhood as a requirement for ownership, and we are not to witness any sort of 
allocation of rights towards machines and animals.” See Guadamuz, supra note 422 at 173. Professor Alexandra 
George shared similar view in a recent conference in Singapore, online: <future-of-law-conference.com>. 
853 See “Blade Runner – Opening Titles (HQ)” (17 July 2012), online (video): YouTube <youtube.com/watch?v=-
fu7jN2_2pE>.  
854 See “The Terminator (1984) Official Trailer - Arnold Schwarzenegge Movie” (25 August 2016), online (video): 
YouTube <youtube.com/watch?v=k64P4l2Wmeg>.  
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unchallenged. This debate assumes that we can allocate legal rights to AI, at least theoretically. 
And it starts by looking at the existing regime and seeing how to best distribute a limited bundle 
of rights to AI in the current state of technological progress with an eye towards what may come. 
To start, the current IP regime should accommodate and anticipate the ongoing variable 
needs that various evolving levels of technology require. Right now – and for the next five to ten 
years – AI is unlikely to evolve to the point of exhibiting semi-human capabilities, even though it 
may eventually. We are more inclined in the near future to witness developments in computer-
generated works: automated works created with minimal or no human involvement.  
During this stage, the IP regime should change, adapt, exempt – or all three – to recognize 
and protect non-human creations, albeit within its existing framework and mechanisms.855 
Acknowledging the importance of strong user rights and the public domain, increasing IP 
protection is crucial for this stage of development. As Abbott highlights, the current IP regime is 
not serving the purpose it was designed for, and technological developments, especially with 
patents, will exacerbate IP’s loss of theoretical identity. 
Second, once independent AI creations develop over the next few decades, and as the 
human effect on AI output weakens, IP justifications will have to change and adapt too. When that 
occurs, AI’s IP rights – which would be hypothetically recognized by this time – can be catered to 
by allocating specific rights to AI as the technological climate demands. The moral rights approach 
is but one conceivable way of doing this. Another is changing the IP regime to distinguish instead 
between humans and non-humans (as opposed to between humans and AI) for creations and 
inventions. I intend to explore several other alternatives like those incorporating doctrines of joint 
                                                          
855 Abbott, supra note 656. 
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authorship, derivative works, and work made for hire; at the outset, however, I find them less than 
convincing. 
Solum notes the different ways that IP scholars tried to address earlier technological 
developments, like peer-to-peer file sharing.856 Posner and Landes857 “propose indefinitely 
renewable copyrights.”858 Netanel and Fisher support legalize file-sharing,859 and suggest 
“replac[ing] the lost revenues with a tax on hardware and internet service.”860 To address issues 
with copyright duration extension, Joseph Liu suggests considering time as a factor in fair use and 
fair dealing analyses.861 In several papers, Lemley challenges IP justifications generally in a digital 
world that facilitates free duplication of IP-protected goods.862  
These scholarly considerations demonstrate the need to re-evaluate the shape and scope of 
IP laws. What follows is a return to the IP justifications described at the outset of this part in 
chapter II.B, explored under the lens of AI-IP rights.  
                                                          
856 Solum, The Future of Copyright, supra note 812 at 1138. 
857 William M Landes & Richard A Posner, “Indefinitely Renewable Copyright” (2003) 70 U Chicago L Rev 471; 
Posner & Landes, The Economic Structure of IP, supra note 416. 
858 Solum, The Future of Copyright, supra note 812. 
859 Neil W Netanel, “Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing” (2003) 17 Harv JL 
& Tech 1; William W Fisher III, Promises to Keep: Technology, Law and the Future of Entertainment (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004) [Fisher, Promises to Keep]. 
860 Solum, The Future of Copyright, supra note 812. 
861 Joseph P Liu, “Copyright and Time: A Proposal” (2002) 101 Mich L Rev 409. 
862 Mark A Lemley, “Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property” (2004) 71 U Chicago L Rev 129 
at 132; Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, supra note 27. See also Barthes, supra note 531. 
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2.4.1 The Utilitarian Approach Justifies AI-IP Rights 
IP under the utilitarian theory promotes innovation and intellectual productivity for society’s 
“greater good.” As such, allocating legal rights for AI adheres to Bentham’s consequentialist 
reasoning if computer authorship is sufficiently incentivized to produce more innovation and 
intellectual output. Yet, computers are unrecognized by patents and copyright laws as inventors 
and authors, so AI inventions and works – no matter what value they produce for humankind – are 
not patented or copyrighted unless they are “directly influenced by humans authors [or 
inventors].”863 This approach creates barriers “to inventorship for computers as well as people”,864 
and goes against the utilitarian theory principles. 
I argue that there is no legal justification to attribute patents or authorship to inventors or 
computer programmers who did not influence the production of the invention or creation. As 
Abbott further offers, “If a computer scientist creates an AI to autonomously develop useful 
information and the AI creates a patentable result in an area not foreseen by the inventor, there 
would be no reason for the scientist to qualify as an inventor on the AI’s result.”865 Yanisky-Ravid 
echoes Abbott’s argument: “[T]he creativity of an AI system is not a result of the creativity of the 
programmers; at the very least, the causal relationship is not close enough to justify ownership … 
in the new works generated by AI machines. The human programmer is only ancillary to the 
creation of the artworks.”866  
If a computer programmer created an AI for one specific purpose and the AI created an 
original work tangential or unrelated to that purpose, where is the justification to allocate the 
                                                          
863 Hristov, supra note 422 at 436. See also Guadamuz, supra note 422. 
864 Abbott, supra note 656 at 1093. 
865 Ibid at 1095. 
866 Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 236 at 701. 
168 
 
programmer authorship rights? One might argue, under utilitarianism, that incentivizing more 
programmers to design AI programs will improve the odds that those programs produce useful 
creations, which in turn maximizes human benefit. This might be false logic, as explained through 
the following example of the innovative way machine learning is developing isolated from human 
intervention: the March 2016 Alpha Go match, in which a famous computer program defeated one 
of the top world Go players, Lee Sedol.867 Not only did AlphaGo win, but it won in such an 
unpredictable fashion; AlphaGo’s move 37 left the human players and programmers speechless.868  
As AI advances, we should expect more creativity from AI programs, and as a result, more 
unpredictability. If computer programs create useful works and inventions at a greater but 
unpredictable rate, then it follows that we should not develop a legal system that discourages (or 
at least, fails to encourage) computer programs to be less creative and original by design.869  
 From a utilitarian perspective, promoting computer inventorship is desirable and should 
justify the rewards of IP protection. First, “the financial motivation it will provide to build creative 
computers is likely to result in a net increase in the number of patentable inventions produced.”870 
In our current stage of development, the need for human involvement is artificial; in fact, humans 
influence few inventions at all. Amending patent laws to recognize computers as patent-eligible 
could motivate the scientific community to develop more programs that automatically produce 
inventions without worrying about the human inventor criterion. In many ways, this shift is not 
                                                          
867 See also Part I, footnote 148. 
868 Cade Metz, “In Two Moves, Alphago and Lee Sedol Redefined the Future” (16 March 2016), online: Wired 
<wired.com/2016/03/two-moves-alphago-lee-sedol-redefined-future>. Move 37 is explained in the article: “With the 
37th move in the match’s second game, AlphaGo landed a surprise on the right-hand side of the 19-by-19 board that 
flummoxed even the world’s best Go players, including Lee Sedol. ‘That’s a very strange move,’ said one 
commentator, himself a nine dan Go player, the highest rank there is. ‘I thought it was a mistake,’ said the other. Lee 
Sedol, after leaving the match room, took nearly fifteen minutes to formulate a response.” 
869 See the text around footnote 647. 
870 Abbott, supra note 656 at 1108. 
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“revolutionary”: it is only technical and just and could be designed in a way that leaves economic 
benefit to scientists or programmers as a transitional measure to maintain incentives to develop.871 
I share Abbott’s conclusion that “courts and policy makers should be guided first and 
foremost by the explicit constitutional [i.e., incentive based] rationale for granting patents.”872 
And, “allowing patents [and copyright protection] on computational inventions as well as 
computer inventors would do away with what is essentially a legal fiction – the idea that only a 
human can be the inventor of the autonomous output of a creative computer – resulting in fairer 
and more effective incentives.”873 Humanity should be willing to accept a certain level of AI 
personhood. 
In copyright law, immense value exists in AI-Authorship and “without an established 
period of protection, there is no tangible incentive for developers of AI machines to continue 
creating, using, and improving their capabilities.”874 Several justifications exist for AI authorship 
in both the current stage of development and the future. And as with patents, our current 
developmental stage demands we extend legal protection to computer-generated works.  
The next stage of AI development adds further concerns. Solum contends that the utilitarian 
idea of the “good life” is defined as maximizing pleasures and minimizing pain. Thus, the question 
is if AI can have interests, which equates with the question of whether AI can have or demonstrate 
                                                          
871 I agree that, in the current climate, scientists and computer programmers should retain economic rights from the 
computer’s invention. 
872 Abbott, supra note 656 at 1108. 
873 Ibid. 
874 Hristov, supra note 423 at 438. Hristov further provides: “Simply put, even if programmers and the companies for 
which they work have invested a substantial amount of time and money into the creation of AI machines, for the most 
part, they would not be able to enjoy copyright protection or the financial benefits associated with it. This trend could 
ultimately limit innovation by dissuading developers and companies from investing in AI research, resulting not only 
in the decline of AI but also in the decline of innovation across a number of related sectors.” 
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feelings.875 If one, however, takes a more objective and public perspective on interests – as John 
Finnis does876 – the question is whether an AI can flourish by including goods such as “life, 
knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion.”877 
Solum argues that despite AI’s lack of a biological “life”, it may still lay claim to a life that 
experience goods like knowledge, play, friendship, practical reasonableness, and perhaps even 
religious.878 Finnis does not rule out such “life” from non-humans. But if we take Finnis’s theory 
too literally (i.e., good lives include athletic competition, good food, parenting, children, etc.) this 
raises a theoretical wall since AI, at least as we can perceive it today, might not have Finnis’s 
“good life”.879 I concur with Solum that “AIs might claim that they do have interests and goods, 
but that the good for an AI is quite different than it is for humans.”880  
A good argument could be made for creating a new model for AI-IP under utilitarianism. 
We can challenge the “only humans deserve authorship” argument by countering that AI 
                                                          
875 As I have indicated in the previous chapter, it seems plausible that AI will be able to “lie” making humans believe 
that they have feeling. 
876 John Finnis explains “life” as follows: “The term ‘life’ here signifies every aspect of the vitality … which puts a 
human being in good shape for self-determination. Hence, life here includes bodily (including cerebral) health, and 
freedom from the pain that betokens organic malfunctioning or injury.” Joh Finnis, Natural Law & Natural Rights, 
2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 86. Obviously, there is an argument to be made here against the 
manipulation of Finnis’s theory for AI. True, Finnis clearly centered his philosophical basis on human and humanity. 
However, what if the concept of “life” as Finnis defines it can be attenuated to non-human creation that can express 
“life”? 
877 Solum, supra note 236 at 1272. Finnis, ibid at 155, further develop his ideas: “For there is a ‘common good’ for 
human beings, inasmuch as life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, religion, and freedom in practical 
reasonableness are good for any and every person. And each of these human values is itself a ‘common good’ inasmuch 
as it can be participated in by an inexhaustible number of persons in an inexhaustible variety of ways or on an 
inexhaustible variety of occasions. These two senses of ‘common good’ are to be distinguished from a third, from 
which, however, they are not radically separate. This third sense of ‘common good’ is the one commonly intended 
throughout this book, and it is: a set of conditions which enables the members of a community to attain for themselves 
reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which they have reason to 
collaborate with each other (positively and/or negatively) in a community.”  
878 AI and religion is explored in the reboot of Battlestar Galactica 2004 TV series. See Wikipedia, “Battlestar 
Galactica (2004 TV series)” (last edited 30 September 2018), online: 
<en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battlestar_Galactica_(2004_TV_series)>.  
879 I did mention several science fiction movies or TV series which show AIs experiences good food and relationships 
and thus might have Finnis’s good life. However, those examples are fictional, and in the scientific community, there 
is no support for Finnis’s vision. 
880 Solum, supra note 236 at 1272. 
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authorship and inventorship can serve society better. The lingering question concerns the right 
structure of this new AI-IP theory. And to face that question requires addressing incentive doctrine. 
Incentive doctrine is based on the notion that “individuals will not invest in inventions or creation 
unless the expected return from doing so exceeds the cost of doing so.”881 Granting exclusive rights 
to authors or inventors imposes social costs on the public that can only be justified “to the extent 
that they do on balance encourage enough creation and dissemination of new works to offset those 
costs.”882 
In the AI era, incentive theory might lose its substantive grip because computers cannot be 
incentivized since they are already programmed to create.883 This claim might be false; if we expect 
AI to possess human qualities, we can expect that AI will share similarities to human behaviour, 
given that “both robots and AI agents create problems for law because one cannot always predict 
what they will do when they interact with their environment.”884 Further, as Yanisky-Ravid 
suggests, assuming that there would be no real need to incentivise AI to create – an assumption I 
am not willing to make yet – and that AI would be able to produce good works, the “existing 
balance would be thrown off”, since “there wouldn’t be any risk of a lack of artistic creation even 
                                                          
881 Mark Lemley, Peter Menell & Robert P Merges, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age, 5th ed (Aspen 
Publishers, 2010) at 12. Abbott, supra note 656 at 1096, further explains the rooted basis for the incentive theory: 
“Congress is empowered to grant patents on the basis of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution … It also 
provides an explicit rationale for granting patent and copyright protection, namely to encourage innovation under an 
incentive theory. The theory goes that people will be more inclined to invent things (i.e., promote the progress of 
science) if they can receive government-sanctioned monopolies (i.e., patents) to exploit commercial embodiments of 
their inventions. Having the exclusive right to sell an invention can be tremendously lucrative.” See also Garrett 
Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Common” (1968) 162: 3859 Science 1243. 
882 Lemley, Menell & Merges, ibid at 14. This perception is well established in the US law and economy approach, as 
I have discussed in earlier parts. We should, however, be reminded that copyright is not the only legal mechanism that 
govern dissemination of art. Contract law can allocate copyright to other entities, see e.g. Pamela Samuelson, 
“Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities” (2003) 66 Law & Contemp Probs 147; Yanisky-
Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 236. 
883 This notion was shared by Yanisky-Ravid and Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu, stating in a recent paper that “autonomous 
machines do not need any incentive - that incentive is relevant only to people and entities until machines, robots and 
AI systems start producing […].” See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 293 at 2239. 
884 Balkin, supra note 11 at 51. 
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if copyright law did not exist to protect such creations. Such a reality could, furthermore, pose an 
existential threat to the entire copyright regime.”885 It is more likely, however, that machine 
creations in the coming decade would not rise to human expectation and quality, making human 
creations even more valuable, an outcome which might result in creating two (or more) markets: 
high human art and low machine (IKEA) art. This future requires a stronger copyright regime. 
From an AI-IP rights perspective, even in this future, there is a real need to copyright AI creations 
from a policy standpoint. Given the importance of preserving human art – i.e., incentivize human 
creators – denying AI works protection would result in free access to AI works, which would make 
competition conditions for human creations harder. 
 Moreover, incentive theory may be irrelevant in the future both for humans and non-
humans. As Lemley stated rhetorically: “Why are people creating so much content without the 
incentive of IP rights? And why hasn’t the sky fallen on the content industries?”886 Additional 
studies have claimed that “[p]sychological and sociological concepts can do more to explain 
creative impulses than classical economics. As a result, a copyright law that treats creativity as a 
product of economic incentives can miss the mark and harm what it aims to promote.”887 Clearly, 
the Internet era brought new and different variables into play. Although they might not be relevant 
to AI as non-humans, the AI era may herald similarly divergent variables that would change, 
diminish, or extinguish the existing incentive theory. 
                                                          
885 Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 236 at 703. Indeed, as Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 
at 2, recently argue, “The digital era exacerbates the anxiety of authorship, as ‘artificial intelligence’ supposedly 
supplants human artists, writers and composers in generating visual, literary and musical outputs indistinguishable 
from human-produced endeavours.” 
886 Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, supra note 27 at 487. 
887 Tushnet, Economies of Desire, supra note 414 at 515; Silbey, The Eureka Myth, supra note 414. 
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2.4.2 Does a Lockean Basis Exist for AI-IP Theory? 
Several indications can be found in Locke’s theory in support of allocating rights to AI. This 
discussion testifies to the Lockean theory’s validity and strength, which is still a vital player in the 
development of IP laws, a position that should continue for the next decades. 
At first blush, Lockean theory seems not to recognize AI rights. Lockean theory 
acknowledges a person’s right in the fruit of his/her labour, as one of Locke’s core arguments is 
that “a person who labors upon resources that are either unowned or ‘held in common’ has a natural 
property right to the fruits of his or her efforts.”888 AI and all its subsequent creations are the 
product of a person’s labour in coding or manufacturing that AI, so Locke might consider all of 
those fruits as belonging to the programmer. In a world in which “there is enough and as good left 
in common for others”,889 there is no basis to restrict programmers from their just right in their AI 
fruits.890 
Now, even under the assumption that Lockean theory generally accepts a programmer’s 
right to his/her AI’s independently created works, causation becomes more remote and the 
programmer’s unjust enrichment increases as the connection between that programmer and the 
AI’s output distances. Thus, even according to the Lockean theory, the programmer should be 
allowed limited or none of the fruits of the AI’s labour.891 Yanisky-Ravid echoes this conclusion 
in stating that “when a creator is a machine, robot, or AI system, the personality theory and the 
labor theory are irrelevant.” In her view, “we do not need to recognize a programmer for an artistic 
                                                          
888 Fisher, supra note 407 at 170.  
889 Locke, supra note 258 at 134. 
890 Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 293 at 2242 adopt Locke’s theory “only to the extent of arguing that inventors 
should be awarded for the fruits of their labor.” 
891 Nozick, supra note 477 at 178-182. 
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accomplishment that is not his or her own.”892 In a more recent paper, Yanisky-Ravid and Liu 
clarify that “proper application of Locke’s labor theory” depends on the definition of the “fruits” 
that could result from the contribution of each player in the creation process.893 Accordingly, they 
explain, “Locke’s labor theory calls for compensating those players, including the programmers, 
with a portion of the profits from the subsequent inventions created by the AI, in light of the 
programmers’ and other players’ contributions.”894 Yanisky-Ravid based these ideas on her 
multiplayer-model and the assumption that AI could not and should not be entitled to IP rights. I 
do not share those assumptions as I have explained in earlier parts and as I will further develop.  
We might be able to derive further insights from Locke’s manifesto, On Parental Power,895 
which seems to reflect Locke’s opinion on the moral right of parents to their children’s creations.896 
Locke emphasized the preservation of the natural right stating that parent’s rights are limited by 
nature and that even if a father has a right to “enacting penalties on his children … he has no 
dominion over the property or actions of his son.”897 This puts it mildly since Lockean theory lacks 
any justification supporting a child’s obligation to provide his/her parent with property or 
economic rights indefinitely. 
Locke’s philosophy is rooted in the concept that people are free and consent is required to 
                                                          
892 Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 236 at 707. Yanisky-Ravid offers an alternative model – AI 
work made for hire – which I shall address in Part III. 
893 Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 293 at 2242: “The division of profits among the various players – the AI 
programmers, trainers, owners and operators – should reflect their respective contributions to the development of the 
inventions created by the AI.” 
894 Ibid. 
895 Locke, supra note 258 at chapter VI.  
896 I concede that it is not identical to the programmer-AI relationship, but it is similar enough to extract some 
analogous philosophical reasoning. Locke was not the only philosopher to discuss the relation between parents and 
children. See also John Stewart Mill, On Liberty (Ticknor and Fields, 1863). 
897 [Emphasis added]. Locke, supra note 258 at 157. And yet ironically Lockean theory is so often exploited to support 
lengthy postmortem copyright duration, even though children should have no justifiable reason to benefit from IP 
fruits of their parents’ labour. See Jordan Fine, “Negotiating With Ghosts: The Arbitrariness of Copyright Terms” 
(2017) 29 IPJ 333. 
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exercise political authority on another individual.898 Children, however, are not full citizens so 
they cannot consent to governmental political authority, as Nozick suggested.899 Scholars have 
argued that Locke’s theory supports a view that natural parents own their child since the child is 
the product of the parent’s labour.900 Hettinger remarks that “[i]f property rights in the very things 
created were always an appropriate reward for labor … parents would deserve property rights in 
their children.”901 Nozick argues that Locke failed to distinguish between children as the product 
of labour and any other product of labour. For Nozick, this lacuna in Locke’s theory nullifies the 
very essence of Locke’s theory:902 
“If the point is that people cannot own their children because they themselves are owned 
and so incapable of ownership, this would apply to owning everything else they make as 
well. If the point is that God … is the maker of a child, this applies to many other things 
that Locke thinks can be owned [...].”  
For Locke, however, children do not lack all rights perpetually; parents serve only as temporary 
guardians over their children’s rights, so certain parental power over children is warranted, but 
temporary. Locke began his manifesto on paternal power by echoing his initial statement that “all 
                                                          
898 Locke, supra note 258 at 122: “A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one 
having more than another; there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, 
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one 
amongst another without subordination or subjection; unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest 
declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him by an evident and clear appointment an undoubted 
right to dominion and sovereignty.” 
899 Nozick, supra note 477 at 287. Nozick rejects Locke’s idea that a child’s consent to parental power provides an 
intriguing allegory (that might have written today to describe the relation children have with social media): “Some 
members of the Board maintain that by accepting the benefits of growing up under the wing of the corporation and by 
remaining in its area of influence, the youngsters have already tacitly consented to be shareheld [...].” Putting it mildly, 
Nozick strongly opposes this suggestion by claiming that “tacit consent isn’t worth the paper it’s not written on […].” 
900 Locke, supra note 258 at 134: “[E]very man has a property in his own person … The labour of his body and the 
work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided 
and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
property.” [Emphasis added]. Parental labour as reflected by the education and means that parents provide to a child, 
and not only by their biological connection (conceiving the child and giving birth). 
901 Hettinger, supra note 407 at 41. 
902 Nozick, supra note 477 at 288.  
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men by nature are equal.”903 As developed by other legal philosophers, equality is not absolute, 
and “[c]hildren … are not born in this state of equality” and “[t]heir parents have a sort of rule and 
jurisdiction over them when they come into the world, and for some time after, but it is but a 
temporary one … age and reason, as they grow up, loosen them, till at length they drop quite off 
and leave a man at his own free disposal.”904 Equality is indeed a natural law given to all men and 
women but, as Locke suggested, it depends on “age and reason”. As I have contended, reason is a 
prerequisite for any AI – let alone IP – right.905 
Locke also explains that the law “in its true notion, is not so much the limitation as the 
direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no farther than is for 
the general good of those under that law.”906 The law, according to Locke, is an instrument for 
happiness and freedom for the intelligent agent:907 
“Could they be happier without it, the law, as a useless thing, would of itself vanish; and 
that ill deserves the name of confinement which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices. 
So that, however it may be mistaken, the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to 
preserve and enlarge freedom; for in all the states of created beings capable of laws, where 
there is no law, there is no freedom.”  
Locke’s choice to use broad terms like “intelligent agents” and “created beings” when emphasizing 
the law’s crucial role in fostering freedom, suggests that such freedom is not reserved merely for 
humans. After all, AI could easily fit plain language definitions of “created being” and “intelligent 
                                                          
903 Locke, supra note 258 at 147. 
904 [Emphasis added]. Ibid. 
905 It should be noted, however, that in the past decades, children’s rights were recognized (and extended) in the US 
and other jurisdictions. See e.g. Ursula Kilkelly & Laura Lundy, eds, Children’s Rights (New York: Routledge, 2017); 
Mary Ann Mason, From Father’s Property to Children's Rights: The History of Child Custody in the United States 
(Columbia University Press, 1996). 
906 [Emphasis added]. Locke, supra note 258 at 148. 
907 [Emphasis added]. Ibid.  
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agent”, so according to Locke, AIs deserve to express freedom.  
In drawing similarities between justifications underlying parent-child and programmer-AI 
relationships, we should also accept Locke’s position limiting a creator’s (parent’s or 
programmer’s) rights on two conditions: (1) time – the rights are not indefinite; and (2) reason and 
intelligence as a prerequisite to establish independence. First, parental power over their children is 
limited until the moment in which “reason shall take its place and ease them [the parents] of that 
trouble [of taking care of their children].”908 Also, Locke differentiates between the parent and the 
child in stating that “he that understands for him must will for him too; he must prescribe to his 
will and regulate his actions; but when he comes to the estate that made his father a freeman, the 
son is a freeman too.”909 Second, reason and intelligence serve as an important criterion for legal 
rights in Locke’s view:910 
“The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting according to his own will, is grounded on 
his having reason which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, and 
make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will.”  
In conclusion, Lockean theory provides several justifications for AI-IP. Locke’s views on parent-
child relationship, equality, freedom, and liberty rights to intelligent agents all serve as justification 
for AI-IP theory. 
2.4.3 The Personhood Dilemma 
Hegel’s philosophy could advocate for AI’s legal standing as part of accepting its personhood and 
autonomy rights. Hegel argues that a bond exists between a man and his property. Depriving the 
                                                          
908 Ibid at 149. 
909 Ibid. 
910 Ibid at 151. 
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person of his property causes discomfort and pain. Accordingly, by proving AI’s attachment to its 
creations, we might assume that AI possesses a semi-human personality. This personhood status 
can be integrated into the Turing Copyright Test.911 
Kantian and Hegelian approaches, however, are based on a creator’s emotional connection 
to the creative work. At AI’s current stage, it seems implausible to assume it holds any emotional 
connection to its created work.912 As Abbott observes, “Creative computers invent because they 
are instructed to invent, and a machine would not be offended by the manner in which its inventions 
were used.”913 Nevertheless, we might assume that future AIs could sustain a level of intelligence 
allowing them to develop a more substantial connection to their creative output. If that is the case, 
the question is whether to develop an AI-IP based model that relies on that personal connection? 
And if so, should we not also consider a programmer’s personal connection to his AI creation’s 
creation? The personhood theory might support a programmer’s rights to his AI’s creations even 
when the AI itself can also develop a real connection to its creation. 
 Several conclusions can be drawn from Fisher and Radin’s arguments as outlined earlier 
in this part.914 First, AI-IP theory should adopt Fisher’s suggestion to differentiate between 
different expression levels in IP, from highly expressive and innovative creations to low expressive 
creations. Post-differentiation, AI-IP theory should allocate various levels of protection across this 
spectrum of expressiveness. Parchomovsky and Stein support this approach in their paper, which 
                                                          
911 Turing invented the “imitation game”, the name he gave to his AI test. See Turing, supra note 44. Turing argued 
for the possibility of computer programs ascending the human intelligence. Turing aspired to “test whether the artifact 
was indistinguishable from a person with regard to what he took to be pertinent property, verbal behavior.” [Emphasis 
in original]. The Turing Test seeks to evaluate whether a machine is able to exhibit intelligent behaviour. The 
Copyright Turing Test will assess AI creativity. If the AI passes the test, we might as well claim that the AI deserves 
to be recognized as the author.  
912 Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 293 at 2242 at 2243: “Consequently, an AI system cannot be entitled to patent 
rights to its creations and inventions because personality is exclusively attributed to human beings.” 
913 Abbott, supra note 656 at 1107. 
914 See part II.B(3).  
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also considers allocation across originality spectrum.915 
In essence, there is no reason to monopolize creations or innovation that lack real value. 
Though defining levels of creative and innovative expression may be difficult and highly 
subjective in practice, it can be emphasized theoretically that some works and inventions are more 
original and innovative than others. This approach would subsequently increase the public domain 
and reward only works able to prove a level of investment truly deserving IP protection. 
A range-based IP protection regime would need to be adapted to accommodate computer-
generated and AI works. For example, as computer programs advance along with their ability to 
create genuine and innovative creations, so the validity of the justification to award creativity and 
originality with a higher level of protection is correspondingly strengthened. Beyond 
Parchomovsky and Stein proposal, I suggest that when computer-programs and AIs produce highly 
creative works or innovative inventions unexpected by the original programmer’s intent, such 
unexpectedness (or non-obviousness in patents) can indicate independent creation by the computer 
program or AI. Simply put: When an AI creates an independent work or invention, IP should not 
be awarded to the programmer or the owner of the program.916 
Several of Radin’s four conceptions of a person might also be well suited for AI. For 
example, one element in Radin’s conception of a person is his ability to think – his intelligence, 
having self-awareness, and memory. Under this conception, for an AI to deserve all rights, it must 
demonstrate the ability to think, remember, to be self-aware, and this may never occur or be 
                                                          
915 Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 427 at 1507-8 introduce three mechanisms to change the level of protection in 
copyright. First, the doctrine of equivalents, which “designed to afford the maximum degree of protection to 
exceptionally original works”; Second, the added value doctrine “will govern infringement actions involving works 
of standard or average originality … compare the relative originality of the plaintiff’s work with that of the defendant”; 
Third, the sameness rule “will regulate copyright conflicts that involve minimally original or nonoriginal works. The 
rule will create a rebuttable presumption of copying when an allegedly infringing work containing minimal originality 
is substantively similar to the plaintiff’s work.” 
916 I address the questions of AI authorship and ownership in Part III. 
180 
 
provable. Even then, it may be permissible to grant AI certain rights, without recognizing the full 
capacity of a human’s rights – or better yet, reserving those rights until such intelligence is proven. 
It is important to note that a “person” need not necessarily mean a “human being”; “[i]n Roman 
law, persona came to mean simply an entity possessing legal rights and duties … for philosophers 
the nature of a person has never been reduced to a generally accepted theory.”917 
2.4.4 Social Planning Theory 
Social planning theory is centred around the idea that IP rights should promote social good. As I 
have expressed earlier, IP rights do not currently optimally maximize social good. And, as Abbott 
suggests, allocating IP rights to AI may help since AI could develop new technologies that will 
eventually benefit humanity. The mere possibility that computer-generated works can be produced 
without human interference means that scientists and researchers could devote their work toward 
developing the most efficient socially-beneficial programs without concern about patenting that 
output. 
I argue that no reason exists in our current stage of computer programming and AI to limit 
patents, for example, only for inventions directly influenced by humans. This approach serves 
social planning theory to the letter. True, “AI could develop immoral new technologies”,918 but so 
could humans. Further, I do not endorse granting patents automatically without any human 
supervision or regulation. These risks could be avoided by other means. 
 Social planning supports AI rights even in future stages of development (i.e., when AI 
becomes capable of expressing semi-human behaviour) if these rights benefit humanity. First, 
                                                          
917 Radin, supra note 492 at 39. John Rawls developed the concept of a person in a way which might include an AI. 
Rawls distinguished between three conceptions of a person in his paper on Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory. 
See John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” (1980) 77 J Phil 515 at 533-535. 
918 Abbott, supra note 656 at 1107. 
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social planning theory opposes lengthy IP rights. Allocating AI rights to the public domain, while 
reserving its economic rights for the prosperity of the public and allocating its moral rights to the 
AI itself, will maximize creations or inventions available for public enjoyment. 
This allocation model is not immune from criticism. First, we might promote two distinct 
levels of IP rights: for humans – which will remain practically the same; and for non-humans – 
which will be designed to benefit humans (allocating rights to AI means, in practice, providing the 
public with more access to creations). AI creations might prove more attractive for humans; thus 
human creations (authors and inventors) will trend toward obsolescence, a remnant of the past.  
From a social perspective, it is hard to foresee whether this might be good or bad. Perhaps 
it is part of the natural evolution, much like changes in music preferences throughout history. On 
the other hand, perhaps as a consequence, human creations would become more valuable compared 
to “artificial” but easily accessible AI creations. 
Second, AI rights promote democratic values and culture. Netanel’s approach rejects recent 
endorsements of extensive IP protection (e.g., for 3D printing) and supports instead promoting AI 
applications for personal users. There is no justifiable reason to limit or restrict technology that 
can benefit humanity, and that includes AI. As Fisher, Zemer, and Netanel might concede, limiting 
protection over AI creations forces inventors and creators to follow certain rules to patent, which 
in turn hinders AI development and potential. Increasing the size of the public domain available 
for inventions or works to be integrated into AI capabilities is preferable. 
Several concerns exist regarding data availability or privatization in the future. It is vital to 
consider the theoretical implications on data as the building block of machine learning and AI 
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programs.919 Social planning theory likely opposes any privatization of data. Any limitation on 
data usage (in which IP has a crucial role) also limits research in machine learning (and 
subsequently AI). Under a socialist theory, 920 the public – via the state – owned the capital. Since 
data could also be considered as a form of capital, socialist thinking would promote public 
ownership of data. 
The question remains whether it is optimal for the government to control our data? The 
notion raises concerns, especially regarding privacy risks and censorship. The alternative, 
however, in which most of our data is held restriction- and supervision-free by corporations is 
equally problematic. A third scenario is probably best, in which the government establishes 
agencies and regulators to provide a “data safe environment”. 
2.4.5 Moral rights: An Alternative Approach for AI Rights? 
Moral rights doctrine may offer an alternative route to developing AI-IP justifications. If we accept 
the assumption that AI can be regarded as a person under certain conditions, we should consider 
granting AIs a minimal standard of moral rights over its creations (like the rights of attribution or 
withdrawal).921 This would act as a compromise: we allocate moral rights for non-human AI 
creators – recognizing the bond between the AI and its creations – while also reserving economic 
rights allocation for human creators. Despite numerous popular objections (even for human 
creators),922 moral rights present an appealing IP pathway to protect AI creations. 
                                                          
919 Big Data poses significant concerns. See Canada Competition Bureau, supra note 204. 
920 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production, Friedrich Engels, ed (New York: Appleton & 
Company, 1889) 365 (Marx addressed the impact the technology might have on humanity in the IV part of his manifest 
on Capital). See also Nick Dyer-Witheford, Cyber-Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High-technology 
Capitalism (University of Illinois Press, 1999). 
921 In an era where we can expect many works to become intangible, enforcement would become a challenge. 
However, as Sundara Rajan explains, “the fact that rights are difficult to enforce does not necessarily mean that they 
should be dispensed with.” Sundara Rajan, supra note 552 at 6. 
922 As Sundara Rajan, supra note 552 at 16, explains: “The power of moral rights can create a sense of uneasiness. It 
leads to the question of whether mechanisms exist to limit the possibility of negative effects on industry or, indeed, 
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While, commercially speaking, AI lacks the need or desire for financial gain, we may all 
benefit from granting AI moral rights recognition. First, by adhering to common and 
internationally accepted copyright practices there would be no need to allocate any effective legal 
rights to AI. Second, moral rights can be applied in a way that distinguishes between AI, human 
(and any AI-human hybrid) creations. Thus, promoting quality assurance by preventing 
exploitation, alteration, or manipulation of AI works.  
I acknowledge one challenge, as the distinction between allocating integrity rights to AI – 
as reasoned immediately – and attribution rights is perhaps harder to justify. Indeed, at the current 
stage of its development, AI does not possess elements such as honour or reputation to prejudice. 
However, in the future AI might be able to express these elements.  
We can grant AI a limited scope of rights (like the rights of attribution and integrity) which 
serves the purpose – as Sundara Rajan suggests – of distinguishing between AI and human 
creations. By doing so, the public can gain full access to AI creations (protected under moral, not 
economic rights) while their economic rights are managed by a governmental or an international 
organization which can reinvest AI’s earnings into education, health, and other causes for human 
benefit (similar to Norway’s oil profits model).923  
                                                          
culture.” Furthermore, from an economic perspective, moral rights “may inhibit the exploitation of creative works … 
by bringing uncertainty to the process of using, editing, modifying, or interpreting works, discouraging the growth of 
both industry and art around the existing wealth of human culture.” Ibid at 18. From a public policy perspective, moral 
rights may inhibit “the publication of creative works, while moral rights claims could penalize those who undertake 
to disseminate them.” Ibid. This argument reflects the general claim that copyright, as a whole, is a state monopoly 
that restricts creations from the public domain. In that respect, establishing moral rights is an extension of this 
monopoly and an additional restriction on the public. 
923 The Government Pension Fund of Norway (known as the Oil fund) was established in the 1990s to invest the 
surplus of Norwegian petroleum assets. See Norway, “The Government Pension Fund”, online: 
<regjeringen.no/en/topics/the-economy/the-government-pension-fund/id1441>. 
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This is all to say that once we recognize AI-IP rights, then we can regulate those rights 
through IP law in order to create the right incentives and restrictions to regulate and maximize the 
public pool of knowledge for the benefit of human society.  
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PART III: AI AUTHORSHIP 
‘We are the products of editing, rather than of authorship.’ (George Wald) 
3.1 BUILDING A NEW AI AUTHORSHIP 
For the Bristlecone Snag: 
‘A home transformed by the lightning 
the balanced alcoves smother 
this insatiable earth of a planet, Earth. 
They attacked it with mechanical horns 
because they love you, love, in fire and wind. 
You say, what is the time waiting for in its spring? 
I tell you it is waiting for your branch that flows, 
because you are a sweet-smelling diamond architecture.’ 
that does not know why it grows.’ 
 
You might be fooled into believing this poem was a human creation. You would not be alone; the 
editorial of one of the oldest student literary journals was deceived by Zackary Scholl’s poetry 
generator.924 As my previous parts made clear, core questions arise from computer-generated 
works: Who is its author? Is it copyrightable? If so, who is the owner? Should we devalue art just 
because it is the creation of a machine? What happens in cases like Scholl’s where no human is 
identified as author, and/or the creation is not known to be computer-created? On this last question, 
this example reveals an important truth. People are easily deceived, and even professionals are 
susceptible to confusing human art and artificial/computer-generated art. 
To answer these questions, we must revert to the basic concept of authorship. Suffice to 
say for that example, the author is the programmer, Scholl. He modified a computer program to 
use a context-free grammar system to generate poems. For Scholl’s program, it is easy to 
                                                          
924 Brian Merchant, “The Poem That Passed the Turing Test: They Should Have Sent a Computer” (5 February 2015), 
online: Motherboard <motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vvbxxd/the-poem-that-passed-the-turing-test>. 
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demonstrate and prove his influence on the creative process that eventually produced this poem. 
Scholl is indeed the owner of the program and its output.925  
Innovations in machine-learning and artificial intelligence technology pose many different 
challenges to copyright law.926 Guadamuz described Google’s Deep Dream as an application that 
“mimics human thinking and makes a decision as to how to transform the input based on a pre-
determined algorithm.”927 The novelty of Deep Dream, and its ilk, is that the program itself – not 
the programmer – eventually makes its own artistic decisions about what it should amplify in the 
image. This creates an unpredictable result. The result of the process provides different levels of 
abstraction, producing “new images that do not resemble the originals, but most importantly, they 
are not the result of creative decisions by the programmers, but rather they are produced by the 
program itself.”928  
I propose beginning my revisit to copyright’s core by exploring the seminal question of 
who, or as Michael Foucault asked, what is an author. I begin here, as Andrew Bennett noted, 
because “[t]he history of literary criticism from the earliest times may in fact be said to be 
                                                          
925 See e.g. Apple, supra note 631 at 1249. 
926 Based on biological neural networks, see Marilyn M Nelson & W T Illingworth, A Practical Guide to Neural Nets 
(Addison-Wesley, 1991). 
927 Guadamuz, supra note 422 at 171. Deep Dream is a computer vision program that uses convolutional neural 
networks to enhance image patterns. You can experience Deep Dream capabilities at the Deep Dream Generator, 
online: <deepdreamgenerator.com>. 
928 Ibid at 173. This conclusion, however, is debatable. Reading the researchers (the programmers) description raise 
few questions as to the independence and free will of the program. The researchers describe their input as follows: 
“Instead of exactly prescribing which feature we want the network to amplify, we can also let the network make that 
decision. In this case we simply feed the network an arbitrary image or photo and let the network analyze the picture. 
We then pick a layer and ask the network to enhance whatever it detected. Each layer of the network deals with 
features at a different level of abstraction, so the complexity of features we generate depends on which layer we choose 
to enhance.” Alexander Mordvintsev, “Inceptionism: Going Deeper into Neural Networks” (17 June 2015), online 
(blog): Google Blog <research.googleblog.com/2015/06/inceptionism-going-deeper-into-neural.html>. It seems that 
by picking the layer and feeding the program specific images part of the artistic decision is at the programmer’s choice.  
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organized around conceptions of authorship …” Literary theory, we might say, “is largely a 
question of author theory.”929  
The definition of authorship has been contested for centuries and developed differently 
across jurisdictions. Despite these differences, most jurisdictions exclude animals and computers 
from authorship.930 Historically and globally, creativity’s source was assumed to be solely 
human.931 As a result, and as I explain further below, the world has collectively deemed non-
human creations as inferior and unworthy of legal protection. 
More recently, the concept of authorship has faced waves of criticism and change. 
Christopher May and Susan Sell remind us that authorship (as with other intellectual property 
fields) is also the ongoing struggle to seek control of and exploit valuable knowledge and ideas.932 
Oren Bracha adds that copyright was shaped by interactions between elements still present in AI 
debates such as “technology, economic elements, ideology, existing institutional practices, and 
other social factors.”933 As I argued in previous parts, and further contend below, it is vital to 
understand that humans design all laws – copyright included – so our interactions, expectations, 
and conceptions affect and justify those laws. As with money, human recognition gives laws value. 
There are many options for authorship with AI: the programmer, the user, or the AI itself, 
joint authorship between all three, or perhaps none at all if the work falls into the public domain 
or if AI is disqualified as a rights-bearer. By exploring who an author can or should be for AI 
works, I explore if changes are needed in the normative basis of our legal system – i.e., recognizing 
                                                          
929 Andrew Bennett, The Author (London: Routledge, 2004) at 4. 
930 Vaver, supra note 237 at 115. 
931 Clifford, supra note 803 at 1676. 
932 Chirstopher May & Susan K Sell, Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical History (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2006) at 4: “Long before there was a formal legal definition of intellectual property, there were many 
attempts to control valuable knowledge and information by groups who stood to gain from it exploitation.” 
933 Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: The Intellectual Origins of American Intellectual Property, 1790–1909 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016) at 32. 
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AI as a legal rights-bearer – or if changes in copyright laws are required in order to acknowledge 
new sources of creation. If significant changes are needed for either, I do not concede that they 
must be instantaneous. In our current stage of computer-assisted and computer-generated works, 
our current legal framework might be sufficient.934 All we might need are a few tweaks and 
amendments to that framework to regard any work, whether human-created or not, as 
copyrightable. It may also do with changes aimed at preventing abuse of computer-generated 
works, as I will explain further. 
In Part I, I had outlined the AI debate. In Part II, I had explored ways that IP theories might 
include AI creations and inventions as part of a new IP law regime. Part III builds on the two 
previous parts, as well as follows arguments and ideas that surfaced earlier. First, I will explore 
and challenge our current conceptions of the “author”. I will reflect on some of copyright’s legal 
exceptions and justifications. This discussion correlates with the IP theory discussion I had 
purposely “neglected” in Part II, delving deeper into authorship. Second, I will seek an answer to 
the question posed above: Who (or what) is the author? Third, I will provide a comparative outline 
of two copyright standards – originality and creativity – as developed in several jurisdictions.  
The following sections also aspire to draw preliminary conclusions for a broader concept 
of originality that might benefit human and non-humans alike. 
                                                          
934 James Grimmelman argues that there are no AI authors: “It is possible that some future computer programs could 
qualify as authors. We could well have artificial intelligences that are responsive to incentives, unpredictable enough 
that we can’t simply tell them what to do, and that have attributes of personality that make us willing to regard them 
as copyright owners. But if that day ever comes, it will because we have already made a decision in other areas of life 
and law to treat them as persons, and copyright law will fall in line. But unless those mechanical minds also invent 
workable time travel, their future existence is of no bearing now. The copyright issues we would face on that far off 
day are fundamentally different in kind from those we face today.” James Grimmelman, “There is No Such Thing as 
a Computer-Authored Work- And It’s a Good Thing, Too” (2016) 39 Colum J L & Arts 403 at 414. 
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3.2 UNDERSTANDING (HUMAN) AUTHORSHIP 
3.2.1 Who is an Author?935 
Even though copyright law is relatively new and was not part of the classical world, as a legal 
regime copyright was always susceptive to technological advancements.936 However, it was not 
until the invention of the printing press – allowing the production of affordable copies of books – 
that copyright’s modern legal conception was born.937  
Copyright, “began with ‘authorship’,” while copyright law served as the mechanism to 
“solidify the notion of literary property.”938 Authorship is one of “the more elusive concepts in 
copyright law,”939 and, as Peter Jaszi offers, the “centrality of [the] concept is an uncritically 
accepted notion.”940 SCOTUS described it as the “very ‘premise of copyright law’.”941  
Author rights refer to original works “created by ‘authors’, such as books, plays, music, 
art, and films” that possess some degree of creativity.942 Vaver adds that “[t]he term 
compendiously describes whoever writes a book, letter, or play, as well as every other producer of 
creative works [...].”943  
Our views on authorship within copyright law evolved with rhetoric, as Mark Lemley 
                                                          
935 Alternatively, should I rather ask – “What” is the author as Michel Foucault challenged in his monumental book. 
See Michel Foucault, “What is an Author” in The Foucault Reader, Paul Rabinow, ed (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1984) at 101.  
936 Copinger & Skone James On Copyright, 14th ed by Kevin Garnett, Gillian Davies & Gwilym Harbottle, eds 
(London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999) at 31-32: “Although there is plenty of evidence that Greek and Roman authors 
were greatly concerned to be identified as the author of their work and that their authorship should be recognised.” 
937 Ibid at 31. 
938 Peter Jaszi, “Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of ‘Authorship’” (1991) 1991 Duke LJ 455 at 
466.  
939 Alan R Durham, “The Random Muse: Authorship and Indeterminacy” (2002) 44 Wm & Mary L Rev 569 at 571.  
940 Jaszi, supra note 938 at 471. 
941 Durham, supra note 939. 
942 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 32. Neighbouring rights, in contrast, “refer to ‘works’ created by 
‘entrepreneurs’, such as sound recording, broadcasts, cable programmes, and the typographical format of published 
editions.” 
943 Vaver, supra note 237 at 115. 
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suggests “[t]he rise of property rhetoric in intellectual property cases is closely identified not with 
common-law property rules in general, but with a particular economic view of property rights.” 
This view emphasizes the importance of private ownership as a solution to the economic problem 
known as the tragedy of the commons.944 The basic propertization idea strengthens the individual’s 
perspective of authorship while simultaneously weakening the public domain.945 Indeed, “[t]he 
‘authorship’ concept, with its roots in notions of individual self-proprietorship, provided the 
rationale for thinking of literary productions as personal property with various associated attributes 
including alienability.”946 
The modern author concept developed during the eighteenth century947 as a shift from a 
poetics of imitation to “a valorization of originality”, with the “writer” becoming an “author”.948 
Copyright did not reach its modern form as a “discrete area of law that grants rights in works of 
literature and art” until the mid-nineteenth century.949 In the UK, only after the passage of the 
                                                          
944 See Mark Lemley, “Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property” (1997) 75:4 Tex L Rev 873 at 897 [Lemley, 
Romantic Authorship]. See also D’Agostino, supra note 408 at 51: “The author was a proprietor inherently deserving 
if the fruits of the fruits of his labor. The author as owner of ideas was likened to an owner of property threatened by 
trespassers on his land. The literary work began to be seen as a ‘form of estate’.” 
945 Lemley, Romantic Authorship, ibid at 902: “What is going on here is not the product of some eighteenth-century 
vision of authorship with unfortunate consequences. Rather, it is a wholesale attack on the public domain in intellectual 
property law. The attack does not simply consist of multiple efforts to whittle away the scope of that domain for the 
benefit of those who get to own pieces of it, though that is certainly part of it. Rather, the attack is more fundamentally 
a challenge to the very idea of the public domain as an intrinsic part of intellectual property law. Now, I happen to 
think that the ‘propertization’ of intellectual property is a very bad idea.” 
946 Jaszi, supra note 938 at 472. Zemer argues that traditional proprietarianism emphasizes “that every theory relates 
in one way or another to the bundle of rights associated with the right to traditional tangible property – the right to 
use, the right to exclude others from use and possession, and the right to transfer the owned object as a gift, by sale or 
bequest – and with traditional principles of trespass and encroachment into one’s private dominion.” See Zemer, On 
the Value of Copyright Theory, supra note 418 at 67. 
947 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, copyright law “served to control the printing and distribution of 
books rather than to protect author’s rights. Until the eighteenth century, in England, this form of protection took to 
form of privilege or a monopoly granted by the Crown to certain printers.” See D’Agostino, supra note 408 at 42. See 
also Jaszi, supra note 938 at 468-471; Jane Ginsburg, “The Role of Authorship in Copyright” in Ruth L Okediji, ed, 
Copyright Law in an Age of Limitations and Exceptions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 60. 
948 Craig, supra note 489 at 13-14. 
949 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 33. 
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Copyright Act in 1911 was copyright law “rationalized and codified into the type of modern, 
abstract, and forward-looking statute.”950  
In America, James Madison and Charles Pinckney reflected on the “congressional powers 
relating to the encouragement of learning technological innovation.”951 These discussions 
eventually lead to what is known today as the US Copyright Clause, which empowered the US 
Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”952 
However, as Oren Bracha notes, “In 1800 American copyright law was still the unique regulation 
of the book trade, which retained the traditional institutional features of the publisher’s economic 
privilege, now bestowed on authors under a universal regime of rights.”953  
The Statute of Anne in 1710954 is considered, by most copyright historians, as the catalyst 
to developing the modern author.955 In Jaszi’s words, it was “a conceptual move that gave us 
copyright as we know it.”956 D’Agostino explained that the Statute “officially ended the system of 
privileges, granted the author copyright protection, aimed to encourage the composition of socially 
                                                          
950 Ibid. The Statute of Anne remined in force until repealed by the Copyright Act of 1842. The 1911 Copyright Act 
“brought several major reforms in order to comply with the Belin Act of the Berne Convention on all points where it 
conflicted with the previous law of the United Kingdoms.” Copinger, supra note 936 at 44. For example, the Act 
extended the term protection to life of the author plus 50 years (to match the international standard), and for the first 
time “provided that copyright should subsist in records, perforated rolls, and other contrivances by means of which 
sounds may be mechanically reproduced […].” 
951 Bracha, supra note 933 at 48. 
952 US Const art I, s 8 cl 8. Bracha, supra note 933 at 49, further opines that “[t]he important innovation of the 
constitutional clause was the creation of a national power to legislate in the fields of patent and copyright.” 
953 Bracha, ibid at 256. 
954 Also known as the Act for Encouragement of Learning, 8 Anne, c. 19.  
955 Copinger, supra note 936 at 37: “The Statute of Anne was the first copyright law, as such, in the world and it is the 
foundation on which modern concept of copyright was built.” Copinger argues that there were two revolutionary 
principles established by the Statute: “[R]ecognition of the author as the fountainhead of protection and adoption of 
the principle of a limited term of protection for published works.”  
956 Peter Jaszi, “Is There Such a Thing as Postmodern Copyright?” (2009) 12 Tul J Tech & Intell Prop 105 at 107. 
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desirable works and prevent the practice of piracy.”957 It promoted John Locke’s ideas of just 
labour and natural rights, which reflected two of the four central ideas of modern copyright law.958 
It marked a cultural change, divorcing copyright from censorship by structuring copyright as a 
property right rather than a regulatory mean.959  
D’Agostino further explains that the book industry’s growth from the 1730s onwards 
fuelled the English booksellers’ copyright feuds.960 On one side, authors argued to expand 
copyright and their ownership rights. Their concerns dealt “mainly with royalties and moral rights, 
objecting to publication without consent, false attribution of authorship, and modifications to the 
text that were harmful to their reputation.”961 On the other side – as Mark Rose observed – others 
argued that no one could and should have ownership of ideas and that copyright must be limited 
and restricted.962 These struggles framed modern copyright law, and the core values and ideas that 
led the debate still affect copyright scholarship to this day. 
In many ways, the AI discussion parallels these early struggles. AIs are the new authors 
struggling for recognition and rights over the “old” institutions. The book publishers remain with 
                                                          
957 D’Agostino, supra note 408 at 47. As D’Agostino further provides (quoting Ronan Deazley): “[F]or the first time 
since the incorporation of the Stationers’ Company in 1557, not just the booksellers, but also the author, and indeed 
anyone else who was sufficiently inclined, was entitled to own and deal in the copies of works.” 
958 May & Sell, supra note 932 at 93. The other two, as May and Sell provide, are the stimulation of creativity and 
social requirements. For further discussion about the Lockean theory impact on IP and Copyright see e.g. Carys, 
Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author’s Right, supra note 471; Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 
supra note 487; Merges, supra note 415, Part I, chapter 2 – Locke. 
959 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993) 
at 48. 
960 D’Agostino, supra note 408 at 52. 
961 Ibid at 53. 
962 Rose, supra note 959 at 91: “[T]he proponents of perpetual copyright asserted the author’s natural right to own his 
creation. Second, their opponents replied that ideas could not be treated as property and that copyright could only be 
regarded as a limited privilege of the same sort as patent. Third, the proponents responded that the property claimed 
was neither the physical book nor the ideas communicated by it but something else, an entity consisting of style and 
sentiment combined.” 
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us today, shaping this new fight over copyright expansion. The arguments evolved with 
technology, but the core values remain. It is still a debate over ideas, ownership, and royalties.  
Slowly but steadily, authorship became an individual ownership right, as the romantic 
period took hold: “the author became the actual ‘genius’ innately inspired and thus capable of 
producing original work.”963 The Romantic period, which Ronald Barthes and Foucault identify at 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,964 emphasized the individual author and the 
sanctity of creativity.965  
Barthes has described the author as “an individual creative personality, a solitary originator 
of stylistically consisted work.”966 Martha Woodmansee, Jaszi and Rose have pointed to the 
significant effect of the romantic author on the core values of copyright law, obscuring practical 
approaches to copyright and contributing to the preservation of economic rights for companies and 
publishers.967  
Indeed, the romantic ideal of authorship, in which “the writer becomes an author”,968 has 
                                                          
963 D’Agostino, supra note 408 at 49-50. 
964 Bennett, supra note 929 at 55. 
965 Ibid at 58, further explains: “The eighteenth-century philosophical, commercial and political emphasis on 
individuality, with its ideology of possessive individualism and its special privileging of authorial autonomy, is bound 
up with a transformation in the value of the idea of originality,” and “[b]y the mid-eighteenth century, the notion of 
originality has become central to a conception of a newly empowered author.” 
966 Bridy, supra note 423 at 7. See e.g. Barthes, supra note 531 at 142-43.  
967 Bridy, ibid. This era stands in contrast to the Renaissance and Neoclassical periods, as Woodmansee explains: 
“Whether as a craftsman or as inspired, the writer of the Renaissance and neoclassical period is always a vehicle or 
instrument: regarded as a craftsman, he is a skilled manipulator of predefined strategies for achieving goals dictated 
by his audience […].” Martha Woodmansee, “The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the 
Emergence of the ‘Author’” (1984) 17 Eighteenth-Century Stud 425 at 427 [Woodmansee, The Genius and the 
Copyright]. See also Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi, eds, The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation 
in Law and Literature (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994); Keith Aoki, “Authors, Inventors and Trademark 
Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public Domain Part I” (1993) 18 Colum.-VLA J L & Arts 11. A recent 
research discusses the importance of Woodmansee and Rose’s work to the history of Copyright, see Kathy Bowrey, 
“Law, Aesthetics and Copyright Historiography: A Critical Reading of the Genealogies of Martha Woodmansee and 
Mark Rose” in Isabella Alexander & H Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, eds, Research Handbook on the History of 
Copyright Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) at 27 [Research Handbook on the History of Copyright Law]; Martha 
Woodmansee, “The Romantic Author” in Research Handbook on the History of Copyright Law, ibid at 53.  
968 Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright, ibid at 429. 
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had an enormous influence on the development of copyright.969 Zemer echoes Rose and 
Woodmansee by stating that the Romantic author “plays a significant role in copyright discourse, 
even if we do not expressly mention it.”970  
Several scholars have challenged the romantic author paradigm.971 The perception of the 
author as a solitary creator, who with his unique abilities is creating original marvels, seems 
unrealistic and misguided.972 As Barthes remarked: 973 
“The text is a tissue of quotation drawn from the innumerable centers of culture … the 
writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original. His only Power is 
to mix writings, to counter the ones with the others, in such a way as never to rest on any 
one of them.”  
                                                          
969 Jaszi, supra note 938. See also Lemley, Romantic Authorship, supra note 944; Jane C Ginsburg, “Exceptional 
Authorship: The Role of Copyright Exceptions in Promoting Creativity” in Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, eds, The 
Evolution and Equilibrium of Copyright in the Digital Age (Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 15 and 23 [Ginsburg, 
Exceptional Authorship] (Ginsburg argues that the idealization of the romantic author led to an allocation of excessive 
legal protection). See also Cary J Craig, “Feminist Aesthetics and Copyright Law: Genius, Value, and Gendered 
Visions of the Creative Self” in Irene Calboli & Srividhya Ragavan, eds, Diversity in Intellectual Property: Identities, 
Interests, and Intersections (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 273 [Intellectual Property: Identities, 
Interests, and Intersections]; Rebecca Tushnet, “The Romantic Author and the Romance Writer: Resisting Gendered 
Concepts of Creativity”, Intellectual Property: Identities, Interests, and Intersections, ibid at 294 [Tushnet, The 
Romantic Author and the Romance Writer]. 
970 Zemer, The Idea of Authorship, supra note 526 at 74. Zemer rejects the romantic author views on the creation 
process. See also Lior Zemer, “The Copyright Moment” (2006) 42 San Diego L Rev 247 [Zemer, The Copyright 
Moment].  
971 Alexandra George, Constructing Intellectual Property (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Zemer, 
The Idea of Authorship, supra note 526; Zemer, The Copyright Moment, supra note 970; Barthes, supra note 531; 
Tushnet, The Romantic Author and the Romance Writer, supra note 969 at 294 and 296. 
972 Craig, supra note 489 at 12-13. Craig applies Foucault’s theory along with other prominent scholars such as 
Woodmansee and Rose challenging the modern author as a sole creator arguing that “such scholarship has brought 
attention to ‘just how culturally specific and historically contingent such seemingly transparent terms actually are, and 
how complex the contexts in which they emerged, were contested, and gained legitimacy’.” 
973 Barthes, supra note 531 at 146.  
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The concept of individualism is based on the romantic author’s perception of the author as an 
individual genius.974 The roots of individualism originate in the Statute of Anne,975 which changed 
the legal standing of authors, granting them copyright protection “aimed to encourage the 
composition of socially desirable works […].”976  
According to this copyright model, “the literary notion of the author as originator merged 
with Locke’s economic theory of possessive individualism to produce the legal construct of the 
author as proprietor.”977 Bennett suggests that the concept of individualism is “related to the 
‘break-up of the medieval social, economic and religious order’, with its feudalistic emphasis on 
a person’s place in that relatively rigid hierarchy.”978 The concept, as Bennett further explains, is 
dated in the English tradition “as early as the period 1050-1200” and “fundamental to facets of 
classical culture.”979  
James Boyle argues that “the idea of authorship is socially constructed and historically 
contingent [and that] the romantic vision of authorship plays down the importance of external 
sources by emphasizing the unique genius of the author and the originality of the work.”980 Boyle 
                                                          
974 Martha Woodmansee, “On the author effect: Recovering Collectivity” (1992) 10 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 279 at 
280 [Woodmansee, On the author effect]: “[D]oing well what is worthy to be done, and what was never done before… 
for the delight, honor, and benefit of human nature.” (Woodmansee cites William Wordsworth, Essay, Supplementary 
to the Preface, in Paul M Zall, ed, Literary Criticism of William Wordsworth (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1966) at 158 and 184). 
975 Bridy, supra note 423 at 8; The Statute of Anne 1709 reads as follows: “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 
by vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors, or Purchasers, of such Copies, during the Times therein 
mentioned.” See generally Ransom, supra note 453 at 1709. Similarly, the US Constitution empowers Congress “to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” US Const art I, § 8 cl 8. It should be noted that the Statute of Anne 
affected not only the US, but Israel’s copyright regime as well. Hence, the “Anne effect” is much broader than Bridy 
describes. 
976 D’Agostino, supra note 408 at 47. However, as D’Agostino, ibid at 49, argues “the Statute was not entirely an 
author’s statute, but more of a publisher’s statute. In this period, copyright has traditionally been a publisher’s right 
and not an author’s right.” 
977 Bridy, supra note 423. 
978 Bennett, supra note 929 at 56-57. 
979 Ibid. 
980 James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009) at 114 [Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens]. 
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points out to one of the core arguments within copyright law (mainly US copyright law) – does 
regulation of information produce too much or too little? The difficulty, as he explains, is that “the 
use of some general body of ‘public goods theory’ to analyze information issues seems to be 
impossible.”981 In the absence of a clear and convincing economic argument, the romantic 
authorship values and ideas “mixed” into the economic analysis. Thus, claims Boyle, the romantic 
author paradigm is influencing (and affecting) the framing of legal rights allocating rights unjustly 
– “those who do not look like authors find their property claims disfavored.”982 As appealing as 
Boyle’s argument may be, it is not without flaws. There are more reasons for copyright expansion 
than the “romantic determinism”.983 As Vaver notes, “[t]he life of the law here is less logic or 
literature than lobbying.”984 Bently outlined better suspects,985 such as corporate greed, interest 
groups, legislative process, property rhetoric, internationalization, national economic and trade 
interests. Accordingly, “[t]he romantic author was, at most, a minor accomplice.”986  
Furthermore, there is a growing understanding that the author is socially constructed,987 
and authorial creation is a collaborative process.988 Woodmansee demonstrated it by tracing the 
authorship concept’s evolution. As Woodmansee has shown, authorship was always a 
collaborative process in which authors shared their writing.989 Jaszi identified the romantic author 
                                                          
981 Ibid at 115. 
982 Ibid at 116. 
983 Anne Barron, “Introduction. Harmony or Dissonance? Copyright Concepts and Musical Practice” (2006) 15 Soc 
& Leg Stud 25. See also Lemley, Romantic Authorship, supra note 944 at 879, arguing that the romantic authorship 
cannot provide sufficient explanation for the changes in IP law.  
984 David Vaver, “The Copyright Mixture in a Mixed Legal System: Fit for Human Consumption?” (2001) 5:2 
Electronic J Comp L at part III, online <https://www.ejcl.org/52/art52-3.html>. 
985 Lionel Bently, “R. v. the Author: From Death Penalty to Community Service - 20th Annual Horace S. Manges 
Lecture, Tuesday, April 10, 2007” (2008) 32 Colum J L & Arts 1 at 21-64. 
986 Ibid at 21. 
987 Woodmansee & Jaszi, supra note 967 at 1 and 9. 
988 See Jane Ginsburg, “The Author’s Place in the Future of Copyright” (2009) 153 Proc Am Phil Soc 147 [Ginsburg, 
The Author’s Place in the Future of Copyright]. 
989 Woodmansee, On the author effect, supra note 974 at 281: “From the Middle Ages right down through the 
Renaissance new writing derived its value and authority from its affiliation with the texts that preceded it, its derivation 
rather than its deviation from prior texts.” 
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paradigm as the main source for undermining the authorship’s collaborative nature.990 Rosemary 
Coombe and Zemer have both argued that intellectual products are the result of social dialogue.991 
Notable works by several prominent scholars such as Boyle,992 Coombe,993 Jessica Litman,994 
Drassinower995 and others have promoted the idea of copyright as a communicative act.  
Drassinower, for example, rejects copyright theory’s common conceptual paradigms.996 
Drassinower, instead, relies on the internal rationality of copyright997 and considers copyright 
works as acts of speech. Thus, copyright law “protects the integrity of the work as a communicative 
act.”998 And consequently, infringing a copyrighted work acts as compelling its author’s speech. 
Accordingly, copyrights – like limits on communicative acts – must both accord with others’ 
communicative rights (endorsing fair dealing policy) and must be limited specifically to 
communicative uses (endorsing a relaxed limit on incidental copying).999 
Indeed, the concept of the author is changing. However, is the author really dead? Not 
necessarily.1000 We should distinguish between the author in the literature (who may be dead for a 
                                                          
990 Ibid; Peter Jaszi, “On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity”, both in Woodmansee 
and Jaszi, supra note 967. 
991 Coombe, Objects of Property, supra note 524; Zemer, Dialogical Transactions, supra note 437.  
992 Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens, supra note 980. Boyle argues for a socially constructed basis for authorship 
– criticizes the individualistic basis of the romantic author paradigm. 
993 Coombe, Objects of Property, supra note 524.  
994 Jessica Litman, “The Public Domain” (1990) 39 Emory LJ 965.  
995 Drassinower, supra note 442. 
996 Ibid at 8. 
997 Ibid at 7. 
998 Ibid at 8. 
999 Ibid. See also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “The Immanent Rationality of Copyright Law” (2017) 115 Mich L Rev 
1047; Special IPJ edition (2016) and William T Gallagher, ed, “Review Symposium: Abraham Drassinower’s What’s 
Wrong with Copying?” (2017) 7:2 IP L Book Rev. It is interesting to note that a Copyright Act based on Drassinower’s 
conception would have protected or acted as a defense for CBC’s “ephemeral” copies in Canadian Broadcasting Corp 
v SODRAC 2003 Inc, 2015 SCC 57. 
1000 Bently explains: “[A] number of attempts have been made to show that the critique of romantic authorship signified 
by the notion of the death of the author implies a necessary rethinking of the role of authorship in copyright law. If 
the two concepts of authorship and literary property emerged at the same time, based on common conceptions of 
individualism, personality and creativity, then it might be reasonable to expect the concepts to disappear at the same 
time.” Lionel Bently, “Copyright and the Death of the Author in Literature Law” (1994) 57 Mod L Rev 973 at 976 
[Bently, Copyright and the Death of the Author in Literature Law]. Ginsburg further observes: “Artistic merit has 
never been a prerequisite to copyright (at least not in theory), and authors are not necessarily less creative for being 
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while)1001 and the legal concept of authorship, which is changing, developing, and expanding.1002 
The legal concept of authorship is still with us, and “there is plenty of evidence that copyright law 
continues to employ the rhetoric and conceptual underpinnings of authorship, in both the judicial 
and legislative arenas.”1003  
I am not willing to concede the idea that AI authorship marks the end of copyright. I believe 
that copyright will have an important role in the coming decades. My assumption does not preclude 
a conceptual change within the copyright regime. As the title for my dissertation implies – the 
legal boundaries of copyright require rethinking. Copyright law should become more receptive to 
social change (AI included). Perhaps it already is – as Jaszi’s analysis indicated – on a review of 
two divergent US Court decisions in Koons.1004 
New changes are on the horizon, especially the computer-generated works and expected 
AI revolution: we might live to see the death of the human author and the rise of the AI author. 
Woodmansee has foreseen these changes already, stating that “technology is hastening the demise 
of the illusion that writing is solitary and originary.”1005 Indeed, in the new technological era, the 
concept of the sole (romantic) author is obsolete. Even if we put aside AI authorship for a moment, 
we ought to consider the way humans interact with technology today. Information and data engulf 
                                                          
multiple. As a result, the syllogism ‘the romantic author is dead; copyright is about romantic authorship; copyright 
must be dead, too’ fails.” Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship, supra note 750 at 1065. 
1001 Bently, Copyright and the Death of the Author in Literature Law, ibid: “Indeed, it has been argued that the death 
of the author in literary theory has already been paralleled by the demise of copyright and its replacement with trade 
marks law.” 
1002 See e.g. David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright (London: Routledge, 1992). 
1003 Bently, Copyright and the Death of the Author in Literature Law, supra note 1000 at 977. Bently further provides: 
“The poststructuralist critique of authorship appears so far to have had no significant influence on copyright law which 
has continued to employ romantic images of authorship, at least in some contexts.” 
1004 Jaszi, supra note 956 at 105: “Koons may have caught the very leading edge of a profound wave of change in the 
social and cultural conceptualization of copyright law-specifically, the emergence of an understanding that is at least 
incipiently ‘postmodern’ in nature.” Rogers v Koons, 960 F (2d) 301 (2d Cir 1992) and Blanch v Koons, 467 F (3d) 
244 (2d Cir 2006).  
1005 Woodmansee, On the author effect, supra note 974 at 289. 
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us from all sides. We use Google Images, Google Scholar, and Google Books to gather 
information. We enjoy unlimited sources of information on every topic and every issue. The 
human author of our time can easily be affected by different styles of works and creations. 
Advancements in technology will speed these processes even further. These unique characteristics 
of the new creation process make the individual author a reminiscence of the past.  
The new AI authorship is a collaborative process, as Woodmansee claims. But, it is difficult 
to argue that it is socially constructed – computer programs are not affected by human 
interactions.1006 On the other hand, the social concept itself might change: i.e., we might be willing 
to accept a different version of social interaction, framing the “dialogue” differently. Transmitting 
data, for example, might indeed be considered a sort of language.1007 AIs and humans might be 
able to communicate, thus creating new ways for social interactions.1008 If we can accept non-
human legal rights, we might as well accept new ways of interaction and new ways to socialize. 
New and innovative ways to socialize and dialogue between humans and non-humans will change 
the concept of authorship allowing a more inclusive way to structure constructive connections that, 
in turn, will affect the creative process.  
3.2.2 The Human Author 
Authorship is perceived as a human ingenuity-rooted concept. The Berne Convention defines 
authorship indirectly, stating that “[t]he person or body corporate whose name appears on a 
cinematographic work in the usual manner shall … be presumed to be the maker of the said 
                                                          
1006 This might change in the future, however. As computer programs advance, we might expect that it would be able 
to adapt, change, and learn from human behaviour. 
1007 It seems that Litman, supra note 994 at 1014 is willing to accept this idea, albeit partially: “User interfaces are 
themselves languages--the languages people use to operate their computers.” 
1008 As I indicated in Part I, robots are providing relief and care for the elderly today. These connections will enhance 
in the future, allowing both humans and robots to interact on a different level. 
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work.”1009 Jane Ginsburg indicates that “it is not clear that the person whose name appears must 
be a human being.”1010 Ginsburg shows that we can vest ownership in productions where its human 
input is unclear “without tricking out the owner in the garb of an author.” Sam Ricketson and Adolf 
Dietz, however, both argued that Berne restricts authorship only to humans.1011  
Seeking guidance from other jurisdictions delivers similar results. The CDPA deems an 
author as “the person who creates it.”1012 Australia’s Copyright Act explicitly defines an author as 
the “person who took the photograph.”1013 The EU Term Directive implies a human element.1014 
Justine Pila and Andrew Christie conclude:1015 
“The assumption that every literary work has a human author is undoubtedly central to 
the (pre-technological and industrial) theory of literary production embodied in the Anglo-
Australian copyright legislation.”  
                                                          
1009 [Emphasis added]. Berne, supra note 565 at art 15.1. Though it should be noted that a maker is not an author under 
Canada’s copyright laws. 
1010 Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship, supra note 750 at 1069. Ginsburg further suggested that the Dutch copyright 
laws permit the authorship of legal entities. See Auteurswet (Dutch Copyright Law) art 8: “A public institution, an 
association, a foundation or a company that makes a work public as its own, without naming any natural person as the 
maker, is taken to be the maker of that work, unless it is proved that in the circumstances the making public of the 
work was unlawful.” 
1011 Ricketson, supra note 795; Adolf Dietz, “The Concept of Authorship Under the Berne Convention” (1993) 155 
RIDA 3. See also the discussion in Part II, chapter III(B). 
1012 CDPA, s 9(1). However, since the last does not defines what is a “creation” the “definition does not get us very 
far”, Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship, supra note 750 at 1070. 
1013 Australia’s Copyright Act 1968, s 10. The Australian Copyright Act makes the distinction between works of human 
authorship and other subject-matters (for example, productions such as broadcast signals and sound recording). The 
Australian definition, however, is not very clear and leaves room for interpretation (i.e., who took the picture?). 
Further, section 84 defines a qualified person as “an Australian citizen or a person (other than a body corporate) 
resident in Australia.” The latter might cause some confusion in the future if AI would be deemed to be a citizen or a 
resident (like in the case of the AI robot Sofia, which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia decided to bestow citizenship). I 
explained in the second part the ambiguity in section 9(3) of the CDPA, in regard to computer programs. See also 
Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship, supra note 750 at 1070. 
1014 According to Article 1: “[T]he rights of an author of a literary or artistic work … shall run for the life of the author 
and for 70 years after his death.” Presumably, there is a connection between the most elementary human trait – death, 
and copyright. EU, Commission Directive (EC) 2006/116/EC of 12 December 2006 on the Term of Protection of 
Copyright and Certain Related Rights, [2006] OJ, L 372/12 at art 1 [Term Directive]. 
1015 Justine Pila & Andrew Christie, “The Literary Work Within Copyright Law: An Analysis of its Present and Future 
Status” (1999) 13 IPJ 133 at 156. 
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The US Copyright Office stated in its Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, that “it 
will refuse to register a claim if it determines that a human being did not create the work […].”1016 
Following this rationale, SCOTUS has consistently interpreted authorship as a process involving 
human beings or persons, restricting the authorship of non-humans.1017  
 In Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co,1018 Justice Holmes explained the concept of 
authorship as a unique quality of human personality: “The copy is the personal reaction of an 
individual upon nature. Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity 
even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible which is one 
man’s alone.”1019 
In Urantia Foundation v Maaherra,1020 Urantia Foundation claimed that Kristen Maaherra 
infringed its copyright by distributing a computerized version of a book. Both parties, however, 
agreed that the authors of the book were “celestial beings”, and that these celestial beings “have 
delivered the teachings, that were eventually assembled in the Book, ‘through’ a patient of a 
Chicago psychiatrist, Dr. Sadler.”1021 Putting the factual argument aside, the court concluded that 
                                                          
1016 [Emphasis added]. Compendium of US Copyright Office Practices, supra note 422. 
1017 See Naruto’s discussion, supra note 237. Abbott argued that recognizing individual rights for IP protection must 
include some level of awareness to the animal’s contribution in the form of expected incentive/benefit or a certain 
connection to the creation, which the monkey in Naruto did not possess. Abbott, supra note 656 at 1121. See also 
Guadamuz, supra note 422 at 173; Andres Guadamuz, “The Monkey Selfie: Copyright Lessons for Originality in 
Photographs and Internet Jurisdiction” (2016) 5 Internet Pol’y Rev; Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, 
supra note 847 at 658. Grimmelmann refers to Fromer and Lemley, stating that “as a general matter, however, 
copyright uses a hybrid test, drawing on both the perspective of the expert and that of a nonexpert observer (either the 
consumer or the ordinary person).” See Jeanne C Fromer & Mark A Lemley, “The Audience in Intellectual Property 
Infringement” (2014) 112 Mich L Rev 1251 at 1267-73.  
1018 188 US 239 (1903). 
1019 [Emphasis added]. Ibid at 250. Durham opines that “the Court emphasized ‘personality’ as a source of originality, 
that ‘something irreducible, which is one man’s alone,’ but stopped short of declaring personality the essence of 
authorship. Perhaps it is the “singularity” of a work, a by-product of personality, which marks it as original. If so, 
some works devoid of personality might take their ‘singularity’ from some other source – even a random source – and 
still qualify as original works of authorship. The Court, however, had no need in Bleistein to split hairs with such 
precision.” Durham, supra note 939 at 582.  
1020 114 F (3d) 955 (9th Cir 1997).  
1021 Ibid at 957. See also Cummins v Bond, [1927] 1 Ch 167 (Eng). In Cummins, the UK court held that a medium’s 
writings – which allegedly were transmitted to her by a celestial being – is the copyright owner of her writings: “It 
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for copyright purposes, “a work is copyrightable if copyrightability is claimed by the first human 
beings who compiled, selected, coordinated, and arranged.”1022 It is intriguing, however, to analyze 
the court’s decision about the human element. It seems that the court tried to avoid challenging the 
faith of the parties (i.e., arguing that there are no celestial beings and thus there has to be a human 
author). In avoiding this ruling, for obvious reasons, the court made an important remark:1023  
“The copyright laws, of course, do not expressly require ‘human’ authorship, and 
considerable controversy has arisen in recent years over the copyrightability of computer-
generated works.” 
As Yanisky-Ravid argues, however, “the case can also be interpreted as lending support for the 
idea that the statue really does not protect works authored by non-humans.”1024 She referenced the 
court opinion stating that “it is not creations of divine beings that the copyright laws were intended 
to protect.”1025  
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v Reid,1026 the Community for Creative Non-
Violence (CCNV) “entered into an oral agreement with the respondent … to produce a statue 
dramatizing the plight of the homeless for display.”1027 The legal issue in this matter was 
                                                          
was proved that the whole of the manuscript of the work was written by the plaintiff alone in her own automatic 
writing, and none of it was dictated by the defendant or any other living person.” In establishing Cummins’s 
authorship, the court did not dismiss the possibility of the celestial being as the source of the writings, finding that 
they “ought to be regarded as the joint authors and owners of the copyright, but inasmuch”. However, the court is not 
willing to concede to the idea of assigning co-authorship right in this matter, stating that “I do not feel myself 
competent to make any declaration in his favour, and recognizing as I do that I have no jurisdiction extending to the 
sphere in which he moves, I think I ought to confine myself when inquiring who is the author to individuals who were 
alive when the work first came into existence and to conditions which the legislature in 1911 may reasonably be 
presumed to have contemplated. So doing it would seem to be clear that the authorship rests with this lady, to whose 
gift of extremely rapid writing coupled with a peculiar ability to reproduce in archaic English matter communicated 
to her in some unknown tongue we owe the production of these documents.” Ibid at 173. 
1022 [Emphasis added]. Urantia Foundation, ibid at 958. See also Penguin Books, supra note 765, contending that a 
religious book (The Course) is not an original work but a work of Jesus.  
1023 Urantia Foundation, ibid. 
1024 Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 236 at 719. 
1025 Urantia Foundation, supra note 1020 at 958. 
1026 490 US 730 (1989). 
1027 Ibid at 730. 
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established, under the work made for hire doctrine, who the owner of the sculpture is.1028 In 
addressing the question of authorship, SCOTUS opined that “the Copyright Act of 1976 provides 
that copyright ownership ‘vests initially in the author or authors of the work’ ... As a general rule, 
the author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into 
a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.”1029  
In Aalmuhammed v Lee,1030 a case involving the 1992 biographical drama film Malcolm 
X,1031 Jefri Aalmuhammed claimed to be a “co-creator, co-writer, and codirector of the movie.”1032 
In rejecting Aalmuhammed’s claim of co-authorship, the court defined authorship by stating that 
an author “[…] will likely be a person ‘who has actually formed the picture by putting the persons 
in position, and arranging the place where the people are to be – the man who is the effective cause 
of that’, or ‘the inventive or master mind’ who ‘creates, or gives effect to the idea’.”1033 
The contemporary “common sense” that presumes the author to be a living, breathing, 
thinking being rested on these earlier cases and conceptions. As Bridy concludes, SCOTUS has1034 
“defined authorship and copyright in broadly humanistic terms, citing the Framers’ 
                                                          
1028 See ibid: “The parties, who had never discussed copyright in the sculpture … filed competing copyright 
registration certificates. The District Court ruled for CCNV in its subsequent suit seeking, inter alia, a determination 
of copyright ownership, holding that the statue was a ‘work made for hire’ as defined in the Copyright Act … and was 
therefore owned exclusively by CCNV … The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the sculpture was not a ‘work 
made for hire’ … since it was not ‘prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment’ in light of 
Reid’s status as an independent contractor under agency law. The court also ruled that the statue did not satisfy the 
second subsection of the § 101 definition … since sculpture is not one of the nine categories of ‘specially ordered or 
commissioned’ works enumerated therein, and the parties had not agreed in writing that the sculpture would be a work 
for hire.” 
1029 [Emphasis added]. Ibid at 737.  
1030 202 F (3d) 1227 (9th Cir 2000). 
1031 Wikipedia, “Malcolm X (1992 film)” (last edited 3 August 2018), online: 
<en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malcolm_X_(1992_film)>.  
1032 Aalmuhammed, supra note 1030 at para 7. Denzel Washington, the lead star, asked Aalmuhammed to assist him 
in preparing for the movie. In doing so, Aalmuhammed claimed that he made many changes to the script and thus 
should be considered a co-author. 
1033 [Emphasis added]. Ibid at para 22. The court relied on Burrow-Giles, supra note 715. 
1034 Bridy, supra note 423 at 10, quoting Burrow-Giles, ibid at 57-58. In Burrow-Giles and later Bleistein v Donaldson 
Lithographing Co, supra note 1018, SCOTUS, explains Bridy, ibid at 12, “augmented its early jurisprudence of 
authorship, but departed from the developing focus on creativity and genius.” 
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reliance on English Law: an author is ‘he to whom anything owes it origin; originator; 
maker; one who completes a work of science or literature’; copyright is ‘the exclusive right 
of a man to the production of his own genius or intellect’.”  
Hence, for AI to be regarded as an author in law, it is essential to disconnect the authorship concept 
from assumptions about individualism and current perceptions of creation as a human monopoly.  
As I stated earlier, a work of authorship is not an individualized process; no author is a sole 
genius. “Works of authorship, whether the result of years of study and labour or of a sudden leaps 
of spontaneous insight, begin with what has been done in the past, and they go beyond the past in 
logical and understandable ways.”1035  
Zemer claims that copyright law allows “disproportionate enclosures of portions of the 
general public domain, of social symbols and cultural elements fundamental to the development 
of society and its members.”1036 If we accept this argument, it is possible to move forward to 
establish a more reasonable balance between the author – any author, human or non-human – and 
the public domain. 
Furthermore, if we take into consideration recent developments in technology, we can 
assume future AI will possess some level of inter-connection, otherwise known as a hive mind. 
My assumption is based on the way our technology is connected today. Almost all computers (and 
smartphones) are connected through the Internet. Software is updated on a routine basis, almost 
independently. Hence, we might assume that future technology will establish hive mind 
interactions like what exists today. In doing so, the concept of individual creation will become a 
remnant of a different era. AI will be able to produce or acquire new creations at any moment, 
                                                          
1035 Zemer, The Idea of Authorship, supra note 526 at 73. 
1036 Ibid. See also Steven Wilf, “Who Authors Trademarks?” (1999) 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 7. 
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instantly creating new adaptations and sharing creations with other AI. The reality might work 
differently: AI might be unwilling to share or prepared to do so only under certain conditions.  
3.2.3 Resolving AI Data Barriers1037 
3.2.3.1 Presenting the Challenges 
We usually focus on output – the work itself – when discussing creative machines. As a result, we 
ignore input: the data gathered and processed by programs or engineers.1038 In previous parts, I 
introduced IP theories that support looser IP restrictions to maximize social and cultural 
engagement. In this chapter, I will consider AI input and address data barriers.  
AI and machine-learning algorithms require a massive amount of data to develop.1039 
Facebook, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and other companies are gathering data, indexing pictures, 
videos and messages to improve their search, translation and commercial algorithms. Yet, the mere 
availability of data is not enough. AI needs good data. Incomplete or biased data can exacerbate 
problems.1040  
                                                          
1037 I am aware that there are other considerations such as data privacy and trade secrets. However, I choose to focus 
on concerns relating mostly to copyright. For further reading on data privacy see Giuseppina D’Agostino & Dionne 
A Woodward, “Diagnosing Our Health Records in the Digital World: Towards a Legal Governance Model for the 
Electronic Health Record in Canada” (2010) 22 IPJ 127. 
1038 “Data” is simply a set of values of qualitative or quantitative variables. In referring to data in the context of AI or 
machine-learning, I usually mean “Big Data” (i.e., complex datasets, either structured, unstructured or semi 
structured). See e.g. David Debenham, “Big Data Analytics, Big Financial Institutions, and Big Money Fraud 
Litigation” (2016) 32 BFLR 103. 
1039 Thomas Margoni identify the steps required to develop AI training database, which, as he indicates, might vary. 
See Thomas Margoni, “Artificial Intelligence, Machine learning and EU copyright law: Who owns AI?” (2018) 
CREATe Working Paper 2018/12. 
1040 Amanda Levendowski argues that copyright laws limits access to data and encourages AI companies to use low-
quality data (BLFD – biased, low friction data). See Levendowski, supra note 224 at 589.  
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Good data, however, might be copyrighted,1041 which poses a problem: where the AI’s 
input infringes copyright, the output may infringe too.1042 Indeed, not all data is copyrightable. 
Facts and raw data are usually ineligible for copyright protection.1043  
AI can infringe copyright on several different levels: 
1. Making digital copies of copyrighted works and saving them on either the hard drive or the 
“cloud”. To date, however, courts “have yet to confront whether unauthorized copies made for 
training AI are necessarily infringing copies;”1044  
2. Modifying data in a way that creates a derivative work;1045 or 
                                                          
1041 Access to data could also be inhibited by privacy laws and anti-circumvention of technological protection measures 
(TPM). In this chapter, however, I will focus mainly on related copyright issues.  
1042 See e.g. CONTU, supra note 621 at 46: “The unlawful use of a program or data base might limit or negate the 
author’s claim of copyright in the ultimate work, just as the failure of a translator to obtain a license from the proprietor 
of the translated work might prevent securing copyright in and making use of the translation.”  
1043 See e.g. Vaver, supra note 237 at 92: “The raw facts or data by themselves, especially where collected from other 
sources, are not copyright […].” See also CCH, supra note 440 at para 212; Nautical Data International, Inc v C-Map 
USA Inc, 2013 FCA 63 at para 11; Maltz v Witterick, 2016 FC 524 at para 29. It is not always easy to distinguish 
between types of data (i.e., factual uncopyrighted data and developed or creative data, which is copyrightable). In GSI, 
supra note 781 at para 43, the court differentiated between raw and processed data. And although the court found that 
the data was protected as a compilation, it did not rule out the possibility of protecting processing data as well: “One 
ping from a hydrophone would not suffice; it is the collection, arrangement, distillation and compilation that creates 
the work – both at the raw data level and then at the more refined processed data level.” GSI, ibid at 77. Indeed, a 
compilation of data is copyrightable. See Vaver, supra note 237 at 92.  
1044 Levendowski, supra note 224 at 595. A recent law suit that was filed in Montreal might challenge this assumption. 
In that suit the plaintiffs, artist Amel Chamandy and Galerie NuEdge Fine Arts, claimed that the defendant, Adam 
Basanta, infringed Chamandy “Your World Without Paper” painting by using the painting image as part of a database 
Basanta created to compare between his computer-generated images to contemporary works. The defendant describe 
the process in his website: “Each newly created image is then analyzed by a series of deep-learning algorithms trained 
on a database of contemporary artworks in economic and institutional circulation. When an image matches an existing 
artwork beyond an 83% match, it uploads it to this website and a twitter account.” See 
<allwedeverneed.com/about.html>. See Teresa Scassa, “Artist sued in Canada for copyright infringement for AI-
related art project” (4 October 2018), online (blog): Teresa Scassa 
<www.teresascassa.ca/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=286:artist-sued-in-canada-for-copyright-
infringement-for-ai-related-art-project>. 
1045 Copyright Law of the United States, supra note 627 §§ 106(1) and (2). The SCC, for example, upheld a trial court 
decision that the “burning” of Apple’s program on silicon chips is a “translation and an exact reproduction of the 
assembly language program”, infringing Apple’s copyright. Hence, “translating” of copyrighted data might constitute 
an infringement as well. Apple Computers v Mackintosh Computers, [1990] 2 SCR 209, 110 NR 66. The silicon chips 
were protected under section 3 of the Copyright Act, RSC 1985, supra note 590. Even a temporary reproduction might 
constitute infringement under Canadian copyright law, Canadian Broadcasting Corp, supra note 999. See also 
Margoni, supra note 1039 at III.3.a: “Three types of derivative works are specifically regulated by the Berne 
Convention: translations, arrangements of music, and adaptations and other alterations … Whether the term language 
includes only ‘traditional’ human languages, or also includes modern forms of ‘artificial’ languages such as computer 
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3. Gathering data using programs (crawlers),1046 or a text and data mining (TDM) process that 
can extract information such as photographs1047 and e-books.1048  
In the last case, part of AI-mined data might be copyrighted,1049 even if unprotected by other means 
like through a contract, trade secrets or privacy laws.1050 In Century 21 Canada Limited 
Partnership v Rogers Communications Inc, for example, the British Columbia Supreme Court held 
that Zoocasa (a wholly owned subsidiary of Rogers) infringed Century 21’s terms of use by 
scraping its real estate listings from the website and incorporating them into a real estate search 
engine.1051 In discussing fair dealing, however, the court held that there is no need to ask for 
permission to render a dealings as “fair”.1052 On the other hand, scarping the Internet to gather data 
                                                          
programming languages is ultimately a matter to be decided by domestic law, but in principle not incompatible with 
Berne's broad definition.”  
1046 A crawler (or spider) is an algorithm that searches the web for indexing purposes. 
1047 From online newspapers or other sources available online. Facial recognition algorithms require million of 
photographs for training purposes. These photographs might be copyrighted. 
1048 Google feed its AI algorithm with book novels in order to improve its Gmail Smart Reply program, which is an 
AI-powered service that generate automatic responses to emails. Peter Dockrill, “Google Is Making Its AI Binge-Read 
Thousands of Romance Novels to Get a Little Warmer” (6 May 2016), online: Science Alert 
<sciencealert.com/google-is-making-its-ai-binge-read-thousands-of-romance-novels-to-get-a-little-warmer>. These 
usages might constitute an infringement of the author’s copyright depending on the applicability of the fair use/dealing 
defense. In Authors Guild v Google Inc, 804 F (3d) 202 (2nd Cir 2015) the court ruled in favour of a search engine by 
Google Books. However, the legal position might change in the future. Further, there are several differences between 
Google Books’ service and a given database such as the one Smart Reply used. The fair use reasoning can be stretched 
to a point. It might not be normatively justified to allow Google to use its Google Books library (or its unlimited data 
resources) to train AI for commercial purposes.  
1049 There are different ways in which data could be gathered and indexed. If, as Sobel explains, the engineers strip 
most of the photographs’ original expression (cropping only the faces in low resolution, keeping the photographs in a 
contained database), chances are that the courts would exempt the usage of the photographs in the database. However, 
these assumptions are based on the current legal framework, which might change in the future. Given the high value 
of these databases there is an argument to be made for claiming royalties for selling or licensing the database. Benjamin 
L W Sobel, “Artificial Intelligence’s Fair Use Crisis” (2017) 41 Colum J L & Arts 45 at 67-68. 
1050 Data protection laws prevent sharing spesefic information without consent (i.e., medical data). See e.g. Privacy 
Act, RSC 1985, c P-21; Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5. 
1051 Century 21 Canada Limited Partnership v Rogers Communications Inc, 2011 BCSC 1196, 338 DLR (4th) 32. See 
also Denise Brunsdon, “Dating Sites Scrape Internet for Women’s Photos, Including Those of Deceased” (5 December 
2013), online (blog): IPilogue <iposgoode.ca/2013/12/dating-sites-scrape-internet-for-womens-photos-including-
those-of-deceased>.  
1052 Century 21, ibid at para 252: “The issue of fair dealing only arises where there is no consent to the activity 
complained of. The fact that consent has not been given, or has been refused, whether orally or in writing or in a 
robots.txt file, is only the starting point for a fair dealing analysis. It is not the end point for an analysis of fair dealing. 
The test is the character of dealing not the dealing without consent.” Yet, in 1395804 Ontario Ltd (Blacklock's 
Reporter) v Canada (Attorney General), [2017] 2 FCR 256 at para 37, 2016 FC 1255, the court held that “the deliberate 
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(like photos) for commercial purposes might be excluded as a form of research under fair 
dealing,1053 making fair dealing for most AI or machine learning companies unattainable.  
There are several differences between human and computer-generated/AI infringement.1054 
For one, it is difficult to establish whether a human creator explicitly copied a work instead of 
merely being influenced or inspired by similar works and authors. By contrast, computer programs 
(and most likely AI as well) store and index data in an orderly manner, making it easier to 
investigate any alleged infringement.1055 Indeed, determining infringement might seem plausible 
when examining current computer-programs works. AI and machine-learning algorithms can even 
be coded to target specific usages, to locate potential infringements and issue cease-and-desist 
letters, and even to block access for certain violating companies or individuals.1056 
                                                          
breach of the accepted terms of access to and use of copyrighted material, whether protected by a paywall or not, is a 
relevant consideration in applying the fair dealing provisions of the Act.”  
1053 Trader Corp v CarGurus, Inc, 2017 ONSC 1841 at para 38. In Trader Corp, the respondent, CarGurus, indexed 
and scraped dealers’ websites using crawls to extract vehicle photos, which Trader Corp owned. In addressing fair 
dealing defence, Judge Conway stated: “I am not persuaded that CarGurus’ use of the Trader Photos is ‘fair’. At this 
stage of the analysis, CarGurus's own purpose may be considered – that purpose was strictly a commercial one. The 
character of the dissemination of the Trader Photos was unfair, in that they were widely disseminated through the 
Internet for the entire life of the vehicle listing. The entire photo was displayed, not just a portion of it.” 
1054 Under copyright law, the plaintiff could argue that the defendant’s work exhibits substantial similarity to the 
plaintiff’s original creation. The courts then can examine the work and investigate whether the defendant had access 
to the work to establish the probability of copying. 
1055 Sobel, supra note 1049 at 65-66. Sobel explains: “The vagaries of the human brain have led to some awkward 
rulings: George Harrison was found to have ‘subconsciously’ copied a song by the Chiffons, and a jury found that the 
singer Michael Bolton had access to an obscure Isley Brothers song because it was played on radio and television in 
the areas where Bolton lived as an adolescent, nearly three decades before he released an allegedly infringing song.” 
See also Three Boys Music Corp v Bolton, 212 F (3d) 477 (9th Cir 2000); Bright Tunes Music Corp v Harrisongs 
Music, Ltd, 420 F Supp 177 (SDNY 1976). 
1056 Using algorithm-based capabilities and other programs to detect suspicious anomalies is not new. See e.g. Antonio 
Capobianco, Pedro Gonzaga & Anita Nyeső, Algorithms and Collusion - Background Note by the Secretariat (OECD, 
2017); Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E Stucke, Algorithmic Collusion: Problems and Counter-Measures (OECD, 2017). 
On the complexities that algorithms create for competition law see also Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E Stucke, Virtual 
Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2016). Korea’s Trade Commission, for example, is using BRIAS – an automatic quantitative analysis system – to 
detect bidding anomalies and preventing bid-rigging conspiracies. Michal Gal and Niva Elkin-Koren also suggested 
using algorithms to empower consumers to maximize profits. See Michal S Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, “Algorithmic 
Consumers” (2017) 30:2 Harv JL & Tech 309. In a different paper, Elkin-Koren argues that the fair use doctrine 
should be embedded in those systems. See Niva Elkin-Koren, “Fair Use By Design” (2017) 64 UCLA L Rev 1082. 
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But, mere presence of a specific song or style within a computer program should not 
necessarily imply infringement. Take, for example, an AI designed to learn a user’s personal 
preferences and compose tailored songs and music from its access to all the songs available on 
Spotify.1057 It would be challenging to prove that the AI’s music derived from any specific song(s): 
“All funk songs bear a debt to James Brown, so it would not be altogether surprising if the funky 
Al generated output that was substantially similar to his work.”1058 Further, the same legal 
reasoning could be applied to humans and non-humans alike. As Woodmansee Coombe, Zemer, 
and others have argued, human creation is influenced by cultural perceptions, other creations, and 
experiences, as well as affected by a constant dialogue – it is not a work of sole genius.1059 The 
same inspiration and social structures could and should be applied to AIs.  
A different set of challenges revolves around access and the availability of and to data. 
Levendowski argues that the current legal regime renders the AI market accessible only to 
dominant AI developers like Apple, Facebook, Google, IBM, Microsoft, and Amazon. 
Small companies that cannot acquire good data or are unwilling to face expensive legal 
battles in using copyrighted data, might choose not to enter the AI market or to use low-quality 
data resulting in poor AI programs.1060  
Levendowski explains that low-quality data often demonstrate bias. For example, using 
public domain works from the early 1920s reflects the dominance of the Western white male and 
                                                          
1057 Spotify is a music streaming service. 
1058 Sobel, supra note 1049 at 66. As Sobel notes: “Because creativity is cumulative, rather than ex nihilo, a work can 
bear the mark of works that its author has not encountered firsthand.” 
1059 Zemer, Dialogical Transactions, supra note 437. See also Coombe, supra note 541. 
1060 Levendowski, supra note 224. Levendowski explains, at 609: “[A] newcomer would find it nearly impossible to 
build something approaching the vastness of Facebook’s build-it model. And it is equally unlikely that said newcomer 
could strike a licensing deal comparable to Google’s agreement with global news agencies or a partnership equivalent 
to IBM’s buy-it model. Without the resources to get the vast amounts data easily acquired by major AI players, 
meaningful competition becomes all but nonexistent.”  
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creates biases against blacks, women, the LGBTQ community and other disadvantaged or minority 
groups.1061 A program using such works would also lack a basic understanding of common modern 
phrases and would apply different meanings to day-to-day terms. For example, AI companies 
would find limited use in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn or Bessie Smith’s song Baby Won’t 
You Please Come Home for analyzing current consumer trends. 
Alternatives to public domain data are available by developing independent creations or 
using works under universal licensing and Creative Commons (e.g., machine-readable data on 
Wikipedia). These alternatives risk being insufficient or providing low-quality data.1062 Database 
creation is costly, so big players who already control abundant data are strengthened by these 
availability and accessibility issues.1063 Thus, a small start-up AI company is less likely to find 
investors willing to invest in creating a database. 
3.2.3.2 Exemptions for AI Data  
Several jurisdictions have introduced TDM exemption legislation. As with other legal issues 
described in this dissertation, however, TDM policies diverge between countries: 
 In the UK, the IPO defines TDM as “[t]he use of automated analytical techniques to analyse 
text and data for patterns, trends and other useful information.”1064 In 2014, the UK amended 
the CDPA to include a non-commercial research exemption.1065  
                                                          
1061 Given that in Canada works are protected for only 50 years plus the death of the author, we can expect better 
quality of data in Canada. It should be noted that the new agreement between the US-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) 
expects to extend copyright protection to 70 years.  
1062 Take Wikipedia for example – the vast majority of its content editors are male, making its data potentially biased 
against women. Wikipedia, “Gender bias on Wikipedia” (last edited 5 October 2018), online: 
<en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender_bias_on_Wikipedia>.  
1063 Nevertheless, these data might also be biased since it is reliant on users and thus do not include communities that 
do not use Facebook or Google. 
1064 UK, “Guidance Exceptions to Copyright” (12 June 2014), online: IPO <gov.uk/guidance/exceptions-to-
copyright>. 
1065 UK, The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Research, Education, Libraries and Archives) Regulations 2014, 
SI 2014/1372, s 3(2)(1)(a). Incorporating section 29A of the CDPA: “The making of a copy of a work by a person 
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 In 2016, the EU Commission introduced a new Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single 
Market,1066 which included an exemption for TDM.1067 The directive also offered changes to 
EU’s copyright laws, expecting to impose greater restrictions on users’ rights.1068  
 Both Germany and France include in their copyright statutes non-commercial TDM 
exemptions for scientific and research purposes.1069  
 As part of Japan’s AI and innovation initiatives, it amended its copyright law in 2010 to include 
a broad exemption which appears to include both commercial and non-commercial uses and is 
not limited to research and scientific purposes.1070  
                                                          
who has lawful access to the work does not infringe copyright in the work provided that- (a) the copy is made in order 
that a person who has lawful access to the work may carry out a computational analysis of anything recorded in the 
work for the sole purpose of research for a non-commercial purpose.” Notice that the exemption does not apply to 
databases. Discussing UK’s fair dealing doctrine, Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 224, explain that “the dealing 
must be fair for the purpose of research or private study, criticism or review, quotation, the reporting of current events, 
parody or ‘illustration for instruction’. As such, it is irrelevant that the use might be fair for the purpose not specified 
in the Act, or that it is fair in general.” Under the UK fair dealing doctrine, the test “does not depend on the subjective 
intentions of the alleged infringer” (an objective approach). Fairness “is said to be a question of degree and 
impression”, which is determined according to several factors such as the amount of work that was taken (quantity 
and quality), the use that was made by the user (this correlates with the US fair use transformative factor – a defendant 
that can show that the dealing was transformative has a stronger case; on the other hand, a commercial use of the 
dealing weigh against the defendant), consequences of the dealing (market impact), whether the work was published 
or not (if the dealing is in relation to an unpublished work it weigh against a fair dealing), etc. Several considerations 
might affect a ruling regarding machine-learning and AI. For example, using pictures for creating a data corpus for 
machine-learning algorithms – the amount that would be taken might weigh against considering this corpus as fair 
dealing; on the other hand, the quality of the data might be very poor.  
1066 EU, Commission Directive (EC), 2016/0280 (COD) Proposal of 14 September 2016 for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market [Copyright in the Digital Single 
Market Directive]. 
1067 Ibid at art 3. 
1068 Article 13, for example, was rejected by the EU Parliament. 
1069 France, Intellectual Property Code, art L 122-5, 10 (for works) and art L 342-3 and 5 (for databases). French 
copyright laws exempt only using lawful sources that made available with the consent of the owners. Meaning, if the 
owners prohibit using data for AI training or other purposes (in its website terms of use for example) – the exemption 
does not apply. Germany exemption entered into force in March 2018. Urheberrechtsgesetz, art 60d enables TDM for 
non-commercial scientific research. For further reading about TDM exemptions in the EU’s countries see EU, The 
Exception for Text and Data Mining (TDM) in the Proposed Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market – 
Legal Aspects (2018), online (pdf): 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2018/604941/IPOL_IDA(2018)604941_EN.pdf>. 
1070 Japan, Copyright Act, Act No 48 of 1970, art 47: “A person that, without prejudice to the right provided for in 
Article 25, publicly exhibits the original copy of an artistic work or photographic work, may print such work in 
pamphlets for the purpose of explaining or introducing the work to persons viewing it.” 
212 
 
 The US’s and Canada’s standing on these issues is a bit more complex, though, as I explain 
below, TDM might be exempted as fair use or fair dealing at least until a better legislative 
framework is put in place. 
Courts view computer-programs and machine output as mechanical, routine, and generally 
uncreative or unoriginal.1071 These perceptions are rooted in the legal community and reflected in 
the history of software copyright protection.1072 Such perceptions might be changing as evidenced 
by CONTU and the subsequent amendment to the US Copyright Act in 1980. The question is 
whether current legal regimes will accommodate technological progress in the foreseeable future. 
Given the impact of data on AI’s progress, any legal changes to tighten or loosen data barriers will 
affect AI research significantly.  
Fair use and fair dealing doctrines are prominent legal mechanisms that could enable 
copyrighted work use, without the need for an author’s or owner’s explicit authorization to do 
so.1073 Admittedly, their interpretation and rules differ across jurisdictions. The basic principle, 
however, is closely linked: Copyrighted material can be used in circumstances otherwise 
considered infringement. 
Data exemptions in the US are governed mostly by its court-developed fair use doctrine.1074 
In several prominent cases since the early 1990s, the American courts rendered a use as “fair” if it 
was transformative, or in other words – it created something useful and different.1075  
                                                          
1071 See the discussion in part II, Ch. II(B): The Present: From Computer-Assisted to Artificial Intelligence.  
1072 Sobel, supra note 1049 at 51: “[R]eactions to new expressive technologies, in court or the culture at large, reveal 
a belief that machines cannot in themselves impart, apprehend, or evince authorial expression.” As Sobel further 
expresses: “Just as copyright treats machines as too dumb to count as authors, it also treats machines as too dumb to 
count as readers.” 
1073 Levendowski, supra note 224 at 619-622. Although, as I have shown, some jurisdictions include an owner’s 
permission (or lack of) as part of the fairness analysis.  
1074 Copyright Law of the United States, supra note 627 § 107.  
1075 Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 US 569 at 579 (1994) [the “Pretty Woman” case or Campbell]. 
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In Sega v Accolade,1076 the Ninth Circuit ruled against Sega and found that Accolade’s 
“intermediate copying” was fair use. The court held that1077 
“[A]lthough Accolade’s ultimate purpose was the release of Genesis-compatible games 
for sale, its direct purpose in copying Sega’s code … was simply to study the functional 
requirements for Genesis compatibility so that it could modify existing games and make 
them usable with the Genesis console.”  
Kelly v Arriba and Perfect10 v Amazon followed the same reasoning;1078 both Ninth Circuit Courts 
held that when search engines like Google use thumbnail (small images) display of copyrighted 
images from other websites – while hyperlinking to those sites – this constituted fair use.1079 
Google Images and Google Books applications have also been exempted on similar grounds.1080 
In the recent case of Authors Guild case, the court held that the “[s]nippet view … does not threaten 
the rights-holders with any significant harm to the value of their copyrights or diminish their 
harvest of copyright revenue.”1081 
                                                          
1076 Sega Enterprises, supra note 848. Sega claimed that Accolade (the defendant) developed compatible games (Sega 
developed the “Genesis” consulate and licensed the consulate to developers) by reverse engineering their consulate. 
1077 Ibid at para 46. 
1078 Sobel, supra note 1049 at 52. Kelly v Arriba Soft Corp, 336 F (3d) 811 (9th Cir 2003); Perfect 10, Inc v 
Amazon.com, Inc, 508 F (3d) 1146 (9th Cir 2007). Sobel explains, ibid at 53, that “both decisions doubled down on 
the rhetoric of non-expressive machinery. The defendants’ image search engines assembled photographs into ‘tool[s]’ 
– mere machines – not vehicles for conveying expression.” In Kelly, for example, “[t]he dispositive element of Kelly’s 
fair use finding was Arriba’s lack of artistic purpose in reproducing Kelly’s images. While Kelly's photographs are 
‘artistic works intended to inform and to engage the viewer in an aesthetic experience’.”  
1079 Perfect 10, supra note 1078. Since then, Perfect 10 sued several companies without much success. In the last case, 
Perfect 10, Inc v Giganews, Inc, No 15-55500 (9th Cir 2017), the court affirmed the District Court ruling against 
Perfect 10.  
1080 Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, supra note 847 at 665; Authors Guild, supra note 1048. 
1081 Leave to appeal was denied in April 2016. However, in the recent Fox News Network LLC v TVEyes, Inc, No 15‐
3885(L) at para C (2nd Cir 2018), the Second Circuit rejected TVEyes’s fair use defense by distinguishing Google’s 
Book case on the basis that “[w]hile the [Google Books] snippets allowed a user to judge whether a book was 
responsive to the user’s needs, they were abbreviated to ensure that it would be nearly impossible for a user to see a 
meaningful exposition of what the author originally intended to convey to readers.”  
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It is important to highlight the differences between Authors Guild, Perfect10, and Kelly.1082 
In Authors Guild, the court was willing to establish fair use in cases where harm to the plaintiff’s 
market might arise, stating that “the possibility, or even the probability or certainty, of some loss 
of sales does not suffice to make the copy an effectively competing substitute that would tilt the 
weighty fourth factor in favor of the rights holder in the original.”1083 Also, in Authors Guild, the 
amount and substantiality of the portion taken from the work did not change the outcome. 
Levendowski suggests that courts are willing to accept “[c]reating wholesale copies of copyrighted 
literary and visual works … when those works are not exposed to the public.”1084 
Other factors should be considered in analyzing fair use, like the commercialized nature of 
the work.1085 Such consideration should, however, weigh against the work’s transformative nature 
as Justice Souter emphasized in Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music: “[T]he more transformative the 
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh 
against a finding of fair use.”1086 D’Agostino explains that while establishing fair use might 
sometimes be difficult “there is flexibility with emerging technologies.”1087 
                                                          
1082 There is a difference between using a thumbnail (that can also direct users to the website it is derived from) to 
being able to enjoy parts of books in a way that might harm potential buyers. The Google Books user can read parts 
of the books and decide not to purchase the book. See Authors Guild, supra note 1048 at 224: “We recognize that the 
snippet function can cause some loss of sales. There are surely instances in which a searcher’s need for access to a 
text will be satisfied by the snippet view, resulting in either the loss of a sale to that searcher, or reduction of demand 
on libraries for that title, which might have resulted in libraries purchasing additional copies.” 
1083 Authors Guild, ibid; Sobel, supra note 1049 at 55; Levendowski, supra note 224 at 629. Judge Parker bluntly 
stated in Authors Guild v HathiTrust, 755 F (3d) 87 at 100 (2nd Cir 2014): “Lost licensing revenue counts under Factor 
Four only when the use serves as a substitute for the original and the full‐text‐search use does not.” Levendowski, 
concludes that in “[u]sing copyrighted works as training data for AI systems is not a substitute for the original 
expressive use of the works.” 
1084 Levendowski, supra note 224 at 628. The SCC expresses a similar view in CCH, supra note 440 at para 58: 
“Although certainly not determinative, if a work has not been published, the dealing may be more fair in that its 
reproduction with acknowledgement could lead to a wider public dissemination of the work — one of the goals of 
copyright law.” 
1085 As D’Agostino, supra note 408 at 36 observes: “Today, in the US, there is no presumption against fair use if the 
defendant makes a commercial use. Commercial uses tend to weigh in favour of the plaintiff.” 
1086 Campbell, supra note 1075. 
1087 D’Agostino, supra note 408 at 40. 
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Canada lacks an explicit exemption for TDM or AI training.1088 Thus, TDM are governed 
by the fair dealing doctrine, as developed by a series of SCC, the Federal Court of Appeal, and 
Copyright Board decisions. Recently, as part of section 92 review of the Copyright Act, several 
companies, scholars and industry leaders have submitted briefs advocating for amending the 
Copyright Act to include either a broader fair dealing doctrine or an AI training/TDM 
exemption.1089  
Under Canada’s Copyright Act, a dealing is fair because “the purpose of research, private 
study, education, parody or satire does not infringe copyright.”1090 The SCC has long held that fair 
                                                          
1088 Under Copyright Act, RSC 1985, s 30.71, temporary reproduction of a work or other subject matter (like data) 
would not constitute an infringement. This exception might enable the usage of data as part for AI training purposes. 
However, it is debatable whether the data could indeed be temporarily and not integrated into the AI code. First, it is 
difficult to maintain which data is copyrightable and which is not. Second, as Element AI (an AI company based in 
Toronto) argued recently, given that “informational analysis provides inputs to other technical processes such as 
iterative learning by AI algorithms, it may not always be clear when copies need to be destroyed.” ElementAI, 
“Promoting Artificial Intelligence in Canada: A Proposal for Copyright Reform” (3 October 2018) at 4-5, online (pdf): 
<www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Brief/BR10078507/br-external/ElementAI-e.pdf>. See also 
recital 15 of the Software Directive, supra note 641 (translation, adaptation or transformation of the computer program 
code constitute an infringement, unless these steps are required “to achieve the interoperability of an independently 
created program with other programs”). The Software Directive subject the rights of a computer program author to 
the exceptions stated in arts 5 (Exceptions to the restricted acts) and 6 (Decompilation). For further reading see 
Margoni, supra note 1039 at III.3.b.1. 
1089 See IP Osgoode, “Submission to the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology for the Statutory 
Review of the Copyright Act” (10 December 2018), online (pdf): 
<www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Brief/BR10269431/br-external/DagostinoGiuseppina-e.pdf>. 
ElementAI, ibid at 3, stated, for example, that “[a] targeted exemption within the Copyright Act (Act) to allow for 
informational analysis would help secure a predictable legal environment for Canada’s Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
ecosystem to both continue its unprecedented growth and reach competitive maturity.” Microsoft further suggested to 
“[d]raft the new exceptions to clarify that the techniques of machine learning involving copying analyzing, and using 
lawfully acquired works protected by copyright to develop new knowledge – are permitted and require no 
authorization of the copyright owner, and by any entity or individual for lawful purposes.” See Microsoft, “Submission 
of Microsoft to the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology on the 2018 Statutory Review of the 
Copyright Act” (4 September 2018) at 7, online (pdf): 
<www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Brief/BR10008894/br-external/MicrosoftCanada-e.pdf>. 
Others have supported a broader fair dealing doctrine, see e.g. Pascale Chapdelaine et al, “Brief - Statutory Review of 
the Copyright Act submitted by Pascale Chapdelaine, on behalf of Canadian intellectual property law scholars” (20 
November 2018) online (pdf): <www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Brief/BR10166923/br-
external/ChapdelainePascale01-e.pdf >. 
1090 Copyright Act, RSC 1985, supra note 590, s 29. Fair dealing is confined to the enumerated purposes listed in the 
act.  
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dealing should not be interpreted restrictively. Canadian courts have instead chosen to strengthen 
user’s rights and emphasize fairness’s importance.1091  
Further, a Canadian use’s commercial nature is considered as a factor, but it is not 
determinative. As Vaver stated, “[r]search purposes are not restricted to private purposes. Non-
private or commercial research … can therefore qualify as fair dealing.”1092 Nevertheless, as noted 
by the SCC: “[R]esearch done for commercial purposes may not be as fair as research done for 
charitable purposes.”1093  
Determining whether a user has taken a “substantial part” is an essential part of the fair 
dealing analysis. The test to find if a substantial part was taken includes both quantitative and 
qualitative factors. While none of the factors are determinative, qualitative factors are more 
important and might weigh against fair dealing in Canada, in cases where massive amounts of 
copyrighted data feed the algorithms. 
In the future, courts might limit fair dealing’s applicability to TDM-related cases to force 
the parties to bargain for royalty agreements. If data is equivalent to currency and quality data is 
high-value, there might be a normative justification to motivate the parties to negotiate for a “fair” 
use. The recent York University decision might illustrate a move in that direction.1094  
                                                          
1091 CCH, supra note 440; Vaver, supra note 237 at 233-244. In determining fair dealing, the courts address the 
following: the purpose of the dealing, nature if the sourced work, how much and what was used, the effect on the 
market and whether there are easy alternative available. Giuseppina (Pina) D’Agostino, “Healing Fair Dealing? A 
Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canadian Fair Dealing to UK Fair Dealing and US Fair Use” (2008) 53 McGill 
LJ 309 (D’Agostino offers several suggestions to remedy fair dealing in Canada). 
1092 Vaver, ibid at 240. 
1093 CCH, supra note 440 at para 54. See also Trader Corp, supra note 1053. Further, from a normative perspective, 
there are justifications for limiting access to free data for commercial purposes and allowing access for social causes. 
For an interesting discussion about artificial intelligence and social good, see Gregory D Hager et al, Artificial 
Intelligence for Social Good (Computing Community Consortium (CCC), 2017), online (pdf): <cra.org/ccc/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2016/04/AI-for-Social-Good-Workshop-Report.pdf>. 
1094 The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency v York University, [2018] 2 FCR 43, 149 CPR (4th) 375. In rejecting 
York University fair dealing arguments, Justice Phelan of the Federal Court held that York requires to pay royalites. 
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Proponents of a broader fair dealing defence for machine learning or AI training argue that 
copyrighted data in such learning or training is used for research purposes and should, therefore, 
be exempt under fair dealing doctrine. Michael Geist recently expressed this:1095 
“There are several purposes that would permit some text and data mining activities, 
notably exceptions for research, education, and private study. However, given Canada’s 
emphasis on the commercial benefits of AI, the law may not offer sufficient flexibility to 
safely move from the lab or classroom to the market.” 
Geist suggests that Canada should emulate US fair use, “by making the current list of fair dealing 
purposes illustrative rather than exhaustive”, or by adopting specific data mining exception like in 
the UK.1096 As I explain in the coming sections, however, broadening fair dealing is the wrong 
path for Canada. 
Back in 2007, Israel’s 2007 Copyright Act adopted a fair use doctrine similar to the 
US’s.1097 Zemer highlighted several core changes that this Act implemented, including: replacing 
fair dealing with fair use; broadening the list of exceptions and limitations; and adding new fair 
uses like quotations, instructions, and examinations (in a similar manner to the changes introduced 
in the CDPA).1098 One significant difference between American and Israeli doctrines is that Israel 
                                                          
However, it is interesting to note the negoatiations between the parties about the Interim Tariff described by the court. 
It seems that the parties could have reached a reasonable agreement to avoid the proceedings. 
1095 Michael Geist, “Why Copyright Law Poses a Barrier to Canada’s Artificial Intelligence Ambitions” (18 May 
2017), online (blog): Michael Geist Blog <michaelgeist.ca/2017/05/copyright-law-poses-barrier-canadas-artificial-
intelligence-ambitions>. See also Pascale Chapdelaine et al, supra note 1089 at 3-4 (suggesting to replace fair dealing 
with fair-use); Michael Geist, “Fairness Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from Fair Dealing to Fair Use” in 
Michael Geist, ed, From: The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of 
Canadian Copyright Law (Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, 2013). 
1096 Ibid, Michal Geist Blog.  
1097 Israel, Copyright Act, 2007, s 19. 
1098 Lior Zemer, “Copyright Departures: The Fall of the Last Imperial Copyright Dominion and the Case of Fair Use” 
(2011) 60 DePaul L Rev 1051 at 1078 [Zemer, Copyright Departures]; See also Tony Greenman, Copyright Law, 2nd 
ed (Green man publishing, 2008) at chapter 6 – permissible uses; Neil Netanel, “Israel Fair Use from an American 
Perspective” in Michael Birnhack & Guy Pessach, eds, Authoring Rights: Reading in Copyright Law (Nevo 
Publishers, 2009) at 377. 
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“does not refer to the commercial nature of the use and does not make an explicit distinction 
between commercial uses and nonprofit uses.”1099  
Up until today, fair use or fair dealing relied on two core elements that excuse the usage of 
copyrighted data by computer programs: 
1. The computer-program’s or machine’s inability to purposely infringe copyright; 
2. The computer-programs’s or machine’s minimal or none- existent effect on potential markets 
in a way that is material to copyright law.1100 
AI developments are beginning to challenge these assumptions. Machine learning is distinct from 
basic computer codes. Its algorithms do not require specific instructions and can learn and evolve 
by acquiring and analyzing data, adjusting its code in the process. This represents a marked 
departure from simple data gathering, storing, and processing employed by computer programs 
until now. These algorithms could potentially enable the study of a human author’s or artist’s 
expression and style and learn to employ patterns appropriating that author’s or artist’s distinct 
“tone”.  
With that ability to mimic human expression and style, machine learning and AI pose a 
grave risk to human author’s market. Works resulting from an AI’s study of a particular human 
artist could provide affordable substitutes to their creations.1101 Moreover, using copyrighted 
works as data renders that use of the work as “raw material” – as opposed to, for example, 
consuming the work or incorporating it into a new piece. Thus, the way we use the data should 
change the way we define the data. When a work is used for its designated purpose it should be 
                                                          
1099 Zemer, Copyright Departures, ibid at 1084. 
1100 Sobel, supra note 1049 at 57. 
1101 Ibid at 75. 
219 
 
regarded as a work; when the work is used for a different purpose, like for AI training, it should 
be tagged in the same way the AI and its programmer view it: raw material or simply “data”.1102  
In the future, courts might make use of productive or consumptive dichotomy – developed 
by Justice Blackmun in the dissent to Sony Corporation of America v Universal City Studios1103 – 
to determine if exempting AI data is just from a public policy perspective. The dichotomy’s logic 
is straightforward: productive use benefits the public and might constitute a fair use, but 
consumptive uses are “not what the fair use doctrine was designed to protect.”1104  
Not all machine-learning or AI developments and applications should be recognized as 
productive by nature. As Justice Stevens warns us in Sony’s majority decision, we should be 
cautious not to fall into a legal “mash” arguing that all uses could result in productive social 
impact.1105 Under the same logic, “[i]f future productivity is no defense for unauthorized human 
consumption, it should not excuse robotic consumption, either.”1106  
                                                          
1102 Ibid at 625: “I suggest that the language we use to describe how humans and AI systems experience copyrighted 
works reveals a new and different purpose. When humans experience these works, we call them ‘works’. When AI 
systems do it, these works are transformed into ‘data’.” Matthew Sag called works using for AI developments “grist 
for the mill”. Matthew Sag, “Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology” (2009) 103 Nw UL Rev 1607 at 1624. See 
also Maurizio Borghi & Stavroula Karapapa, “Non-Display Uses of Copyrighted Works: Google Books and Beyond” 
(2011) 1 Queen Mary J Intel Prop 21 at 23. 
1103 Sony Corp, supra note 440. 
1104 Ibid at 496. Justice Blackmun explains, at 478-479, that a productive use is “resulting in some added benefit to 
the public beyond that produced by the first author’s work.”  
1105 Ibid at 455, footnote 40: “[T]he notion of social ‘productivity’ cannot be a complete answer to this analysis. A 
teacher who copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly productive. But so is a teacher who copies for the sake of 
broadening his personal understanding of his specialty. Or a legislator who copies for the sake of broadening her 
understanding of what her constituents are watching; or a constituent who copies a news program to help make a 
decision on how to vote.” 
1106 Sobel, supra note 1049 at 74. 
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In many ways, fair use results from the ongoing struggles between authors and users.1107 
In her monumental 1982 paper,1108 Wendy Gordon argued that fair use doctrine should be applied 
in three conditions:  
1. When “market failure is present” (the pre-condition).1109 
2. When “transfer of the use to defendant is socially desirable”; and, 
3. When “an award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff 
copyright owner.”1110 
Market failure theory offers a scale of legal arguments. Some scholars argue for a model in which 
all uses are paid in full: a fared use model.1111 Others are concerned that a fared use model would 
“advance the interests of established rightsholders while inhibiting participatory semiosis and 
downstream uses of copyrighted works.”1112 Merges developed a further distributive model, 
arguing that copyright is a subsidy to creators, so fair use can be recognized as a tax on rights 
owners to facilitate specific usages.1113  
3.2.3.3 Alternative Approaches to AI Data Barriers  
Sobel argues that the two alternatives – machine-learning or AI’s input as fair use or an 
infringement – are bad. The former would most likely stagnate technological developments and 
                                                          
1107 Ibid at 84-5. 
1108 Wendy J Gordon, “Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its 
Predecessors” (1982) 82 Colum L Rev 1600. 
1109 Ibid. Market failures include: (a) high transactions costs and low anticipated profit (which, new technologies are 
likely to present); (b) uses that might harm externalities (scholarship for example); and (c) non-commercial activities 
and advancements of knowledge (free expression such as criticism). 
1110 Ibid at 1614. 
1111 Tom W Bell, “Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use 
Doctrine” (1998) 76 NCL Rev 557 at 595.  
1112 Sobel, supra note 1049 at 84.  
1113 Robert P Merges, “The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the ‘Newtonian’ World of On-line 
Commerce” (1997) 12 BTLJ 115. Merges argues that fair use should be extended behind Gordon’s failed markets to 
subsidized categories of usages.  
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hinder research, leaving the field empty for other international players. The latter creates two 
different legal systems – for humans and non-humans – which would favour the non-humans and 
disincentivize the humans.1114 Further, fair use might worsen inequality since only the strong and 
wealthy would be able to fight expensive legal suits.1115 
Relying on fair use as a mechanism for regulating TDM and AI raises reasonable 
concerns.1116 As illustrated above, the fair use doctrine does not provide certainty to users, 
investors, and AI companies, which is important for building a strong innovative market. On the 
other hand, fair use offers flexibility that is missing from the slow legislative process. Courts might 
more efficiently address new technological changes under old law than waiting for new law. There 
are also alternative means to address challenges, like levies and doctrinal or political reforms (such 
as Fisher’s government-funded reward system for entertainment media to compensate 
creators).1117 Different legal regimes, like contracts, could provide additional regulating 
measures.1118  
My support lies with the narrow fair dealing camp, between it and broader fair use. 
Admittedly, fair use played a crucial role in welcoming a more inclusive copyright regime. Courts 
turned to this mechanism in cases where applying a rigid rightsholders policy would harm other 
important causes. 
                                                          
1114 Sobel, supra note 1049 at 82: “Why should a digital humanities scholar devour millions of texts without 
compensating their authors, while a more conventional literary hermeneut-or an ordinary reader-must pay for the 
copyrighted works she interprets?” 
1115 Ibid at 85. 
1116 Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, supra note 847 at 660, further addresses the concern that exempting 
machine creation might create two different legal system, which offer favorable treatment to machine creation. 
1117 Ibid at 90-6. Fisher, Promises to Keep, supra note 859. 
1118 Publishers, social media, and other giant services (Google, Microsoft, Amazon, etc.) are all using contracts to 
enforce their policy on its users. 
222 
 
Nevertheless, fair use must not exceed its original purposes. Retreating to fair use (or 
planting a US fair use model in fair dealing jurisdictions like Canada) to harbour TDM, machine-
learning and AI training might restrain courts from addressing the real and significant issues: The 
relationship between artificial/machine and human creations. Instead, I suggest a different policy: 
An exemption for TDM, machine-learning and AI training. This exemption could feature a 
distinction between using data for commercial purposes and other public uses (including social 
justice causes). Royalties, for example, can be applied when data is used partly or wholly to 
develop algorithms for commercial purposes. Under this exemption, the government could provide 
access to data for social causes or other public benefits as part of its big-data policy.  
There are reasons to be critical about royalties. Indeed, the EU’s recent attempt to impose 
a quasi-royalty mechanism might chill exploring these ideas.1119 But to establish an exemption 
mechanism for TDM, machine learning, and AI training, governments ought to explore all possible 
balanced approaches and weigh all relevant considerations.  
Data barriers may also be alleviated by intermediate measures like levies, international 
agreements, and acquiring or licensing data. An example of an alleviating levy can be found in the 
US legislature’s introduction in the 1990s of the Audio Home Recording Act (AHARA).1120 A 
decent ad-hoc solution may be found by enacting AI-AHARA legislation to shield users and 
companies from infringing owners’ works by using their data as input on the one hand and 
establishing a compensation scheme to provide royalties on the other. 
                                                          
1119 Copyright in the Digital Single Market, supra note 1066 at art 13 (which was rejected recently). 
1120 Monica Zhang explains that AHARA “was intended to provide proper compensation to copyright owners by 
mandating royalties for certain technologies to compensate copyright owners for losses from home taping, while 
simultaneously shielding manufacturers and consumers from infringement liability.” See Monica Zhang, “Fair 
Compensation in the Digital Age: Realigning the Audio Home Recording Act” (2016) 38 Hastings Comm & Ent LJ 
145 at 147. See also David Nimmer, Copyright Illuminated: Refocusing the Diffuse US Statute (Kluwer Law 
International, 2008); Sobel, supra note 1049 at 91-3. 
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An example of an alleviating international treaty can be found in international initiatives 
like the recent Marrakesh Treaty.1121 International treaties can include exceptions for specific 
technologies. And, since AI’s and machine learning’s advancement relies on access to data, 
exemptions for access to helpful but copyrighted sources might create desirable consequences for 
innovation and research.1122  
An international initiative to create an open-source pool of free data and information could 
be a good start,1123 though its chances of success are slim. First, reaching international consensus 
is difficult, made more so by issues like data protection and access laws that vary significantly 
between countries. Second, changes in the legality of the usage of information among different 
countries for other considerations (such as privacy) will only widen the gap between countries.1124 
Ultimately, an opportunity might arise to create a limited data pool for research or within bilateral 
agreements like NAFTA or USMCA. 
As I explained earlier, acquiring or licensing data for development purposes might offer an 
alternative interim solution. Companies could acquire or license copyrighted data to build a 
database for machine-learning or AI training. These databases could include various types of data, 
                                                          
1121 Marrakesh Treaty, supra note 845. A unique international initiative that allows distribution of copyrighted data 
for the benefit of social causes. Lior Zemer & Aviv Gaon, “Copyright, disability and social inclusion: the Marrakesh 
Treaty and the role of non-signatories” (2015) 10 J Intell Prop L & Prac 836.  
1122 Tal Z Zarsky, “Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data” (2017) 47 Seton Hall L Rev 995 at 996. 
1123 This suggestion also serves public policy considerations. By creating “data pool” for certain purposes, the 
government can make sure that the data is “clean” and unbiased. I understand that by delegating this role to the 
government – any government – censorship concerns might be justified. However, coping with big data in the age of 
“fake news” requires resources, funding and public driven interests. This task is most suited for government agencies. 
To alleviate legitimate concerns, the government can establish independent agencies and institutions, in order to limit 
political influence.  
1124 GDPR, supra note 184, is a good example. The GDPR is a comprehensive EU data protection legislation, 
regulating the processing of data originated in the EU. I share Zarsky’s, supra note 1122, opinion that “[t]he GDPR’s 
provisions are … incompatible with the data environment that the availability of Big Data generates. Such 
incompatibility is destined to render many of the GDPR’s provisions quickly irrelevant. Alternatively, the GDPR’s 
enactment could substantially alter the way Big Data analysis is conducted, transferring it to one that is suboptimal 
and inefficient. It will do so while stalling innovation in Europe and limiting utility to European citizens, while not 
necessarily providing such citizens with greater privacy protection.”  
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which could also be found in the public domain or be provided by governments in support of AI 
research. However, a licensing policy is not ideal in the long term. First, the high costs of licensing 
are a significant barrier to small firms. Second, there might not be much variety of sources to 
satisfy AI developing needs. As Levendowski opines, “recent studies have suggested that, at least 
in the context of training AI systems, bigger is objectively better.”1125 On the other hand, 
encouraging individual data creation and licensing could open new markets and, either directly or 
indirectly, increase investments in high-quality data, which would benefit the AI field. 
3.2.3.4 Orphan Works AI Challenges  
3.2.3.4.1 The AI “Orphans” 
An orphan work is a copyright-protected work in which the rights-holder cannot be located. 
Without an owner or author, the work is an “orphan”. Orphan works pose different challenges to 
AI in the digital age:1126  
1. More works are prone to manipulation. It is easier for a computer (nonetheless AI) to create 
works and circulate them through the Internet without anyone realizing that. Given expected 
developments in AI, a greater quantity of “orphans” is expected.1127  
2. AI are becoming better and better in imitating human works, making it harder to distinguish 
between human and non-human creations. Thus, under the current legal regime, computer-
                                                          
1125 Levendowski, supra note 224 at 621: “AI systems trained using larger datasets perform more accurately than those 
trained with smaller ones.” 
1126 There are other challenges posed by orphan works, which are outside the scope of my dissertation. For example, 
orphan works could cause a chilling effect by preventing users from creating derivative works. When copyright owners 
cannot be located, potential users do not have any way to seek permission to use the works. Their options are to either 
use it at their own peril and risk being sued in the future or forego using the work entirely, which can rob society of 
new works or access to reproductions of already existing works. 
1127 David R Hansen, “Orphan Works: Causes of the Problem” (2012) Berkeley Digital Library Copyright Project, 
Working Paper 3. 
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generated or AI works might be labelled as orphans despite having known (albeit inorganic) 
creators. 
3. The process of composing a song or painting a picture often takes time and involve other people 
besides the (human) artist. AI, however, can generate instant works automatically without 
human’s influence and involvement. Therefore, it is likely that more AI works would be “lost” 
given that the creation process makes it more difficult to track them. 
4. Where a work is generated automatically with no human involvement, it could either be 
misappropriated by a human or simply labelled as an orphan if no human is involved and the 
origin is difficult to establish.  
Notably, if the work is a computer’s output with no human influence, it could also be considered 
not a work at all, since it lacks the human author required by many copyright regimes. Since an 
orphan work is copyright-protected, a computer-generated work would be better off as an orphan 
work (with no human) than a computer-generated work (with no human). On the other hand, AI 
technology has great potential in resolving some of the issues mentioned here. For example, smart 
AI search engines could enable better ways to locate rights-holders. 
3.2.3.4.2 What are Orphan Works? 
A work may be deemed an orphan for several reasons, not limited to the following: 
 the author is deceased;  
 the work was intentionally abandoned; or 
 the work was generated automatically with little or no human involvement and without proper 
documentation (as with computer-generated works).  
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Different countries employ different licencing regimes for orphan works. In Canada, for example, 
an individual seeking to licence a song with no apparent author or owner can apply to Canada’s 
Copyright Board, which evaluates the request and establishes whether the work needs a licence. If 
he demonstrates that he conducted a thorough search to locate the work’s rights-holder and came 
up empty, the Copyright Board might concludes that no licence is required, “and the applicant will 
have the comfort of an official decision that its planned use is legal.”1128  
The Canadian orphan work definition hinges on whether the rights-holder can be located; 
the Board lacks jurisdiction where the rights-holder is unknown but locatable or was located but 
has not responded.1129 
The UK, like Canada, uses an upstream model,1130 by which users must apply for a licence 
if they want to use a copyrighted work. Users apply online, and the IPO collects and holds the fees 
for eight years; and, if a rights-holder emerges, the IPO transfers those funds to them. The IPO is 
more autonomous and therefore more flexible than similar administrative bodies in other countries.  
The US and the EU have similar orphan work definitions. The US Copyright Act 1976 
defines an orphan work as a work whose owner is impossible to identify or contact. The EU’s 
definition is similar to the US’s: a work whose author or rights-holder is not known or cannot be 
                                                          
1128 Vaver, supra note 237 at 262; Giuseppina D’Agostino & Margaret Hagan, “IP Osgoode Orphan Works Hackathon: 
Final Report” (IP Osgoode, 2016), online: <canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/copyright-policy-
publications/orphan-works-hackathon.html>. Giuseppina D’Agostino, “Copyright Exceptions and Limitations and the 
Copyright Board of Canada” in The Copyright Board of Canada: Bridging Law and Economics for Twenty Years 
(ALAI) (Éditions Yvon Blais, 2011); Jeremy de Beer & Mario Bouchard, “Canada’s Orphan Works’ Regime: 
Unlocatable Owners and the Copyright Board” (2009), online (pdf): <cb-cda.gc.ca/about-apropos/2010-11-19-
newstudy.pdf>. 
1129 The Federal Court of Appeals has stated that the Canadian Copyright Board is in a better position to adjudicate 
these matters and has deferred to its findings of facts as well as its interpretation and analysis. As stakeholders’ interests 
drift farther apart, D’Agostino suggests that the Canadian Copyright Board will play an increasingly important role in 
balancing these interests. 
1130 UK CDPA (2013 amendment), section 116A (Power to provide for licensing of orphan works); J Griffiths, Lionel 
Bently & W R Cornish, “United Kingdom” in International Copyright Law and Practice, Paul Edward Geller & 
Melville B Nimmer, eds (Lexis Nexis, 2016) § 8[2][e][i]. The Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs & Trade 
Marks, can “grant non-exclusive licenses for the use of ‘orphan works’.” 
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located.1131 The EU, like the US, employs a downstream model, which allows users to use 
copyrighted or copyrightable works without having to seek a licence, so long as they adhere to the 
regulatory requirements.1132  
It has a two-pronged approach: 
 The first prong: The EU Directive 2012/28/EU, which outlines the permitted uses of orphan 
works and includes a statutory exemption that allows “public service organizations” – like 
libraries – limited use of orphan works. The directive also includes a diligent search 
requirement, creates a registry, and mandates fair compensation if a rights-holder is found. 
 The second prong: A Memorandum of Understanding which allows for the voluntary collective 
licensing of “out-of-commerce” works. The EU Intellectual Property Office regulates the EU 
scheme, and the Orphan Works Database was recently launched under its auspices.1133  
                                                          
1131 In 2012, the EU has also introduced orphan works legislation adopting the Orphan Works Directive, which was 
implemented in 2014. EU, Commission Directive (EC) 2012/28/EU of 25 October 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of 
Orphan Works, [2012] OJ, L 299/5 at art 2: “[a] work or a phonogram shall be considered an orphan work if none of 
the rightholders in that work or phonogram is identified or, even if one or more of them is identified, none is located 
despite a diligent search for the rightholders having been carried out and recorded.” Art 4 sets up a mutual recognition 
status of orphan works among the EU members states, while Art 6 forces EU member states to allow access to 
museums, archives, etc., to the works. 
1132 As part of the EU Europeana initiative, the EU treatment is more comprehensive. Estelle Derclaye, Ben Smulders 
& Herman C Jehoram, “The European Union and Copyright” in International Copyright Law and Practice, Paul 
Edward Geller & Melville B Nimmer, eds (Lexis Nexis, 2016) § 4[2][i]. 
1133 The Orphan Works Database available online: <euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/web/observatory/orphan-works-
db>.  
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A licencing model exists in several other jurisdictions including: Nordic countries (which applies 
an extended collective licencing),1134 Germany,1135 Japan1136 and Korea.1137  
3.2.3.4.3 Orphans: Causes and Alternatives  
According to the US Orphan Works and Mass Digitization report, there are four major causes for 
the growing ocean of orphan works:  
1. the elimination of copyright formalities; 
2. the progressive extension of copyright terms;1138 
3. technological advancements which allow creators to “create and preserve more copyrightable 
works”; and 
4. technological advancements – specifically the shift from print to mass digitation – which give 
users access to works and facilitate their use.1139  
                                                          
1134 Most Nordic countries have adopted the ECL (extended collective licensing) model. ECLs allow for collective 
management organizations/collective societies, which represent right-holders of certain types of works, to license and 
collect royalties on behalf of right-holders (members and non-members alike). Most schemes have an opt-out 
mechanism. US Copyright Office, Orphan Works and Mass Digitization: a Report of the Register of Copyrights (2015) 
at 18-19, online (pdf): <copyright.gov/orphan/reports/orphan-works2015.pdf>. 
1135 Germany has an ECL framework for out-of-commerce works which libraries can use. There is a registry and the 
CMO can administer works by non-members so long as the works are listed in the registry, no right-holder has objected 
within six weeks, and the license is for a non-commercial purpose. Ibid at 27. 
1136 The government can issue licenses if there was a diligent, but fruitless, search. The user will still have to pay a 
fee, which goes into a fund. There is mandatory licensing for certain orphan works. This system has been used very 
rarely. Ibid at 31-32. 
1137 Users can apply for a compulsory license from the government and must indicate on the copies made that a license 
was granted for the use of that particular orphan work. This system, like the Japanese system, has also been used only 
rarely. Ibid at 32-33.  
1138 US, Register of Copyrights, Report on Orphan Works (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2006), online (pdf): 
<copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf>. The report suggests that the increase of orphan works could be linked 
to the changes in US copyright law, which removes an owner’s “formalities” requirements to obtain protection: “The 
elimination of two particular types of mandatory formalities, renewal and notice, play an important role in heightening 
the orphan works problem.” See Hansen, supra note 1127 at 2-3. 
1139 Hansen, ibid. 
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The first two causes relate primarily to the US, but the last two can be applied more globally. 
Sherman and Bentley point out to another general cause: Authors do not even realize that they 
have created a copyrightable work.1140 
The report notes the US orphan works system’s shortcomings, including the lack of an 
incentive to conduct a diligent search and meagre protection for rights-holders of orphan works. 
The report rejects most foreign models (like Canada’s) by claiming that despite creating a diligent 
search requirement, these systems are rarely used and are often limited in scope. Instead, the report 
suggests that users should still be allowed to rely on fair use, but that there should also be 
modifications made to the Shawn Bentley Act of 2008.1141  
Given the changes in technology and mass digitation,1142 the orphan works issue has 
become increasingly pressing. Legislators, courts, and academics are racing to keep up with the 
developments.1143  
                                                          
1140 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 330. 
1141 The modifications include: a notice of use provision, allowing judicial consideration of foreign determinations 
regarding the adequacy of searches, and an exception regarding the use of orphan works in derivative works. The 
report proposes that if users demonstrate good faith, do their due-diligence, give proper notice, and properly attribute 
the works or mark them with an orphan works symbol, they should be able to rely on the protection of fair use and be 
subject to only limited remedies. The report further suggests that the legislation include a definition of “due-diligence” 
and a list of best practices of searches. The report proposes that non-profit organizations that infringe copyright, should 
not be required to pay compensation so long as they cease their use immediately. There are several other suggestions, 
but the overarching theme is the need to balance the various competing interests, including the public interest. 
1142 Mass digitization is a related phenomenon which is exacerbated by the problem of orphan works. Mass digitization 
requires many licenses, which is difficult to obtain when there are so many orphan works. To address this issue, the 
Orphan Works and Mass Digitization report suggests creating an ECL framework (for educational purposes) where 
collective societies would collect royalties and would include an opt-out for rights-holder. 
1143 The IP Osgoode’s Hackathon was a particularly fruitful source of technology-related proposals. These included 
an IP compliance tool for music streaming; an app which would allow users to mark a work as an orphan work (similar 
to the trademark symbol), which would allow them to demonstrate good faith and may also aid in locating rights-
holders, a variety of navigation tools to make diligent searches easier; matchmaking tools to help locate rights-holders 
as well as companies providing license negotiation or diligent search services; and, a public-facing register. 
Participants in the Hackathon also offered policy considerations such as the collection of fees for system maintenance, 
the creation of an exception for library digitization projects, and the use of unpublished letters and archival material. 
They also suggested merging the orphan works scheme with the Canadian Intellectual Property Office and integrating 
Canadian and EU databases. 
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The orphan works problem has created a chilling effect which prevents potential users from 
using orphan works to create derivative works or reproductions of original works. Any solution 
devised to address this problem must balance the interests of authors, users, and the public: It must 
be transparent and provide certainty, but also be flexible enough to ensure fair outcomes. 
As discussed above, international models diverge, employing upstream models (requiring 
users to seek a license) or downstream ones (no license is required, but users must comply with 
the regulations). Some jurisdictions contemplate ex-post facto compensation while others require 
ex-ante compensation. Each model has its benefits and drawbacks.1144  
Tackling orphan issues requires a multi-tiered approach that includes policy changes, 
platform streamlining, better and more comprehensive databases, and more regulatory guidance. 
As D’Agostino and Hagan suggest, international government collaboration would increase access 
to resources and expand the knowledge base.1145 
Any AI authorship model must address orphan works challenges. For example, AIs might 
be labelled as “the authors” of a work while the public would own its economic rights. In this 
scenario, AI orphan works could be exempted.  
Alternatively, maybe there should be no digital orphan works, and orphan works legislation 
should be amended to include only human works. Orphan works should also be exempted for AI 
training and TDM. Given the importance of quality data to AI development, orphan works might 
act as a better alternative to more expensive and less accessible data. In balancing between orphan 
                                                          
1144 Common critiques are the limited scope of the legislation or the power of the regulatory body, the long processing 
times, the lack of transparency and certainty, systems which are difficult to navigate, the lack of regulatory guidance, 
the problematic engagement of collective societies and the burden placed on them, the lack of incentives for users to 
engage with the system and follow the regulations, and the limited resources available. 
1145 D’Agostino & Hagan, supra note 1128. 
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works rights-holders, the public, and the specific use of the works, the balance shifts towards 
creating an exception for orphan works AI databases. 
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3.3 WHO IS THE AUTHOR? 
My discussion focuses on authorship of a computer-generated or AI work, specifically on who 
should be the rightsholder of an AI’s output. Many entities are involved in the development of an 
AI and its subsequent creations,1146 so the question engages different players, each one of whom 
could be a legitimate rights-holder. Some players are at odds with each other 
(AI/public/programmer), others might be willing to share their rights (programmer/user), and still 
others may overlap (programmer/employee). 
First, the relationship between ownership and authorship is a preliminary and crucial 
consideration for answering the question in a “just” manner. Many copyright law frameworks – 
Canada’s, for example – make ownership dependent on authorship by granting the author 
copyright as the first owner.1147  
The concept of authorship was influenced by concepts of ownership (and property) and 
vice versa. Thus, “to ask who is the author of a computer-generated work is to ask who has 
ownership rights in it.”1148 From a doctrinal perspective, however, authorship and ownership can 
be kept apart as two distinct concepts. The presence of one does not necessarily make the other 
present too. Regardless, authorship and ownership affect each other significantly, making a 
separation process very difficult. 
Second, is a lack of consensus among IP scholars that AI could be an author or should be 
treated differently from “pen-and-paper works”.1149 Grimmelmann, for example, argues that there 
                                                          
1146 Yanisky-Ravid and Liu outline ten entities: programmers, data suppliers, trainers and feedback suppliers, AI 
systems owners, AI operators [i.e., the users], new employers, the public, the government, investors and the AI system 
itself. Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 293 at 2231-2233; See also Boyden, supra note 714 at 378. 
1147 Copyright Act, RSC 1985, supra note 590, s 13(1). 
1148 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1189-1190.  
1149 James Grimmelmann, “There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work – And it’s a Good Thing, Too” 
(2016) 39 Colum J L & Arts 404 at 406 Grimmelmann states that “[e]very kind of copyrighted work can be – and 
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is nothing new under the sun, and “[w]e can imagine a digital creative process that perfectly 
parallels any analog one.”1150 Grimmelmann claims that these considerations, “have been with us 
since the Statue of Anne” and will remain with us “as long as copyright considers it important to 
assign ownership of a work to an ‘author’ who is causally responsible for the work’s existence.”1151  
Ginsburg & Budiardjo have stated further that “computers today, and for proximate 
tomorrows … would not qualify as ‘authors’. Asking whether a computer can be an author 
therefore is not a fruitful inquiry.”1152 Other scholars contend that IP law might not be relevant in 
the future for both human and non-human alike. As I already explained, I do not share these 
assumptions. 
In this section, I will present the directions that AI authorship might take in the future. First, 
I will address the main players who have a substantial claim to AI’s authorship: the programmer, 
the user, and the AI. Second, I will address the “no authorship” alternatives; these can be framed 
in different ways, such as public rights or government ownership. Finally, I will address two other 
rights models: author in law, and AI moral rights. 
My analysis centres around the traditional copyright framework; but I will make further 
policy observations and consider alternative legal frameworks where applicable. I am willing to 
establish that the computer or AI is the author of its own independent computer-generated work 
(i.e., where no human involvement occurred). In past and current stages of computer-assisted 
                                                          
regularly is – created using computers.” Microsoft Word, Apple Pages etc. for literary works; Sibelius, Noteflight for 
musical works; Adobe Photoshop for pictures and graphics and so on.  
1150 Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work, supra note 1149 at 407. 
1151 Ibid at 404. Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 6, echo Grimmelmann in a recent paper, stating that “the 
questions artificial intelligence (AI) raises precede the digital era. They arose with the advent of photography, and 
persist whenever a work’s creator incorporates uncontrolled forces, whether faunal or meteorological, mechanical or 
digital, to generate the work.” Therefore, they conclude, at 53, that “generative machines should be examined through 
the lens of copyright’s previous treatment of tools and amanuenses […].” 
1152 Ginsburg & Budiardjo, ibid at 6-7. 
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works – when the program operates merely as a tool – the programmer, user, or owner of the 
program should be considered as an author (reserving all subsequent rights, economic or moral, 
when applicable). 
In the next stage of development – generated by computer alone – the complexities 
snowball. The courts will most likely prefer to establish human impact on the creation (even minor) 
to avoid allocating legal rights to AIs. This approach might suffice, but only for a while. As 
technology advances, sustaining this legal framework would be difficult, and thus we should 
consider other alternatives.1153  
A collaborative legal framework might be prudent in this next stage, one that involves joint 
authorship or ownership between one or more of the key players and the AI. Under this model, 
either rights would be assigned to the public – making the work available for use for a short period 
– or profits would be invested in government foundations for public causes. The only restriction 
on this model would be an obligation to attribute the creation to the AI or computer that created 
the work. As several scholars suggest, attributing computer-AI rights is essential to avoid potential 
exploitation, manipulation, and degradation of those works. It is also vital to promoting the 
integrity of knowledge. 
In the final stage, if and when we reach singularity, it is hard to predict what might happen 
and what authorship model may fit. I suggest, however, that we do not discriminate between human 
and non-human creations at that stage. I advocate for AI rights or at least a limited set of moral 
rights that recognize an AI’s attachment to its creations. 
                                                          
1153 In discussing alternative models for computer-generated or AI authorship, I am willing to consider other ideas, 
such as assigning the programmer the neighbouring rights in the works for a limited time. 
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3.3.1 The Programmer 
The first and most favourable candidate for AI authorship is the programmer.1154 We should 
distinguish between two different models for the programmer:  
1. the “basic” – authorship in the AI’s program itself; and  
2. the “basic plus” – authorship in both the AI’s program and the AI’s output. 
As CONTU explains, “[a]uthorship of the program or of the input data is entirely separate from 
authorship of the final work, just as authorship of a translation of a book is distinct from authorship 
of the original work.”1155 Unfortunately, looking to CONTU’s recommendations for guidance 
might not prove very useful.1156 
At the present stage of AI development, programmers might have more substantial claims 
for authorship in the computer-generated or AI output because a line can be clearly drawn between 
programming and the program’s output. As AI develops, however, that line weakens along with 
an authorship claim.  
When a programmer creates an AI capable – by its definition and basic code – of changing 
its own algorithm, its creation process, and the creation itself, the line might disappear entirely. As 
Wu observes, “The programmer does not cause the output to be fixed in a tangible medium, 
because of the user’s intervention, or the randomness built into the program.”1157  
                                                          
1154 There could be more than one programmer or, for that purpose, a company that employs a group of programmers. 
1155 CONTU, supra note 621 at 45.  
1156 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1195, footnote 34: “CONTU did not explain why it thought the failure to get 
permission to use a copyrighted program or data base (something the copyright owner normally has no statutory 
authority to control) would “limit or negate” the user’s copyright in the output.” CONTU, ibid at 45-6: “It is, of course, 
incumbent on the creator of the final work to obtain appropriate permission from any other person who is the proprietor 
of a program or data base used in the creation of the ultimate work. The unlawful use of a program or data base might 
limit or negate the author's claim of copyright in the ultimate work, just as the failure of a translator to obtain a license 
from the proprietor of the translated work might prevent securing copyright in and making use of the translation.”  
1157 Wu, supra note 14 at 171. 
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The programmer of such a program might have authorship (and patent) rights to the AI 
program, but his claim to the output diminishes. Vaver would agree, “Where the programmer has 
no control or creative choice over what the translation program is applied to, and the source work 
owner has no control or creative choice over the workings of the program, neither deserves to be 
called an author […].”1158  
Ginsburg and Budiardjo imply that surrendering too much control over the execution of a 
work calls into question whether the “initial conception of the work was anything more than a 
general idea.”1159 In Kelley v Chicago Park, the Seventh Circuit, seem to accept the notion that 
when an author (or a programmer) has limited control on the outcome, assigning copyright 
protection might be challenging.1160 However, they do seem to agree that the programmer “of fully 
generative machines … which create works without further intervention or input [i.e., randomly] 
can be the author of the resulting outputs.”1161  
Lack of connection between the programmer and the resulting output of the computer-
generated or AI program “does not destroy the designers’ authorship claims any more than the 
lack of a direct connection between the nature photographers’ minds and the expressive aesthetic 
                                                          
1158 Vaver, Translation and Copyright, supra note 718 at 162. Vaver explains the CDPA position stating that “[t]he 
reason for protection has nothing to do with encouraging human creativity and everything to do with protecting the 
product of capital investment from unfair competition or misappropriation.” 
1159 Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 20. They further explain, at 33: “[I]f an artist fully develops a creative 
plan or conception for a work … but does not control the execution of that plan (instead delegating the execution to a 
force beyond the author’s control), the artist may not be an ‘author’ in the copyright law sense.” The same is true to 
programmers.  
1160 635 F (3d) 290 (7th Cir 2011). In Kelly, the court discussed whether a living garden could be considered a work 
under copyright law. In rejecting copyright claims, the court held that forces of nature cannot be copyrighted. This 
decision is controversial and was criticized by several scholars. See e.g. Jani McCutcheon, “Natural Causes: When 
Author Meets Nature in Copyright Law and Art. Some Observations Inspired by Kelley v Chicago Park District” 
(2018) 86 U Cin L Rev 707. 
1161 Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 71: “[C]opyright law does not always require an author to hold in her 
mind a precise mental image of the work she sets out to create. The essence of the conception requirement is the 
formulation of a complete creative plan for the work.” 
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content of their works destroys those photographers’ ability to claim authorship over their 
images.”1162 
Several justifications exist to adopt a programmer-based authorship model. First, the 
programmer is responsible for the AI program’s creation by providing creativity, skill, and labour 
to the program,1163 and crucially influences the creation process. Using the labour-based 
justifications, “even though it may be a fruit he had not envisioned” the programmer is normatively 
entitled to his or her reward for the fruits of his or her labour in making the program.1164 According 
to this perspective, the AI program and all subsequent products are the results of the programmer’s 
labour. From a utilitarian perspective, the programmer must be incentivized to create the program; 
without awarding copyright, there would be no incentive for creating or improving AI 
programs.1165 Tying this together, the programmer authorship model requires no significant 
changes to the existing authorship legal framework. Several jurisdictions have already adopted a 
programmer-based model, including the UK.1166 
By default, allocating authorship to the programmer is both normatively and doctrinally 
justified. Advocating a programmer authorship model as a default, however, should not mean that 
the programmer be designated as owner in all cases and circumstances. It equally should not extend 
copyright to the maximum length of fifty or seventy years. So, while the current legal framework 
grants programmers’ copyright in both the program and its output,1167 I argue for a new model that 
                                                          
1162 Ibid. 
1163 Bridy, supra note 423 at 51, further offers that “[i]ntuition and the principle of transitivity both suggest that the 
programmer of generative software is the logical owner of the copyright in the works generated by his or her software. 
He or she is, after all, the author of the author of the works.” 
1164 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1205. 
1165 Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 236 at 706-707: “Developing AI systems capable of creating 
works of authorship is a great accomplishment. Therefore, it may make sense to grant programmers the copyrights of 
works created by AI systems to recognize the magnitude of that accomplishment.” 
1166 CDPA, s 9(3), which indicate that the author of a computer-generated work “shall be taken to be the person by 
whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.” 
1167 See e.g. Software Directive, supra note 641. 
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would limit copyright for both the program and its output. We should, however, distinguish 
between copyright protection for the program and the output of the program. It might be 
normatively justified to offer a more extended protection period for the former.1168 
In earlier chapters, I presented models by Parchomovsky, Siegelman, and Stein, who 
advocate for a more balanced approach to IP and copyright protection that correlates the level of 
protection awarded to the level of originality of the creation.1169 These innovative approaches 
might offer a good alternative for establishing the level of protection for the programmer. 
Further, given the differences between AI programs (advanced AI programs and more basic 
programs), there are normative justifications for limiting the scope of protection to the programmer 
even where copyright protection is a desirable outcome.1170 AI programs have a shorter lifespan 
than other programs. Extending copyright protection for a long period would hinder the ability to 
develop additional applications or make changes to the program, which is a socially desirable 
outcome. A limited balanced copyright model for AI programs would incentivize more AI 
research. 
From a policy perspective, assigning copyright in the AI’s output to the programmer 
overstretches the authorship concept to any creator of intellectual labour. Given the length of 
copyright protection, broadening the scope of authorship might adversely shift the balance in other 
IP regimes. Take patenting, for example, where strengthening programmers would strengthen 
large companies and developers like Google and Microsoft at the expense of the public and other 
small players. 
                                                          
1168 Considering, for example, the time and investment of the programmer in making the program.  
1169 Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 426 at 1458; Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 427 at 1507. 
1170 These considerations extend the scope of my research. We should not extend the maximum length of copyright 
protection for the programs (50 to 70 years). In my opinion, even patent models of 15-20 years is too much.  
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Samuelson provides further counter-arguments against a programmer-based model. For 
starter, “[i]f the programmer chooses to exploit the value of the program by charging a significant 
fee for its acquisition, it seems only fair that he agrees to yield some of his rights to those who 
have paid for that right.”1171 Samuelson also explains why expectations between the parties – the 
user and the programmer – justify that the programmer would not be able to claim copyright in the 
computer-generated/AI creations: 1172 
“Granting all rights to the programmer would mean that the programmer would 
automatically own everything the program was capable of generating. This solution over-
rewards the programmer, particularly in light of the fact that the programmer is no more 
able to anticipate the output than anyone else.”  
Even in the limited cases that discuss computer-generated or AI copyright “courts have 
consistently taken the pragmatic approach of attributing authorship for copyright purposes to the 
person who held the pen and did the actual writing.”1173  
While there are good justifications for assigning programmers copyright in the program 
itself,1174 there are reasons not to assign copyright in the AI’s output: “Just as we do not need to 
incentivize programmers to create works of authorship in which they do not have any creative 
input, we do not need to recognize a programmer for an artistic accomplishment that is not his or 
her own.”1175 Dorotheou agrees that when “the connection between the programmer’s work […] 
                                                          
1171 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1207. This argument, however, is challenging in cases in which the programmer 
charges no fee like in open source programs. Freeware, creative commons, or ad-revenue based software models skirt 
this argument.  
1172 Ibid at 1208. 
1173 Bridy, supra note 423 at 50. 
1174 An interesting case is Nova v Mazooma, in which Kitchin L. J. debated whether authorship in a computer-generated 
work subsides with the programmer or the user, ruling for the programmer, which was responsible for designing the 
games. Nova Productions [2006], supra note 746.  
1175 Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 236 at 707. See also Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 293 at 
2236: “[W]e do not challenge the eligibility of the programmer to be entitled to ownership according to copyright 
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and the final work is too remote […] [t]here can no longer be a link to the programmer, irrespective 
of whether the programmer was the original creator.”1176  
Arguments in favour of assigning copyright in the AI’s works to the programmer posit the 
view that this is the most prudent and doctrinally reasonable policy. Even if we follow the 
suggested logic that AI program and the AI’s output should be assigned to the programmer, we 
might be creating an even bigger problem concerning the enforceability of the rights over the AI’s 
output.1177  
In between the “no copyright” and “all copyright” to the programmer’s, a middle ground 
approach might help to resolve the issue. Similar to patents and Parchomovsky’s model, the 
programmer could be granted a neighbouring right in the AI’s output for a limited time.1178 The 
Canadian Copyright Act contains several neighbouring rights. Between the songwriter and the 
maker of the recording, the latter retains neighbouring rights solely in the recording, while the 
songwriter retains authorship rights in the composed music.  
Translating this model to AI, the songwriter becomes the programmer – the musical 
composition assimilated to the AI program – and is thus entitled to copyright for that program. 
Neighbouring rights in the AI’s output then falls to the programmer, the user, or the AI depending 
on the circumstances of the output’s generation.  
                                                          
laws governing the software she or he develops … On the other hand, this entitlement does not automatically result 
in ownership over the products and processes created by AI systems.” 
1176 Dorotheou, supra note 423 at 90. 
1177 Wu addressed these concerns back in 1997 arguing that “[a] major practical problem with awarding copyright 
ownership to the programmer is enforceability. Is the user expected to notify the programmer and voluntary pay 
royalties every time the user uses the program to generate another work? More likely, the user will have an incentive 
to conceal the output, and the programmer will have a choice of licensing the software into a shroud of distrust and 
suspicion or avoid licensing the software altogether.” However, as Wu pointed out, this situation is no different from 
enforcing any licensing agreement. Wu, supra note 14 at 171.  
1178 Part II to the Copyright Act, RSC 1985, supra note 590, outlines the legal framework for protecting neighbouring 
rights (for example performance and sound recording).  
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In reflecting between the different models I have presented above, and will discuss below, 
under our present level of computer-generated or AI development programmers and users – are 
better candidates for AI’s neighbouring rights. As for those neighbouring right’s protection terms, 
the EU database protection of fifteen years might serve as a benchmark.1179 I would suggest a 
limited term of no more than five years because that length is more appealing to current legal and 
technological levels and thus could be applied without posing significant difficulties.1180 
3.3.2 The User 
Deciding authorship between AI, users and programmers reminds me of the famous Bible story, 
the Judgment of Solomon:1181 Two women claim to be a baby’s mother and, to resolve the dispute, 
King Solomon suggests cutting the baby in half to give one half to each mother (only the true 
mother, of course, refuses the offer by demanding that her beloved child remain intact). Here, 
instead of a baby, users and programmers both have claims to a computer-generated or AI 
“baby”.1182  
As with the Bible story, determining ownership (parenthood) is difficult, because “[t]he 
resulting work might be virtually identical to the program, or it might be virtually identical to the 
user’s input, or it might be similar to both, but identical to neither, and we will have to inspect the 
expression in the program, the input, and the work to say for sure which is the case.”1183  
                                                          
1179 EU, Commission Directive (EC) 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, [1996] OJ, L 
77/20 at art 10(1) [Database Directive]. 
1180 Five years might seem arbitrary. In a way it is. There are reasons to limit protection to software. As I explained in 
Part II, programs have a very limited lifespan. The lifespan of a smartphone’s application, for example, is only a few 
weeks. We can expect that with advancements in technology AI and machine-learning programs’ lifespan would be 
even shorter. Under this assumption, offering the programmer longer protection is not justified and less reasonable to 
sustain under the utilitarian approach (which is the strongest basis for assigning copyright protection to the 
programmer).  
1181 1 Kings 3:16–28. 
1182 Some authors, however, compare a song to a baby – Yehonatan Geffen, a famous Israeli composer, for example, 
wrote in The Sixteen Sheep album – “How a song is born? Like a newborn baby.”  
1183 Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work, supra note 1149 at 411. 
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Bruce Boyden suggests seeing authorship as a spectrum where, as “the programmer 
contribution increases, the user’s decreases and vice versa.”1184 Accordingly he says that,1185 
“[D]etermining the authorship of a work will depend on whose meaning or message is 
embodied in that work … whether a computer-generated work transmits a person’s 
meaning or message correlates with whether they would be able to predict the output of 
the computer program in operation.” 
In our current stage of AI development, computer-generated output derived from simple software 
– akin to a Microsoft Word document or Adobe Photoshop image – falls into the user-heavy 
extreme of the spectrum. Once the program is released, the resulting documents or images are 
exclusively created by users, not the programmers.1186  
At the other programmer-heavy extreme, we might find a CD played by a software 
program, or a “Choose Your Own Adventure” story in which the user can choose a path from an 
infinite number of options.1187 Boyden concludes that “at least at the extremes what determines 
authorship of the output of a computer is whether a person’s intended meaning reliably or 
predictably forms part of that output.”1188  
                                                          
1184 Boyden, supra note 714 at 387. 
1185 Ibid at 385. 
1186 Unless the programmer happens to be a user, and in such a case the programmer would simply be classified as a 
user. 
1187 Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 35, further explain: “We might conclude that the reader [i.e., the user] 
is not the author of the sequence because he has contributed nothing that the initial author [i.e., the programmer] has 
not foreseen; the author has preset the content of each option, and the combinations of options, though numerous, 
remain a very finite universe.” In other words, even if the user is in fact the creator of the output, given that its creation 
was limited to the programmer’s conceptions and ideas, and could not exceed the programmer’s plan, the user could 
not be labled as the “author” of the output. The courts reached a similar outcome in videogames cases. In Midway Mfg 
Co v Artic Int’l Inc, 704 F (2d) 1009 at 1012 (7th Cir 1983) the court held: “Playing a video game is more like changing 
channels on a television than it is like writing a novel or painting a picture. The player of a video game does not have 
control over the sequence of images that appears on the video game screen. He cannot create any sequence he wants 
out of the images stored on the game’s circuit boards. The most he can do is choose one of the limited number of 
sequences the game allows him to choose. He is unlike a writer or a painter because the video game in effect writes 
the sentences and paints the painting for him; he merely chooses one of the sentences stored in its memory, one of the 
paintings stored in its collection.” 
1188 Boyden, supra note 714 at 387. 
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 Ginsburg & Budiardjo provide a somewhat similar view on the matter. Instead of a 
spectrum, they suggest a binary model between upstream and downstream creators. The upstream 
creator will be the sole author if he or she controls “the downstream contributor’s process of 
execution,” reducing the latter to a “[…] ‘mere amanuensis’, or to selecting among outcomes the 
upstream contributor has anticipated and build into the work.” The downstream creator would be 
the sole author if the upstream creator “provided only an unprotected idea, which the downstream 
creator has elaborated into detailed conception.”1189 The upstream might be considered “the 
programmer” and the downstream “the user”.  
There are several good arguments that favour granting users AI authorship. In computer-
assisted works (e.g., Microsoft Word), the case for a user’s authorship is self-explanatory: The 
program operates as a pen,1190 and the user – not the programmer – authors the work. As 
Grimmelmann suggests, “[W]here the program is Finale [musical composition software] and the 
work is a string quartet, the user is the author of that musical work.”1191 As long as the user employs 
his or her skill, labour and creativity in creating the work, it is logical that authorship should be 
assigned to the user,1192 who – as Samuelson adds – should then “be free to exploit this product 
commercially.”1193  
Conversely, the user’s claim to authorship weakens when his role becomes insignificant or 
trivial and his input in the creative process diminishes. An example would be cases where the user 
                                                          
1189 Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 34.  
1190 As Justice Whitford expressed in Express Newspapers, supra note 728 at 1093. 
1191 Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work, supra note 1149 at 409-410. 
Grimmelmann further explains that there is no real issue with the fact that in some cases the only difference between 
users who are authors and users who are not is a push of a button: “The user who pushes a button on a music box to 
start it playing is not an author; the user who pushes a button on a camera to take photograph is.” 
1192 Obviously, as the role of the user diminishes, and other contenders appear, the user’s claim for authorship is 
weakened. 
1193 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1192. The only exception, Samuelson explains, “should be for instances in which 
the work generated by a computer incorporates a substantial block of recognizable expression from the copyrighted 
program.” 
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only initiates the program that then performs its own self-sufficient AI program or pre-conditioned 
codes.1194 Indeed, “where the program displays a fifteen-second animation of fireworks whenever 
the user pushes the space bar, the programmer is the author of that audiovisual work.” Jane 
Ginsburg echoes Grimmelmann, stating that while “Pope Julius II may have commissioned the 
painting of the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel … the author of the frescos remains Michelangelo.”1195 
As technology and AI progresses, a user’s claim (or AI) for authorship in the output might 
wane where the programmer’s claim grows. This will occur particularly where the program 
expresses more independence, clearly increasing the programmer’s influence on the outcome. 
Guadamuz aims to solve this ambiguity by simply “reading the letter of the law and applying it on 
a case by case basis.1196 If the artificial agent is directly started by the programmer, and it creates 
a work of art, then the programmer is clearly the author … However, if a user acquires a program 
capable of producing computer-generated works, and uses it to generate a new work, then 
ownership would go to the user.”1197  
Guadamuz’s distinction seems reasonable. A user’s influence on the creative process might 
justify allocating copyright to him and not to the programmer or the AI. Ginsburg and Budiardjo 
explain that “[t]he user’s creative contribution interrupts the designer’s authorship claim.”1198 Thus, 
a “potential distinction is whether the user supplies anything new to the machine, or whether the 
                                                          
1194 Ibid at 1201: “It is difficult to justify user authorship when the role of the user of a generator program has been 
reduced to merely causing the output to be generated (for example, typing the word ‘compose’ in a music generator 
program).” 
1195 Ginsburg, People Not Machines, supra note 795 at 134. Ginsburg adds: “Were a future Julius IV to instruct a 
computer to interrogate its comprehensive database of religious art to devise and paint a sequence of Old Testament 
scenes, that Julius would no more be the author of the output than was his forebear.” 
1196 In Toronto Real Estate Board v Commissioner of Competition, 2017 FCA 236 (CanLII), online: 
<http://canlii.ca/t/hp34l>, the Federal Court of Appeal of Ontario, reached a similar conclusion, stating, para 185: 
“The point of demarcation between a work of sufficient skill and judgment to warrant a finding of originality and 
something less than that – a mere mechanical exercise – is not always self-evident. This is particularly so in the case 
of compilations. It is, however, within the parameters of the legal test, a highly contextual and factual determination.” 
1197 Guadamuz, supra note 422 at 176. 
1198 Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 83. 
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output is necessarily a rearrangement of elements already within the machine.”1199 Samuelson 
agrees, “Whatever the user does to the text thereafter to edit or change it will, of course, create the 
basis for saying that the user may be an author of those portions of the text that he modified.” She 
argues that users cannot be authors of or claim IP rights to unmodified portions, or “perfect” raw 
output.1200  
Ginsburg and Budiardjo offer a different distinction – the possible anticipation test. When 
the programmers “define and bound the downstream creator’s role” (i.e., the user), the user “does 
not disrupt the upstream creator’s claim of authorship”, and thus the programmers would be 
designated as authors.1201 However, “when the upstream creator’s creative plan for the work does 
not limit the downstream user’s creative autonomy, and instead relies on the downstream creator 
to endow the work with additional (and unforeseeable) creative content, the upstream creator 
cannot claim to be the sole author of the resulting work.”1202 In determining ownership, the 
Ginsburg and Budiardjo model apply torts foreseeability reasoning, asking “whether the upstream 
creator could have anticipated what the downstream user would do to ‘complete’ the work.”1203  
An argument against user-authorship model is the “free rider” principle. Assigning 
copyright to users – especially those with minimal contributions to the creation process – 
disincentivizes programmers and other players from investing in technology (as discussed later, 
this argument also applies when assigning copyright to the AI or to the public).1204 In response to 
                                                          
1199 Ibid at 86. 
1200 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1201: “Under the traditional paradigm of copyright, the answer to these questions 
would seem to be ‘no’.”  
1201 Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 88. In this scenario, “the upstream creator has effected a limited 
delegation of creative control to the downstream creator, who simply completes the upstream creator’s creative plan 
by making a relatively foreseeable choice – pushing a button, choosing between a limited set of parameters or settings, 
or moving a joystick to proceed through a simple videogame.” 
1202 Ibid at 88-9. 
1203 Ibid at 89. Ginsburg & Budiardjo explain that the test “would not inquire whether the machine’s designer actually 
anticipated the result.” 
1204 Dorotheou, supra note 423 at 91; See also Perry & Margoni, supra note 779. 
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this argument, Wu endorses a basic contractual arrangement to balance the claims of programmers 
and users, “A programmer could always make the program more attractive to users by specifying 
in the software license that the user has certain rights to works generated by the program.”1205 If 
the parties behave rationally, we can assume that the market would drive the program’s price and 
reflect an arrangement that maintains incentives to create and improve the program, while 
providing a worthwhile enough user experience that users continue purchasing or entering a 
licensing agreement for that program.  
Other arguments against user-authorship include Hristov’s position that since users “have 
the smallest contribution to the initial development of AI, their claim for authorship is the least 
compelling”,1206 so “[b]y losing copyright claims to end users, owners and programmers may 
restrict the use of AI by third parties.”1207 
Despite this, there are still good statutory reasons to allocate authorship to users. One is 
that “the user will have been the instrument of fixation”, which copyright law traditionally grants 
as the author. US courts share a narrower view on fixation,1208 rejecting user-authorship arguments 
in Stern Electronics and William Electronics that the user – not the programmer – fixed the work 
and is entitled to authorship.1209 Nichols argues, however, that the factual basis that led the US 
courts to that conclusion is quickly disintegrating, “The vastly enhanced complexity of today’s 
                                                          
1205 Wu, supra note 14 at 162-163.  
1206 Hristov, supra note 422 at 444. 
1207 Ibid. 
1208 Stern Electronics, Supra note 634; Williams Electronics, supra note 632. 
1209 Wu, supra note 14 at 151: “The Second Circuit rejected the argument because ‘many aspects of the display remain 
constant … regardless of how the player operates the controls’ and this ‘repetitive sequence of a substantial portion 
of the sights and sounds of the game’ qualifies for copyright protection.” 
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games makes the fixation inquiry for the purposes of a game publisher’s claim to an audiovisual 
work much more difficult.”1210  
Samuelson provides this policy consideration as a counter to the disincentivization 
argument: The program’s programmer or owner was already compensated for the right to use the 
program, either by the user’s purchase or license.1211  
Moreover, users “are in the best position to take the initial steps that will bring a work into 
the marketplace.”1212 Thus, the user authorship model serves society’s interests better. As 
Samuelson noted before Feist,1213 many jurisdictions’ low originality standards support user 
authorship.1214 Under the US’s current originality standard, it would be more difficult to justify 
originality for mere button-pushing, but in the UK and other jurisdictions, user-authorship through 
low-originality standards has a stronger foothold.1215  
Looking for guidance in the case law toward user-authorship provides little help, as 
jurisprudence on it is scant. In the UK, Kitchin L. J. acknowledged the user’s impact on the creation 
process, stating in Nova Productions v Mazooma Games that “[t]he appearance of any particular 
                                                          
1210 W Joss Nicholas, “Painting through Pixels: The Case for a Copyright in Videogame Play” (2007) 30 Colum J L 
& Arts 101 at 115. Nicholas further suggests, ibid at 116: “Today, videogame play lies on a spectrum of interaction 
ranging between ‘changing channels on a television’ and ‘writing a novel’. As it approaches the latter, a game 
producer’s claim to the game itself as an audiovisual work diminishes. Instead, the focus turns to the videogame play: 
who creates it and who, if anyone, owns it? Thus, we are back to the issue first discussed in the introduction of this 
Article: what are the copyright implications when third parties complete the novel?” I would add that Nicholas’ paper 
dated more than a decade ago and, if anything, his conclusion is more relevant today. 
1211 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1203. Samuelson offers further policy considerations. For example, the ability of 
the user to play a greater role “in shaping the output into a commercially valuable form”, and that the user “may use 
the program for functions that are beyond the programmer’s expertise” (utilize a program for developing some 
architectural plans can only be done by an experienced architect user). 
1212 Ibid at 1227. 
1213 Feist, supra note 440. 
1214 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1202: “One who tape-records a live performance of improvised jazz, for example, 
is considered the ‘author’ of the sound recording thereby under copyright law, even though the creative input by the 
user of the recorder might be limited to pressing the ‘record’ button.” 
1215 I will address AI copyright standard in the following chapters. 
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screen depends to some extent on the way the game is being played.”1216 Even if the user has some 
impact, however, Kitchin L. J. ruled against any authorship claim since the user’s “input is not 
artistic in nature and he has contributed no skill or labour of an artistic kind. Nor has he undertaken 
any of the arrangements necessary for the creation of the frame images. All he has done is to play 
the game.”1217  
On the first reading of Nova, it seems that Kitchin L. J.’s view on the user’s artistic 
contribution to the computer-generated or AI sets the bar high for a user’s authorship. This high 
bar makes programmers – at least in the UK – natural candidates for authorship in both the program 
and its output. On a second reading, however, I suggest that Nova’s ruling offers guidance to a 
user’s authorship in computer-generated or AI works, depending on the user’s influence on the 
creative process. In Nova, the user’s impact was limited to following the original design dictated 
by the programmer and can be distinguished from cases where the user has more liberty in the 
creation process and effectively changes the outset of the program’s output. 
In Torah Soft Ltd v Drosnin,1218 and Rearden, LLC v Walt Disney,1219 the US courts 
established “whether the user’s contribution constituted the ‘lion’s share of the creativity’ and thus 
superseded the authorship claim of the designer of the program.”1220 And, although in Walt Disney 
the court relied on the Torah Soft decision, it reached a different outcome, concluding that “unlike 
in Torah Soft, where the user merely inputs a word into the program, MOVA Contour’s user inputs 
                                                          
1216 Guadamuz, supra note 422 at 177; Nova Productions [2006], supra note 746. See also Navitaire v EasyJet, [2004] 
EWHC 1725 (Ch).  
1217 Nova Productions [2006], ibid at para 106. 
1218 136 F Supp (2d) 276 (SDNY 2001). 
1219 293 F Supp (3d) 963 (Dist Ct Cal 2018). 
1220 Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 85. 
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a two dimensional camera capture that may range from [an actor’s] facial expressions … to the 
[actor’s] subtle and dynamic motions.”1221  
The Australian Federal Court addressed a case similar to Nova in Acohs Pty Ltd v Ucorp 
Pty Ltd.1222 In that case, Judge Jessup dismissed Acohs’ appeal of a copyright infringement and 
upheld the finding that the very basic computer program’s output is not protected under copyright 
law,1223 since “the source code as a work … was not written by any single human author” but, 
rather, was generated by a computer.1224 Acohs follows a rigorous and conservative approach 
toward computer programs. Judge Jessup held that users could not be the authors of the program’s 
output since “[t]hey were not computer programmers, and there is no suggestion that they either 
understood source code or ever had a perception of the body of source code which was relevant to 
the MSDSs [i.e., the program’s output] on which they worked.”1225  
This false equivalency between programming capabilities and the creative process is 
problematic. A painter need not understand basic chemistry to be assigned copyright in his or her 
painting; nor must a writer have a mechanical understanding of typewriters or the code underlying 
Microsoft Word. 
Where an AI is self-sufficient – capable of performing without any human influence or 
guidance – a different user-related issue arises. Here, the user might supervise the AI, ensuring it 
causes no harm or does not diverge from its purpose designation. Under this framework, a user’s 
                                                          
1221 Walt Disney, supra note 1219 at 971. In Torah Soft the user only insert terms in a “google translate” style and the 
program searched the biblical database, re-organized the terms according to its designed algorithm and created a matrix 
of Bible code with the user’s term. 
1222 [2010] FCA 577, 86 IPR 492. The case was appealed, though the result concerning the originality and copyright 
was not changed, see Acohs Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd, [2012] FCAFC 16, 201 FCR 173; see also Guadamuz, supra 
note 422 at 183-4. 
1223 The program provided guidelines for preparing Material Safety Data Sheet (“MSDS”). 
1224 Acohs, supra note 1222 at para 50. 
1225 Ibid at para 52. 
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authorship might seem unjustified, and the authorship pendulum might shift to the programmer 
depending on the autonomous level of the program.1226 In a recent paper, Yanisky-Ravid argues 
for a user-authorship model in which the users “bear accountability for the systems’ production, 
in addition to the benefits thereof.”1227  
Yanisky-Ravid model is rooted in incentive theory and claims – similarly to Samuelson – 
that a “legally sanctioned monopoly allows the users to use, sell, or distribute the works more 
efficiently, as well as to be accountable for avoiding infringements and counterfeits.”1228  
                                                          
1226 For example, if the program follows the programmer’s instructions or even if the program accomplished the 
programmer original purpose. 
1227 Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 236 at 707. Automated and AI systems pose interesting 
questions concerning criminal and liability (tortious) implications. First and foremost, these discussion aims to 
consider who is responsible for AI wrongdoings. I did not address these issues in previous parts for fear of 
overstretching my dissertation to the far-reaching areas of the legal galaxy. Having stated that, I am aware of the 
liability and criminal concerns pose by machines both in the context of IP (patent, trademarks, and copyright) and in 
other areas such as ethics, corporate liability, and economics. See e.g. Amar Kumar Moolayil, “The Modern Trolley 
Problem: Ethical and Economically-Sound Liability Schemes for Autonomous Vehicles” (2018) 9 JL & Tech & 
Internet 1; Gabriel Hallevy, When Robots Kill: Artificial Intelligence under Criminal Law (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 2013); Rachel Charney, “When Robots Kill: Artificial Intelligence Under the Criminal Law” (2015) 
73:1 UTLJ 69; Scherer, Regulating AI, supra note 220. In the context of IP, machine-learning or AI systems could 
potentially infringe a patent (by producing a patented invention) or infringe authors’ work (by using a book as part of 
its database). When there are several parties involved, responsibility might fall to the human individual or company. 
However, given that under US patent law, for example, “only individuals can infringe on a patent”, it might be legally 
impossible to include AI systems as part of a legal suit for infringement. This situation might prove even more 
problematic when the connection between the AI’s programmer and its output (the infringement) is limited. As I 
explained in Part I, AI is expected to act on its own in a process that might not be intended (or foreseeable) by its 
programmers. Obviously, if an AI causes damages, there must be a way to compensate the affected parties. To resolve 
this harmful potential, we must address several issues. First, resolving data barriers, which I discussed in the previous 
chapter. Second, creating a database that would be available for AI and machine-learning programs for assessment of 
infringing potential. However, this solution also poses a challenge – by creating this database, individuals and 
companies would also expose their innovations, which might not be well accepted. On the other hand, there are 
government database for patent and we might find a way to develop a method to employ the government database for 
this purpose. Third, contractual or insurance solutions might present alternative approaches. We could require 
programmers to insure their AI for possible infringements in the future. See e.g. Bridget Watson, “A Mind of Its Own 
- Direct Infringement by Users of Artificial Intelligence Systems” (2017) 58:1 IDEA 65 at 69 (in the context of patent 
infringements). Peter Menell offered a different suggestion to implant specific standards as part of the algorithms 
code. We could consider creating an algorithm that would be able to provide similar guidelines for AI and machine-
learning systems or using these standards in other AI technology. Further, by enabling an AI hybrid standard 
algorithm, we could save administrative costs – these algorithms could be more efficient in locating infringements 
and issue decisions. See Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, supra note 612. 
1228 Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, ibid at 712. 
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While Yanisky-Ravid user-authorship approach might seems a prudent legal solution, it is 
actually far from satisfactory. Her model assumes that the user affects the AI output and thus is 
the better candidate for authorship. Given expected developments in technology, her model 
remains either irrelevant or mostly relevant to present computer-generated developments and not 
to the expected self-sufficient, independent AI, under which the user might become a supervisor.  
 Yanisky-Ravid’s arguments follow CONTU’s reasoning, albeit partially. CONTU’s report 
advised awarding authorship to the user since the user is the computer “employer”. However, as 
pointed out by Samuelson, this is easier said than done, given that more than one person uses the 
program with varying degrees of responsibility.1229 CONTU noted, however, that the same 
company usually employs all persons as part of the creation process, making copyright allocation 
more practical.1230  
 At the beginning of this section, I compared the programmer-user scenario to the two 
maternal candidates before King Solomon. Wise Solomon “solved” the issue by suggesting cutting 
the boy in two and giving each woman a half. The story ended with Solomon ruling in favour of 
the mother who refused to cut the baby because she would rather give the baby to the other mother 
than kill him. Given the complexities described above, perhaps adopting a Solomon ruling is not 
a bad idea for programs and users: “cut” the rights in two,1231 giving half to the programmer and 
                                                          
1229 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1195, footnote 34. Samuelson is critical that “CONTU thus hints at joint authorship 
as a solution without indicating just who the joint authors might be.” 
1230 CONTU, supra note 621 at 45: “When the authors work together as a voluntary team and not as employees of a 
common employer, the copyright law with respect to works of joint authorship is as applicable here as to works created 
in more conventional ways, and the team itself may define by agreement the relative rights of the individuals 
involved.” 
1231 In this scenario, I relate to the AI output rights only (and not the rights in the AI program). 
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half to the user.1232 Though, as I further explain in the next chapters, this situation might create a 
different set of co-authorship problems.  
3.3.3 The AI  
The US Copyrights Office introduced the idea of allocating authorship to a computer back in 
1965.1233 A decade later, CONTU rejected these notions, stating that even if computers could 
create works independently, they “should not be copyrightable because they had no human 
author.”1234 As Samuelson aptly notes, CONTU’s conclusion incorrectly thought that completely 
independent computer creation was too speculative and remote to take seriously.1235  
In the early 1990s, Miller further rejected AI authorship, claiming that “an artificial 
intelligence expert says that these systems have not yet been able to emulate the capacities of a 
cockroach.”1236 Miller misses a few important facts: cockroaches are among the most intelligent 
insects; more importantly, intelligence is not the only factor we should consider.1237  
True, current legal regimes cannot assign authorship to AI because it lacks legal rights. As 
I indicated in Part II, however, there are easy legislative solutions to change that. The EU 
Parliament, for example, urged the EU Commission to consider creating a legal status for robots 
                                                          
1232 I understand Solomon’s outcome turned out a bit different from what I suggested. Solomon’s actual ruling was to 
give the entire baby to the real mother. Using this analogy, Solomon would decide the true author, user or programmer 
and give him or her all the rights.  
1233 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1192, footnote 22: “The crucial question appears to be whether the ‘work’ is 
basically one of human authorship, with the computer merely being an assisting instrument, or whether the traditional 
elements of authorship in the work … were actually conceived and executed not by man but by a machine.” 
1234 CONTU, supra note 621 at 44.  
1235 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1195, footnote 34. Yet, “CONTU did not say whether, if time proved it wrong about 
these predictions, it would agree with those who thought truly computer-generated works could not be copyrightable 
for lack of a human author or would support granting rights to the machine.” In any case, it seems that CONTU’s was 
not willing to consider a computer as an author of anything. 
1236 Miller, supra note 59 at 1070. In earlier part of his paper, ibid at 1043, Miller stated: “The technology has not yet 
produced a world of copyright without human authors, and there is no reason to believe that we are en route to that 
world or, even if we are, that we will reach it in the foreseeable future.” 
1237 There are other normative reasons for assigning authorship to AIs.  
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“so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the status 
of electronic persons with specific rights and obligations.”1238 The EU Commission, however, 
rejected this motion. Nevertheless, there are voices in the EU that favours these ideas. The UK, for 
example, is more susceptive to the EU Parliament’s ideas, at least partially.1239  
Here are several arguments supporting AI authorship. First, as Samuelson posits, if it “is 
impossible to tell by hearing the music whether it was composed by a computer or by a human, 
one might wonder whether the notion of machine authorship ought to be accepted.”1240 Second, 
the concept of authorship need not be restricted to humans (as I argued in earlier parts). Thirdly, 
“[a]lthough both the programmer and the user might contribute to the framework within which the 
computer makes its selections or arrangements of data, the computer actually makes the 
selections.”1241 Boyden further opines that in cases where the programmer could not predict the 
computer-generated outcome, and the user only pushes a button, the computer truly “authored” the 
work.1242 
Arguments against AI authorship tend to relate to lack of personhood.1243 Granting AI 
authorship might set a precedent for granting AIs other legal rights and duties which we might not 
be willing to do, at least presently. Personhood is a legal concept, though, and our willingness to 
change other legal concepts changes over time; perhaps we might consider adopting personhood 
for AIs. Among copyright scholars, Grimmelmann and Miller have both expressed unwillingness 
                                                          
1238 The EU Parliament Report, supra note 185 at 12.  
1239 AI in the UK report, supra note 55 at chapter 8.  
1240 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1196-7. Samuelson offers a Turing test copyright standard. 
1241 Ibid at 1199. 
1242 Given that “the output is unpredictable and not transparent, even to the authors or users of the program.” See 
Boyden, supra note 714 at 389. 
1243 See the personhood discussion, Part I chapter III. 
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to recognize the possibility of AI authorship.1244 Grimmelmann explicitly states that “[c]opyright 
law doesn’t recognize computer programs as authors, and it shouldn’t.”1245  
The strongest argument against AI authorship is that computers create without any need 
for incentive. One solution to this would involve coding the program to do as we bid, or in more 
sophisticated AIs, to make the AI believe through coding that its true purpose and destiny is to 
create works. As speculative as it sounds, this might produce interesting results. AIs might develop 
to follow human creativity similarly or identically to humans.1246 Grimmelmann explains:1247 
“Robots that act indistinguishably from humans can also be expected to respond 
indistinguishably from them in response to legal pressures. A robot that says it cares about 
not being sanctioned for copying without permission and acts accordingly is a robot that 
can effectively be deterred from copying.”  
Further, even if AI authorship lacks any utilitarian justifications, there are other justifications to 
consider.1248 We should be reminded that in the future it might be difficult to justify discriminatory 
treatment toward AIs and, as Samuelson opines, “unless the Constitution were construed to bar 
machine authorship, perhaps the copyright statute should be construed to permit it.”1249  
 It is clear, in any case, AI authorship would shake copyright’s core and force us to re-
evaluate basic principles we hold dear. A key question to answer is how to assign copyright to AIs 
                                                          
1244 Miller, supra note 59; Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work, supra note 1149 at 
403. Grimmelmann offers: “I would like to talk about computer-authored works – I would like to, except that they 
don’t exist.”  
1245 Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work, ibid. 
1246 Take the humanoid AI robot from the television serious Star-Trek: The Next Generation as an example for such 
an AI. 
1247 Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, supra note 847 at 680. 
1248 I discuss IP justifications for AI-IP in Part II chapter IV above. 
1249 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1199. Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 7, argue, however, that “even if the 
concept of ‘author’ in the U.S. Constitution and the Copyright Act could encompass non-human actors, the machines 
of today would not qualify as ‘author’.”  
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without devaluing the motivation for programmers and users to develop programs or to deliver 
works to the public. In a human-governed world, ownership is an important element of innovation. 
But let me temper the above concern. First, no one is arguing in favour of assigning copyright to 
AIs today, since AI has not reached a worthy level of technological advancement. On the contrary, 
I share Abbott’s proposal to strengthen human ownership by extending protection to include a 
computer program as a possible inventor or author.1250 Second, by the time computer programs 
and AIs reach an appropriate level of development that enables human-invention-free creation, the 
incentive basis for copyright might become obsolete for human creations too – AIs would be able 
to create independently (fixing and improving its codes).  
As Lemley argues, incentive theories might lose their grip for both humans and machines 
in the future (if not already, to some extent, today) with post-scarcity world where economic 
incentives no longer foster innovation.1251 In fact, many humans already choose to create without 
any real gain (or are over-incentives).1252 
3.3.4 Joint Authorship 
AI authorship could comprise a collaborative framework between the above three players, namely: 
the programmer, the user, and the AI.1253 In the future, there are circumstances where a user’s 
                                                          
1250 Abbott, supra note 1017. Given the current level of development, these changes would result in awarding 
programmers and users more protection in their inventions. 
1251 Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, supra note 27; Lemley, Faith-Based IP, supra note 465; Contra Merges, 
Against Utilitarian Fundamentalism, supra note 469. 
1252 As Lawrence Lessig expressed: “The technological trend means that more is possible with less. The legal trend 
means that less is allowed than before. The technological trend could give the power to create to an extraordinary 
range of citizens. The legal trend means that the right to create is increasingly held in a smaller and smaller circle.” 
Lawrence Lessig, “Innovating Copyright” (2002) 20 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 611 at 616. See also Silbey, The Eureka 
Myth, supra note 414, which points out that qualitative study suggests most actual creation bears little relationship to 
economic motivation from IP. Once something is created or invented, individuals will start developing a business 
strategy.  
1253 For further reading on joint authorship see Melville B Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer On Copyright: A 
Treatise on the Law of Literary, Musical and Artistic Property, and the Protection of Ideas (New York: M Bender, 
1978- ) [Nimmer, Nimmer On Copyright]; Paul Goldstein, Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1989). Nimmer and Goldstein offer different views on whether each joint author contribution 
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contribution will likely be more significant. Video gamers, for example, would “do more than 
simply react to the story presented onscreen, but participate in creating that story as it unfolds, 
somewhat like the holodeck on the starship Enterprise.”1254  
Boyden argues that in these cases, the programmer and the player both contribute to any 
resulting creation with ideas, plots, and other elements, “in ways that perhaps neither party could 
fully predict”. Boyden concludes that such creations constitute a joint authorship that emerges 
“from the operation of the program, instead of a close collaboration between authors.”1255  
The user-programmer joint authorship model is appealing because it resolves the need to 
choose between the two AI authorship frontrunners.1256 CONTU agreed that joint authorship 
constitutes a plausible solution – albeit leaving ambiguous the identity of “authors”1257 – since:1258 
“When the authors work together as a voluntary team and not as employees of a common 
employer, the copyright law with respect to works of joint authorship is as applicable here 
as to works created in more conventional ways, and the team itself may define by agreement 
the relative rights of the individual involved.”  
A few years later, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (COTA) expressed the 
same idea as CONTU but specified what “authors” it had in mind by explicitly contemplating that 
computer programs could be considered as co-creators:1259, 1260 
“[T]he programmer’s, the user’s, and even the computer’s expressions are intermingled 
                                                          
must be copyrightable or whether no individual copyright is required as long as the joint work might be. Nimmer 
argues that an individual contribution is not required while Goldstein contends that it is. See also Lior Zemer, “‘We-
Intention’ and the Limits of Copyright” (2006) 24:1 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 99. 
1254 Nicholas, supra note 1210 at 122. 
1255 Boyden, supra note 714 at 387. 
1256 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1221. 
1257 Ibid at footnote 145. 
1258 CONTU, supra note 621 at 45. 
1259 Bridy, The Evolution of Authorship, supra note 624 at 396-7. 
1260 Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics and Information, supra note 628 at 70. 
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in the process of creation, separating rights in the products of interaction with a program 
from those in the program itself will become increasingly difficult.”  
Concerning a programmer-user joint authorship model, the recognition of such a model faces 
several doctrinal difficulties. For starters, the definition of joint authorship does not match in the 
US, UK, Canada and other jurisdictions: 
 Lacking a definition for “joint authorship”, the US defines a “joint work” as “a work prepared 
by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable 
or independent parts of a unitary whole.”1261 
 Meanwhile, the Canadian Copyright Act defines a work of joint authorship as “a work 
produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in which the contribution of one author 
is not distinct from the contribution of the other author or authors”;1262 The UK’s CDPA offers 
a definition nearly identical to that of Canada.1263 
As Vaver explains, intention is crucial under the US joint work approach, “authors must intend 
their contributions to be merged into a unitary whole before their work is considered joint.”1264 
Wu further provides that “the courts have interpreted this to mean that they must intend to be joint 
                                                          
1261 [Emphasis added]. Copyright Law of the United States, supra note 627 § 101. See also Thomson v Larson, 147 F 
(3d) 195 at 200 (2nd Cir 1998) (explore the joint work elements); Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 (explaining 
intent to merge requirement).  
1262 Copyright Act, RSC 1985, supra note 590, s 2. Regardless of the joint works applicability in other jurisdictions, it 
is doubtful that it would be found useful in Canada. As Vaver, supra note 237 at 121 opines: “Some courts seem 
reluctant to admit joint authorship. This tendency may spring partly from the romantic view of the author as Lone 
Genius, or from a more pragmatic desire to avoid problems that plague co-ownership generally but that are particularly 
acute for copyright.” 
1263 CDPA, s 10(1). Defining a work of joint authorship as “a work produced by the collaboration of two or more 
authors in which the contribution of each author is not distinct from that of the other author or authors.” In a similar 
way to the UK and Canada, Australia’s Copyright Act 1968, s 10 defines a work of joint authorship as “a work that 
has been produced by the collaboration of two or more authors and in which the contribution of each author is not 
separate from the contribution of the other author or the contributions of the other authors.” Israel Copyright Act 2007, 
s 1, defines joint work as “a work created jointly by several authors, wherein it is not possible to discern each author’s 
contribution to the work.” Thus, the reoccurring element is the inability to discern between each author’s contribution 
to the work. The intent serves no purpose.  
1264 Vaver, supra note 237 at 119. 
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authors … they must intend for each contributor to have an interest in the copyright.”1265 Ginsburg 
and Budiardjo conclude that given the non-collaborative nature of the relations between the 
programmer and the user:1266 
“[T]he 1976 Act’s requirement of contemporaneous intent to merge specific contributions 
may deny joint work status to the outputs … And because in many cases the individual 
contributions of designer and user may be insufficient to justify a claim of sole authorship, 
the denial of joint work status to these outputs would leave them authorless’.” 
A joint programmer-user authorship model also creates practical problems by fractioning 
ownership rights: “[I]f the programmer of the generator program is given rights because of his 
contribution,”1267 other programmers responsible for other parts of the programming might also be 
considered as joint authors. Joint authorship becomes a never-ending story.1268 
Finally, there is no general industry standard to make formal agreements between 
programmers and users for creating a joint work, unlike other joint authorship scenarios like 
songwriters and performers. Without such a standard, evidencing intention under the US joint work 
model becomes impossible.1269 Hence, as Samuelson concludes, the joint authorship model seems 
“more satisfactory in theory than it would prove in practice.”1270 Moreover, given that a joint 
                                                          
1265 Wu, supra note 14 at 168. Wu further explains that “[t]he reasoning for this interpretation is that persons such as 
editors, peer reviewers, and research assistants intend their contributions to be merged into the unitary whole, but they 
do not expect to be accorded the statue of joint authorship.” 
1266 Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 49. They further reject ideas to make changes to joint works defenition, 
giving that any such change would require abandoning “the hallmarks of authorship in the traditional copyright world, 
or to rescind the fundamental principle of technological neutrality.” Ibid at 111. 
1267 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1222. As Samuelson remarked: “Once fractionation begins, it is difficult to stop.”  
1268 See e.g. the recent decision in Garcia v Google, Inc, 786 F (3d) 733 (9th Cir 2015). In Garcia, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s denial of the actress Cindy Gracia’s motion for a preliminary injunction against the 
producer of the film Innocence of Muslims. Garcia claimed copyright in her acting performance as a join work. In 
rejecting her claims the ninth circuit stated: “Garcia’s theory of copyright law would result in the legal morass we 
warned against in Aalmuhammed – splintering a movie into many different ‘works,’ even in the absence of an 
independent fixation. Simply put, as Google claimed, it ‘make[s] Swiss cheese of copyrights’.” 
1269 In many cases there is a licensing agreement. Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1222. 
1270 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1224. 
259 
 
authorship is based on co-ownership, it could also result in disagreements between the parties, and 
exploitation of the work by one party.  
 The above issues are compounded when contemplating joint authorship between the 
programmer-user-AI trio. It is not less complex, however, when limiting the discussion to user-
programmer joint authorship either. Under the US joint work approach, a user-programmer-AI 
authorship seems too improbable, as AI possesses no potential for intentionality.1271 And, as Solum 
admits, it would be speculative to think that AI could be developed to possess such capabilities, or 
even prove that AI indeed had an intention if it or its creator claimed it did.  
Then again, perhaps these arguments are short-sighted. Future AIs might indeed 
demonstrate some level of human-like free will, which should satisfy intentionality. Moreover, the 
rejection of the intent requirement by other jurisdictions makes clear that such intent is not an 
essential part of the joint authorship equation. In other words, joint authorship for AI is not an 
impossibility.  
In my view, however, a joint authorship model makes a weak basis for AI authorship. My 
concern is that it imports all the problems encountered in assigning copyright individually to 
programmers, users, or AIs, with an additional set of difficulties specific to joint authorship. 
3.3.5 No Authorship 
3.3.5.1 Public Domain 
Since choosing authorship seems so difficult, perhaps an ideal solution is to “[l]et the raw output 
be in the public domain, just as a found object would be.”1272 Here are a few arguments we should 
                                                          
1271 Solum, supra note 236 at 1267. See also Tal Vigderson, “Hamlet II: The Sequel: The Rights of Authors vs. 
Computer-Generated Read-Alike Works” (1994) 28 Loy LA L Rev 401. 
1272 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1224; Boyden, supra note 714 at 391. Litman, supra note 994 at 1014, observes that 
“[t]he current dispute over copyright protection for computer software user interfaces raises analogous issues. User 
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consider.  
First, the public domain model avoids immediate challenges to the IP regime, and it is 
consistent with the approach shared in many jurisdictions (i.e., AI works are not copyrightable).1273  
Second, building on the theoretical justifications discussed in Part II, IP law is designed to 
protect human creations only: “If it is not clearly necessary to grant the exclusive rights to stimulate 
creativity, traditional principles would seem to argue that the set of exclusive rights not be awarded 
to anyone.”1274 As Clifford argues, a “[m]achine itself is not able to claim the copyright because 
such claims are limited to humans.” Since no one has a claim for non-human creations, he contends 
that the works enter the public domain by default.1275 Ricketson agrees with Clifford, unconvinced 
that “such productions should be entitled to any protection at all”.1276 Ricketson and Clifford both 
express a prominent argument in AI personhood debates: “[O]nly natural humans deserve legal 
rights.”1277 I challenged this argument in Part I.1278  
Both American and Canadian copyright frameworks seem to favour the no-authorship 
approach for AI. The US Copyright Office stated explicitly that copyright law only protects 
creative human works founded in the mind.1279 Under Canada’s Copyright Act, Mark Perry and 
                                                          
interfaces are themselves languages--the languages people use to operate their computers. Because user interfaces 
have the attributes of languages, users learn them as if they were languages. To the extent that individual commands 
or keystrokes in popular user interfaces are understood by users as individual words, they must belong to the public 
domain simply because they are elements of language. The public’s demand for unrestricted use of language will not 
tolerate private ownership of words or word-analogues under the rubric of copyright.”  
1273 Butler, supra note 765 at 734: “If not found the product of a human author, these works will not be afforded 
copyright protection under the Act.” As I explained in Part II, under current copyright laws, this is true in many other 
jurisdictions.  
1274 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1225. 
1275 Clifford, supra note 803 at 1695. 
1276 Ricketson, supra note 795 at 29. 
1277 Solum, supra note 236 at 1260. 
1278 First, its not completely true – we do award legal rights to non-humans (corporations and ships for example). 
Second, Solum, ibid at 1261, stated that this statement “is akin to American slave owners saying that slaves could not 
have constitutional rights simply because they were not white or simply because it was not in the interests of whites 
to give them rights.” See also Bryson, Robots Should Be Slaves, supra note 244.  
1279 See supra note 1016. 
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Thomas Margoni endorse works belonging to the public domain, “in absence of direct human 
intervention.”1280 In short, no-authorship models seem entirely possible under existing 
frameworks. 
The public domain model also conforms with theoretical IP justification. A primary 
concern of IP law is increasing and spreading the public pool of knowledge. Such a goal is certainly 
achieved by relinquishing computer-generated/AI works to the public domain. Yochai Benkler 
discusses the importance of the free distribution of information, knowledge, and culture for 
society,1281 and suggests that “enforcing copyright law leads to inefficient underutilization of 
copyrighted information.”1282  
Ginsburg also encourages knowledge distribution, noting the evolution of the creative 
process and the diffusion of creativity due to the increase of the “Wikipediafication of content.” 
Thus, Ginsburg contends, maybe “no one can fairly own a copyright, either.”1283 I discussed 
similar IP and copyright ideas, challenging copyright regimes in earlier parts.1284 
As noted above, there is little consistency about who the author is of computer-
generated/AI. As Samuelson explains, it is also unclear if allocating computer-generated/AI 
output’s rights to either the programmer or the user would motivate creations. The programmer is 
rewarded for creating the program (through selling or licensing it) and the user is motivated by 
                                                          
1280 Perry & Margoni, supra note 779 at 11. 
1281 Benkler, supra note 617. Benkler, at 25, argues against the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: “The single most 
threatening development at the physical layer has been an effort driven primarily by Hollywood, over the past few 
years, to require the manufacturers of computation devices to design their systems so as to enforce the copyright 
claims and permissions imposed by the owners of digital copyrighted works. Should this effort succeed, the core 
characteristic of computers – that they are general-purpose devices whose abilities can be configured and changed 
over time by their owners as uses and preferences change – will be abandoned in favor of machines that can be trusted 
to perform according to factory specifications, irrespective of what their owners wish.” 
1282 Ibid at 37. 
1283 Ginsburg, The Author’s Place in the Future of Copyright, supra note 988 at 152. 
1284 See the discussion in Part II chapter II(B)(1); Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, supra note 27; Lemley, 
Faith-Based IP, supra note 465; Contra Merges, Against Utilitarian Fundamentalism, supra note 469. 
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transforming the raw material into something he or she can sell or promote to the public. Hristov 
disagrees, stating that “[w]ithout an established period of protection, there is no tangible incentive 
for developers of AI machines to continue creating, using and improving their capabilities”, which 
could “ultimately limit innovation […] resulting not only in the decline of AI but also in the decline 
of innovation across a number of related sectors.”1285 Hristov, however, fails to acknowledge the 
effect of patents and design law protection, which might be available to programmers and 
developers. 
I find Samuelson’s argument more persuasive between the two positions. First, there is a 
consensus that an AI program is patentable or copyrightable, which means that only the output’s 
authorship, inventorship or ownership presents an issue. Thus, contrary to what Hristov says, 
programmers and inventors are incentivized for their creations.1286 Second, Hristov’s argument is 
more relevant to the present stage of developments, and he does not consider a future where AI is 
coded to be incentivized.  
A clear issue with the public domain model is that it diminishes the user’s incentives to 
bring their creation to the public. As Samuelson observes, “the best reason to allocate ownership 
interests to someone … is that someone must be motivated”,1287 if not to create the work, then at 
least to make it publicly available. Without ownership rights, users might be motivated to withhold, 
falsify, or change the work so they can be assigned authorship, which is the worst possible 
outcome.  
Rewarding “those who bring innovation to the market has always been part of the realities 
                                                          
1285 Hristov, supra note 422 at 438. 
1286 I agree that if the purpose of the program is to generate works or music then – and only then – Hristov might be 
right. 
1287 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1226. 
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of the intellectual property system, even if not part of the sentimental ideology that pervades public 
thinking about intellectual property.”1288 Samuelson’s view here relates mainly to current 
developments, however, and even in our current landscape, we organize information systems to 
share and connect. This is a good indication that future AI creativity would spread through similar 
means of communication; in other words, there is no reason to assume that future AI would lack 
motivation to share its creations with the public. Moreover, if future AIs possess human traits, its 
motivations to share its creations would likely be humanized. Admittedly, some of my above 
assumptions are loosely grounded. But my point is that we should not preclude the possibility that 
AIs – not users – may equally or more so take responsibility for bringing innovation to the public, 
and those allocating rights needs to anticipate this possibility. 
There is yet more support for no-authorship or public domain models. In a recent paper, 
Yanisky-Ravid and Liu argue in favour of abolishing the patent law system for AI inventions, 
because AI inventorship poses significant problems through its multiple potential rights-
holders.1289 They contend that granting exclusive rights to inventors does not “significantly 
incentivize investors”. Among other claims, they argue that patent law is inflexible and may 
“impede future technological progress by making it harder for other AI systems to build on earlier 
inventions.”1290  
While Yanisky-Ravid and Liu focus on patents and not copyright law, they share core 
arguments with the no-authorship model. First, AI’s output could produce patentable, design 
rights, and copyrightable material simultaneously. Second, the development environment is 
                                                          
1288 Ibid at 1227. 
1289 Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 293. Benkler, supra note 617 at 438 expresses similar opinion stating that 
“innovation in the software business has flourished without patents, and there is no obvious reason to implement a 
new exclusive right in a market that seems to have been enormously innovative without it. Most important, software 
components interact with each other constantly.” 
1290 Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, ibid at 2252. 
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similar and involves many contributors, including other significant entities such as data suppliers, 
“trainers”, operators of the AI systems, and investors.  
3.3.5.2 Government Ownership1291,1292 
Another solution similar to the public domain model is the government model, in which ownership 
of computer-generated or AI output falls to the state by default. Canada already embraces some 
default government ownership: Section 12 of the Copyright Act provides circumstances in which 
the Crown owns copyright.1293 In Canada, this mechanism is based on a different rationale. Vaver 
suggests that section’s 12 opening “without prejudice to any rights or privileges of the Crown” is 
a reference to an ancient English prerogative – the Crown’s sole right to print whatever is 
written.1294  
One can argue that the government should benefit from its investments in projects and 
employees. The government is part of the people, and its officials serve the people. However, as 
Vaver points out, people may still be charged for government’s works.1295 Regardless, there is an 
existing legal framework to draw on, and it might be argued that the government could serve public 
needs most efficiently and effectively.1296 
                                                          
1291 I should clarify that by “government” I mean governments in democratic countries. In communist or totalitarian 
regimes (like China, Iran, Russia, etc.), the concept of ownership is different, and the government own large chunks 
of the IP directly or indirectly through government owned entities.  
1292 I should also clarify that this argument is relevant to AI’s output ownership only.  
1293 Copyright Act, RSC 1985, supra note 590, s 12: “Without prejudice to any rights or privileges of the Crown, where 
any work is, or has been, prepared or published by or under the direction or control of Her Majesty or any government 
department, the copyright in the work shall, subject to any agreement with the author, belong to Her Majesty and in 
that case shall continue for the remainder of the calendar year of the first publication of the work and for a period of 
fifty years following the end of that calendar year.” 
1294 David Vaver, “Copyright and the State in Canada and the United States” (1996) 10 IPJ 187 [Vaver, Copyright and 
the State]. 
1295 Ibid. 
1296 Ibid at 202: “The government could advance economic or social welfare by encouraging or discouraging particular 
activities through giving or withholding copyright permission, and charging or not charging royalties.” On the other 
hand, as Vaver further suggests, “Whether the government can be trusted even to recognize when an activity may 
‘assist in the achievement of program objectives’ is doubtful.” 
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Granting the state ownership to AI output might seem like a more radical approach than 
the public domain model since it assumes that only the government can decide how to allocate 
rights. Further, a government model might hinder free speech and become an effective censorship 
tool in cases in which the government prefers to prevent access to specific creations.1297 Additional 
arguments can also be made against the claim that the government would be best at allocating 
rights. Governments might not be that efficient, and this could lead to higher taxes. 
On the other hand, a government model establishes ownership for the public benefit. The 
state could establish trust funds for public causes. As already suggested, the AI could be named 
the work’s “author”, while the government retains entitlement to use the AI’s output for social 
purposes, like Norway’s use of oil revenues in establishing its Government Pension Fund.1298  
The challenges between private and public ownership models on a relatively small scale 
were discussed for ownership of university IP (mostly patents). This discourse produced similar 
arguments to those detailed above.1299 Under the American Bayh-Dole Act, for example, 
universities ought to take the title for inventions where the Federal Government funded the 
research for those inventions.1300  
                                                          
1297 As Vaver shows, this is historically accurate, see ibid at 194-5. See also Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of 
Copyright (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).  
1298 See Part II, chapter IV(E) and footnote 923. 
1299 It could be reasonable to claim that past willingness to accept patent ownership for universities might, under certain 
conditions, lead to accepting a government-based ownership model for AIs works. There is, however, a “slight” 
difference between granting a university IP rights where research is government-funded, and giving the state IP rights 
for something it did not actually fund. On the other hand, building on the IP theories chapter, we can argue that the 
public – via the government – is party to any creation.  
1300 See Samuel Estreicher & Kristina A Yost, “University IP: The University as Coordinator of the Team Production 
Process” (2016) 91 Ind LJ 1081 at 1082. Estreicher & Yost explain that prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, 1980 “there was 
no uniform law that governed who had ownership rights to inventions from federally funded research. Each agency 
had its own regulations, but ownership of inventions resulting from federally funded research typically belonged to 
the government,” ibid at 1087. The Bayh-Dole Act changed that, and “on federally funded projects, the university, 
which is a party to the funding agreement, has the right to retain title in any subject invention.” Only if the university 
fail to comply with the Act, “the federal government may receive title to a subject invention.” Ibid at 1088. For 
example, if the university does not choose to elect title “the government may grant requests for retention of rights by 
the inventor” (which might be the faculty professor).  
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Then again, even the university model is weak. Estreicher and Yost argue that default 
university ownership can shift a university’s research focus to revenue and commercialized 
research,1301 and more profitable research areas.1302 Other concerns arise that governments are not 
in the best position to pursue licensing.1303  
Though a sole government ownership model has lower transaction costs than a multiple 
ownership model like joint authorship,1304 this seems the only reason in support of such ideas. 
Otherwise, government ownership model seems problematic and unwieldy.  
3.3.6 Authors in Law 
Earlier sections in this part discussed authors-in-fact: Those who directly had a hand in creating a 
copyright-entitled work. Authors-in-fact for AI output may include the user, programmer, and AI, 
depending on their influence on the final product. In this section, I look beyond authors-in-fact to 
authors-in-law: Fictitious “authors” granted legal authorship for AI creations despite not 
necessarily being involved in the creation process.  
In this chapter, I consider the most frequently discussed author-in-law classes in an AI 
context: derivative work, work-made-for-hire, and fictitious human authors. These classes could 
establish a legal basis for computer-generated/AI copyright either by creating an alternative human 
author or by considering the creation part of the original work (program).  
                                                          
1301 Ibid at 1091. 
1302 Estreicher & Yost, ibid at 1095; Pat K Chew, “Faculty-Generated Inventions: Who Owns the Golden Egg?” (1992) 
Wis L Rev 259 at 305-6. 
1303 As shown, universities slow down the commercialization process and create a bottleneck in the process. See e.g. 
Teresa Amabile et al, “The HBR List: Breakthrough Ideas for 2010: A Faster Path from Lab to Market” (January-
February 2010), online: Harvard Business Review <hbr.org/2010/01/the-hbr-list-breakthrough-ideas-for-2010>. 
1304 Estreicher & Yost, supra note 1300 at 1100-1. 
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Authors-in-law is a tempting route, but I believe it will lead to adverse outcomes. It also 
provides an example of how the legal community sometimes tries to resolve challenges of 
computer-generated/AI by avoiding the real issues. 
3.3.6.1 Derivative Works  
The derivative work doctrine is based on creating a fictitious author.1305 Derivative work 
encompasses any expressive work based on pre-existing works – either singular or multiple (e.g., 
mash-ups) – and in any form under US laws in which the pre-existing work is “recast, transformed, 
or adapted.”1306 Copyright law defines derivative works in the US broadly, and “appears to reach 
all works ‘based upon’ a copyrighted work, regardless of how it transformed or recast.”1307 In 
contrast, the Canadian Copyright Act does not provide a broad definition, though nevertheless 
might reach similar results.1308  
For AI, we can argue that the basic code originated from the programmer, so every work 
that the AI creates is derivative from the original code. All AI output is therefore derivative work 
under copyright law.1309 This argument, though reasonable, is not persuasive. AI code is no 
                                                          
1305 This concept is not unique for IP laws, given that in many jurisdictions “the definition ‘author’ is an artificial one.” 
The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law, supra note 408 at 340. In the UK, for example, “the author of a 
film is both the producer and principal director. The author of a sound recording is its producer, of a broadcast the 
person making the broadcast, while the author of a typographical arrangement is the edition’s publisher.” 
1306 Bridy, supra note 423 at 64; Dorotheou, supra note 423 at 89-90. A derivative work is “a work based upon one or 
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture 
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, consideration, or any other form in which a work mat be 
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other 
modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work’.” Copyright Law of 
the United States, supra note 627 § 101; see also Lemley, Menell & Merges, supra note 881 at 486. 
1307 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1212. 
1308 Copyright Act, RSC 1985, supra note 590, s 3(1); Théberge v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc, 2002 SCC 
34 at para 73: “I should note that while there is no explicit and independent concept of ‘derivative work’ in our Act, 
the words ‘produce or reproduce the work ... in any material form whatever’ in s. 3(1) confers on artists and authors 
the exclusive right to control the preparation of derivative works such as the union leaflet incorporating and 
multiplying the Michelin man in the Michelin case … To the extent, however, that the respondent seeks to enlarge the 
protection of s 3(1) by reading in the general words ‘recast, transformed, or adapted’ as a free-standing source of 
entitlement, his remedy lies in Parliament, not the courts.” 
1309 Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1212 further explains: “[I]t is hard to deny that a computer-generated work seems 
to be ‘based upon’ the underlying program. To the extent that it ‘comes from’ the generator program, it was ‘derived’ 
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different from DNA; it is the basis for the AI’s “body”. As AI technology evolves, considering an 
AI’s creation as a derivative work becomes more equivalent to attributing any work by a child to 
his or her parents. Dorotheou agrees:1310 
“The connection between the programmer’s work … and the final work is too remote … 
the device is thinking entirely by itself. There can no longer be a link to the programmer, 
irrespective of whether the programmer was the original creator.”  
Perhaps more importantly, AI works would not contain the original code that produces them, as 
Bridy explained, “[t]hey are not copied from the underlying code, and they are not substantially 
similar to the underlying code.”1311 Legislators could, of course, amend the derivative work 
definition to include “works that do not borrow from the original work.”1312 But such amendments 
are not warranted. As Bridy admitted, “removing the requirements of actual borrowing would 
unduly exacerbate existing boundary problems, making a wider range of conduct actionable as 
infringement and potentially inhibiting creativity”, especially in the digital environment.1313  
Finally, recognizing computer-generated or AI works as derivative works would not 
resolve any ownership issues, since “such a classification would not automatically make the owner 
                                                          
from the operation of the generator program.” Perry & Margoni, supra note 779 at 8 concludes: “[E]ven if Canadian 
law recognizes a specific right of derivative work and vests it to the author of the original work, such right is limited, 
narrower than that of the southern neighbour.” 
1310 Dorotheou, supra note 423 at 90. 
1311 Bridy, supra note 423 at 64. Bridy echoes Samuelson’s conclusion: “In general, computer-generated works do not 
incorporate recognizable blocks of expression from the underlying program or from data base that the program draws 
upon in the generative process. For this reason, computer-generated output should not automatically be considered 
‘derivative works’ within the meaning of the copyright statute merely because in common parlance it could be said 
that the output was ‘derived’ from or ‘based upon’ the generator program.” 
1312 Ibid. Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1212-1213 shows that Congress did not intend to consider computer-generated 
works – automatically and invariably – as derivative works. First, Samuelson explains, that when the 1976 Act was 
passed, the issue of computer-generated authorship was still being considered by CONTU. Second, CONTU’s final 
report concluded that the holder of computer-generated output should be the user and not the programmer. Third, there 
is no evidence that Congress intended to expand the derivative works definition. Samuelson concludes, ibid at 1214: 
“[N]othing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to expand the set of rights copyright owners 
would have over derivatives by creating a general derivative work right.” 
1313 Ibid. 
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of the copyright in the generative code the owner of the copyright in the procedurally generated 
work derived from it.”1314  
Where derivative works do not incorporate any element from the code that produced it, the 
copyright in the work is fully owned by the work’s author (i.e., the computer-generated, AI or 
user). In Bridy’s words, there is “no preexisting material in the new work to sustain a copyright 
claim by the author of the original work, leaving a non-legal person as the only copyright 
claimant.”1315 
3.3.6.2 Work Made for Hire 
The second author-in-law option for AI is the “work made for hire” [WMFH] doctrine.1316 This is 
where parties agree – beforehand – that the person commissioning or funding the work will take 
authorship despite not authoring the work (e.g., a ghost-writer penning a celebrity’s autobiography 
will sign a WMFH contract to maintain the story that the celebrity wrote it)..1317 Hence, “the 
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes 
of this title”,1318 and the copyright in any work that was created “within the scope of employment 
or commissioned by independent contractors” belongs to the employer.1319 
                                                          
1314 Bridy, supra note 423 at 65. 
1315 Ibid. 
1316 Work made for hire is “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.” Copyright 
Law of the United States, supra note 627 § 101. See also Reid, supra note 1026, in which SCOTUS addressed the 
doctrine’s definition. 
1317 The EU’s Software Directive allocates the employer all rights in the employee’s computer program (though it does 
not make the employer an author). Software Directive, supra note 641 at art 2(3): “Where a computer program is 
created by an employee in the execution of his duties or following the instructions given by his employer, the employer 
exclusively shall be entitled to exercise all economic rights in the program so created, unless otherwise provided by 
contract.” 
1318 Copyright Law of the United States, supra note 627 § 201(b). 
1319 Lemley, Menell & Merges, supra note 881 at 488.  
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Several scholars have reflected on the applicability of the WMFH doctrine to computer-
generated or AI works.1320 The doctrine might enable attributing the copyright ownership of the 
AI’s work, to the programmer, on the assumption that the programmer is the AI’s employer. This 
makes the doctrine “the least disruptive and most practical solution to the issue of AI generated 
works falling into the public domain.”1321 In that way, Bridy explains, we can “avoid the expedient 
logic that conflates the author’s author (i.e., the programmer) with the actual author (i.e., the 
generative program).”1322  
Bridy favours WMFH over derivative works since WMFH “can be more easily modified 
without undue collateral expansion of the scope of copyrightable subject matter”,1323 and1324  
“[I]s a more fitting framework within which to situate the problem of AI authorship 
because it represents an existing mechanism for directly vesting ownership of copyright in 
a legal person who is not the author-in-fact of the work in question.” 
Hristov echoes Bridy’s proposal, arguing for applying WMFH to AI programs by a flexible 
interpretation of the terms “employee” and “employer” in a way “that an ‘employer’ may be 
considered as someone who employs the services of another entity in order to achieve a goal or 
complete a task.”1325 Under this interpretation, an AI’s programmer might be considered its 
employer. This approach, however, is not a comprehensive solution. For example, Hristov’s 
suggestion is too broad in scope and will effectively include all freelances.1326 
                                                          
1320 Samuelson, Bridy, Hristov and recently Yanisky-Ravid are only a few.  
1321 Hristov, supra note 422 at 440. 
1322 Bridy, supra note 423 at 66. 
1323 Ibid at 63. Bridy further offers that “[t]he work made for hire also avoids the predicament of vesting rights in 
machine – a problem the derivative work doctrine cannot get around.” 
1324 Ibid at 66. 
1325 Hristov, supra note 422 at 446. 
1326 D’Agostino, supra note 408, explains how in the digital era, publishers exploit freelances’ works, making 
freelances vulnerable. Thus, expanding WMFH definition or interpreting WMFH broadly to include AI’s as 
freelances, might only exaggerate the difficulties D’Agostino observed. 
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Bridy claims that her suggestion is no different from the exceptions to computer-generated 
works found in other jurisdictions that create a “legal fiction of authorship by means which 
copyright vests as a matter of law in a party who is not the author-in-fact.”1327 Section 178 of the 
CDPA (reading with section 9(3)), for example, establishes that a computer-generated work is 
protected under the UK copyright laws.  
Bridy’s argument sounds appealing, but the WMFH might de facto recognize AI as an 
employee and thus create a new working class, which is a far-reaching proposition. Bridy 
acknowledge this problem, stating that current copyright laws do not catch computer-generated 
works (or AI) in their legal definitions (sections 101(1) and (2)) “because the relationship between 
the programmer and the authoring code is not an employment relationship in the agency sense 
[and] they are not among the nine categories of commissioned works.”1328 Bridy suggests 
incorporating the UK computer-generated model by stating that a WMFH is “a work generated by 
a computer in circumstances such that there is no human author of the work.” In that case, the 
owner of the work might be the programmer who would be considered the AI’s employer.  
However, as I explain below, allocating ownership to the programmer might be 
normatively unjust. And as Bridy herself pointed out, the user, the program, and the programmer’s 
employer of the programmer are all worthy candidates for authorship or ownership.1329 Bridy’s 
argument also ignores other computer-generated/AI authorship models such as joint-authorship or 
public domain models. Vaver adds that Bridy’s model is far from adequate for Canada, because of 
the significant difference between the WMFH doctrines in the US and Canada.1330 Hence, Bridy’s 
                                                          
1327 Bridy, supra note 423 at 67. 
1328 Ibid at 68. 
1329 Ibid. 
1330 In Canada, the “employer may become only an ‘owner’ of copyright, never an ‘author’ (otherwise the human 
author loses all moral rights).” David Vaver, “A response to ‘Prof Annemarie Bridy Asks: How Human Does An 
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proposition is not a comprehensive global solution. Even if one makes necessary changes to the 
doctrine, it is inadequate normatively: We can allocate legal rights to AI, or we can reject the idea, 
but WMFH only avoids the real issues. 
Yanisky-Ravid also developed WMFH as a prime model for AI authorship. In a recent 
paper, she suggested a “new” model “that sees AI systems as independent workers or employees 
of the users.”1331 Her model builds on Bridy’s argument but instead leans more towards the user, 
and not the programmer, as the employee.1332 Her gist is that the user operates the program (i.e., 
gives it directions), takes the financial risk, and supplies the energy. Yanisky-Ravid justifies her 
take from a policy and practicality perspective, stating that “it makes sense to incentivize people 
or firms as well as other entities to use creative AI systems to create works of authorship because 
doing so will most efficiently promote the proliferation of the devices and the works they 
produce.”1333 
Yanisky-Ravid argues that “most of the time, the candidates who are involved in the 
development and manufacture of the AI system do not meet the threshold of authorship.”1334 Thus, 
she concludes, the programmer and other players should not be the beneficiaries (employees) of 
the AI creation, because “[t]he large number of players significantly weakens each player’s 
individual contribution and thus the bond between the software programmers and the products 
produced by the AI systems.”1335  
                                                          
Author Need To Be?’” (2011), online (blog): IPilogue <iposgoode.ca/2011/08/prof-annemarie-bridy-asks-how-
human-does-an-author-need-to-be/#sthash.rkdaSkOL.6GfnaMH6.dpuf>. 
1331 [Emphasis added]. Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 236 at 708. 
1332 Ibid at 707. See also Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 293 at 2231. 
1333 Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 236 at 712. 
1334 Ibid at 691. See also Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 293. 
1335 Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 236 at 692. 
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Yanisky-Ravid’s vision is narrow-minded; it might be useful at our current computer-
generated phase, but not to more advanced stages of AI. For example, part of the model is based 
on the instructions a user could or would give to the program. In the future, however, an AI might 
create works with no human influence, therefore with no instructions. Further, she claims that this 
model “also solves the inherent problem of multiple players being involved in the development of 
AI systems.”1336 But, there is no real reason why more than one user cannot “employ” the AI 
program, or why a multiplayer model presents such a problem to copyright. AI does not change 
our current development process, which involves as many players as Yanisky-Ravid describes. 
From a policy perspective, Yanisky-Ravid’s WMFH model is “safe” – it provides stability 
and preserves the basic principles of copyright law. It solves liability issues by establishing that 
the user, as the AI’s main contractors, is responsible for the outcomes. On the other hand, as Bridy 
remarks, implementing the model will require changes to current legislation.  
 Even if we accept one of the WMFH proposals, normative concerns arise that we should 
consider. Bridy and Yanisky-Ravid each establish a working status – and maybe even a limited 
personhood status – for AI. Several scholars argue that these scenarios might create a “slave” status 
for AIs and robots.  
Joanna Bryson suggests “that robots should be built, marketed and considered legally as 
slaves, not companion peers.”1337 Bryson pointing to the risks that AIs or robots pose to society. 
First, over-identification (personalization or humanization) with AIs or robots is time-consuming, 
requires allocating resources, and might result in social isolation. On the other hand, there are 
                                                          
1336 Ibid at 713. 
1337 Bryson, Robots Should Be Slaves, supra note 244 at 63. Bryson might use a provocative tone, however, she does 
not mean to make any comparison – nor do I – between human slavery and robots’ so-called slavery, as she further 
explains: “[W]hen I say ‘Robots should be slaves’, I by no means mean ‘Robots should be people you own’. What I 
mean to say is ‘Robots should be servants you own’.” 
274 
 
benefits like providing companionship for the elderly. Second, Bryson expresses concern on an 
institutional and government level about the risks AI or robots pose to legal personhood by making 
them liable for their actions and removing liability for the human programmer or user, or a 
government or corporation.  
Bryson’s argument is appealing, but there are social costs in treating AIs or robots as 
“slaves”. We can assume that as technology evolves AIs or robots will likely anthropomorphize, 
as they are modelled to resemble humans. In that scenario, treating AI or robots as servants might 
affect the way humans treat each other by inciting violent tendencies or become indifferent to other 
people.1338 
3.3.6.3 The Fictitious Human Author  
The third author-in-law model is the fictitious human author, discussed in papers by Wu and 
Timothy Butler. Under the fictitious human author model, whenever a court finds a computer/AI 
as the author of a given work, “the court should presume the existence of a fictitious human author 
and assign copyright to the owner of the AI.”1339  
Butler introduced this theory in 1982,1340 but Wu developed it furthermore recently. While 
Butler assumed that copyright would be assigned to the owner of the AI program, which is the 
“problem-specifier or the computer owner, either individually, jointly or in part,”1341 Wu suggests 
                                                          
1338 Kathleen Richardson explains how sex robots might affect human behaviour: “I problematized these assumptions 
by showing how arguments for sex robots reveal a coercive attitude towards women’s bodies as commodities, and 
promote a non-empathetic form of encounter … In my own work I argue that the buying of sex promotes a disruption 
to empathy, because the buyer of sex is not relating to the person as a subject, but an object.” Kathleen Richardson, 
“Sex Robot Matters: Slavery, the Prostituted, and the Rights of Machines” (2016) 35 IEEE Tech & Soc Magazine 46 
at 48-49. 
1339 Wu, supra note 14 at 159. 
1340 Butler, supra note 765 at 744-745: “When a court finds a given product of AI software is ‘authored’ by machine 
rather than a person, the court should presume the existence of a fictitious human author and assign the appropriate 
fractions of the copyright rights to the owner of the AI software copyrights, the problem-specifier or the computer 
owner, either individually, jointly or in part.” 
1341 Ibid. 
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a broader vision that includes (and maybe even favours) the user. According to Wu, ownership 
“should be assigned to whoever owns the copyright to the AI, on the assumption that this will 
usually be the person who decides whether the AI should generate future works.”1342 The fictitious 
human author model’s greatest advantage is that it avoids the somewhat “painful” discussion of 
AI personhood.  
 Wu offers this model as a last resort, stating that “if the computer program generates a 
poem that is not repetitive or predictable [i.e., no fixation], and the user’s contribution is minimal 
[or there is no user at all like an AI humanoid robot], then the author of the poem may be the 
computer program (the AI) itself.”1343  
Declaring AI authorship, however, is not the end of the discussion. The court must still 
determine if the AI reaches a level of sophistication enabling it to generate further works: “If 
awarding the copyright to the AI will stimulate the AI to create future works, then the AI should 
receive copyright protection; if not, then the court should assign the copyright to the owner of the 
computer program under the Fictional Human Author Theory.”1344 
3.3.7 A Moral Rights Model 
For my final authorship consideration, I want to return to moral rights doctrine, discussed earlier 
in Part II. There, I explained why the moral rights model poses an alternative to other ownership 
models. First, it recognizes the personal connection that future AI might develop toward its works 
and creations.  
                                                          
1342 Wu, supra note 14 at 161. 
1343 Ibid at 174. 
1344 Ibid. 
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Second, by recognizing the AI’s contribution and providing limited protection to those 
works, we could differentiate and prevent any confusion between AI and human works. Third, by 
allocating moral rights to AI creations, we resolve concerns about human appropriation of AI’s 
works. While moral rights model is not a fulsome solution to AI authorship, it might provide an 
alternative to the next phase of AI development and is worth exploring. 
Any AI moral rights model should be implemented in phases. Our current stage of 
development needs no moral rights extended to computer-generated programs since no attachment 
could be established.  
Moral rights should engage only when we reach an independent level of computer-
generated or AI development in which there would be very limited human involvement (or no 
human involvement). Then, and only then, we should consider extending limited moral rights 
(attribution and integrity rights only) to computer-generated or AI creations, either as sole or joint 
authors.  
 My moral rights endorsement is likely to face criticism.1345 As I explained in Part II, moral 
rights historically were designed to protect human rights. Even if countries that acknowledged 
moral rights become willing to accept AI moral rights, those jurisdictions that do not (especially 
for computer programs) will frustrate any attempt at global change. 
Still, the moral rights doctrine contains advantages that we can use to enhance AI 
authorship. First, it allows us to distinguish between a creation’s recognition and integrity, and its 
ownership. Even if AI cannot comprehend creation as humans do, we strengthen the integrity of 
                                                          
1345 Boyden, supra note 714 at 391: “Emergent works likewise need no protection under a moral rights theory as the 
expression of a human being’s personhood, not under a natural rights theory as intellectual labor, because again there 
is neither human creativity nor labor involved in their production.”  
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those creations and make falsification or false attribution of AI art to humans more difficult by 
assigning moral rights.  
Second, the moral rights arguments are an extension of developing AI personhood in 
copyright. If we accept AI personhood and AI’s entitlement to limited legal rights, we should not 
exclude the implementation of AI moral rights. 
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3.4 RESHAPING COPYRIGHT 
Any AI authorship model must also consider other copyright standards. Originality serves as a 
copyright guardian – if a work is not original, it is barred from protection. Originality dictates the 
presence of certain elements for a work to be considered “original”, and in many jurisdictions, 
such elements may include creativity.  
Originality is an important criterion of any creation, AI included. However, establishing 
originality might prove difficult for non-humans. Dan Burk expresses the paradox and absurdities 
in copyright, which urge us to accept impossible and nonsensical assertions.1346 Machine works 
were always considered inferior to human works – how could a simple processor of data satisfy 
the originality standard? However, with the advance in computer programs, these perceptions are 
changing. Machine-learning algorithms prove that a machine can make original and creative 
decisions, which could even surprise its programmers.1347  
My argument is simple and straightforward: We should determine mechanical labour as 
original in the same manner we establish non-mechanical originality. Indeed, there are works made 
by machines that should not be considered original. However, not any mechanical work is 
unoriginal per se. Similarly to programmers, AI could express originality in changing its code, 
offering creative ways to produce works, or making decisions in selecting its sources. There are 
many creative works generated by computers/AI systems in music, art, literature, etc.1348  
                                                          
1346 Dan L Burk, “Method and Madness in Copyright Law” (2007) 3 Utah L Rev 587.  
1347 As with the program that beat the top Chinese Go player in a move no one anticipated, see Gibbs, supra note 772.  
1348 Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Luis Antonio Velez-Hernandez, “Copyrightability of Artworks Produced by Creative 
Robots and Originality: The Formality-Objective Model” (2018) 19 Minn J L Sci & Tech 1 at 7. However, as Yanisky 
Ravid & Velez-Hernandez have offered, at least in the US, the legislator did not provide a clear definition for artwork 
or art. Ibid at 31. 
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Unfortunately, the current legal discourse in copyright law is more interested in 
establishing how we can obtain originality in a more technical sense instead of how we can 
perceive what is original.1349 It is a subjective process, which is more biased toward non-human 
creations.  
There are several innovative suggestions to change copyright standards to accommodate 
AI authorship. Abbott, Joseph Miller, Jeffrey Harrison, Edward Lee, Boyden and, recently, 
Yanisky-Ravid and Antonio Velez-Hernandez argue for adopting a more inclusive benchmark 
facing the difficulties with the current copyright framework.1350 Indeed, as Wu observes, “as 
computer programs become more and more sophisticated … it becomes clear that a more 
sophisticated test is required to serve the interests of justice and the goals of copyright laws.”1351  
  The outline of this chapter is as follows. First, I briefly survey the originality standard as it 
developed across jurisdictions. Originality is not a coherent concept. It varies between different 
systems of law, reflecting local cultural and legal norms.1352 As with many other legal concepts, 
originality is a living and breathing concept, adapting and evolving over time.1353 I will contend 
that the originality standard should apply to all creations without discriminating between humans 
and non-humans. Abbott agrees, stating that “it should be irrelevant whether the content comes 
                                                          
1349 Yanisky-Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, ibid at 32. 
1350 Edward Lee, “Digital Originality” (2012) 14 Vand J Ent & Tech 920 at 924; Joseph S Miller, “Hoisting 
Originality” (2009) 31 Cardozo L R 451 at 457-463 [Miller, Hoisting Originality]. Miller and Abbott are relying on 
patent law and non-obviousness requirements. Harrison expresses similar views suggesting tweaking Feist’s modicum 
of creativity, introducing the “modicum-times-2”, which “might be articulated as ‘requiring more than minimal 
expertise, skill, taste, or judgment’ and that the work be ‘capable of being distinguished from other ordinary objects’.” 
See Jeffrey L Harrison, “Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive Relationship in Copyright” (2004) 32 Hofstra L 
Rev 853 at 867. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 427, ties between the level of originality (and creativity) to 
copyright protection.  
1351 Wu, supra note 14 at 134. 
1352 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 94, explain, “it is worth bearing in mind that, whatever test is applied, the 
question of whether a work is original inevitably depends on the particular culture, social, and political context in 
which the judgement is made … what is seen as original may change over time.” 
1353 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (New York: Clarendon Press, 
1994). 
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from a person or machine, or particular type of machine.”1354 We should, therefore, develop a new 
standard for originality based on the concept of creativity.1355 Second, I will explore the “enigma” 
of machine creativity, challenging the misconceptions about the “inferiority” of machines works. 
Finally, I will discuss the element of intent as a factor in originality and authorship. I will argue 
that, given current developments in computer-generated works, intent should be deemed irrelevant 
for establishing originality. 
 This chapter also provides the basis for my concluding arguments in Part IV, which is the 
final part of my dissertation.  
3.4.1 Framing Originality 
3.4.1.1 The Legal Standard  
The standard of originality goes back a long way. Vaver provides that for a work to be considered 
original it must “(a) originate from its author, (b) not be copied, and (c) involve more than trivial 
or mechanical intellectual effort.”1356 Novelty “in the sense of the patent law is not required.”1357 
                                                          
1354 Abbott, Everything is Obvious, supra note 806 at 27. 
1355 The US Feist creativity approach to originality, though promising, still does not provide sufficient reasoning. 
Regrettably, SCOTUS has not taken the necessary leap forward in developing the concept of creativity, which is vital 
to the originality standard. The SCC ruling in CCH represents an important step in the right direction. 
1356 Vaver, supra note 237 at 100. Except where the work is so simple that the expression and the idea are merged. 
See Morrissey v Procter & Gamble Co, 379 F (2d) 675 (1st Cir 1967); Durham, supra note 939 at 622: “If there is 
only one way, or a few ways, to express an idea or to communicate a fact, so that exclusive rights to the expression 
would effectively preempt the idea or the fact, then ‘merger’ is said to apply and the expression is uncopyrightable.” 
1357 Vaver, ibid; See e.g. Medforms Inc v Healthcare Management Solutions Inc, 290 F (3d) 98 (2nd Cir 2002); Urantia 
Foundation, supra note 1020; See also Nimmer, Nimmer On Copyright, supra note 1253 at § 2.01[A] (2-7): “Although 
in some early copyright cases, the distinction was not recognized, it is now clearly established, both as a matter of 
congressional intent and judicial construction, that the originality necessary to support a copyright merely calls for 
independent creation, not novelty […].” Nimmer further explains that “originality in the copyright sense means only 
that the work owes its origin to the author … is independently created, and not copied from other works.” Nimmer, 
Nimmer On Copyright, ibid § 2.01[A] (2-9). 
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Creativity1358 is an important criterion, though its importance varies by jurisprudence. Bridy 
explains that “[a] work is creative if it embodies some modest amount of intellectual labor.”1359 
The originality debate is divided into two main factions: supporters of the UK’s “sweat of 
the brow” (and much pre-Feist US’s) criteria on the one hand, generally represented by Lockean 
labour theory; and those supporting the creativity-oriented criteria on the other.1360 Between these 
two, the SCC has chosen a third way, commonly known as the “skill and judgment” approach.1361 
From a natural rights perspective, the requirement of originality is one that “merely reflects 
the premise that copyright ought to protect the personality of authors as expressed in their 
work.”1362 According to this view, there is no justification for copyright protection without traces 
of personality. The utilitarian perspective, on the other hand, justifies the protection of works that 
would have not been produced without providing incentives to authors to create.1363 These 
incentives are usually reflected by the financial benefit (“copyright tax”) to authors from acquiring 
their creations for a limited time. However, as Bently and Sherman observe, the legal tests for 
originality “do not reflect with precision any particular theoretical perspective”, though it seems 
that they have influenced the development of the originality standard.1364  
Seeking a common ground for originality might be deemed unnecessary, excruciating, and 
perhaps impossible. Even under the current standard, Litman explains, applying originality is very 
                                                          
1358 Without creativity, there can be no work of art. See e.g. Gardenia Flowers Inc v Joseph Markovits, Inc, 280 F 
Supp 776 (SDNY 1968). This depends on what one means by “creativity”. 
1359 Bridy, supra note 423 at 16. 
1360 Creativity-oriented criteria are inspired both by SCOTUS (Feist, supra note 440) and the EU’s Software Directive, 
supra note 641 at art 1(3) (the author’s own intellectual creation). 
1361 Craig, supra note 489 at 104. Vaver, supra note 237 at 100 explains further that “[t]he intellectual effort required 
for originality implies skill and judgment in expressing an idea, namely, using one’s ‘knowledge, developed aptitude 
or practised ability’ to decide how to produce a work from among available options. Mere industry or ‘sweat of the 
brow’ is not enough; nor is creativity necessary.” 
1362 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 95. 
1363 Ibid.  
1364 Ibid at 96. 
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difficult.1365 However, adopting a common originality standard has its advantages. First, a 
generalized standard will contribute to coherence among different nations and states, “both 
horizontally (treating different works according to a single standard) and vertically (in creating a 
coherent relationship between standards of infringement and subsistence).”1366 Second, delving 
into originality deliberations may create a better standard and have a bearing on the ongoing debate 
concerning the balance between an author’s rights and the public domain (as reflected by the 
struggle between the “sweat of the brow” and creativity approaches). Drassinower further offers 
that the common standard for originality takes balance into account; however, “balance is both 
insufficient and counterproductive as a category grounding the transition” (i.e., from labour to 
authorship).1367 Third, the current low and vague standard for originality is no longer acceptable: 
“[T]he concept of originality is a poor substitute for tangible boundaries among parcels of 
intellectual property because it inherently unascertainable.”1368 
Originality could serve as the “valve” for AI copyright. From a normative perspective, 
copyright bars should be decided on merit – an objective standard as Yanisky-Ravid and Velez-
Hernandez suggest – and not on conceptual beliefs that deny AI any legal rights. By adopting a 
consistent standard for originality, we may develop a better system for allocating rights on that 
basis.  
                                                          
1365 Litman, supra note 994 at 975: “the principle of limiting copyright protection to only those aspects of a work that 
are original with its author, while remarkably easy to state, proves to be impossible to apply.” 
1366 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 99. 
1367 Drassinower, supra note 442 at 57. Drassinower suggests that the current model of copyright protection (the 
“balance model”) is insufficient, stating that “both Feist and CCH propose the transition in the name of balance. Yet 
balance is both insufficient and counterproductive as a category grounding the transition.” Ibid at 219. Drassinower 
argues for the development of a new model – the dialogue model – which, “by contrast, centers its attention on the 
distinction between a thing (whether tangible or intangible) and an act. It sees copyright as juridical protection of the 
integrity of an author’s choice whether to publish or not. Its starting point is thus the specificity of a work of authorship 
as a communicative act.” Ibid at 225-6. 
1368 Litman, supra note 994 at 1004. 
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The originality standard might serve another purpose as well. The principal test for 
machine intelligence is the Turing test, which aims to distinguish between humans and AI or robots 
by assessing the responses of the test subject to given questions. The originality standard can 
piggy-back on this test, using it as a creativity standard to seek out whether it is possible to 
differentiate between human and AI creations. If the test cannot ascertain which is which, it might 
serve to strengthen the AI’s authorship claim.  
Highlighting several key assumptions is important. First, this discussion assumes copyright 
law would retain its current principles, at least in the short run – an assumption scholars have 
challenged. In a world without copyright, no originality standard is needed. Further, the originality 
standard might be weakening under the no authorship model I have suggested and maybe even 
become irrelevant.  
Second, under the AI authorship model, in which the AI is recognized as the author, the 
originality standard would either become as important as today or, as I suggested, more important. 
Third, under any other model – programmer, user or AI authorship – machine creativity is an 
essential element in the authorship discussion and should be addressed properly. 
3.4.1.2 Original and Inconsistent 
Originality is a multicultural standard with different colours and tones across continents and states. 
The basic structure and substance are similar, but on the creativity scale, there are variations. The 
US, the UK, the EU, Canada, and Israel reflect these changes. Thus, I will briefly describe each 
state’s originality model. This discussion opens the way to the following chapter in which I will 
further develop the concept of creativity.  
  The US Copyright Act of 1976 states that “copyright protection subsists … in original 
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works of authorship.”1369 In the Trademark Cases, SCOTUS “limited ‘writings’ as found in the 
Copyright Clause in the US Constitution to ‘only such as are original and are founded in the 
creative powers of the mind’.”1370 In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co v Sarony,1371 SCOTUS further 
defined copyright as “the exclusive right of a man to the production of his genius or intellect.”1372 
In Burrow-Giles, the court constructed a broader definition for the concepts of “author” and 
“writing”, stating that writings mean the literary productions of those authors and “include all 
forms of writing, printing, engravings, etchings, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author 
are given visible expression.”1373  
  Hence, an “author” is one “to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who 
completes a work of science or literature.”1374 The landmark decision of Burrow-Giles shaped the 
legal boundaries of authorship and established the “dichotomy between creative work and 
                                                          
1369 Copyright Law of the United States, supra note 627 § 102(a). Yanisky-Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 
1348 at 24, observe that “the congressional intent behind the Copyright Act was to leave the originality concept 
undefined in order to clear the path for courts to maintain their existing standards of originality.” 
1370 Bridy, supra note 423 at 9. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 US 82 (1879) at 94: “The ordinary trademark has no 
necessary relation to invention or discovery. The trademark recognized by the common law is generally the growth of 
a considerable period of use, rather than a sudden invention. It is often the result of accident, rather than design, and 
when under the act of Congress it is sought to establish it by registration, neither originality, invention, discovery, 
science, nor art is in any way essential to the right conferred by that act. If we should endeavor to classify it under the 
head of writings of authors, the objections are equally strong. In this as in regard to inventions, originality is required. 
And while the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has been, to include original designs for engravings, 
prints, &c., it is only such as are original and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. The writings which are 
to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like. The 
trademark may be, and generally is, the adoption of something already in existence as the distinctive symbol of the 
party using it.”  
1371 Burrow-Giles, supra note 715. 
1372 Ibid at 54-60: “Plaintiff is a lithographer, and defendant a photographer ... [T]he plaintiff … under an agreement 
with Oscar Wilde, became and was the author, inventor, designer, and proprietor of the photograph in suit, the title of 
which is Oscar Wilde … and that said plaintiff made the same at his place of business … [F]rom his own original 
mental conception, to which he gave visible form by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and 
arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to 
present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression, 
and from such disposition, arrangement, or representation, made entirely by the plaintiff, he produced the picture in 
suit.”  
1373 Ibid at 58. 
1374 Ibid.  
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mechanical labor” in the US.1375 
  In Bleistein,1376 Alfred Bell & Co v Catalda Fine Arts Inc,1377 and Ansehl v Puritan 
Pharmaceutical Co,1378 the originality standard “reached a low watermark.”1379 In Bell, the court 
explained that “an ‘original’ in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular work 
‘owes its origin’ to the ‘author’. No large measure of novelty is necessary,”1380 even in a situation 
in which the author would depart substantially from the paintings and this diversion would be 
inadvertent – the new work would be copyrightable: “A copyist’s bad eyesight or defective 
musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable 
variations.”1381  
  In Ansehl, the court relied on Justice Holmes’ opinion in Bleistein1382 and concluded that a 
work “requires very little originality, indeed, to render proposed advertising matter copyrightable 
… The tendency of the modern cases is to increase rather than to restrict the subject matter of 
copyright.” The court then quoted Copinger’s Law of Copyright,1383 stating that “the artistic work 
                                                          
1375 Bridy, supra note 423 at 11. Bridy further explains that “according to the court’s reasoning … the machine taking 
the picture mediated but neither negated nor co-opted the process of artistic production, which could be traced quite 
directly back to the governing consciousness and sensibility of the photographer, the person behind the lens who posed 
the subject just so and altered the lighting just so.” 
1376 Bleistein, supra note 1018. 
1377 191 F (2d) 99 (2nd Cir 1951). In Bell the court argues about whether the mezzotint engravings of a famous painter 
are, by itself, copyright protected (i.e., not only a mere copy of the paintings). The court reflects on the “originality” 
of those engravings. 
1378 61 F (2d) 131 (8th Cir 1932). 
1379 Bridy, supra note 423 at 13-4.  
1380 Bell, supra note 1377 at para 1.  
1381 Ibid at para 2. 
1382 Bleistein, supra note 1018 at 251: “Again, the act, however construed, does not mean that ordinary posters are not 
good enough to be considered within its scope. The antithesis to ‘illustrations or works connected with the fine arts’ 
is not works of little merit or of humble degree, or illustrations addressed to the less educated classes; it is ‘prints or 
labels designed to be used for any other articles of manufacture.’ Certainly works are not the less connected with the 
fine arts because their pictorial quality attracts the crowd, and therefore gives them a real use – if use means to increase 
trade and to help to make money. A picture is nonetheless a picture, and nonetheless a subject of copyright, that it is 
used for an advertisement ... It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.” 
1383 (6th ed, 1927). 
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must be ‘original’, but this means no more than that the work must not be copied from another 
artistic work of the same character.”1384 
These decisions contributed to the confusion surrounding the originality standard in the 
US. The task of shaping originality and providing essential clarity ultimately fell to SCOTUS in 
Feist Publication, Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co.1385  
Feist is considered the most important and influential decision in the US on the concept of 
originality (and maybe even copyright), “hailed both as a landmark decision and a legal 
‘bomb’.”1386 In Feist, the court considered whether the white pages of a telephone directory1387 – 
or any such compilation of facts – are original and thus deserve copyright protection. The court 
clarified that “original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was 
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses 
at least some minimal degree of creativity.”1388 Justice O’Connor relied heavily on the Burrow-
Giles definition of the author as the person to whom we owe the origin of a work.1389 However, 
SCOTUS extended the originality definition of Burrow-Giles to include creativity, even if only a 
minimal degree.1390 
                                                          
1384 Copinger, supra note 936 at 75. It should be noted that there were other cases that required a higher standard for 
originality. See Baltimore Orioles Inc v Major League Baseball Players Association, 805 F (2d) 663 (7th Cir 1986). 
Bridy, supra note 423 at 16. Bridy further offers that in this case, “the Seventh Circuit echoes Bell’s conclusion that 
novelty in the patent sense is not required in copyright law; however, the court pointedly teases apart the concepts of 
originality and creativity, thus departing from Bell’s unitary focus on originality and its conflation of two discrete 
constitutional requirements into a single criterion.” Bridy, ibid at 17. 
1385 Feist, supra note 440. 
1386 Gervais, supra note 440 at 961. 
1387 A telephone directory in which the names, phones and addresses are arranged in a simple (orthodox) alphabetical 
order. 
1388 Feist, supra note 440 at 345. 
1389 Ibid at 346; Durham, supra note 939 at 583. 
1390 Feist, ibid at 363: “As a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that 
possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity.” In addition, SCOTUS also opined that stating facts does not 
deserve copyright protection, Feist, supra note 440 at 347-8: “It is this bedrock principle of copyright that mandates 
the law's seemingly disparate treatment of facts and factual compilations. ‘No one may claim originality as to facts.’ 
... This is because facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one between creation and 
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Under UK copyright law the originality bar is very low. The CDPA provides that 
“copyright is a property right which subsists … in the following descriptions of work – (a) original 
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works.”1391 Hence, establishing originality requires that the 
work of the author is not a copy and that the work will be “the result of [the author’s] ‘labour, skill 
and judgment’” and constitutes an individual’s effort.1392 The UK’s originality standard does “not 
require original or inventive thought, but only that the work should not be copied and should 
originate from the author.”1393  
Bently and Sherman explain that “the amount of ‘labour, skill, and judgement’ must be 
‘substantial’ – or at least not trivial.”1394 However, labour by itself cannot satisfy the originality 
standard and “it is clear that the reason why tracing and photocopying do not produce original 
works is not that there is no labour; rather, it is that it is not the right type of labour.”1395  
In Walter v Lane,1396 the House of Lords granted copyright protection to a note-taking 
process because it “required an ‘industrious collection’ effort.”1397 In University of London Press 
Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd,1398 the court gave a basic, ambiguous definition of originality 
which required an author only to prove that the work is not a copy of something else. In Sawkins 
v Hyperion, the court stated that “a work need only be ‘original’ in the limited sense that the author 
                                                          
discovery: the first person to find and report a particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered 
its existence. To borrow from Burrow-Giles, one who discovers a fact is not its ‘maker’ or ‘originator.’… The same 
is true of all facts – scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day […].” 
1391 CDPA, s 1(1). There is no need for originality in entrepreneurial works (films, sound recording, broadcasts and 
typographical arrangements). 
1392 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 93; Dorotheou, supra note 423 at 85-93. See e.g. Ascot Jockey Club Ltd v 
Simons, [1968] 64 WWR 411, 56 CPR 122 (BCSC); Ladbroke, supra note 743. 
1393 Ibid, quotes Bookmakers Afternoon Greyhound Services Ltd v Wilf Gilbert (Staffs) Ltd, [1994] FSR 723 (Ch D.). 
1394 Bently & Sherman, ibid at 97. See also Merchandising Corporation v Harpbond, [1983] FSR 32.  
1395 Bently & Sherman, ibid at 98. 
1396 [1900] AC 539 (HL (Eng)) (discussed under “author” and not “original”); See also Morris v Ashbee (1868) LR 7 
Eq 34, and Kelly v Morris (1866) LR 1 Eq 697 as quoted in Gervais, supra note 440, footnote 51.  
1397 Gervais, supra note 440 at 958. 
1398 University of London Press Ltd, supra note 743. 
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originated it by his efforts rather than slavishly copying it from the work produced by the efforts 
of another person.”1399 
The UK’s “sweat of the brow” approach may not (and should not) endure foreseeable 
changes in copyright. As Vaver offers, “In deciding on originality, courts should realize the value 
judgment they are being asked to make: Has the author spent enough intellectual effort on the 
product to deserve protection from others’ copying it for his lifetime and another fifty years beyond 
that?”1400 I accede to Vaver’s notion of intellectual effort. Copyright should be awarded, from a 
normative perspective, only to creators that show an intellectual effort in their work. Mechanical, 
“simple” works should not reward the creator copyright protection, and we should not regard such 
works as original under copyright law.1401 
EU-UK relations were always difficult. ECJ’s rulings – most significantly Infopaq – 
“illustrate a certain British resistance to accepting CJEU jurisprudence tout court.”1402 Though, as 
Bently and Sherman offer, in Newspaper Licensing Agency v Meltwater, UK courts were inclined 
to adopt the EU Infopaq ruling.1403 Dorotheou views the situation differently, claiming that these 
decisions have not changed the UK treatment of originality, at least not yet.1404  
With the coming Brexit, it remains to be seen whether the UK will retreat to its laxer 
originality standard, adopt the EU model or formulate a new standard to bridge the differences 
                                                          
1399 [2005] 1 WLR 3281 at 3288. 
1400 Vaver, supra note 237 at 101. 
1401 It is true that in recent decades, copyright protection has been granted to authors and creators for what might be 
regarded as “simple” mechanical work. I do not oppose such decisions. However, the law, copyright included, is a 
living, breathing creature and, as our technology evolves, the law should evolve as well. In this regard, I submit that 
the new originality standard should incorporate more creativity-oriented criteria. 
1402 Ana Ramalho & Maria C Gomez Garcia, “Copyright After Brexit” (2017) 12 JIPLP 669 at 671; For a broader 
review on EU originality, see Rosati, supra note 750. 
1403 Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 110-1; [2010] EWCA Civ 890 at paras 19-22. 
1404 Dorotheou, supra note 423, refers to Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Meltwater [2011] EWCA Civ 890.  
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between the EU and the UK.1405 A return to the “skill, labour or judgment” standard “would depend 
as well on how UK courts will apply originality after Brexit.”1406 
Harmonization and integration among EU member states have always been considered a 
key objective in the EU’s aspirations to constitute a Eurotopia,1407 and “[d]uring the 1990s, it 
became clear that copyright was to play a pivotal role in this respect.”1408 Until not long ago, the 
development of copyright law was placed under the jurisdiction of the national law of each member 
of the EU.1409  
Concerning copyright protection, many argue that originality should play a significant role 
in harmonization among EU members.1410 However, there is no general standard for originality 
among members, and the originality concept varies between continental approaches and the UK’s 
“labour, skill and judgment” standard.1411  
The EU’s Software Directive provides the general guideline for EU originality, stating that 
a computer program would be considered original if “it is the author’s own intellectual 
creation.”1412 The Database Directive and the Term Directive address EU originality as well,1413 
                                                          
1405 Ramalho & Gomez Garcia, supra note 1402 at 670. 
1406 Ibid. Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss further argue that “it is possible that the U.K. courts would take 
the opportunity post-Brexit to depart from the 2009 Infopaq decision … [and] revert to a closed list of categories of 
protected works rather than the more generous open approach … This open approach might lead to copyright 
protection for controversial types of work such as perfumes; the U.K. could now resist any such evolution in 
protectable subject matter.” See Graeme B Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, “Brexit and IP: The Great 
Unraveling” (2018) 39 Cardozo L Rev 967 at 971. 
1407 David Vaver, “Copyright in Europe: The Good, the Bad, and the Harmonized” (1999) 10 Austl Intell Prop J 186. 
1408 Rosati, supra note 750 at 1. 
1409 The relationship between the EU and its members is not in the scope of this paper. See e.g. Irini Stamatoudi & 
Paul Torremans, eds, EU Copyright Law: A Commentary (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014). 
1410 Rosati, supra note 750 at 3. 
1411 Gervais, supra note 440 at 968. 
1412 Software Directive, supra note 641 at art 1(3).  
1413 Database Directive, supra note 1179 at art 3(1), states: “In accordance with this Directive, databases which, by 
reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author's own intellectual creation shall be 
protected as such by copyright. No other criteria shall be applied to determine their eligibility for that protection.” 
Term Directive, supra note 1014 at art 6, states: “Photographs which are original in the sense that they are the author’s 
own intellectual creation shall be protected in accordance with Article 1. No other criteria shall be applied to determine 
their eligibility for protection. Member States may provide for the protection of other photographs.” 
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using similar terms to the one that the Software Directive uses, emphasizing the author’s own 
intellectual creation. Reading the Term Directive in context brings Guadamuz to conclude that 
“not only does the author need to be human, the copyright work must reflect the author’s 
personality.”1414 
In the landmark Infopaq1415 decision, the ECJ, in reciting the Software Directive, held that 
this criterion applies to all types of copyright subject matter.1416 Infopaq provides a gloomy 
prospect for EU AI authorship. By adhering to a higher originality standard (even compared to 
other EU members) that is based on the author’s “own intellectual creation”, it is less likely that 
computer-generated or AI works would be deemed original in the near future.1417  
The ECJ has followed this decision in subsequent cases as well.1418 In Painer, for example, 
the court clarifies the meaning of “author’s own intellectual creation” by saying that “the author 
was able to express his creative abilities in the production of the work by making free and creative 
choices.”1419 In these cases, the ECJ has adopted a continental approach to originality based on the 
                                                          
1414 Guadamuz, supra note 422 at 178. 
1415 Infopaq International A/S, supra note 752. 
1416 Ibid. “[W]orks such as computer programs, databases or photographs are protected by copyright only if they are 
original in the sense that they are their author’s own intellectual creation.” 
1417 See, as an example, the UK decision stating that the EU standard has raised the originality standard: SAS Institute 
Inc v World Programming Ltd, [2013] EWCA Civ 1482. 
1418 See e.g. Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, supra note 757; Football Dataco Ltd, supra note 755 at para 38.  
1419 Painer, supra note 753 at para 89. In Painer, the ECJ debated whether the Term Directive originality standard for 
photographs includes portrait photographers. In para 91, the court explains how the photographer could express 
creative choices: “In the preparation phase, the photographer can choose the background, the subject’s pose and the 
lighting. When taking a portrait photograph, he can choose the framing, the angle of view and the atmosphere created. 
Finally, when selecting the snapshot, the photographer may choose from a variety of developing techniques the one 
he wishes to adopt or, where appropriate, use computer software.” The phrase “free and creative choices” was further 
developed in Football Association at para 98. The court held that sporting events “cannot be regarded as intellectual 
creations classifiable as works within the meaning of the Copyright Directive.” This means football games in particular 
since they “are subject to rules of the game, leaving no room for creative freedom for the purposes of copyright.” 
Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 100-101, pungently remarks that “[w]hile no doubt, to anyone who plays or 
watches football, the claim that there is no ‘creative freedom’ because of the constrains provided by the ‘rules of the 
game’ may seem misguided (so that absence of copyright in football matches may need to be explained in some other 
way), the court is making the important point that where creative choice is highly constrained by rules or functional 
considerations, the resulting ‘work’ is unlikely to be original.” 
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author’s intellectual creation not only for subject matters defined in EU directives (such as 
computer programs, databases, or photographs) but for other creative works as well.1420  
Under Canadian copyright law, the SCC determined in CCH1421 that for a work to be 
considered original, the work “must be more than a mere copy of another work.”1422 However, the 
work does not need to be creative “in the sense of being novel or unique.”1423 Hence, copyright 
protection requires proving “an exercise of skill and judgment.”1424 The decision, as Vaver 
explains, “required an intellectual effort that involved the exercise of skill and judgment beyond 
the mechanical or trivial.”1425  
The concept of originality in Canada has shifted from the traditional “sweat of the brow” 
standard toward that of “skill and judgement.”1426 The SCC refused to side with “either school by 
invoking a vision of the purpose of copyright as a ‘balance’ between ‘promoting the public interest’ 
and ‘obtaining a just reward for the creator’.”1427 However, former SCC Chief Justice McLachlin 
                                                          
1420 Rosati, supra note 750 at 4. 
1421 CCH, supra note 440. See Chief Justice McLachlin opinion at para 16: “I conclude that the correct position falls 
between these extremes [pure labour versus creativity]. For a work to be ‘original’ within the meaning of the Copyright 
Act, it must be more than a mere copy of another work. At the same time, it need not be creative, in the sense of being 
novel or unique. What is required to attract copyright protection in the expression of an idea is an exercise of skill and 
judgment. By skill, I mean the use of one’s knowledge, developed aptitude or practised ability in producing the work. 
By judgment, I mean the use of one’s capacity for discernment or ability to form an opinion or evaluation by comparing 
different possible options in producing the work. This exercise of skill and judgment will necessarily involve 
intellectual effort. The exercise of skill and judgment required to produce the work must not be so trivial that it could 
be characterized as a purely mechanical exercise. For example, any skill and judgment that might be involved in 
simply changing the font of a work to produce ‘another’ work would be too trivial to merit copyright protection as an 
‘original’ work.” Tele-Direct (Publication) Inc v American Business Inc, [1998] 2 FC 22, considered a reflection of 
Feist, supra note 440, in Canada, as stated by Gervais, supra note 440 at 973. 
1422 CCH, ibid at para 16. 
1423 Ibid. 
1424 Ibid. 
1425 David Vaver, “Copyright Defenses as User Rights” (2013) 60 J Copyright Soc’y USA 661 at 665. Vaver further 
explains that “[h]eadnotes, case summaries, and indexes qualified; minor editing and additions to the case reports did 
not.” 
1426 See e.g. Abraham Drassinower, “Canadian Originality: Notes on a Judgment in Search of an Author” in Ysolde 
Gendreau, ed, An Emerging Intellectual Property Paradigm: Perspectives from Canada (Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar, 2008). 
1427 Ibid at 140. Craig, supra note 489 at 129, states that “the Court made a considered choice to avoid the term 
‘creativity’, with its attendant civilian conceptions of authors’ natural rights and its romantic connotations.” 
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argued for a lower bar of originality than Feist, stating that “I would not, however, go as far as 
O’Connor J […] in requiring that a work possess a minimal degree of creativity to be considered 
original.”1428 The SCC might abandon the UK conceptual “sweat of the brow” standard but seems 
reluctant to “go all the way” in adopting the US creativity requirements.  
Israel’s originality standard inclines more toward Feist than CCH. Up until 2007, Israel’s 
copyright law was governed by the UK 1911 Copyright Act and, thus, Israel was considered the 
last “colony” to operate under the jurisdiction and influence of British copyright laws.1429 During 
that time, Israel’s Supreme Court had taken an activist role that eventually shaped Israel’s 
copyright perceptions; this enabled the formulation and adoption of a new Copyright Act and, 
subsequently, the departure from the imperial grip of the UK copyright regime.1430 
In 2007, Israel’s parliament enacted a new copyright law.1431 The 2007 Act does not define 
originality, stating that copyright protection “shall subsist in … original works which are literary 
works, artistic works.”1432 Hence, the Supreme Court decisions that precede the 2007 Act are still 
the most relevant source for understanding originality under Israeli copyright law. Birnhack, Neil 
Wilkof, and Joshua Weisman provide that “[a]ccording to the case law, a work is only to be 
regarded as original if (i) it originated with the author (as opposed to being copied), (ii) it embodies 
the author’s labor, and (iii) it is (minimally) creative. All three elements must be present.”1433 
In the landmark Interlego decision, the court rejected the “sweat of the brow” approach 
                                                          
1428 CCH, supra note 440 at para 22. 
1429 Zemer, Copyright Departures, supra note 1098 at 1054. See also Lior Zemer, “Authors and Users: Lessons from 
Outre-Mer’Mer” (2013) 25 IPJ 231; Michael D Birnhack, Neil J Wilkof & Joshua Weisman, “Israel” in International 
Copyright Law and Practice, supra note 1132 § 1[1][a] (reviewing the historical background of copyright law in 
Israel). 
1430 For further reading see Zemer, The Fall of the Last Imperial Copyright Dominion, supra note 1429; Zemer & 
Gaon, supra note 1121. 
1431 Israel Copyright Act, 2007 [2007 Act].  
1432 Ibid at art 4(a). 
1433 International Copyright Law and Practice, supra note 1132 § 2[1][b][ii]. 
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and adopted the US Feist model.1434 Former Chief Justice Meir Shamgar held that original “means 
that the creativity is the fruit of the creator’s intellectual effort, not that it is novel over existing 
works.”1435 In a later case, the court explicitly stated that Israel’s copyright law “accepted [an 
approach that] conditions copyright protection on the presence of a minimal degree of creativity 
and rejects protection of a work based purely on labour. This approach is based on the leading rule 
established in the United States in Feist.”1436 Not only has the originality definition not changed 
upon adoption of the 2007 Act, but a recent Supreme Court decision has re-embraced the Interlego 
Feist ruling.1437  
3.4.2 The “Enigma” Machine 
3.4.2.1 The Concept of Creativity  
The concept of creativity is important, perhaps essential, to the development of originality, and is 
actively debated.1438 Recent attempts to define creativity, however, have not proven sufficient and, 
“[f]or more than a century, the threshold for creativity has purposefully been kept at a minimal 
level.”1439  
                                                          
1434 CA 513/89 Interlego A/S v Exin-Line Bros SA, 48(4) IsrSC 133 [1994]. 
1435 Eran Liss & Dan Adin, Intellectual Property Law and Practice in Israel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
at 337. 
1436 CA 8485/08 The FA Premier League Ltd v Council for Sports Betting (25 January 2010) (Isr). See also CA 2790, 
2811/93 Eiseman v Qimron, 53 PD 817 [2000] (Isr). For further reading see Niva Elkin Koren, “Of Scientific Claims 
and Proprietary Rights: Lessons from the Dead Sea Scrolls” (2001) 38:2 Hous L Rev 458. 
1437 CA 7996/11 Safecom Ltd v Raviv (18 November 2013) (Isr) at para 35 (Justice Yoram Danziger’s opinion). 
1438 Helle Porsdam, ed, Copyrighting Creativity: Creative Values, Cultural Heritage Institutions and Systems of 
Intellectual Property (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2015); Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, The Systems Model of 
Creativity: The Collected Works of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (New York: Springer, 2014); Joseph P Fishman, 
“Creating Around Creativity” (2015) 128:5 Harv L Rev 1333; Mandel, supra note 414; Silbey, The Eureka Myth, 
supra note 414; Eva E Subotnick, “Originality Proxies: Toward a Theory of Copyright and Creativity” (2011) 76 
Brook L Rev 1487; Drassinower, supra note 442. 
1439 Boyden, supra note 714 at 380. 
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We consider a work creative “if it embodies some modest amount of intellectual labor.”1440 
Determining a “modest amount” is harder than it seems, though. Maybe we should apply Justice 
Stewart’s approach to obscurity, to creativity: “I know it [creativity] when I see it.”1441  
Margaret Boden observes that while we could disagree “about whether some ideas, or 
person, is creative” it would be hard to deny that “creativity does, sometimes, happen[s]” though 
how it happens is puzzling.1442 In seeking to define what is creativity, “[w]e shall see that creativity 
is not a single ability, or talent, any more than intelligence is. Nor it is confined to a chosen 
few.”1443 Indeed, defining creativity is difficult, as “creativity is not the same as novelty. A work 
may be indistinguishable from its predecessors, but still creative and original, so long as the 
similarity is ‘fortuitous, not the result of copying’.”1444 
 Developing creativity as a legal concept, as Nimmer suggested, “is purely a matter of 
policy.”1445 Shaping the concept of originality by adopting a higher creativity standard might be 
the right move, but we must approach the issue with caution, keeping in mind Justice Holmes’s 
warning in Bleistein that “it would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law 
to constitute themselves the final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations […] At the one 
extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation.”1446  
 Creative ideas, as stated by Kaufman and Sternberg, “must represent something different, 
new or innovative”, be “of high quality”, and be “appropriate to the task at hand or some 
                                                          
1440 Bridy, supra note 423 at 16-7. 
1441 Jacobellis v Ohio, 378 US 184 at 197 (1964). 
1442 Margaret A Boden, The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms (London: Routledge, 2004) at 11.  
1443 Ibid at 22. 
1444 Durham, supra note 939 at 584. Feist, supra note 440 at 345. 
1445 Nimmer, Nimmer On Copyright, supra note 1253 § 2.08[B] (2-84). 
1446 Bleistein, supra note 1018 at 251. See also Zahr K Said, “Reforming Copyright Interpretation” (2015) 28 Harv JL 
& Tech 470. 
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redefinition of that task.”1447 Robert Weisberg suggested we define creativity as “goal-directed”, 
in contrast to Durham’s1448 argument for an accidental “clap of a thunder” creation, which cannot 
be defined as creative.1449 
Gervais’ approach to legal creativity is based on the author’s creative choice, and “is not 
dictated by the function of the work, the method or technique used, or by applicable standards or 
relevant ‘good practice.’ Conversely, purely arbitrary or insignificant selection is still insufficient; 
a conscious, human choice still must be made, even though it may be irrational.”1450 As Gervais 
points out, however, one controversial element of the legal definition for creativity “is the 
exclusion of choices dictated by the function of the work. This, in fact, is very close to the test of 
‘practical inevitability’ in Feist: if function dictates the course to be followed, there is no room for 
creativity.”1451  
Kwall’s approach follows that of Gervais but taking a more practical path. Kwall 
recommends a statutory originality standard “that depends upon ‘substantial creativity’”,1452 but 
exempts certain subjects that are typically “characterized by low levels of creativity, thus raising 
the bar in a transparent manner.”1453  
                                                          
1447 James C Kaufman & Robert J Sternberg, eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Creativity (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) at the preface; Elliot Samuel Paul & Scott Barry Kaufman, eds, The Philosophy of Creativity: 
New Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
1448 Durham, supra note 939. 
1449 Robert W Weisberg, Creativity: Beyond the Myth of Genius (New York: W H Freeman, 1993). See also Robert 
W Weisberg & Lauretta M Reeves, Cognition: From Memory to Creativity (John Wiley & Sons, 2013); Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity: Flow and Psychology of Discovery and Invention (New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1996). 
1450 Gervais, supra note 440 at 975. It is interesting to mention Gervais’ views regarding the possibility of computer 
creativity. In his opinion, “the notion of creativity seems to be inexorably linked to the human mind. But what is 
creativity? The exercise of choice? Computers can and do ‘choose’ based on preprogrammed instructions; that does 
not make them authors.”  
1451 Ibid at 977. 
1452 Roberta R Kwall, “Hoisting Originality: A Response” (2009) 20 DePaul J Art, Tech & IP L 1 at 8 [Kwall, Hoisting 
Originality]. 
1453 Ibid.  
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Kwall’s statement that an “originality determination should not be made to depend entirely 
on the judge’s subjective perception”,1454 is in line with previous scholarship emphasizing the 
problems arising from judge’s injecting personal creativity biases into decisions.1455 In Kwall’s 
words, “I would prefer to see an approach that is more nuanced and capable of greater creativity 
in application.”1456  
Joseph Miller presents another approach:1457 Adopting patent law characteristics to define 
the creative segment of originality by “draw[ing] on patent law’s non-obviousness requirement – 
with its focus on departure from conventional wisdom as the mark of a protectable invention – to 
dissolve the sterile dichotomy between near-total abdication and orthodox aesthetics that Holmes 
posed in Bleistein.”1458  
Michael Madison’s approach to copyright is a mechanism for disseminating and producing 
knowledge.1459 He argues that “as creativity law, copyright is oversold. The ubiquity of copyright 
and the ubiquity of creativity suggest that society has more creativity than it needs … copyright 
should be reconsidered as a species of knowledge law.”1460  
As already introduced, Parchomovsky and Stein’s creativity model aims to “calibrate[…]s 
authors’ protection and liability to the originality level of their works.”1461 Under it, “authors of 
highly original works will not only receive greater protection, but will also be sheltered from 
                                                          
1454 Ibid. 
1455 Bridy, supra note 423; Craig, supra note 489 at 23-4: “According to Keith Aoki, the court’s conclusion [in Koons’ 
ruling] resulted from the polarisation of the parties in light of a particular vision of worthy authorship […].” 
1456 Kwall, Hoisting Originality, supra note 1452. 
1457 Miller, Hoisting Originality, supra note 1350. 
1458 Ibid at 463. 
1459 Michael J Madison, “Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge Law” (2010) 12:4 Vand J Ent & Tech L 817 at 
824: “Although creativity should not be excluded from copyright, copyright should be conceived primarily as a system 
for producing, distributing, conserving, sharing, and ensuring access to knowledge.” See also Jenny L Sheridan, 
“Copyright’s Knowledge Principle” (2015) 17 Vand J Ent & Tech L 39. 
1460 Madison, ibid at 820. 
1461 Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 427 at 1507. 
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liability if sued for infringement by owners of preexisting works.”1462 
In Feist, SCOTUS opined that establishing creativity “seems to require not just ‘work of 
the brain’ but an exercise of the imagination – the formation of a mental conception ultimately 
given tangible expression in a work of authorship.”1463 Creativity appears, rather, to require some 
“work of the brain,” or “intellectual labor”.1464  
Feist’s creativity concept might also hint at novelty. In Feist, a telephone directory was 
found to lack creativity for being “entirely typical”, “garden-variety”, and “an age-old practice, 
firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of 
course.”1465 The court added that establishing creativity requires a “spark of creativity” that might 
be “crude, humble or obvious”.1466 Criticizing the “spark” requirement, Clifford suggests that 
“creativity does not usually represent a startling break-through of new thoughts as, more often, it 
results from the reworking of pre-existing ideas and facts.”1467  
The court in Feist appeared reluctant to provide a clear definition for creativity, stating that 
“originality is not a stringent standard; it does not require that facts be presented in an innovative 
or surprising way” and that “the selection and arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or 
routine.”1468  
                                                          
1462 Ibid. “Conversely, creators of minimally original works will receive little protection and incur greater exposure to 
liability if sued by others.” It should be noted, however, that these early notions might already be true in the UK. See 
e.g. the seminal case of Kenrick v Lawrence (1890), [1890] 25 QBD 99 at 103-4: “[A]lthough every drawing of 
whatever kind may be entitled to registration, the degree and kind of protection given must vary greatly with the 
character of the drawing, and that with such a drawing as we are dealing with the copyright must be confined to that 
which is special to the individual drawing over and above the idea - in other words, the copyright is of the extremely 
limited character which I have endeavoured to describe.” 
1463 Durham, supra note 939 at 585. 
1464 Feist, supra note 440 at 347. 
1465 Durham, supra note 939 at 619. 
1466 Bridy, supra note 423; Feist, supra note 440 at 345. 
1467 Ralph D Clifford, “Random Numbers, Chaos Theory, and Cogitation: A Search for the Minimal Creativity 
Standard in Copyright Law” (2004) 82:2 Denver U L Rev 259 at 290 [Clifford, Random Numbers]. 
1468 Feist, supra note 440 at 362. 
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While the court distinguished the US’s approach to creativity – maintaining its importance 
in the originality equation – from the UK’s “sweat of the brow” doctrine. Feist does not, however, 
take the necessary extra leap to establish what creativity is, making it “virtually impossible to 
discern […] where on the spectrum between the surprising and the routine to locate the break 
between eligible and ineligible subject matter.”1469  
Feist stated that creativity is important for establishing originality1470 but was reluctant to 
define creativity beyond general remarks. It seems that the court only ended “the long division 
among federal circuits concerning the protection under copyright of factual compilations.”1471 
Clifford argues, for example, that following the decision, courts misinterpreted Feist’s language 
by “expecting a level of creativity worthy of Beethoven before the work will pass intellectual 
creativity.”1472 Canada’s Supreme Court in CCH tried to provide a clearer path to creativity but 
with little success. The SCC’s originality definition explicitly omitted requirements for creativity, 
leaving “skill and judgment and the omission of labour … to activities performable only by 
humans.”.1473  
In Part IV, I will offer my thoughts regarding the AI authorship standard. At this point, my 
vision for an AI authorship model includes creativity as an important criterion, in contrast to CCH.  
                                                          
1469 Bridy, supra note 423 at 19. Bridy further provides that “Feist’s unequivocal rejection of the routine and the 
mechanical does, however, implicitly place the work that machines do beyond the copyright pale, reinforcing the 
longstanding assumption from Burrow-Giles that purely mechanical labor is per se not creative.” For further scholarly 
critiques of Feist’s lack of creativity requirements see e.g. Leo J Raskind, “Assessing the Impact of Feist” (1992) 17 
U Dayton L Rev 331 at 334; Madison, supra note 1460. 
1470 Bridy, ibid at 20, explains: “It is not enough for … a work to be original only in the sense that it was not copied 
from another work. The court makes at least that much clear by casting creativity as a necessary (even if ultimately 
ineffable) component of originality.”  
1471 Gervais, supra note 440 at 951. 
1472 Clifford, Random Numbers, supra note 1467 at 289. 
1473 Perry & Margoni, supra note 779 at 7; CCH, supra note 440. 
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3.4.2.2 Creative Machines  
Creative machines pose significant challenges for originality. Any AI authorship standard would 
require establishing if interactions with machines could produce “a pattern of output that would be 
considered creative or original if done by a human being.”1474  
This part discusses a machine’s ability to express creativity. I do not address other 
intriguing questions such as a machine’s ability to appreciate creativity. This argument belongs to 
earlier parts where I discussed the Turning test.1475  
Machines and other computer programs are generating content – music, artwork and 
literature – that, would likely be considered original if produced by humans. Current originality 
standards, however, label machine creativity as inferior, slavish versions of human works. As 
Ginsburg and Budiardjo argue, “[n]o machine is itself a source of creativity … Every unanticipated 
machine output arises directly from some human instruction programmed into the machine.”1476  
Machine creativity could differ from human creativity and yet be creative itself. 
Furthermore, even in perceiving machine works today as unworthy of copyright protection lacking 
in creative design, future human perceptions might change to increase machine creation’s value 
(as happened with human creators that were only appreciated years after they died). 
The unequal treatment between machine and computer output is even more substantial in 
involuntary creations. The low bar for originality and creativity for human works was highlighted 
                                                          
1474 Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics and Information, supra note 628 at 72. 
1475 Boden, supra note 1442 at 16-17, explores these questions as part of her three “Lovelace” questions: (1) “whether 
computational ideas can help us understand how human creativity is possible” (2) “whether computers (now or in the 
future) could ever do things which at least appear to be creative” (3) “whether a computer could appear to recognize 
creativity.” 
1476 Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 58. They further explain, at 58-9: “[T]he resulting output, even if unique 
and completely unpredictable, is the direct result of the machine’s process, which, in turn, is inevitably the brainchild 
of some human developer or user.” 
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in the US’s Bell and Israel’s Qimron decisions. In Bell, Justice Frank remarked that “[a] copyist’s 
bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield 
sufficiently distinguishable variations.”1477  
In Qimron, Israel’s Supreme Court granted copyright protection to Qimron’s work – 
uniting and deciphering the pieces of the Dead Sea Scrolls – despite being no different from what 
a machine could do.1478 Undoubtedly, the court would have reached a different outcome under 
current legal standards if the same process would have been performed by a computer. 
Given expected developments in AI, we are likely to see more and more works that express 
random or involuntary creation without programmers dictating the parameters of such creation. 
These works would probably exhibit creativity, but I fear it would not be protected under the 
current standard of originality. As Boyden observes, computer-generated works with no human 
impact challenge copyright law in two ways: First, excluding a machine’s creation from copyright 
protection goes against the non-discriminatory principle in copyright law: “copyright protection 
should not depend on judicial determinations of artistic merit.”1479 Second, there is no need to 
prove a connection “between acts of authorship and the creative elements present in the work.”1480  
Recognizing machine creativity could also hasten the forsaking of romantic perceptions 
about creativity since, “[i]f the source of creativity is superhuman or divine, or if it springs 
inexplicably from some special human genius, computers must be utterly irrelevant.”1481  
Bridy further explains that “[i]f we define creativity as a quintessentially human faculty, 
                                                          
1477 Bell, supra note 1377 at 105. 
1478 It could be argued that Qimron added no creativity, only knowledge. See Qimron, supra note 1436. 
1479 Boyden, supra note 714 at 390. 
1480 Ibid. The courts ask, “as a proxy for creativity, only whether the putative author engaged in expressive activity, 
making choices, or judgements, or using skill; if so, then the court simply presumes, as Justice Holmes suggested in 
Bleistein, that there is ‘something’ in the work, somewhere, that is copyrightable.” 
1481 Boden, supra note 1442 at 16. 
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then computers can never be authors, and we can basically stop there. But if we define creativity 
alternatively as a set of traits or behaviors, then maybe creativity can be coded.”1482 Indeed, 
“creativity isn’t a special faculty, possessed only by a tiny Romantic elite. Rather, it’s a feature of 
human intelligence in general.”1483  
One of the reasons to avoid romantic perceptions about creativity is that, as with other 
human traits, we still do not understand human creativity. Many philosophers “argue that no 
naturalistic explanation of any of our psychological capacities is possible … In short, the 
philosophical respectability of ‘strong’ AI, and of cognitive science in general, is hotly 
disputed.”1484 Accordingly, arguments about creativity are difficult to prove.1485 
I argue that we can – and should – accept that machines can express creativity. However, 
not all machine’s (as not all human’s) output can and should be described as creative. As with the 
“missing something” arguments that seek to exclude AIs simply because of their inability to 
possess human elements, we should avoid adopting similar arguments regarding intelligence and 
creativity.1486 For example, when a program, like Microsoft Excel, “applies a known body of 
knowledge to solve problems with known solutions in a predictable fashion” it is not innovative 
or creative. However, when a machine “is given unpublished clinical data on patent genetics and 
actual drug responses, and tasked with determining whether a drug works for a genetic mutation 
in a way that has not yet been recognized” it should be considered innovative and creative and 
                                                          
1482 Bridy, The Evolution of Authorship, supra note 624 at 398. 
1483 Margaret A Boden, “Computer Models of Creativity” (2009) 30 AI Magazine 24. 
1484 Ibid at 33. 
1485 See e.g. Silbey, The Eureka Myth, supra note 414. 
1486 I presented these arguments in Part I chapter III(B). Wu, supra note 14 at 418-420. The “missing something” 
argument represent the search for consciousness, or a soul, as a requirement for personhood. And while an AI might 
be programmed to stimulate consciousness it would be difficult to determine if it is self-aware. Thus, as Wu, ibid at 
420, offers, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether self-awareness translates into the ability to create rather than merely 
reinterpret.” I do not agree with these assumptions – self-awareness and other obscure elements should not become 
the legal basis for originally.  
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awarded legal protection accordingly, human or non-human alike.1487  
Nancy Andreasen’s long study on human creativity might help us understand creativity 
better.1488 Andreasen sought to decipher this elusive mystery: What makes certain people more 
creative than others? Through brain scans and interviews, she examined creative people from 
different fields, which led to her establishing interesting conclusions about the creative human 
mind. 
Andreasen outlined earlier studies on intelligence and creativity, including Lewis Terman’s 
extensive IQ study.1489 Although Terman’s subjects grew up to become well established, having 
high salaries and a happy life, their high IQs did not predict high levels of creative achievement 
later in life. Only a few made significant creative contributions to society.”1490 Terman’s study, 
reinforced by subsequent research, refutes the connection between intelligence and creativity: 
High intelligence does not have a significant effect on creativity.  
Andreasen describes several alternative approaches to predicting creativity, in the absence 
of an intelligence-based explanation. First, is the “little c” approach: a quantitative assessment of 
creativity. The little c approach uses tests to score people’s capacity to be creative. For example, 
subjects would be asked to answer the question, “How many uses can you think of for a brick?” A 
person would score high results if he or she came up with many different responses (which the 
little c approach labels as a person with “divergent thinking”). Higher scores equal greater creative 
potential. Given the difficulties already discussed above in defining creativity, and that certain 
                                                          
1487 Abbott, Everything is Obvious, supra note 806 at 29. 
1488 Nancy C Andreasen, “Secrets of the Creative Brain” (July/August 2014), online: The Atlantic 
<theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/07/secrets-of-the-creative-brain/372299>. See also Nancy C Andreasen, The 
Creating Brain: The Neuroscience of Genius (Dana Press, 2005). 
1489 Terman’s study began in 1921 and consisted of 856 boys and 672 girls. His study is considered an important 
milestone in the human creativity quest. 
1490 Andreasen, supra note 1488. 
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assumptions about creativity must be accepted (for example that creativity can be measured using 
tests), the little c approach is a weak approach to creativity assessment.  
Second is the “duck test” where “if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it must be 
a duck”. This approach relies on a selective group of well-established, creative and accomplished 
individuals. However, as with the little c approach, the duck test is facing criticism due to its 
inherent subjectivity. The duck test relies on personal taste and is time-sensitive due to evolving 
standards and artistic value. Further, creativity might vary between different fields (e.g., creativity 
in the arts might not be equated with creativity in science or business).1491 
In searching for human creativity, Andreasen finds that “creative people [from both groups 
– scientists and artists] have shown stronger activations in their association cortices during all four 
tasks than the controls have.”1492 Andreasen explains that creative people are autodidacts, 
polymaths, and persistent. Their creativity happens in unusual moments like an afternoon nap or a 
shower. Creative people also seem to have a broad interest in many fields and areas and are 
adventurous risk-takers.  
Andreasen further establishes a connection between mental illness and creativity: “The 
creative subjects and their relatives have a higher rate of mental illness than the controls and their 
relatives do […] The most common diagnoses include bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety or 
panic disorder, and alcoholism.”1493 As Theseus said in Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream play, “The lunatic, the lover, and the poet Are of imagination all compact.”1494  
 While Andreasen’s studies explore human creativity, Boden focuses on machine creativity. 
                                                          
1491 Ibid. 
1492 Ibid. 
1493 Ibid. 
1494 A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act 5, Scene 1. 
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Boden offers a roadmap for machine creativity by distinguishing between psychological (P) and 
historical (H) creativity.1495 While P creativity “is one that’s new to the person who generated it. 
It doesn’t matter how many times, if any, other people have had that idea before”, H creativity “is 
one that is P-creative and has never occurred in history before.”1496 For example, Harold Cohen’s 
AARON program, which generates drawings, might be considered H creative.1497 However, even 
if it does, it might still not be considered creative under copyright standards. As Ginsburg and 
Budiardjo explain in analyzing AARON’s program: “[T]he ability of these machines to generate 
outputs ‘on their own’ does not justify the logical leap to the concept of “machine authorship’.”1498  
Machine creativity is inspired by the different ways in which human creativity occurs: 
combination, exploration or transformation. Combinational creativity means producing unfamiliar 
combinations of familiar ideas (creating collage or mimicry parrots). Exploratory creativity vests 
on “culturally accepted style of thinking, or ‘conceptual space’,” which “is defined (and 
constrained) by a set of generative rules” (style of painting or a national cuisine).1499 
Transformative creativity is altering the style or space by changing its defining elements, resulting 
in new ideas that could not be generated before. Boden prefers transformational creativity since 
“it can give rise to ideas that are not only new but fundamentally different from any that went 
before. As such, they are often highly counterintuitive.”1500 
  Combinational creativity is most complex for machines. AI can make novel combinations 
                                                          
1495 Boden, Computer Models of Creativity, supra note 1483 at 23. 
1496 Ibid at 24. i.e., novelty in patent law. 
1497 AARON is a computer-generated program that creates paintings with no specific instructions from its user (i.e., 
AARON chooses what colors to use, what figures to paint etc.). Given that AARON can create unique painting, using 
colors that even its creator wouldn’t use, it is considered H creative. Some of AARON’s works are available online at 
Cohen’s website <http://aaronshome.com/aaron/index.html>. 
1498 Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 70.  
1499 Boden, Computer Models of Creativity, supra note 1483 at 25. 
1500 Ibid. 
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from existing data. But it is difficult to “generate and prune these combinations in such a way that 
most, or even many, of them are interesting – that is, valuable.”1501 The challenge is that machines 
or computer programs lack human’s vast cultural and world knowledge that often is involved in 
the process.  
AI could develop innovative algorithms, like The Deep Blue program that beat Kasparov 
or the AI program that won the Chinese Go game. But no AI system today has the vast knowledge, 
developed concepts and richness of a human being. 
Explanatory creativity could be modified for AI if the relevant rules and styles are specified 
clearly on. Boden claims that in comparison to combinational creativity, explanatory creativity 
proved a greater success, as “the computer comes up with results that are comparable to those of 
highly competent, sometimes even superlative, human professionals.”1502  
Human scientists not only explored different fields and subjects, but also transformed these 
fields. Will AI be able to do that? 
I share Boden’s view that it is misleading to claim that computers can only follow strict 
programming code and instructions. A computer “can do only what the program enables it to do. 
But if its programmer could explicitly tell it what to do, there’d be no bugs – and no ‘world-class’ 
color prints from AARON surpassing the handmade productions of Cohen himself.”1503 By 
enabling randomness in its code and the ability to make changes, we could enable programs to 
exceed its original programming.1504  
                                                          
1501 Ibid. 
1502 Ibid at 27. 
1503 Ibid. 
1504 Ibid at 29, describes potential changes: “These changes are similar to the point mutations and crossovers that 
underlie biological evolution. Many evolutionary programs also include a fitness function, which selects the best 
members of each new generation of task programs for use as ‘parents’ in the next round of random rule changing. In 
the absence of an automated fitness function, the selection must be made by a human being.” 
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These changes and adaptations might not suffice to deem an AI creative, at least by human 
standards, but with progress in big-data and deep-learning, AI might develop ways to process 
different styles and vast knowledge,1505 and subsequently, as Boden opines, a “program may 
include rules for changing itself.”1506 Ginsburg and Budiardjo, however, are not convinced. For 
them even the “more sophisticated ‘learning’ models which we may not precisely understand or 
supervise … does not change … [the] initial conclusion that machines are not ‘creative’.”1507  
Boden, Andreasen, Abbott and others offer a broader view on creativity and intelligence 
and pose intriguing questions about developing creative AI and defining machine creativity. If we 
assume machine creativity might develop in a similar way to human creativity, then we might 
consider Andreasen’s observations on creativity.  
As I suggested, developing randomness and intuition in AI’s codes might produce similar 
results in human creativity. Herbert Simon, for example, concluded that since humans and 
machines share a similar decision-making process, intuition could – theoretically – be 
programmed.1508 For ethical reasons, we should not design AI with inherent mental illness, but we 
can try to impose certain traits associated with human creativity. 
Progress might be achieved when AI can process data from a broader spectrum of sources 
developing what I described in Part I – artificial general intelligence. A different observation might 
                                                          
1505 David Levy explains the concept of randomness and free will: “Manifestly computer do make choices, but does 
this mean that they have free will? After all, the choices made by computers are often explicitly determined within a 
program. But some decision-making mechanism employed in programs are capable of the same type of flexibility as 
those evident in humans, incorporating a balance between predictable choices determined solely by logic expressed 
within a program and the unpredictable choice of randomness.” David Levy, Robots Unlimited: Life in a Virtual Age 
(Wellesley, Ma: A K Peters, 2006) at 384. 
1506 Boden, Computer Models of Creativity, supra note 1483 at 29. 
1507 Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 63. 
1508 Herbert A Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative 
Organizations, 4th ed (New York: Free Press, 1997) at 139; Latar, supra note 32 at 23: “Whether we will be able to 
fully program intuitive processes and thus make an artificial brain that is as or more creative than the human brain still 
remains more if the realm of science fiction. A scientific answer will require scientific research of enormous scope.” 
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result from studies about intelligence and creativity. It seems that even if AI can surpass the Turing 
test and other criteria for intelligence, that does not mean AI would become creative under 
Andreasen’s terms; nor would it be able to achieve transformative creativity under Boden’s terms. 
Further, even if we could develop random patterns in AI, the courts might be reluctant to award 
copyright to random creations anyway.1509  
Alternatively, perhaps we should abandon the quest for creativity as part of the originality-
copyright standard both for human and non-human alike, and focus more on the process rather 
than the outcome – leaving less room for human objectivities and artistic taste. In this regard, 
maybe the right approach is to incorporate patent law novelty and non-obviousness requirement in 
lieu of creative elements. I will further develop these ideas in Part IV. 
The discussion I outlined in this chapter is fascinating, posing conflicting and intriguing 
issues concerning creativity. However, when addressing the legal boundaries of copyright law, 
which centred around the originality standard, one does not need to aspire for either Einstein’s or 
Picasso’s “eureka”.  
The legal definition for creativity is very limited and “a spark of creativity” – taking 
                                                          
1509 Bridy, supra note 423 at 11, explains, that SCOTUS was reluctant to establish whether random (unstaged) 
photographs can be considered for copyright protection; Durham, supra note 939. An interesting case is Meshwerks 
Inc v Toyota Motor Sales USA Inc, 528 F (3d) 1258 (10th Cir 2008). “Meshwerks insists that … its digital models of 
Toyota cars and trucks are sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection. Meshwerks’ models, which form the 
base layers of computerized substitutes for product photographs in advertising, are unadorned, digital wire-frames of 
Toyota's vehicles.” However, the court decided that Meshwerks’ “photos” were not original and hence did not deserve 
to be protected under copyright law, holding that “digital modeling can be, surely is being, and no doubt increasingly 
will be used to create copyrightable expressions. Yet, just as photographs can be, but are not per se, copyrightable, the 
same holds true for digital models. There’s little question that digital models can be devised of Toyota cars with 
copyrightable features, whether by virtue of unique shading, lighting, angle, background scene, or other choices. The 
problem for Meshwerks in this particular case is simply that the uncontested facts reveal that it wasn’t involved in any 
such process, and indeed contracted to provide completely unadorned digital replicas of Toyota vehicles in a two-
dimensional space. For this reason, we do not envision any ‘chilling effect’ on creative expression based on our 
holding today, and instead see it as applying to digital modeling the same legal principles that have come, in the 
fullness of time and with an enlightened eye, to apply to photographs and other media.” Section C. See also Lee, supra 
note 1350 at 925-933. 
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SCOTUS’ words in Feist – would satisfy originality in most cases and most countries. In other 
jurisdictions, originality could be established even with a smidgen of creativity or no creativity at 
all. However, this low creativity bar is for human creations only. Computer-generated and 
machines require a higher standard to be deemed creative. These approaches are not normatively 
justified, nor should we sustain these discriminatory standards for AI authorship.  
3.4.2.3 Intentionality  
On the outskirts of this discussion one issue remains – Should AI show intention in order to be 
deemed an author? And if so, how could we possibly prove AI intention exists? Wu suggests that 
intentionality is an important element for AI authorship: “If an AI cannot make value judgements 
… then perhaps something is missing.”1510 However, intention and randomness might not coexist. 
Thus, giving that randomness might prove important to AI creativity, the intent requirement for 
authorship should be reconsidered. 
 Lawrence Becker distinguishes between works of art and other labour that is not the 
product of an intellectual process. Becker suggests excluding “objects that we merely appropriate” 
(like picking strawberries), incidental discoveries or unintentional by-products (such as an 
unplanned child, Becker’s example not mine).1511 He suggests adopting a narrower conception for 
the mental elements that are involved in the labour process. A thing, Becker offers, can constitute 
authorship when it satisfies three conditions:1512 
“(1) its causal history is traceable to (or through) the intentional states of an agent or 
agents; (2) those agents, in the process of making their causal contribution to producing 
the thing, are also creating or realizing their mental representations of it; (3) those 
                                                          
1510 Wu, supra note 14 at 422. 
1511 Lawrence C Becker, “Deserving to Own Intellectual Property” (1993) 68 Chicagio-Kent L Rev 609 at 613. 
1512 Ibid. 
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representations either constitute the artifact itself (as when the ‘thing’ is an idea), or play 
a substantial causal role in its production.”  
Under condition 1, natural objects are excluded, while conditions 2 and 3 rule out mere physical 
labour and fruitful accidents. Becker’s conditions emphasize causality and intentionality as crucial 
elements for authorship, which are determined by the agent’s intentions and eventual mental 
representations.1513  
Following the Israel Supreme Court’s decision in Qimron, Nimmer offered to distinguish 
between intent to create a work and intent to create a work of authorship, arguing that only a work 
of authorship should be copyrightable.1514 Intentionality, Nimmer explains, is a vital part for 
authorship: “Copyright protection arises only for works that reflect an intent to produce something 
personal or subjective. By contrast, works that are objective, whether in fact or as presented, fail 
to qualify as works of ‘authorship’ in the copyright sense.”1515  
 Both Becker and Nimmer emphasize intent (or intent to create) as vital for establishing 
authorship. These positions, as I already explained, are difficult to reconcile with the current trends 
in machine creativity. Maybe in the future, AI will develop consciousness, which encompasses 
some level of intuition. However, this time might not come soon.  
In his work, Zemer raises similar concerns regarding collective intentionality by the 
public.1516 Zemer proposes observing the public “as having a collective intention to retain a right 
in every copyrighted entity.”1517 Indeed, any AI authorship model would have to either forsake 
                                                          
1513 Zemer, The Idea of Authorship, supra note 526 at 83. 
1514 David Nimmer, “Copyright the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality” (2001) 38 Hous L Rev 1. 
1515 Ibid at 161. 
1516 Zemer, The Idea of Authorship, supra note 526 at 85: “[T]he question whether the public qualifies for the intent 
element which both Becker and Nimmer advocate, and which I accept.” 
1517 Ibid at 86. 
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intent and causation requirements or shape its theories differently. As I already discussed, on the 
surface, it seems difficult to develop an AI creative program that would both perform randomly – 
which is an important element in developing machine creativity – and demonstrate intent.  
Causation might prove to be even more difficult to determine. I criticized the GDPR for its 
“right to explanation” for machine-learning algorithms, which is somewhat dubious in wording.1518 
Many programmers expressed concern about these obligations, claiming that machine-learning 
programs are intended to be sporadic and thus explaining that the process is considered a 
significant challenge.1519 If programmers cannot explain how the AI program achieved certain 
goals (as with the Chinese Go AI program) how can we prove causation for establishing 
authorship? 
 On the other hand, programmers might enable coding AI to aspire to create a work of 
authorship, i.e., coding the program to believe it is an author. However, even if this is possible in 
theory, given AI’s inherent “hive mind” and collective abilities (as I explained in Part I, we can 
                                                          
1518 GDPR, supra note 184, art 22 para 3, states that a data controller “shall implement suitable measures to safeguard 
… at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and 
to contest the decision”, otherwise a person has “the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated 
processing.” Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt and Luciano Floridi observe that the right to explanation is not 
required by the regulation: “Critically, a right to explanation is not mentioned … In all of the GDPR, a right to 
explanation is only explicitly mentioned in Recital 71, which states that a person who has been subject to automated 
decision-making: should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should include specific information to the data 
subject and the right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the 
decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision.” Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano 
Floridi, “Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection 
Regulation” (2017) 7 IDPL 76 at 79-80. However, Bryce Goodman and Seth Flaxman, suggest that “[t]he provisions 
outlined in Articles 13-15 specify that data subjects have the right to access information collected about them, and 
also requires data processors to ensure data subjects are notified about the data collected.” Bryce Goodman & Seth 
Flaxman, “European Union regulations on algorithmic decision-making and a ‘right to explanation’” (2017) 38 AI 
Magazine 6. However, in order to provide “meaningful information about the logic” (Article 13 para 2(f)) of the 
program, one must explain the way the program works and how the algorithms process the data. See also Sandra 
Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Chris Russell, “Counterfactual Explanations Without Opening the Black Box: 
Automated Decisions and the GDPR” (2018) 31:2 Harv JL & Tech 841. 
1519 Though recent research shown progress in explainable machine-learning, see e.g. DARPA’s Explainable Artificial 
Intelligence (XAI) project. David Gunning, “Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)”, online: 
<darpa.mil/program/explainable-artificial-intelligence>. 
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assume that any AI will share its knowledge with other AIs), individual intent would be even more 
tricky (i.e., to prove specific AI intention to create a work of authorship). Zemer’s theory for 
collective public intentionality could, however, be applicable to AI’s collective net.  
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PART IV: NEW VISION FOR AI COPYRIGHT 
“We can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be done” (Alan Turing) 
4.1 THE AI AUTHOR 
Who is the AI author? This question might be difficult to answer today. My dissertation offers 
several alternative paths to AI authorship. All are possible, and all could change the way we 
perceived our legal concepts and, subsequently, IP and copyright law. The AI author might turn to 
be very much like the human author: Expressing creativity in a similar manner and thus, as I have 
explained above, might be accorded the same legal protection as humans. 
We should not expect changes to be abrupt and sudden. Every day we encounter new 
innovative inventions and every day our computers learn to do something new. The process might 
be slow or fast. We could reach singularity within the next five, thirty or hundred years. I do not 
wish to engage in the futuristic discussion, my research aims to outline not only the legal 
consequences of an AI author but also what might happen along the development way. As people 
say, sometimes the journey is more important than the destination.  
Allocating legal rights to AIs for their creations seem unprobeable at our current stage of 
technological development.1520 As Samuelson and others suggested, in searching for the right 
model for AI ownership, legal scholars offer several alternatives such as the AI user-authorship 
model, derivative works, or WMFH doctrines. I discussed the supporting reasons for adopting 
those models in Part III. I also explained why some of these models are better than others.  
When I sat to write Part III, I had a very specific model for AI authorship in mind. At first, 
I thought computer-generated programs should be awarded authorship, albeit limited in scope, 
provided that its works are original and creative. I resented the fact that the concept of creativity 
                                                          
1520 As Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 57, recently observed: “[T]he concept of ‘machine authorship’ more 
reflects what we hope (or fear) artificial intelligence will eventually become than what it is today.” This statement 
might be true. Nonetheless, I do not share Ginsburg & Budiardjo skepticism for AI-Authorship.  
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within copyright’s legal standard is limited and, as a pro-public domain scholar, I thought that by 
awarding authorship to AIs, even early development of AIs (and subsequently limiting the 
programmer’s and user’s copyright), AI could also serve as a new social instrument for improving 
public access to works, music, and art.  
That was a very optimistic vision. Delving into the scholarly papers, my ideas took a 
different path. Given that AI is a very general concept (as I explained in Part I), crediting any 
computer-generated work as an AI (or AI author) is not the right approach at present. There is a 
bridge we must cross, and there are differences we must settle between diverse ideals for copyright 
and different legal structures among many countries and jurisdictions.  
 There are, however, several conclusions to be drawn at that point. First, a programmer AI-
authorship model is misguided and unwarranted – both from doctrinal and normative perspectives. 
There is no reason to provide programmers (or companies) the same copyright protection in their 
computer-generated or AI works. Programmers enjoy – and should continue to enjoy – patent 
rights (if eligible) for their creations and should be able to enjoy copyright protection for a limited 
time according to a more balanced model that takes the level of originality and sophistication of 
the program into consideration.  
Second, a user-authorship model for the interim period in computer-generated and pre-AIs 
stages is a more reasonable and prudent approach. I share Samuelson’s argument that the user is 
best positioned to deliver creations to the public and thus is more favourable for authorship at the 
current level of development. I also agree with Yanisky-Ravid’s view on the importance of users 
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in the next stages of development, which could serve as the “supervisors” of the AI program and 
thus more suitable for ownership, albeit partially.1521  
Third, on a theoretical level, joint authorship models between the programmers and users 
might be applicable as well. However, on a practical level, I do not think this approach is 
warranted. As I explained in Part III, there are many challenges in applying the joint authorship 
model for user-programmer. If a joint model is indeed necessary or wanted – licences are a better 
legal mechanism to implement such collaborations.  
Fourth, moral rights can serve as a supplementary legal mechanism to support AI 
authorship in the coming decade. I developed the moral rights model in Part II and III. I presented 
the advantages of assigning moral rights to AI or the computer programs on two levels. First, with 
computer-generated and AI automated creations (i.e., with no human influence), a limited set of 
moral rights (like the right of attribution and the right of integrity) could prevent falsification or 
exploitation of the digital works. Second, on the next level of development, when AI is able to 
create independently and express some level of awareness and maybe even attachment to its 
creations, moral rights might be justified on a normative level as with human authors. 
 Fifth, even if we do concede to one or two alternative models for AI authorship, there 
might be still works that would not be fitted to those categories. However, this outcome should not 
be considered as wrong, since those “authorless” works would serve a different and important 
purpose – strengthening the public domain.  
 Indeed, the answer to the question of who the author is, might be “Its complicated”. 
However, in bridging the legal history of computer development and IP we can provide some 
                                                          
1521 Under Yanisky-Ravid’s supervisory model, we can also limit the liability issues with AI infringements. 
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insights and predictions for the process of legal protection. As indicated, I share the understanding 
that we should not expect a significant shift in copyright within the next decade. Having stated 
that, I should also clarify that we should not read “significant” as “none”. On the contrary, I expect 
changes which would establish that any non-human creation is indeed worthy of protection even 
if created with no human influence. I believe that – either through the courts or by the legislators 
– IP laws will recognize any computer-generated output (that is considered original under 
copyright laws) as copyrightable per se.  
Ownership is a different matter though. I believe copyright laws should be amended to a 
user-favourable model, but I do not see that happening soon. I expect that in the coming years, the 
ownership model would remain pretty much the same. Eventually, however, a user-authorship 
model might be implemented as an interim legal mechanism for highly developed computer 
programs (though not yet AIs). This could happen in the next decade. 
In a practical sense, I do not expect significant changes to the current legal protection for 
computer-generated output. This outcome is not desirable and should be challenged. One way to 
enable a more inclusive approach to computer-generated and AI creations is to implement a data 
policy that would enable uses of computer-generated creations for the public. 
As I have outlined in Part III, data barriers expect to affect the development of AI and thus 
governments should consider exempting data for AI training purposes.1522 However, any such 
policy should also make sure to provide public access to AI creations that were created with these 
data. A different result would further strengthen the major corporations, as well as limiting 
competition and innovation in the field. 
                                                          
1522 IP Osgoode has recently advocated for creating a data exception in the Copyright Act. See IP Osgoode Submission, 
supra note 1089. 
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One possible solution I presented in Part III is to create a royalty-based system that can 
make sure that part of the revenue from AI companies and initiatives using the excepted data will 
benefit the public. However, tracking the data in the process might be very difficult and even 
unrealistic. 
There are also other concerns with establishing a royalty-based system such as with 
limiting user rights.1523 This is where new technologies might prove useful, as with the recent Earth 
Bank of Codes.1524 The project is using blockchain technology to map and classify biological data 
from every species and animal in the Amazon basin, coding their genetic sequences using 
cryptography on the blockchain. 
The blockchain data could be accessible to scientists and companies worldwide and, in 
theory, would enable the tracing of the data, thereby creating platforms for a fairer system of 
sharing and royalties. The Earth Bank of Codes project could be implemented on any data. Thus, 
for example, we could register books, songs, pictures and any kind of IP on the blockchain, creating 
a database for AI training purposes. 
In the next chapter, I will further develop the AI standard. I believe that adopting a new 
standard for copyright protection would serve copyright law better. Indeed, it is important to 
differentiate between the different levels of development (i.e., not any computer should be 
considered as an inventor or as an author).  
                                                          
1523 As I have explained in Part III, Articles 11 & 13 to the proposed Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive, 
supra note 1066, were heavily criticized for damaging the Internet community by limiting user rights and for stifle 
companies’ ability to sample copyrighted data. Eventually, article 13 was rejected by the EU parliament. 
1524 See Earth Bank Codes, online: <earthbankofcodes.org>. Blockchain technology is based on blocks (lists of 
records) linked using cryptography (which is a sort of mathematical method to secure communication): “A blockchain 
is quite literally like a giant spreadsheet for registering all assets, and an accounting system for transacting them on a 
global scale that can include all forms of assets held by all parties worldwide.” See Robert Herian, Regulating 
Blockchain: Critical Perspectives in Law and Technology (New York: Routledge, 2018) at Part I, blockchain. 
Blockchain should not be confused with Bitcoin, which is only one possible application of the technology. Blockchain 
provides numerous opportunities for both the government and the public sector. 
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4.2 FORMULATING AN AI STANDARD 
Building upon the last three parts, and the previous AI Author chapter, my next step is to revisit 
the copyright standard. In Part III, I outlined the scholarly originality debate. I argued that two 
important changes ought to be implemented (not necessarily linked to AI). One is a higher 
originality and creativity-based standard; the second is bridging the originality gap between 
jurisdictions. 
 There are several challenges in formulating a new standard for copyright. I addressed some 
of those challenges earlier. However, there are also a few ideas presented recently that could 
provide further insights that might enable a new vision for authorship. Further, it seems somewhat 
likely that, without a higher originality bar, recognizing AIs as authors might create an imbalance 
in copyright law given that more works would be awarded protection, dwindling the works 
available for the public to enjoy. 
4.2.1 Looking Back on the Doctrinal Challenges 
As suggested in Part II, computer programs and copyright have never been a good match.1525 In 
rethinking originality, we should distinguish between “simple” programs1526 and highly complex 
and creative programs. Not all programs are the same and not all should be considered original 
under copyright law. Copyright protection for basic programs “is not only a poor fit doctrinally, 
but also in many ways normatively.”1527  
Tailoring the right legal mechanism according to the levels of ingenuity and sophistication 
would benefit developments in the field. In considering changes to copyright standard, we should 
                                                          
1525 See the discussion in Part II, chapter III(A). 
1526 Programs that are created in a relatively short time, do not require much effort, and are technical in style and 
utilitarian (like program for mass production of cars) would not be considered highly creative. 
1527 Osborn, supra note 686 at 1341-2. 
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also account for the length of protection afforded to computer programs. I have suggested that the 
duration of copyright protection to computer programs should be limited. Further, we should also 
assign copyright for creative programs, even if the author or inventor of the program is not human.  
Indeed, as several scholars have suggested through the 1970s and 1990s, copyright law 
might not be the best legal doctrine for computer programs. Stephen Breyer offers several reasons. 
First, a significant difference between the production cost and the cost of copying “is not alone 
sufficient to show that copyright protection is desirable.”1528 Second, the computer program 
industry is flourishing without IP protection.1529 Third, no copyright protection is warranted due 
to the customized nature of programs, which were tailor-made for specific needs.1530  
Samuelson shows that Breyer’s conclusion is not far from the truth and most programs are 
developed in-house for custom users in modern times.1531 It is also important to point out Breyer’s 
claim that “much (but not all) systems software is now, and should continue to be, created by 
hardware manufacturers and sold along with their hardware at a single price.”1532 Many of these 
programs require “updates” and a user is “often buying services and expertise as much as he is 
                                                          
1528 Stephen Breyer, “The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer 
Programs” (1970) 84 Harv L Rev 281 at 344 [Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright]. Justice Breyer revisits his 
1970 paper in 2011 when he was invited to give a keynote speech. Stephen Breyer, “The Uneasy Case for Copyright: 
A Look Back Across Four Decades” (2011) 79 Geo Wash L Rev 1635 [Breyer, A Look Back Across Four Decades]. 
He remained loyal to his ideas, 1641: “The other thing I thought was fairly important is that people got mixed up in 
another way about why copyright existed and what the scope of protection is as a result. The original mixup, I think, 
started with King Dermott, who supposedly said, ‘to every cow her calf.’ Good point, as far as it goes. But many 
people somehow thought that could be their entire analysis of copyright. And you see that showing up even among 
the supporters of copyright term extension—people saying we own this work and therefore we have some kind of 
natural right to every penny that can be made from it. But of course no one else has that right. Teachers certainly do 
not; loads of people do not; hardly any worker does. And now I think that kind of logic is less prevalent.” 
1529 Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, ibid.  
1530 Ibid at 345. 
1531 Pamela Samuelson, “The Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights Revisited” (2011) 79 Geo Wash L Rev 1746 
[Samuelson, The Uneasy Case for Software].  
1532 Ibid.  
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buying a particular computer program.”1533 These conditions have not changed and are expected 
to become even more prominent in the future. 
The long-term (and much needed) relationship decreases the necessity of legal protection. 
As Samuelson suggests, “If no one but the developer of such software ever has access to a machine-
executable form of the program, copyright protection is arguably unnecessary.”1534 The 
characteristic mentioned above, along with the rapid progress of computer programs, which is 
probably only expected to become even more rapid in the future, weigh against the 
disproportionate length of copyright protection.1535  
 Setting aside the long-relationship subscription potential of computer-programs, there are 
also other technological measures that could secure programs in an effective way, making copying 
very difficult and, more importantly, not worthwhile. Contract law, trade secrets, patent law, and 
other technological means provide additional layers of protection.1536 And, as Menell explains: “If 
these means of protecting research and development are inexpensive and effective, then legal 
protection may not be needed to ensure efficient provision of the good.”1537 
4.2.2 Alternative Models for Originality 
My approach for a higher originality standard might seem like an attempt to nullify copyright 
protection for computer programs. It is not my intention. However, if eventually that would be the 
                                                          
1533 Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, supra note 1528 at 345. 
1534 Samuelson, The Uneasy Case for Software, supra note 1531 at 1779. 
1535 See also Osborn, supra note 686 at 1341: “The rapid obsolescence renders the majority of the software’s copyright 
term inconsequential: no one cares enough to copy the software after it useless.” 
1536 Though, as I explained in Part II, Alice made patenting (at least in the US) more difficult. I should also emphasize 
that I do not support strengthening trade secrets or contracts for computer programs protection. I only wish to argue 
that the current legal framework for computer programs offers extensive protection that might not be warranted. See 
Samuelson, The Uneasy Case for Software, supra note 1531. 
1537 Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, supra note 612 at 1339. 
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outcome, these programs probably should not have been protected under copyright law in the first 
place.  
Copyright made sense in an era when programming was based, to some extent, on literature 
codes. With advancement in technology where most of the coding does not necessarily require 
actual “writing”, this rationale might not prevail. Indeed, programming styles and methods are 
changing, and new environments “allow users to avoid directly typing virtually any code for some 
programs. Instead, they select icons that visually represent functions.”1538 
Formulating a new standard for copyright law requires a modular approach that would 
exclude simple programs (as well as mechanical “sweat of the brow” creations) from copyright 
protection. As I have explained, this does not mean that basic programs and slavish human works 
would not be legally protected – we could offer protection under a different legal mechanism like 
contract law and trade secrets. However, copyright protection should be reserved for creative 
creation only. 
I am aware of the difficulties in establishing creativity. As many have argued before, we 
would not wish for judges to decide what is creative and what is not. Legal protection should not 
be determined by artistic taste. I am also aware that my proposal might borrow more elements 
from patent law’s non-obviousness criteria for patentability. 
A different argument is that my proposal de facto nullifies copyright law since it might not 
be worthwhile to claim or pursue copyright protection. Again, I agree that that eventually might 
be the outcome. However, formulating the perfect balance between what can, and should be, 
protected and what should not, and cannot, be protected is complex. In my dissertation, I only wish 
                                                          
1538 Osborn, supra note 686 at 1356. This style of coding “abstracts the coding practice, removing it one or more levels 
from the literal code.” Though Osborn is skeptical whether these expected changes will change court’s decisions. 
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to point out several routes we could take to correct the flaws in our current legal framework. I am 
inclined to suggest a change in copyright law that would effectively exclude basic computer 
programs from copyright protection. Creative machine-learning algorithms and AI, on the other 
hand, would be able to copyright their creations if they meet the originality-creativity standard.  
Maybe the time has come to revisit Menell’s and Samuelson’s suggestions for sui-generis 
protection for computer programs once more.1539 Providing a thorough and detailed analysis of the 
economic and competitive implications that legal protection might have on the development of 
computer programs in the mid-1980s, Menell reached the conclusion that “there does not seem to 
be any economic justification for bestowing copyright protection on these products.”1540 He further 
suggests that “patent law is more appropriate” as a legal mechanism for protection of computer 
programs,1541 arguing for “creating a hybrid form of patent protection specifically tailored to 
accommodate the market failures endemic to the provision of computer operating systems.”1542 
Menell, too, is aware of the relatively short life span of computer programs, thus offering that the 
patent protection would be “shorter in duration than traditional patent protection.”1543  
Menell concludes that the hybrid patent protection would allow certain uses such as reverse 
engineering and “contain a flexible compulsory licensing provision.”1544 Menell wishes to promote 
innovation by adequately awarding protection for “truly innovative and useful operating systems.” 
He further explains that limiting the scope of protection under certain conditions, like “moderate 
                                                          
1539 Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, supra note 612; Pamela Samuelson et al, “A Manifesto 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs” (1994) 94 Colum L Rev 2308. 
1540 Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, ibid at 1359. 
1541 Ibid at 1364. 
1542 Ibid at 1365.  
1543 Ibid.  
1544 Ibid. 
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duration, reverse engineering, adaptation – and the provision for compulsory licensing”, would 
promote the industry.1545  
Menell’s statement that “legal protection should be significantly shorter in duration than 
traditional copyright protection” seems to support my earlier suggestion to limit copyright 
protection. And other suggestions to allow reverse engineering and compulsory licensing are 
compatible with Menell’s belief that “[i]n order to realize the benefits of networks externalities 
and to promote creativity in the integration of software programs, it would seem worthwhile to 
allow limited access to application programs, particularly those that emerge as industry 
standards.”1546 
 Indeed, as I have indicated in several parts, patent law might present a better model for a 
copyright standard for the next phase of technological development. In a recent paper, Abbott 
framed a new standard for patent law in the AI era which incorporates the expected changes in 
technology, making a new formula for both human and non-human patents – the inventive machine 
standard.1547  
As with AI authorship, an inventive machine “should be one which generated patentable 
output while meeting traditional inventorship criteria.”1548 Abbott argues that the source of the 
invention is irrelevant – whether it came from a human or a machine. He further contends that 
“[h]aving inventive machines replace the skilled person may better correspond with real world 
                                                          
1545 Ibid at 1366. 
1546 Ibid at 1371. 
1547 Abbott, Everything is Obvious, supra note 806 at 33.  
1548 Ibid at 27. 
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conditions.”1549 Abbott explains that once highly advanced machines – like IBM Watson – replace 
the average worker, the average worker would become inventive.1550  
In other words, when AI and highly advanced computers become the standard in the 
industry, capable of outperforming the human worker in any field, inventive machines would be 
the new standard, making the bar for obviousness higher in a way that simple machine and humans 
will no longer qualify as inventive.1551 Given AI unlimited potential, everything might be obvious. 
And if everything is obvious, nothing can be patented.  
Abbott’s argument is based on two propositions. The first pushes for amending patent laws 
to recognize computers as inventors. Today, this approach is important to encourage the 
development of inventive and sophisticated AI computers, which serve the patent system. Given 
that under the current legal framework a computer-generated patent is not patentable (since we 
cannot register a computer as an inventor), it is important to consider amending patent law so that 
AI’s programmers will be willing to invest the time and resources needed for the development of 
the field.  
The second, which is intertwined with other scholarly debates, is that in the future we might 
reach the point where patents might not be required to facilitate inventions or creations since both 
humans and non-humans would not require incentives to create.1552 This reasoning could apply to 
authorship as well. As machines produce more and more works, incentive theories might become 
less and less important.1553 Other scholars have echoed this statement recently, arguing that “IP 
                                                          
1549 Ibid at 29. 
1550 Ibid at 30. 
1551 Ibid. 
1552 Ibid at 39-40: “Once inventive machines set the baseline for patentability, standard inventive machines, as well as 
people, would generally be unable to obtain patents.” Though, patent might still be desirable in certain industries and 
for development of certain products (like in the biotechnology and pharma industries). 
1553 I have addressed these arguments earlier in Part II, chapter IV(A). 
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law applies [to digital creations] less than many believe, and its incentive is less necessary than 
many would expect.”1554  
In challenging the copyright standard, Boyden offers a different alternative for originality. 
Boyden argues for using tort law principles in copyright law – mainly the concepts of causation 
and predictability. A person should be assigned authorship in a computer-generated or AI output 
only if he could predict or foresee the output based on the development of the concepts of 
negligence in tort law. Under Boyden’s model, an author would be required to prove that “the 
output foreseeably includes a meaning or message that the author wishes to convey to his or her 
audience.”1555  
Like the foreseeability test in torts, establishing authorship would require assessing 
whether a reasonable person, “knowing what the putative author knew, would have tried to convey 
a given meaning to an audience through the computer program.”1556 The test should be “whether 
the putative author foreseeably communicated that meaning to the audience.”1557 A similar test 
was recently suggested by Ginsburg and Budiardjo to distinguish between upstream (i.e., the 
programmer) and downstream (i.e., the user) creators.1558 
Boyden’s suggestion is refreshing. His approach tackles one of the issues I addressed 
earlier, especially – the assigning of authorship (and copyright protection) of computer-generated 
works to the authors or owners of the program. Boyden’s approach would strengthen the relation 
between the author or programmer and the work. In cases in which the author or programmer (or 
                                                          
1554 Osborn, supra note 686 at 1306. See also Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, supra note 27. 
1555 Boyden, supra note 714 at 393-4: “When it comes to torts, the necessary foreseeability for negligence liability is 
whether a reasonable person, knowing what the defendant knew, would have perceived the risk.” 
1556 Ibid at 394. 
1557 Ibid. 
1558 Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 88. I have discussed their suggestin in Part III.  
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the designer) is able to explain the creation’s process – he or she would be assigned copyright. 
However, Boyden’s approach is limited to very specific computer programs and does not fit into 
my vision for a higher originality standard (as I do not think that simple creations – made by 
computers or humans – are worthy of copyright protection).  
Further, AI technology is based on the unpredictability of the outcome. This excludes 
authors, programmers, or designers – who neither explain nor foresee the outcome of the process, 
thus making Boyden’s model unsatisfactory for future technological developments which would 
incorporate machine-learning algorithms.  
Even if creators do need “some appropriability mechanism to recoup their costs to maintain 
incentives to create”, that does not mean that they necessarily need IP laws – contracts and other 
legal doctrines provide an alternative.1559 In the coming years, the computer program market is 
expected to face many changes. We can expect that most programs will be automated, presenting 
a very simple and utilitarian model for computer programs. Other programs might be more 
complex and tailored made for specific organizations, sellers or individuals. We can also expect 
more machine-learning based programs that will be able to express some degree of creativity.  
Lee presented a different approach to originality for the digital age. His suggestion could 
be applicable to AI and computer-generated works. Under Lee’s new digital originality formula, a 
“work must be (1) independently (2) created, and (3) possess at least a modicum of creativity.”1560 
Lee suggests bifurcating the phrase “independently created” (as in Feist) to emphasize individual 
contribution.1561  
                                                          
1559 Osborn, supra note 686 at 1337. 
1560 Lee, supra note 1350 at 936. The digital originality test slightly diverged from Feist two stages test which bridged 
between independently and created.  
1561 Ibid at 937: “[T]he pairing of the two concepts has obscured the meaning each respectively contributes to the 
notion of independent creation.” 
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This logic is actually better construed with earlier remarks concerning putting more 
emphasis on the process of the creation rather than the result in order to determine originality, as 
Lee noted, “Contrary to the analysis in Meshwerks, the independence requirement focuses on the 
process of what the person in fact did instead of the end product.”1562 This element of the test – “to 
highlight that the process of how the creator came up with the work is key”1563 – is subjective.  
The second part of Lee’s test is creating a copyrightable work, meaning – a work that falls 
under copyright subject matter. This part of the test is objective and focuses on the product itself 
(i.e., the outcome and not the process). As Lee further explains, although it seems that Meshwerks’ 
work could be considered a work given the human influence in the process, this element of the test 
could face difficulties with AI and computer-generated works, given the legal barriers to AI 
authorship that I have discussed in earlier parts. 1564 In this regard, Lee’s model is very limited in 
scope and does not offer an innovative approach for non-human creations. 
The third and last part is the modicum of creativity, which is also objective and focuses on 
the product and not the process. In confronting the weaknesses in Feist – most noticeably Feist’s 
reluctance to define what constitutes a creative “spark” – Lee draws some conclusions from the 
clues that Feist did provide for what could not constitute this spark: “(1) works that are so 
‘commonplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of course’ and (2) works that are ‘so 
mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever’.”1565  
Given that very few courts found works that actually fell below this threshold, Lee 
concludes that “courts need not engage in searching review for originality.” He calls for the courts 
                                                          
1562 Ibid. 
1563 Ibid. 
1564 Ibid at 945: “Had a computer program created entirely the wire frames of the Toyota car, the models arguably 
would not meet the second requirement of originality.” 
1565 Ibid at 943. 
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to apply a “generous approach to the originality analysis” and suggests that “probing questions on 
the level of creativity involved in a work are avoided unless the work is of doubtful creativity.”1566 
Lee’s conclusion seems to correlate with that of other scholars I mentioned earlier, such as 
Subotnick. 
4.2.3 Heightening Originality 
Low creativity and inventorship standards serve IP law poorly.1567 The alternative of raising the 
originality or inventorship bar is to establish that AIs are incapable of inventive or creative activity. 
The US Copyright Office, for example, has already ruled that non-human authors are not qualified 
for copyright protection.1568 As I explained in Parts I & II, I believe that disqualifying AIs works 
and inventions produces dire outcomes for innovations, hindering the development of technology, 
which will result in fewer inventions and fewer creations for the benefit of humanity. 
A different set of issues is whether raising the originality standard would benefit 
development in the AI field. While advocating for a higher standard might be considered 
reasonable for humans and AIs, some suggest that making changes to the copyright standard might 
cause more harm than good and would serve technological developments poorly. 
Osborn suggests that changes in programming methods make programs less eligible for 
copyright protection. He explains that programmers rely more and more on “default structures to 
do much of the coding, with the programmer simply filling in the blanks.”1569 This programming 
                                                          
1566 Ibid. 
1567 Abbott, Everything is Obvious, supra note 806 at 42: “Failing to raise the bar for patentability once the use of 
inventive machines is widespread would significantly exacerbate this anticommons effect.” 
1568 Ibid. 
1569 Osborn, supra note 686 at 1305. Osborn further explains the process, 1310: “The ‘programmer’ does not directly 
type the code, but rather selects icons that represents functions or selects from default structures based on commonly 
used features. The use then fills in certain parameters to actuate the function for her particular need.”  
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process for utilitarian programs “highlights how little authorship occurs in the textual level.”1570 
Osborn describes the copyright challenge in adapting these methods by comparing programming 
to cooking:1571 
“If simple ordering choices could constitute sufficient creativity, then even simple listing 
of ingredients would qualify for copyright protection. After all, one could list flour first and 
eggs second or vice versa. One could alphabetize the ingredients or organize them by 
weight. And yet, we are told that mere listings of ingredients are not copyrightable.” 
Adopting a higher originality standard, in the current level of computer development, might 
exclude these programs from copyright since the programmer’s “work” is too simplistic and 
technical. Consider Qimron’s work for example – a higher originality standard would no doubt 
have resulted in a different outcome in his case.1572 
 However, both doctrinally and normatively, adopting a higher originality standard might 
be the right approach after all. Several scholars have argued in favour of heightening originality. 
Diane Zimmerman, for example, views Feist as “half a revolution” given that “it neither gives us 
an originality standard with real teeth nor an explication of the core nub of copyright into which 
those teeth (were they to erupt) would be intended to bite.”1573  
Zimmerman argues that Feist’s decision reflected the court’s “dismay at the quantities of 
work of trivial merit that now receive lengthy and virtually airtight statutory protection.”1574 
Harrison and Joseph Miller also express similar notions, sharing some commonalities with the 
                                                          
1570 Ibid at 1310. 
1571 Ibid at 1322. 
1572 I discussed Qimron’s case in Part III, see Qimron, supra note 1436 and the text near supra note 1478. 
1573 Diane L Zimmerman, “It’s an Original!(?): In Pursuit of Copyright’s Elusive Essence” (2005) 28:2 Colum J L & 
Arts 187 at 202. 
1574 Ibid. 
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non-obviousness requirement in patents. As I have argued earlier, non-obviousness could serve as 
an alternative mechanism for originality in the AI era.1575  
Then again, perhaps we should forsake attempts to change the originality standard both for 
humans and non-humans, given Eva Subotnick’s argument that, “courts are ultimately doomed to 
fail in the quest to explain, in a satisfying way, how a work of authorship is original in and of 
itself.” 1576 Subotnick criticizes Miller’s and Harrison’s proposals, arguing that changing the legal 
standard for originality would result in raising the level of uncertainty in litigation and might distort 
artistic production.1577 Subotnick suggests that under the current copyright laws, a court can only 
identify originality through “proxies for the legal concept.”1578 Her paper focuses on photographs 
but can easily apply to other works, computer-generated included. Given what Subotnick describes 
as “the courts’ inability to reach originality in an unmediated fashion” and that a decisive account 
of the legal concept of originality is not within reach, the most practical approach is to leave the 
originality standard is it is.1579  
Subotnick also tosses cold water on the idea of raising the originality bar to incorporate 
more creative elements, arguing that this change would only “result in greater manipulation of the 
proxies, determinations based on judicial subjectivity, and/or undesirable distortions of behavior 
                                                          
1575 See Miller, Hoisting Originality, supra note 1318 at 477: “Our experience with patent law’s nonobviousness 
requirement suggests that taste is not the only measure of creativity. We can also assess creativity as a departure from 
that which is conventional, routine, or pedestrian. Rather than judge a work based solely on our own taste, we can 
judge a work by the ways in which the author’s individual voice stands apart from conventional expression.” See also 
the discussion near footnotes 1457 and 1350. 
1576 Subotnick, supra note 1438 at 1494. 
1577 Ibid at 1536-7. Subotnick explains, at 1537: “This uncertainty would result from an increased lack of predictability 
as to whether a work was creative enough to merit copyright protection at all.” 
1578 Ibid. Subotnick identifies three such proxies: ontology, narrative and comparison. The ontology proxy reflects the 
courts reliance on an existent work, implying that the work is original “merely if it is not a copy and sidesteps the 
creativity requirement.” The narrative proxy denotes the court’s use of a plaintiff’s authorial narrative to identify its 
work’s originality, “translating” the visual work into a legal text. The comparison proxy reflects the court’s method 
to establish originality by comparing between the work at issue to other works presented by the parties. 
1579 Ibid at 1495. 
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to comply with a legal rule.”1580 Heightening originality might also erode the potential income for 
creators from the low quality works they use to foster challenging creative works. 
To put this argument in the AI context: If we raise originality, excluding basic computer 
programs and computer-generated works, we will decrease programmers’ control and income from 
these works, making it more difficult to invest in more creative works. In other words, basic 
programs support highly creative and unorthodox programs.1581  
Maybe we should focus more on the process rather than the outcome, leaving less room for 
human subjectivities and artistic tastes. In that regard, Justice Holmes’s attempt in Bleistein to 
protect works “of little merit or of humble degree”1582 under copyright laws effectively reduced 
courts’ role as “artistic critics.”1583 As I have explained in Part III, Feist’s spark of creativity 
requirement did not prove to be of much use and, as Subotnick and others have argued, might only 
be used to “deny copyright protection to sufficiently creative works.”1584 
In considering early attempts to challenge originality in the digital era, the Meshwerks 
                                                          
1580 Ibid. She further explains why, at 1528: “First, heightening the originality bar might distort artistic production or 
increase judicial tastemaking. Second, rigorous policing of the scope of protection to which a work is entitled can go 
a long way toward alleviating the need to raise the originality threshold. Finally, any proposal to heighten the 
originality requirement should take into account the complex ways in which creators and industries finance the 
production of original, creative works.” 
1581 Ibid at 1549. 
1582 Bleistein, supra note 1018 at 251. 
1583 Subotnick, supra note 1438 at 1502: “The originality of a work under the Bleistein paradigm could be equated 
with its having originated with an author or, as Professor Diane Leenheer Zimmerman phrases it, ‘if it is not copied, 
it is original’.” 
1584 Ibid at 1507. See also Clifford, Random Numbers, supra note 1467 at 289-290. Clifford specifically stated that a 
higher degree of creativity, which Feist might promote, would result in the excluding of computer programs: “Rather 
than expecting a work to contain a ‘minimal degree of creativity,’ a significantly higher quantum of intellectual 
creativity is expected. What could be lost by this unrealistic expectation is that many of the average, mundane works 
that constitute a significant percentage of the expressive works developed and marketed will no longer be protected, 
making them economically unviable. Whether it is a typical computer program, a statue to be sold to a tourist, a dime-
store novel, or a series of bingo cards, the way that the intellectual creativity requirement is being formulated in the 
lower courts is problematic for insuring that sufficient incentives are available for the authors of these types of works.” 
As I have expressed earlier, this outcome is not necessarily unwarranted, at least for basic computer programs. 
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decision is probably one of the leading cases.1585 Though the 3D digital art in Meshwerks is inferior 
to AI works; it is still presents exciting and challenging arguments to be considered as part of any 
attempt to reshape originality. 
In short, Meshwerks created digital copies of Toyota’s cars by taking the cars’ 
measurements using a grid of tape that was processed to a computer. Meshwerks’ employees 
“sculpted” the images on the computer, in what the court described as an extensive stage.1586 In 
considering the new medium (i.e., digital creation), the court concluded that “Meshwerks’ models 
are not so much independent creations as (very good) copies of Toyota’s vehicles.”1587 However, 
as Lee noted, the court’s decision “is not a model of clarity” and its opinion “ambled between (1) 
originality cases involving photographs and (2) originality cases involving factual 
compilations.”1588  
There are several flaws in the court’s decision. First, the decision seems to follow the 
unequal treatment of digital and computer-generated works as slavish copies.1589 Lee further 
concludes that “[i]f the court’s analysis were correct, then every realistic pencil sketch of objects 
in the world, such as the kind Leonardo da Vinci was famous for, could never qualify for 
copyright.”1590  
                                                          
1585 Meshwerks, supra note 1509. For a more recent case, see Home Legend, LLC v Mannington Mills, Inc, 784 F (3d) 
1404 (11th Cir 2015).  
1586 Ibid at 1260-1: “Approximately 90 percent of the data points contained in each final model, Meshwerks represents, 
were the result not of the first-step measurement process, but of the skill and effort its digital sculptors manually 
expended at the second step.” The dispute arose when Meshwerks claimed that Toyota infringed its terms of use for 
the wire-frame models. In defense, Toyota argued that Meshwerks’ products lacked sufficient originality: “defendants 
argued that any original expression found in Meshwerks’ products was attributable to the Toyota designers who 
conceived of the vehicle designs in the first place; accordingly, defendants' use of the models could not give rise to a 
claim for copyright infringement.” 
1587 Ibid at 1264. 
1588 Lee, supra note 1350 at 927. 
1589 Ibid at 928. Lee pointed out that Toyota’s car could not be considered copies simply because “[i]t is a car – an 
uncopyrightable useful article.” He later explains, at 944, that “[t]he court based this reasoning on the mistaken 
premise that realistic depictions of things in the world are somehow impermissible ‘copies’ under Feist.”  
1590 Ibid at 929-930. 
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In equating digital modeling with photography, Lee argues that even if there are similarities 
in the end product, the process is different: “[D]igital modeling of wire frames involves extensive 
measuring, computer modeling, and then human sculpting of data points that may require 
considerable human input, skill, and judgement […].”1591 Moreover, using photography cases as 
the leading approach for digital originality would have resulted in a different outcome, given that 
“the prevailing approach is that virtually any photograph – even from an automatic, point-and-
shoot camera – satisfies the originality requirement […].”1592  
In the more recent case of Home Legend, the Eleventh Circuit reached a different 
conclusion concerning another digital work – the “Time Crafted Maple” design. Home Legend’s 
design is a digital copy of wooden planks that were selected and moulded to give an old “time-
worn” look. Like in Meshwerks, following the digital adaptation, Mannington’s employees made 
changes to the processed images. However, in Home Legend, the court distinguishes Meshwerks, 
stating that “by contrast, the evidence shows that Mannington did not have another work in mind. 
At most, it had in mind a genre: rustic flooring. It created a digital artwork in that genre. The 
creative work was all Mannington’s.”1593  
I find Home Legend more convincing and befitting to the user-authorship model that I have 
suggested. If anything, these decisions only reflect the challenges that courts and legal scholars are 
facing when applying copyright laws to new technologies.  
 
                                                          
1591 Ibid at 931. 
1592 Ibid. I believe this conclusion is true under Feist, and even more so under CCH. As for the EU approach, which 
is more human-oriented, I find it difficult to ascertain to which direction the courts might turn. 
1593 Home Legend, supra note 1585 at 1410-1411. The court further explains, at 1411: “And even if copyright did not 
protect the altered individual plank images, the Glazed Maple design is more than that. It is a compilation expressing 
original selection and creative coordination of elements. A compilation even of uncopyrightable elements is eligible 
for copyright protection.” 
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4.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
My dissertation sought to discuss AI implications for IP and copyright law. In Part I, I outlined the 
main issues and historical developments of AI technology, as well as addressed the conceptual 
challenge of the AI concept. In Part II, I further developed the theoretical IP discussion framing 
possible routes for AI-IP theory. Part III provided the central thesis for my dissertation considering 
the different models for AI authorship and discussing copyright standards for originality. In this 
part, I revisited some of my earlier ideas and questions, building upon my arguments and providing 
some considerations and conclusions regarding AI authorship.  
 My dissertation is only the first step of a long journey to understand machine creativity and 
AI better within a theoretical discussion in IP law. I have only aspired to provide possible 
directions, as well as to point out both the opportunities and the difficulties that would result from 
any suggested changes to IP laws. As I have already stated, I have faith in the competency of the 
copyright legal framework to withstand the coming storm. I also believe that there is so much more 
we can do to amend flaws in our legal systems. 
Indeed, the pace of technology is often too fast for our legal structures to adapt. Both the 
legislators and the courts are often too slow in making required changes. However, this is precisely 
what is expected from us in academia – to point out what ought to be changed and to voice our 
concerns offering alternative solutions. I hope my research was able to do this, albeit partially.   
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